Strasburg Scooters, LLC v. Strasburg Rail Rd., Inc. , 210 A.3d 1064 ( 2019 )

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2019 PA Super 158STRASBURG SCOOTERS, LLC : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
Appellant : PENNSYLVANIA
:
V. :
:
:
STRASBURG RAIL ROAD, INC. :
Appellee :
: No. 1253 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered July 18, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Civil Division at No: CI-18-02906
BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED MAY 16, 2019
Appellant, Strasburg Scooters, LLC (“Scooters”), appeals from an order
sustaining the preliminary objections of Strasburg Rail Road (“Rail Road”) and
dismissing Scooters’ complaint with prejudice for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Scooters alleged that the manner in which Rail Road uses its side
tracks interferes with Scooters’ use of real property (“the Property”) that
Scooters leases from MarNik Holdings (“MarNik”). Scooters asked the trial
court to declare that Rail Road has “abandoned” the side tracks or, in the
alternative, to define the manner in which Rail Road may use the side tracks.
For two reasons, the trial court correctly determined that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over this action. First, under the Interstate
Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995 (“ICCTA”), 49 U.S.C.
§§ 10101-16106, the federal Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) has
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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exclusive jurisdiction over the “operation” and “abandonment” of side tracks.
49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(2). Thus, the STB has exclusive authority to decide
whether Rail Road abandoned the side tracks and the manner in which Rail
Road may use the side tracks. Second, Scooters failed to join an indispensable
party, MarNik, which had a direct and substantial interest in this action as the
owner of the Property. Accordingly, we affirm.
Scooters is in the business of providing guided scooter tours through
Lancaster County from the Property, which is located at 242 Gap Road in
Ronks, Pennsylvania (“the Property”). Complaint, ¶ 3. Scooters uses the
Property to store its scooters, train customers and otherwise operate its
business. Id., ¶ 4. The deed appended to the complaint demonstrates that
Scooters does not own the Property. Id., ¶ 4 & exhibit A. Instead, Scooters
leases the Property from MarNik, successors in interest to Crusemire &
Williams LLC. Id.
Rail Road, a corporation located at 301 Gap Road in Ronks,
Pennsylvania, is in the business of providing recreational rides and activities
to tourists and also provides freight services in sections of the railway not
abutting the Property. Id., ¶¶ 2, 5, 9.
On April 24, 2018, Scooters filed a declaratory judgment action against
Rail Road seeking relief relating to the right-of-way. Scooters did not name
MarNik Holdings as a party in this action. Scooters alleged that the Property
is subject to a right-of-way for the benefit of Rail Road’s property that was
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established in an 1897 deed to Rail Road’s predecessor in title. Id., ¶¶ 6, 8
& exhibit A. The right-of-way permitted
use [of] the tracks now lying on the premises formerly of Philip
Lebzelter, his heirs and assigns, as the side tracks, to place and
run engines and cars on the same, together with the rights and
privileges to enter upon said premises or repair tracks as often as
occasion may require, always acting with discretion and fairness.
Id., ¶ 7 (emphasis added). When the right-of-way was created in 1897, it
was used only for freight hauling services to local businesses, not for providing
pleasure excursions. Id., ¶ 9.
Scooters alleged that Rail Road abandoned the “predicate underlying
use” of the right-of-way by changing its business from freight hauling to
pleasure excursions. Id., ¶ 11. In addition, Scooters claimed that Rail Road
infringed on Scooters’ rights by
a. Parking its railroad cars on the right-of-way, thereby
substantially impinging on [] Scooters’ use of the Property.
b. Showing indifference to the safety of individuals utilizing []
Scooters’ property as demonstrated by a number of occasions
whereby the Rail Road has chosen to cause damage to personal
property of [] Scooters, rather than contact [] Scooters or
otherwise take steps to avoid same, which could have easily been
done. This includes, among other things:
i. Failing to notify the owners of [] Scooters, Marc Crusemire
and Nicole Mosuly, of exercise of its rights under the right-
of-way and hitting scooters parked on the parking lot of []
Scooters;
ii. Simply tossing personal property of [] Scooters aside
when the rail road chooses to do maintenance without
notifying [] Scooters’ management of its intent to do same;
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c. Showing indifference to possible damage to [] Scooters and/or
its customers, as evidenced by the exchange of correspondence
between the [] Rail Road relative to concerns voiced by []
Scooters.
Id., ¶ 12.
Scooters requested that the trial court “declare the right-of-way
benefiting [] Rail Road . . . abandoned and to extinguish same; or in the
alternative, to enter an order defining the parameters of the exercise of the
right-of-way by [] Rail Road.” Id., Prayer for Relief.
On May 18, 2018, Rail Road filed preliminary objections seeking
dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On July 17,
2018, the trial court sustained Rail Road’s preliminary objections and
dismissed the complaint. The court found that
Rail Road’s storage of cars and access to the cars using its right-
of-way over Scooters’ property falls within the definition of the
‘operation of side tracks’ [in the ICCTA] and [the question]
whether the Rail Road has abandoned its right-of-way by
abandoning the ‘predicate underlying use’ falls within the
definition of ‘abandonment of side tracks’ [in the ICCTA].
Trial Ct. Op., 8/30/18, at 4. The court ruled that STB had exclusive jurisdiction
to resolve the issue of abandonment. Id. at 4-5.
Scooters filed a timely appeal, and both Scooters and the trial court
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Scooters raises two issues in this appeal:
1. Whether the Trial Court erred in granting the Preliminary
Objections of [Rail Road] by finding that the Surface
Transportation Board has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction
over the request of [Scooters] that the Court interpret a private,
contractual obligation of the parties?
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2. Whether Trial Court erred in applying [ICCTA] to claims that do
not involve state or local laws or regulations affecting railroad
transportation?
Scooters’ Brief at 4. Both questions effectively raise the same issue: whether
the STB has exclusive jurisdiction over Scooters’ action against Rail Road.
Subject matter jurisdiction “relates to the competency of the individual
court . . . to determine controversies of the general class to which a particular
case belongs.” Green Acres Rehab. & Nursing Ctr. v. Sullivan, 113 A.3d
1261, 1268 (Pa. Super. 2015). “The want of jurisdiction over the subject
matter may be questioned at any time. It may be questioned either in the
trial court, before or after judgment, or for the first time in an appellate court,
and it is fatal at any stage of the proceedings, even when collaterally involved
. . . .” In re Patterson’s Estate, 19 A.2d 165, 166 (Pa. 1941). Moreover,
it is “well settled that a judgment or decree rendered by a court which lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the person is null and void . . . .” Com.
ex rel. Howard v. Howard, 10 A.2d 779, 781 (Pa. Super. 1940). The
question of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, by any
party, or by the court sua sponte. Grimm v. Grimm, 149 A.3d 77, 82 (Pa.
Super. 2016). Because jurisdiction is a pure question of law, our standard of
review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Id.The trial court held that the STB had exclusive jurisdiction over this
dispute under 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b), which provides:
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The jurisdiction of the [STB] over—
(1) transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies
provided in this part with respect to rates, classifications,
rules (including car service, interchange, and other
operating rules), practices, routes, services, and facilities of
such carriers; and
(2) the construction, acquisition, operation,
abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team,
switching, or side tracks, or facilities, even if the tracks are
located, or intended to be located, entirely in one State,
is exclusive. Except as otherwise provided in this part, the
remedies provided under this part with respect to
regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt
the remedies provided under Federal or State law.
49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (emphasis added). The “part” referenced in this
provision is Part A of Subtitle IV of Title 49, 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11908.
Federal courts have repeatedly held that Section 10501(b) preempts
state law actions concerning rail operations on the ground that the state law
actions are “regulatory.” For example, in B & S Holdings, LLC v. BNSF Ry.
Co., 889 F.Supp.2d 1252 (E.D. Wash. 2012), a landowner filed a state law
adverse possession claim seeking fee simple title to a portion of the railroad’s
property. The district court held that the ICCTA preempted this claim
“because not only would it interfere with railroad operations, but would divest
the railroad of the very property with which it conducts its operations.” Id. at
1258. Next, in Maynard v. CSX Transportation Co., 360 F.Supp.2d 836(E.D. Ky. 2004), a railroad acquired a right-of-way from the plaintiffs’
predecessors in title in 1902. The railroad later built a side track near the
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main rail line. The plaintiffs filed an action to prohibit the railroad from
blocking access to their homes by leaving trains on the side track for lengthy
time periods. The plaintiffs asserted that their action involved “the
enforcement of basic contract rights by a state court in matters where right-
of-ways were granted by land owners who kept certain crossing rights and
those rights are being violated.” Id. at 838. The district court held that ICCTA
preemption applied:
The side tracks at issue in this case are an essential part of [the
railroad’s] railroad operations and assist in providing rail service
to the AEP Kentucky Coal’s loading facility adjacent to Plaintiffs’
property. But for the side track, a train being used to transport
coal would have to stay on the mainline track, which would
interfere with the movement of commerce. The side tracks allow
the mainline track to be open for other rail travel, which enhances
the movement of commerce on the rail lines. Because of their
essential role, side tracks are a vital part of [the] railroad[‘s]
operations. Because it is [the railroad’s] construction and
operation of the side tracks in this case which give rise to Plaintiffs’
claims, those claims are expressly preempted by the ICCTA.
Id. at 842.1
1 See also Pace v. CSX Transp., Inc., 613 F.3d 1066, 1069 (11th Cir. 2010)
(state law nuisance claim preempted under ICCTA because remedy sought
would limit use or operation of side track); Friberg v. Kansas City Southern
Railway Co., 267 F.3d 439, 444 (5th Cir. 2001) (common law negligence
action for freight cars blocking grade crossing and limiting access to property
preempted); Cedarapids, Inc. v. Chicago, Central and Pacific R.R. Co.,
265 F.Supp.2d 1005, 1014-15 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (state court suit by lessee of
property, subject to railroad right of way, seeking injunction barring railroad-
lessor’s use of trackage in question and rescission of lease preempted);
Rushing v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 194 F.Supp.2d 493, 500–01 (S.D.Miss.
2001) (ICCTA preempts state law nuisance and negligence claims intended to
interfere with railroad’s operation of switchyard); Guckenberg v. Wisconsin
Central Ltd., 178 F.Supp.2d 954, 958 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (common law
nuisance action concerning switching of rail cars on side track preempted).
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Simply put, if an action falls within Section 10501(b)(1) or (b)(2)—if,
for example, an action concerns the “operation” or “abandonment” of side
tracks—the trial court must dismiss the action due to the STB’s exclusive
jurisdiction over the proceedings.
Here, Scooters’ complaint alleges that Rail Road infringed on Scooters’
use of its property by parking railroad cars on the right-of-way and damaging
Scooters’ personal property. Scooters further alleges that Rail Road
abandoned the predicate use of the right-of-way by changing its business from
freight hauling to pleasure excursions. Scooters asks the court to declare that
Rail Road “abandoned” its right-of-way or to “defin[e] the parameters of the
exercise of use of the right-of-way by [Rail Road].” Complaint, Prayer for
Relief.
Scooters’ request to find the right-of-way “abandoned” falls expressly
within Section 10501(b)(2), which provides that STB has exclusive jurisdiction
over “abandonment” of “side tracks.” Scooters’ alternate request for the court
to define the parameters of use of the right-of-way falls within Section
10501(b)(2) as well, because it concerns the “operation” of the side tracks,
once again a subject over which the STB has exclusive jurisdiction. Because
the STB has exclusive jurisdiction over both issues, the trial court properly
dismissed Scooters’ action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
There is a second and equally serious jurisdictional defect in this case:
Scooters’ failure to join MarNik, the owner of the Property, as a party. The
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failure to join an indispensable party is a non-waivable defect that implicates
the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Northern Forests II, Inc. v.
Keta Realty Co., 130 A.3d 19, 28-29 (Pa. Super. 2015). Failure to join an
indispensable party “should be raised sua sponte.” Barren v. Dubas, 441
A.2d 1315, 1316 (Pa. Super. 1982). Accordingly, we raise this issue even
though the parties and trial court did not.
A party is indispensable
when his or her rights are so connected with the claims of the
litigants that no decree can be made without impairing those
rights. If no redress is sought against a party, and its rights would
not be prejudiced by any decision in the case, it is not
indispensable with respect to the litigation. We have consistently
held that a trial court must weigh the following considerations in
determining if a party is indispensable to a particular litigation:
1. Do absent parties have a right or an interest related
to the claim?
2. If so, what is the nature of that right or interest?
3. Is that right or interest essential to the merits of
the issue?
4. Can justice be afforded without violating the due
process rights of absent parties?
In determining whether a party is indispensable, the basic inquiry
remains whether justice can be done in the absence of a third
party.
This Court has held that in a quiet title action, all parties who
claimed title to the property at issue must be joined as
indispensable parties.
Northern Forests II, 130 A.3d at 29 (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
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In Barren, we cited a number of decisions for the proposition that the
fee owner of land is an indispensable party to litigation over the right to use
and enjoy his property. We explained:
In Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Diamond Fuel Co.,
[346 A.2d 788 (Pa. 1975),] our Supreme Court vacated a decree
recognizing the existence of a disputed maintenance and repair
right of way because the litigants had failed to join the fee owner
of the servient tenement.
In the instant case there can be no question that the
fee simple owner of the servient tenement is an
indispensable party. The right to the use and
enjoyment of his property will be adversely affected
by any litigation involving the easement and,
therefore, he must be joined. The failure to do so
deprives the court of jurisdiction.
346 A.2d at 789. Similarly, when there is a dispute as to the
existence of an easement, all owners of servient tenements have
a material interest in the controversy and should be joined as
defendants, even though such an owner may have had no part in
the interference with, or obstruction of, the alleged easement.
Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 409, 411 (1953) (“Necessary parties
defendant to suit to prevent or remove obstruction or interference
with easement of way”). Cf. Huston v. Campanini, [346 A.2d
258 (Pa. 1975)] (persons to whom vendors allegedly sold
restaurant after declaring forfeiture and repossession from
plaintiffs were possible bona fide purchasers, and, therefore,
indispensable parties); Tigue v. Basalyga, [304 A.2d 119 (Pa.
1973)] (in suit to set aside deed allegedly obtained through fraud,
deceased’s personal representative was indispensable party);
Kelley v. Kelley, [] 115 A.2d 202 ([Pa.] 1955) (when
adjudicating interests in coal lands, all co-tenants are
indispensable parties); Biernacki v. Redevelopment Authority
of the City of Wilkes-Barre, [379 A.2d 1366 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1977)] (“Clearly, the owner of real estate is an indispensable party
to proceedings seeking transfer of the title to the property to
another and culminating in an order purportedly vesting title in
another. It would be difficult to imagine a darker cloud on one’s
title than that created by the court’s order in this case.”)
(condemnation case).
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Id., 441 A.2d at 1316-17.
The present dispute concerns the use of the right-of-way running
through property owned by MarNik. As the fee owner of the Property, MarNik
has a material interest in this dispute, and justice cannot be done in its
absence. Northern Forests II, 130 A.3d at 29; Barren, 441 A.2d at 1316-
17. This provides an additional reason for affirming the trial court’s order
granting Rail Road’s motion to dismiss.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 05/16/2019
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