Schroeder v. Post ( 2019 )

Digitally signed by
Reporter of Decisions
Reason: I attest to the
Illinois Official Reports accuracy and
integrity of this
document
Appellate Court Date: 2019.04.16
12:12:56 -05'00'
Schroeder v. Post, 2019 IL App (3d) 180040
Appellate Court RUTH J. SCHROEDER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DOUG POST,
Caption Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. Third District
Docket No. 3-18-0040
Filed January 18, 2019
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Iroquois County, No. 17-L-12; the
Review Hon. James B. Kinzer, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on John A. Denton, of Godin, Denton & Elliott, P.C., of Momence, for
Appeal appellant.
Tony L. Brasel, of Bourbonnais, for appellee.
Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the
court, with opinion.
Justices Holdridge and McDade concurred in the judgment and
opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, Doug Post, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion asking the court
to reconsider its October 2017 order in a forcible entry and detainer action in favor of plaintiff,
Ruth J. Schroeder. In that order, the court awarded plaintiff possession of the premises and
damages in the amount of $62,726, which included $27,000 in holdover damages. We affirm.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 We take the following facts from the parties’ agreed statement regarding the evidence and
testimony presented during the October 2017 bench trial.
¶4 Plaintiff, defendant’s aunt, owned an undivided 75% interest of the approximately 200
acres of land in Crescent City, Illinois, that is the subject of this lawsuit. Her brother, Robert
Post, defendant’s father, owned the other 25% of the land. Defendant farmed the land on a
cash-rent basis for several consecutive years. When defendant failed to pay plaintiff the total
amount of rent due for the 2016 crop year (he still owed $6866) by October 2016, plaintiff gave
him written notice of termination of the lease agreement and demanded that he quit and deliver
up possession of the property on or before February 28, 2017.
¶5 Robert did not agree to terminate defendant’s farm tenancy. He instructed defendant to
continue farming the land even after defendant received plaintiff’s notice. Defendant
continued to farm the land during the 2017 crop year without plaintiff’s consent. During the
2017 crop year, defendant made no payments to plaintiff.
¶6 Following the parties’ arguments, the trial court awarded plaintiff possession of the
premises and ordered defendant to pay damages in the amount of $62,726 plus costs ($6866 for
2016 rent and $55,860 for 2017 rent). The 2017 award includes holdover damages pursuant to
section 9-202 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/9-202 (West 2016)).
¶7 Thereafter, defendant filed a motion to reconsider, asserting that the court erred in
awarding plaintiff (1) possession of the land that she did not prove belonged to her and
(2) double damages where defendant “mitigated damages, saved waste, and there was no
finding of bad faith” by continuing to farm the land in 2017. Following a hearing, the court
denied defendant’s motion to reconsider finding that Daugherty v. Burns, 331 Ill. App. 3d 562
(2002), controlled the outcome. The court also stated:
“And I also find that [defendant’s] behavior was sufficiently wrongful and not
sufficiently colorable to avoid the penalty aspect of the holdover statute. The penalty is
in there to keep people from holding over, and if there’s no penalty imposed here, any
tenant out there can simply say I’m not getting off the property. The worst that can
happen is I farm it for next year and have to pay the cash rent that I would have paid last
year despite the fact that perhaps insurance goes up 5 or 10 percent. So his behavior
here was sufficiently wrongful as I said and not sufficiently colorable to avoid the
penalty aspect of a holdover statute.”
¶8 Defendant appeals.
¶9 ANALYSIS
¶ 10 On appeal, defendant argues only that the trial court erred in awarding plaintiff holdover
damages.
-2-
¶ 11 Section 9-202 of the Code governs holdover damages. It provides:
“Wilfully holding over. If any tenant or any person who is in or comes into possession
of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, by, from or under, or by collusion with the
tenant, wilfully holds over any lands, tenements or hereditaments, after the expiration
of his or her term or terms, and after demand made in writing, for the possession
thereof, by his or her landlord, or the person to whom the remainder or reversion of
such lands, tenements or hereditaments belongs, the person so holding over, shall, for
the time the landlord or rightful owner is so kept out of possession, pay to the person so
kept out of possession, or his or her legal representatives, at the rate of double the
yearly value of the lands, tenements or hereditaments so detained to be recovered by a
civil action.” 735 ILCS 5/9-202 (West 2016).
Essentially, the holdover statute permits a landlord to recover double the yearly value of the
lands that a tenant “willfully holds over” after the tenant received written notice demanding
possession upon expiration of the parties’ lease. See id.
¶ 12 While the statute does not define “willful,” our supreme court long ago noted, “when the
lease ha[s] expired according to its terms, the holding over, although intentional, is not within
the statute, unless it was knowingly and willfully wrongful; that where the tenant continued to
hold under a reasonable belief that he was doing so rightfully, he does not incur the penalty.”
Stuart v. Hamilton, 66 Ill. 253, 255 (1872). “[A] tenant is not to be charged double rent under
the holdover statute if [he] remains in possession of the premises for ‘colorably justifiable
reasons.’ ” Wendy & William Spatz Charitable Foundation v. 2263 North Lincoln Corp., 2013
IL App (1st) 122076, ¶ 43 (quoting J.M. Beals Enterprises, Inc. v. Industrial Hard Chrome,
Ltd., 271 Ill. App. 3d 257, 261-62 (1995)).
¶ 13 We review a trial court’s determination regarding whether a landlord is entitled to holdover
damages under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. J.M. Beals Enterprises, 271 Ill.
App. 3d at 260; Hoffman v. Altamore, 352 Ill. App. 3d 246, 250 (2004). “A finding is against
the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the
finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.” Best v. Best,
223 Ill. 2d 342, 350 (2006).
¶ 14 After reviewing the record, we find that the manifest weight of the evidence supports the
trial court’s award of holdover damages. In Daugherty, the court held that a year-to-year
tenancy terminates “in its entirety once unanimous consent to continue the tenancy no longer
exists.” Daugherty, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 570. In other words, Daugherty made it clear that one or
more joint owners of property may terminate an oral lease agreement without the unanimous
consent of all joint owners. We find no reason to disagree with the Daugherty court.
¶ 15 Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff, a joint owner of the farmland at issue, terminated the
oral lease agreement by giving defendant written notice in October 2016. It is also undisputed
that defendant ignored plaintiff’s notice of termination and continued to farm the land during
the 2017 crop year while paying no rent. Based upon the evidence, the trial court reasonably
concluded that defendant had no reasonable belief that he rightfully possessed the land in 2017.
¶ 16 CONCLUSION
¶ 17 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Iroquois County.
-3-
¶ 18 Affirmed.
-4-