State v. Baker , 2019 Ohio 2280 ( 2019 )

[Cite as State v. Baker, 2019-Ohio-2280.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
CLERMONT COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2018-06-042
: OPINION
- vs - 6/10/2019
:
CHEYANNE A. BAKER, :
Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM CLERMONT COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. 2012 CR 00111
D. Vincent Faris, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, Nicholas A. Horton, 76 South
Riverside Drive, 2nd Floor, Batavia, Ohio 45103, for appellee
W. Stephen Haynes, Clermont County Public Defender, Robert F. Benintendi, 302 East
Main Street, Batavia, Ohio 45103, Ohio 45069, for appellant
S. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Cheyanne A. Baker, appeals the decision of the Clermont County
Court of Common Pleas revoking her community control and sentencing her to 12 months
in prison. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On July 26, 2013, Baker pled guilty to possession of heroin in violation of R.C.
Clermont CA2018-06-042
2929.11(A). The offense was charged as a fifth-degree felony in accordance with R.C.
2929.11(C)(6)(a). The charge arose after Baker overdosed on heroin and nearly died.
Baker, however, was revived after paramedics administered Narcan. After regaining
consciousness, Baker admitted to paramedics that she was a heroin addict.
{¶ 3} On September 9, 2013, the trial court sentenced Baker to three years of
community control. The conditions of her community control required Baker to adhere to
the general rules and conditions of community control. This included a requirement that
Baker abide by all federal, state, and local laws. Baker was also required to refrain from
consuming or possessing any alcoholic beverages or illegal drugs.
{¶ 4} On May 24, 2016, a violation of community control affidavit was filed with the
trial court. This affidavit alleged Baker violated the conditions of her community control by
(1) failing to follow her probation officer's instructions; (2) failing to pay her monthly
supervision fee; and by (3) failing to refrain from using illegal drugs upon admitting to using
heroin earlier that month. The trial court held a hearing on Baker's community control
violations on June 14, 2016. Baker admitted to all three violations. But, finding Baker still
amenable to community control, the trial court continued Baker on community control
"extended from three years to five years."
{¶ 5} On July 21, 2017, a second violation of community control affidavit was filed
with the trial court. This affidavit alleged Baker violated the conditions of her community
control by (1) committing a fourth-degree misdemeanor offense and thereafter failing to
notify her probation officer of the same; (2) failing to report to the probation department as
directed; (3) failing to follow her probation officer's instructions; (4) failing to participate in
treatment and counseling as recommended upon obtaining an updated substance abuse
assessment; and by (5) failing to refrain from using illegal drugs. It was determined that
Baker had used illegal drugs after she tested positive for methamphetamine and fentanyl.
-2-
Clermont CA2018-06-042
Baker also admitted to again using heroin.
{¶ 6} On July 31, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on Baker's second community
control violations. Baker admitted to all five violations. The trial court then scheduled the
matter for sentencing. Four days later, on August 3, 2017, a supplemental violation of
community control affidavit was filed with the trial court. This supplemental affidavit alleged
Baker had violated the conditions of her community control by admitting to once again using
heroin. Appearing before the trial court the following day, August 4, 2017, Baker also
admitted to the supplemental violation.
{¶ 7} On August 29, 2017, the trial court held a sentencing hearing on Baker's
second community control violations. Still finding Baker amenable to community control,
the trial court continued Baker on community control for an additional five years. The trial
court also imposed a further sanction that required Baker to receive medicated assisted
drug treatment. Baker was also required to participate and successfully complete a drug
treatment program at a specified drug treatment intervention center.
{¶ 8} On October 12, 2017, a third violation of community control affidavit was filed
with the trial court. This affidavit alleged Baker violated the conditions of her community
control by (1) failing to report to the probation department as directed; (2) failing to follow
her probation officer's instructions; (3) failing to refrain from using illegal drugs upon testing
positive for methamphetamine and admitting to using heroin; and by (4) failing to participate
and successfully complete the required medicated assisted drug treatment.
{¶ 9} On January 22, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on Baker's third community
control violations. Baker admitted to all four violations. At a subsequent sentencing hearing
held on February 5, 2018, the trial court once again found Baker was amenable to
community control and continued Baker on community control for another five years. The
trial court also imposed an additional condition that required Baker to participate and
-3-
Clermont CA2018-06-042
successfully complete a drug treatment program from a specified drug treatment facility.
This included a requirement that Baker attend "all individual and group sessions and
medical appointments as they are scheduled by the staff of the treatment provider."
{¶ 10} On March 16, 2018, a fourth violation of community control affidavit was filed
with the trial court. This affidavit alleged Baker violated the conditions of her community
control by (1) failing to follow her probation officer's instructions and by (2) failing to
participate and successfully complete the mandated drug treatment program imposed as
an additional condition to address her addiction to heroin. Specifically, as it relates to that
additional condition, the affidavit alleged:
The defendant did violate Additional Condition No. 1 of the
community control entry * * * in that the defendant failed to
participate in and successfully complete all available
programming at the First Step Home and failed to comply with
all applicable rules and regulations of First Step Home.
Specifically, the defendant was unsuccessfully discharged * * *
for failure to follow the rules of the First Step Home. Upon the
defendant being informed of her discharge, the defendant left
the facility without permission and was considered Absent
Without Leave (AWOL).
{¶ 11} On May 9, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on Baker's fourth community
control violations. Although the record does not contain a transcript of this hearing, the
record indicates Baker admitted to both violations. Specifically, as the trial court stated in
its judgment entry, Baker admitted she had been unsuccessfully discharged from the
required drug treatment program for violating the facility's rules by coming into possession
of heroin when a drug dealer "who came to visit the defendant [at the drug treatment facility]
slipped heroin in her pocket." The trial court further noted that Baker "did not use the heroin
and flushed it down the toilet, but then after being discharged by the staff for allowing the
drug dealer to come into the facility she did not report to the Probation Department as she
should have."
-4-
Clermont CA2018-06-042
{¶ 12} On May 23 and 24, 2018, the trial court held a bifurcated sentencing hearing
on Baker's fourth community control violations. During this hearing, Baker informed the trial
court that she believed prison was the best option for her because she had "heard good
things about the programs that they have there in prison." The trial court advised Baker
that it did not feel that imposing a prison sentence was appropriate, but that "ultimately you
have the right to make choices, even if they're bad."
{¶ 13} Baker then moved the trial court to apply the 90-day prison term limitation
found in R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i). The trial court denied Baker's request. In so holding, the
trial court initially stated:
It's [R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i) that] limits the Court to imposing a
prison sentence on a felony of the fifth degree. At the time of
the violation – if somebody screws up and they don't do well on
community control or if they simply choose not to be on
community control any longer, like Ms. Baker, it limits you to 90
days, which is not a very rationale statute.
However, it does say that if the prison term is imposed for any
technical violations of the conditions of a community control
sanction imposed for a felony of the fifth degree, or for any
violation of law committed while under a community control
sanction imposed for such a felony that consists of a new
criminal offenses and that is not a felony, the prison term shall
not exceed 90 days.
{¶ 14} Continuing, the trial court stated:
As was discuss[ed] during the statement of facts in this case,
the community control violation involved Ms. Baker accepting
heroin from a known drug dealer that the [staff at the drug
treatment facility] says she allowed to come into the facility, who
gave her the heroin and she then – she didn’t use the heroin to
her credit, but she was in possession of heroin and possession
of heroin in the State of Ohio is a felony of the fifth degree no
matter what quantity it is. It goes up from a felony of the fifth
degree, depending on quantity, but an unspecified amount is a
felony in the fifth degree.
{¶ 15} Concluding, the trial court stated:
My finding is that it is not a technical violation and the violation
-5-
Clermont CA2018-06-042
in this case did involve the commission of a felony offense and
therefore I don't think the 90-day limitation applies and that's my
finding.
If you're going to find that that is a technical violation, then
there's no point – then you might as well just say you have to
send somebody to prison for 90 days with credit for time served
if – for anything because to me that's simply not a technical
violation and I will so find. So the prison sentence will be
imposed.
The trial court then revoked Baker's community control and sentenced her to 12 months in
prison.
Appeal
{¶ 16} Baker now appeals from the trial court's decision, raising a single assignment
of error for review. In her single assignment of error, Baker challenges the trial court's
decision finding the 90-day prison term limitation found in R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i) did not
apply.
Standard of Review
{¶ 17} As with all felony sentences, we review the trial court's sentencing decision
for a community control violation under the standard set forth by R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State
v. Ford, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2018-07-052, 2019-Ohio-1196, ¶ 9; State v. Marcum,
146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1. Pursuant to that statute, this court may modify
or vacate a sentence only if, by clear and convincing evidence, "the record does not support
the trial court's findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary
to law." State v. Harp, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2015-12-096, 2016-Ohio-4921, ¶ 7. A
sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial court "considers the
principles and purposes of R.C. 2929.11, as well as the factors listed in R.C. 2929.12,
properly imposes postrelease control, and sentences the defendant within the permissible
statutory range." State v. Ahlers, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-06-100, 2016-Ohio-2890, ¶
-6-
Clermont CA2018-06-042
8. This court may therefore "increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence only when
it clearly and convincingly finds that the sentence is (1) contrary to law or (2) unsupported
by the record." State v. Brandenburg, 146 Ohio St.3d 221, 2016-Ohio-2970, ¶ 1, citing
Marcum at ¶ 7.
90-Day Prison Term Limitation and R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i)
{¶ 18} "The Ohio Revised Code provides the trial court with several options for
punishing a community control violation." Ford, 2019-Ohio-1196 at ¶ 10. One of those
options is set forth in R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c). Pursuant to that statute, if the conditions of
community control are violated, or if the offender violates a law, or if the offender leaves the
state without the permission of the court or the offender's probation officer, the trial court
may impose a prison term in accordance with R.C. 2929.14 and 2929.15(B)(3).
{¶ 19} However, as provided by R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i), the imposition of a prison
term may be subject to a 90-day limitation. Specifically, as R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i)
provides:
If the prison term is imposed for any technical violation of the
conditions of a community control sanction imposed for a felony
of the fifth degree or for any violation of law committed while
under a community control sanction imposed for such a felony
that consists of a new criminal offense and that is not a felony,
the prison term shall not exceed ninety days.
Therefore, based on the language found in R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i), this court has held the
90-day prison term limitation applies only when the community control violation is a
"technical violation" or a non-felony violation of law. State v. Eckert, 12th Dist. Clermont
No. CA2018-06-038, 2019-Ohio-1289, ¶ 11.
{¶ 20} Baker argues the trial court erred by finding the 90-day prison term limitation
did not apply since the notice of violation affidavit at issue did not allege she violated the
conditions of her community control by committing a new felony offense. This, as noted
-7-
Clermont CA2018-06-042
above, was the basis upon which the trial court found the 90-day prison term limitation did
not apply. Therefore, according to Baker, because the notice of violation affidavit did not
allege that she violated the conditions of her community control by committing a new felony
offense, it was error for the trial court to find the 90-day term limitation did not apply when
it found "the violation in this case did involve the commission of a felony offense and
therefore I don't think the 90-day limitation applies and that's my finding."
{¶ 21} However, while not specifically alleging Baker violated the conditions of her
community control by committing a new felony offense, the notice of violation affidavit did
allege that Baker violated the conditions of her community control by failing to participate
and successfully complete a specified drug treatment program. This additional condition –
something that went above and beyond the standard rules and conditions of community
control – was directly imposed and specifically tailored to address and treat Baker's
addiction to heroin. Therefore, because Baker's participation and successful completion of
the specified drug treatment program was not merely an administrative requirement
facilitating her community control supervision, Baker's failure to participate and successfully
complete the required drug treatment program cannot be considered merely a "technical
violation" that would trigger the 90-day prison term limitation under R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i).
{¶ 22} This court addressed a similar argument in State v. Davis, 12th Dist. Warren
No. CA2017-11-156, 2018-Ohio-2672. In that case, the trial court sentenced appellant to
three years of community control after he violated the conditions of his intervention in lieu
of conviction by testing positive for methamphetamine and later by having
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in his car. Id. ¶ 3. The conditions of appellant's
community control included the standard rules and conditions as well as several "special
conditions." Id. One of those "special conditions" required appellant to complete drug and
alcohol treatment at a community-based correctional facility – "a substantive rehabilitative
-8-
Clermont CA2018-06-042
requirement which addressed a significant factor contributing to appellant's criminal
conduct." Id. at ¶ 18. Appellant, however, failed to complete the required drug and alcohol
treatment after voluntarily signing himself out of the facility. Id. at ¶ 4.
{¶ 23} In Davis, appellant admitted that voluntarily signing himself out of the facility
was a violation of one of the "special conditions" imposed as part of his community control.
Appellant nevertheless argued that his failure to complete the required drug and alcohol
treatment was merely technical in nature. Id. at ¶ 16. We disagreed with appellant's
position upon finding his failure to complete the required drug and alcohol treatment was
not a "standard term of community control[.]" Id. at ¶ 17. This court instead found
appellant's failure was a violation of a "special condition of community control directly
imposed by the trial court and specifically tailored to address and treat appellant's
substance abuse issues." Id. Therefore, as this court held in Davis, appellant's
unsuccessful discharge from the community-based correctional facility predicated on
unacceptable conduct of her own choosing, "cannot be considered a technical violation of
community control." Id. at ¶ 18.
{¶ 24} This court's holding in Davis is analogous to the case at bar. Just like in Davis,
the trial court in this case imposed an additional condition that required Baker to participate
and successfully complete a specified drug treatment program to address and treat her
addiction to heroin. As alleged in the fourth notice of violation affidavit filed with the trial
court, Baker admitted that she failed to participate and successfully complete this additional
condition by failing to follow the facilities rules by coming into possession of heroin and by
leaving the facility without permission. This violation – just like the violation at issue in Davis
– cannot be considered a mere "technical violation" of the conditions of community control.
Id. at ¶ 18; see also State v. Blake, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 18CA6, 2018-Ohio-5413, ¶ 11
(failure to complete substance abuse treatment at community-based correctional facility
-9-
Clermont CA2018-06-042
was a "special condition of community control" and not a technical violation); State v.
Mannah, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 17-CA-54, 2018-Ohio-4219, ¶ 14-15 (failure to complete
drug treatment at community-based correctional facility was a specifically tailored
substantive rehabilitative requirement and not a technical violation).
{¶ 25} In so holding, we note that although not made part of the trial court's rationale,
Baker argues the trial court would have erred if it had found the 90-day prison term limitation
did not apply because she admitted to violating more than one of the conditions of her
community control. Specifically, Baker argues she should not be precluded from the 90-
day prison limitation found in R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i) "merely because she had two
technical violations of her community control sanctions." But, as discussed more fully
above, Baker did not have "two technical violations" of the conditions of her community
control. Baker instead had one arguably "technical violation" by failing to follow her
probation officer's instructions and one "non-technical violation" by failing to participate and
successfully complete a specified drug treatment program, an additional condition that was
imposed by the trial court to address her addiction to heroin.1
Conclusion
{¶ 26} The trial court did not err by sentencing Baker to 12 months in prison upon
finding the 90-day prison term limitation found in R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i) did not apply. This
is because, as noted above, Baker admitted to committing a non-technical violation of the
conditions of her community control by failing to participate and successfully complete a
specified drug treatment program to address her addiction to heroin. In reaching this
1. According to the trial court's entry, Baker admitted that she violated the condition of her community control
that required her to follow her probation officer's instructions by "continually absconding from that
supervision[.]" Although the question of whether that violation could be considered merely technical is not
subject to review as part of this appeal, we note that the Sixth District Court of Appeals has determined that
an appellant absconding from reporting to his probation officer "was not a 'technical violation' pursuant to R.C.
2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i)." State v. Calhoun, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-17-067, 2019-Ohio-228, ¶ 33.
- 10 -
Clermont CA2018-06-042
decision, we note that while the trial court found the 90-day prison term limitation did not
apply because she committed a new felony offense, "[i]t is well-established that an appellate
court will not reverse a judgment that is based on erroneous reasoning if that judgment is
otherwise correct, that is, it achieves the right result for the wrong reason." State v. Adams,
12th Dist. Butler No. CA2010-12-321, 2011-Ohio-1721, ¶ 22. Therefore, finding no merit to
any of the arguments raised herein, Baker's single assignment of error lacks merit and is
overruled.
{¶ 27} Judgment affirmed.
HENDRICKSON, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.
- 11 -