United States v. Isabel Yero Grimon , 923 F.3d 1302 ( 2019 )

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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 17-15011
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cr-20221-JEM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ISABEL YERO GRIMON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(May 13, 2019)
Before MARCUS, GRANT and HULL, Circuit Judges.
HULL, Circuit Judge:
After pleading guilty, Isabel Yero Grimon appeals her convictions for
possessing 15 or more unauthorized access devices and aggravated identity theft.
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Defendant Grimon argues that the factual proffer supporting her guilty plea was
insufficient to establish that the unauthorized access devices she possessed affected
interstate commerce and, therefore, the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. The question presented is whether the district court has subject matter
jurisdiction over a criminal case to accept a guilty plea where: (1) the indictment
charges a violation of a valid federal criminal statute and sets forth the interstate
commerce element of the crime; (2) the factual proffer for the guilty plea states the
government at trial would prove that the defendant’s conduct affected interstate
commerce; but (3) the factual proffer does not contain any underlying facts
explaining how the interstate commerce nexus was satisfied.
After review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that the
interstate commence element in § 1029(a)(3) is not “jurisdictional” in the sense of
bearing on whether the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a
case, and thus the government’s alleged failure to prove sufficiently the interstate
commerce nexus does not deprive the district court of its subject matter jurisdiction
over Grimon’s criminal case. Thus, we affirm Grimon’s convictions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Arrest
On January 18, 2017, officers conducted a traffic stop of Grimon’s vehicle
after observing her swerving between lanes and determining, through a records
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check, that there was an active warrant for her arrest out of Texas. Grimon was
arrested on the active warrant, and officers conducted a search incident to that
arrest.
During the search, officers found 19 blank credit cards in Grimon’s vehicle,
16 of which were encoded with account numbers issued to 10 other persons.
Officers also recovered a thumb drive from Grimon, which contained 134 credit
card account numbers issued to other persons. Grimon admitted that (1) she knew
the blank cards were re-encoded with credit card account numbers issued to other
persons, (2) the credit card numbers on the thumb drive did not belong to her, and
(3) she was not authorized to possess those account numbers by their owners.
B. Indictment and Plea
In March 2017, a federal grand jury charged Grimon with (1) one count of
possession of 15 or more unauthorized access devices, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1029(a)(3) (Count 1), and (2) three counts of aggravated identity theft, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (Counts 2-4). Count 1 specifically charged
that Grimon knowingly, and with intent to defraud, possessed 15 or more
unauthorized access devices and that “said conduct affect[ed] interstate and foreign
commerce.”
In July 2017, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Grimon pled guilty to
Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment, and the government agreed to dismiss Counts 3
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and 4. In connection with her plea agreement, Grimon executed a factual proffer
detailing the offense conduct described above. As to all of the elements of Count
1, Grimon’s factual proffer stated that, had the case gone to trial, the government
would have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Grimon “did knowingly, and
with intent to defraud, possess fifteen (15) or more devices which are counterfeit
and unauthorized access devices, said conduct affecting interstate and foreign
commerce.”
At the change of plea hearing, Grimon confirmed, through an interpreter,
that she received a copy of the indictment and had an opportunity to fully discuss
the charges with her attorney. The government summarized the charges in Counts
1 and 2. In doing so, the government explicitly stated with respect to Count 1 that
one of the elements of the offense “is that the Defendant’s conduct in some way
affected commerce between one state and other states or between a state of the
United States and a foreign country.” Grimon then confirmed that she understood
the charges to which she was pleading guilty. The government also read the
factual proffer into the record. That proffer included a stipulation that the
government would have proven at trial that Grimon “did knowingly and with intent
to defraud, possess 15 or more devices which are counterfeit and unauthorized
access devices, said conduct affecting interstate and foreign commerce.”
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After this recitation, through an interpreter, Grimon agreed that the
government’s recitation of the facts was correct and that it could prove those facts
at trial. Grimon also confirmed that she had read and discussed the factual proffer
with her attorney before signing it. Grimon’s attorney stated that he was bilingual
and was able to translate the factual proffer into Spanish for Grimon, that he
explained the factual proffer to her, and that he was confident she understood its
contents.
Grimon pled guilty to Counts 1 and 2, and the district court accepted her
plea. The district court found that Grimon was “fully competent and capable of
entering an informed plea” and that “her pleas of guilty [were] knowing and
voluntary pleas supported by an independent basis in fact containing each of the
essential elements of the offenses.”
C. Sentence
Following a sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Grimon to 12
months’ imprisonment on her § 1029(a)(3) access device conviction in Count 1,
followed by a mandatory consecutive term of 24 months’ imprisonment on her
§ 1028A(a)(1) aggravated identity theft conviction in Count 2. Grimon’s total
sentence is thus 36 months’ imprisonment. At that time, the district court
dismissed Counts 3 and 4 of the indictment.
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Grimon now appeals her convictions.1
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Grimon argues that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over her offenses because the factual proffer (1) merely stipulated to
the interstate commerce element of her access device offense and (2) did not
contain any underlying facts showing that her possession of counterfeit credit cards
and account numbers affected interstate commerce. Grimon stresses that the credit
cards were never used.
The government responds that its indictment charged Grimon with violating
a valid federal statute, alleged an offense against the United States and, therefore,
invoked the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The government argues that
even if Grimon’s stipulation—that her conduct affected interstate commerce—was
an insufficient factual basis for the interstate commerce element of her offense, that
did not deprive the district court of subject matter jurisdiction to accept her plea.
Whether the district court had “subject matter jurisdiction is a question of
law that we review de novo even when raised for the first time on appeal.” United
States v. Iguaran, 821 F.3d 1335, 1336 (11th Cir. 2016).
1
On appeal, Grimon does not challenge the district court’s sentencing guidelines
calculations or the procedural or substantive reasonableness of her sentence.
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A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
“Subject matter jurisdiction,” which Congress bestows on the lower federal
courts by statute, “defines the court’s authority to hear a given type of case.”
United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828, 104 S. Ct. 2769, 2773 (1984); United
States v. Brown, 752 F.3d 1344, 1348 (11th Cir. 2014). In the context of federal
crimes, Congress has granted federal district courts original jurisdiction “of all
offenses against the laws of the United States.” Brown, 752 F.3d at 1348; 18
U.S.C. § 3231. As such, “[s]o long as the indictment charges the defendant with
violating a valid federal statute as enacted in the United States Code, it alleges ‘an
offense against the laws of the United States,’ and, thereby, invokes the district
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.” Brown, 752 F.3d at 1354; see also Alikhani v.
United States, 200 F.3d 732, 734–35 (11th Cir. 2000). An effect on interstate
commerce may be required for Congress to have authority under the Commerce
Clause to forbid the conduct and make it a federal crime in the first place. United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995). But if an
indictment itself alleges a violation of a valid federal statute, the district court has
subject matter jurisdiction of that case.
In contrast to subject matter jurisdiction, some federal statutes do contain
what is referred to as a “jurisdictional element”—that is, an element of the offense
requiring the government to prove that the defendant’s offense had some nexus
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with interstate or foreign commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Suarez, 893 F.3d
1330, 1333 (11th Cir. 2018) (“This statute contains a jurisdictional element—the
offense, in the case of an attempt, ‘would have affected interstate or foreign
commerce.’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a)(2)(D))). In this very case,
§ 1029(a)(3), under which Grimon was convicted in Count 1, contains such an
interstate commerce element. 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3). Specifically, § 1029(a)(3)
provides that whoever “knowingly and with intent to defraud possesses fifteen or
more devices which are counterfeit or unauthorized access devices . . . shall, if the
offense affects interstate or foreign commerce, be punished as provided in
subsection (c) of this section.” Id. (emphasis added).
Nonetheless, interstate commerce jurisdictional elements, such as
§ 1029(a)(3)’s, are not “jurisdictional” in the sense of bearing on whether or not
the district court has subject matter jurisdiction or authority to adjudicate the case.
See Alikhani, 200 F.3d at 735. Rather, the interstate commerce element is
“jurisdictional” only in the sense that it relates to the power of Congress to regulate
the forbidden conduct. See id.; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62, 115 S. Ct. at
1631 (indicating that interstate commerce elements are meant to limit the reach of
federal statutes to ensure the conduct they regulate falls within Congress’s
Commerce Clause powers).
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This Court has therefore explained that, when it comes to federal criminal
statutes requiring an interstate commerce nexus, the government’s failure to
sufficiently allege or prove the interstate commerce element does not deprive the
district court of its subject matter jurisdiction over the criminal case. Alikhani, 200
F.3d at 735. This Court in Alikhani reasoned that, while “[a]n effect on interstate
commerce may be required for Congress to have authority under the Commerce
Clause to forbid certain conduct,” that “does not imply that a district court faced
with an insufficient interstate-commerce nexus loses subject-matter jurisdiction of
the case.” Id. Stated differently, even if an indictment fails to allege sufficient
facts to support, or the government does not present sufficient evidence to prove,
an interstate commerce nexus, the district court still has subject matter jurisdiction
to adjudicate the case under § 3231, including, for example, the power to dismiss
the indictment for failure to allege facts showing the defendant committed the
charged offense. See id.; see also Brown, 752 F.3d at 1348-49 (discussing
Alikhani).
Here, Grimon makes the same argument this Court explicitly rejected in
Alikhani. Grimon asserts that because her stipulated factual proffer merely stated
that her § 1029(a)(3) offense affected interstate commerce, without providing
supporting facts to explain how her conduct affected interstate commerce, the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over her case. But as this Court
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explained in Alikhani, the government’s alleged failure to sufficiently establish an
interstate commerce nexus does not deprive the district court of its subject matter
jurisdiction under § 3231. See Alikhani, 200 F.3d at 735. All that was required for
the district court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Grimon’s case was an
indictment charging her with a violation of a valid federal law enacted in the
United States Code, and the indictment here did just that. See Brown, 752 F.3d at
1354. The indictment tracked the statutory language in § 1029(a)(3), charging that
Grimon:
did knowingly, and with intent to defraud, possess fifteen (15) or more
counterfeit and unauthorized access devices, that is, counterfeit credit
cards encoded with account numbers issued to other persons and credit
card account numbers issued to other persons, said conduct affecting
interstate and foreign commerce, in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Sections 1029(a)(3) and 2.
Whether that indictment sufficiently alleged, or Grimon’s subsequent factual
proffer sufficiently demonstrated, an interstate nexus is merely a non-jurisdictional
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as to that element of the offense and
has no bearing on the district court’s power to adjudicate her case or subject matter
jurisdiction. See Alikhani, 200 F.3d at 735. Thus, we reject Grimon’s claim that
the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to accept her plea.
B. Iguaran
We recognize that Grimon relies on this Court’s decision in United States v.
Iguaran, 821 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2016). But as we explain below, that reliance is
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misplaced. Iguaran dealt with a wholly different statutory scheme, which, unlike
§ 1029(a)(3), specifically requires the district court to make a preliminary
determination regarding subject matter jurisdiction—not just an interstate
commerce “jurisdictional element”—before proceeding with a case.
In Iguaran, the defendant pled guilty to a cocaine conspiracy offense under
the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”). Id. at 1336. Among other
things, the statutory text of the MDLEA “makes it a crime to conspire to distribute
a controlled substance while on board ‘a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.’” Id. (quoting 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), 70506(b)). Unlike the
interstate commerce element in § 1029(a)(3), this “vessel subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States” requirement in the MDLEA is “jurisdictional” in the true,
subject matter jurisdiction sense of the word. See id. Specifically, the MDLEA
expressly states that “‘[j]urisdiction of the United States with respect to a vessel
subject to this chapter is not an element of an offense.’” Id. (quoting 46 U.S.C.
§ 70504(a)). Instead, “‘[j]urisdictional issues arising under this chapter are
preliminary questions of law to be determined solely by the trial judge.’” Id.(quoting 46 U.S.C. § 70504(a)).
In light of this statutory language in the MDLEA, this Court has “interpreted
the on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” provision “as
a congressionally imposed limit on courts’ subject matter jurisdiction, akin to the
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amount-in-controversy requirement contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1332.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Consequently, for a district court to have
adjudicatory authority over a charge that the defendant conspired to violate a
substantive crime defined in the MDLEA, the government must make a
preliminary showing that the vessel was, when apprehended, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States. Id.In Iguaran, this Court vacated the defendant’s guilty plea because the district
court did not make any factual findings with respect to its subject matter
jurisdiction under the MDLEA, and the record contained no facts from which such
jurisdiction could be determined. See id. at 1337–38. We then remanded the case
to the district court for the limited purpose of determining whether subject matter
jurisdiction existed, after affording both parties an opportunity to present evidence
bearing on whether Iguaran’s vessel was subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States. Id. at 1338.
Though Grimon is correct that this Court held in Iguaran that parties may not
stipulate to jurisdiction, but rather only to underlying facts that bear on the
jurisdictional inquiry, that holding is simply irrelevant to her case. Id. at 1337.
Iguaran involved the MDLEA, where the statutory text made clear that
“jurisdiction” is not merely an element of the offense. See id. at 1336(“‘Jurisdiction of the United States with respect to a vessel subject to this chapter is
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not an element of an offense.’” (emphasis added) (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 70504(a))).
Iguaran, as explained above, dealt with a statutory requirement that was truly
“jurisdictional”—that is, without facts showing that Iguaran’s vessel was subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States, the district court in that case had no authority
to adjudicate his case. Id.Here, by contrast, § 1029(a)(3) did not require the district court to determine
that Grimon’s offense affected interstate commerce to have subject matter
jurisdiction. See 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3). Rather, the interstate nexus requirement
was simply one of several elements of Grimon’s § 1029(a)(3) offense that the
government had to prove. See id.; United States v. Klopf, 423 F.3d 1228, 1240
(11th Cir. 2005) (indicating that an effect on interstate or foreign commerce is an
element for offenses under § 1029(a)). Neither Iguaran nor any other case cited by
Grimon has held that this interstate nexus requirement is akin to the amount in
controversy requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 or to the jurisdictional requirement in
the MDLEA. And we squarely hold that it is not. So, whether the government
proved the interstate commerce nexus or failed to prove it, the district court still
had subject matter jurisdiction over Grimon’s case and her Count 1 conviction.
See Alikhani, 200 F.3d at 735.
As to her aggravated identity theft conviction in Count 2, Grimon’s statute
of conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), itself does not contain an interstate
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commerce element. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. However, because a conviction
under § 1028A is predicated on the unlawful transfer, possession, or use of a
means of identification “during and in relation to [an enumerated] felony
violation,” Grimon argues that, if the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the § 1029(a)(3) offense in Count 1, it likewise lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the § 1028A(a)(1) offense in Count 2. For the reasons
stated above, we reject Grimon’s jurisdiction claim as to Count 2 as well.
C. No Other Claim
As a final matter, Grimon’s brief on appeal did not raise any error or
argument other than the subject matter jurisdictional one addressed above. More
specifically, as the government points out, Grimon has not raised on appeal, and
has therefore abandoned, any claim or argument that the alleged insufficiency of
the factual proffer as to the interstate commerce element violated Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11 or rendered her plea unknowing or involuntary. See United
States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining that issues
not raised on appeal are deemed abandoned).
Accordingly, we do not address whether any alleged insufficiency in
Grimon’s factual proffer as to the interstate commerce element of her § 1029(a)(3)
offense invalidated her guilty plea. Because Grimon has raised no claim of Rule
11 error, we also do not address the government’s argument that the doctrine of
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invited error applies because Grimon agreed in her factual proffer that the
government could have established at trial that her conduct affected interstate or
foreign commerce.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Grimon’s two convictions.
AFFIRMED.
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