In re E.H. , 2019 Ohio 2572 ( 2019 )


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  • [Cite as In re E.H., 
    2019-Ohio-2572
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    IN RE E.H.
    :           No. 107614
    A Minor Child                                 :
    :
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 27, 2019
    Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Juvenile Division
    Case No. DL-17119186
    Appearances:
    Mark A. Stanton, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
    Britta M. Barthol, Assistant Public Defender, for
    appellant.
    Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
    Attorney, and Michael A. Short, Assistant Prosecuting
    Attorney, for appellee.
    MARY J. BOYLE, J.:
    Defendant-appellant, E.H., appeals the trial court’s judgment
    denying his motion to suppress and his delinquency adjudication for criminal
    trespassing. He raises two assignments of error for our review:
    The trial court erred when it adopted the magistrate’s order denying
    the appellant’s motion to suppress evidence.
    The evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding
    beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of criminal
    trespass.
    Finding no merit to his arguments, we affirm.
    I. Procedural History and Factual Background
    In December 2017, E.H. was charged with three counts, including one
    count of carrying a concealed weapon in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2), a fourth-
    degree felony, having weapons while under disability in violation of R.C.
    2923.13(A)(2), a third-degree felony, and criminal trespass in violation of R.C.
    2911.21(A)(1), a fourth-degree misdemeanor.
    E.H. moved to suppress the evidence against him. At the evidentiary
    hearing on his motion, the following evidence was presented to a magistrate.
    Tanya Williams testified that on December 21, 2017, she was at her
    boyfriend’s house at 62 Avalon Drive, Bedford, Ohio. She saw two young men
    walking past her boyfriend’s house and did not think anything of it until she saw the
    males cross the street and head to the neighbor’s house directly across the street at
    63 Avalon Drive, Bedford, Ohio. Williams said that one of the males crossed through
    the neighbor’s yard and one of them walked up the neighbor’s driveway. Williams
    further testified that one of the males “had his arms like in a crouching position as
    if they were sneaking up” on the neighbor. She then called 911. Williams said that
    one of the young males was wearing a gray “hoodie,” and one was wearing a black or
    navy blue “hoodie.”
    When asked why she called 911, Williams explained:
    Well, initially they walked past our house and it was probably maybe 15
    seconds later our neighbor had already pulled in her yard and not 15
    seconds after they passed our house, they crossed the street on her side
    of the street, walked past her house and turned around and that’s when
    I saw one young man crossing across the line moving kind of quickly
    and the other was coming up the driveway.
    Williams stated that her neighbor had just pulled in her driveway and
    was “unloading groceries or something out of her car and she had her back turned.”
    Williams stated that the males got within approximately 12 feet of her neighbor.1
    Williams’s boyfriend “was just standing on the front porch looking” at the two males.
    Williams’s 911 call was played in court. In the 911 call, Williams states
    at the beginning that “two black males just tried to carjack our neighbor.” Williams
    further told the operator that the males were wearing a gray hoodie and a black
    hoodie. Williams stated on the call that she and her “husband” watched the two
    males cross the street and approach their neighbor, who had just pulled into her
    driveway. Williams told the 911 operator that the neighbor did not even know that
    the men were there. Williams said that her “husband” walked out on their front
    porch and told them to “keep walking.” Williams said that the males were “on
    Avalon right now” walking toward Columbus Street.
    1 She testified 12 feet, but the state continued to ask her to describe the distance.
    The state apparently stood somewhere in the courtroom and asked Williams if the woman
    was “about this far?” Williams said a little farther. The state requested the court to let
    the record reflect that the males were about 15 to 20 feet away from the woman, but
    defense counsel objected, and the court sustained the objection.
    On cross-examination, Williams admitted that she never told the 911
    operator that one of the males was in a “crouching” position or “sneaking” up on her
    neighbor. Williams further agreed that she did not give any other descriptive
    information about the two men to police.
    Detective Shawn Klubnick of the Bedford Police Department testified
    that around 4:00 p.m. on December 21, 2017, he was driving an unmarked car with
    Lieutenant Stask, supervisor of the detective bureau, when they received a dispatch
    of “a possible carjacking happening on Avalon.” When they received the call, they
    were looking for a vehicle in the area of “Berwyn, Avalon, and Marion,” which is near
    Bedford High School. He said that the dispatcher gave the description of the two
    men as “two young black males wearing a light gray sweatshirt and a dark
    sweatshirt.”
    Detective Klubnick stated that they learned from the dispatch that the
    males were “traveling towards Columbus” Road, which was the same direction that
    Detective Klubnick and Lieutenant Stask were “traveling on Berwyn.” Detective
    Klubnick testified that “within a minute or two” of hearing the dispatch, Lieutenant
    Stask told Detective Klubnick that he saw “two males matching the description
    coming up towards [them] on Berwyn on the sidewalk walking together.” Detective
    Klubnick stated that Berwyn Drive was “very close to Avalon.” After they drove
    about “another ten feet,” Detective Klubnick also saw two males wearing a “light gray
    sweatshirt and a dark colored sweatshirt” walking toward the officers’ direction.
    Detective Klubnick testified that he stopped the unmarked police
    vehicle “about 50 feet in front” of the males, and they waited for the males to “walk
    a little closer” toward them. When the two males “got closer,” Detective Klubnick
    and Lieutenant Stask got out of their vehicle, identified themselves as police officers,
    ordered the males to take their hands out of their pockets, and to get on the ground.
    Detective Klubnick had his gun in his hand, but at his side. He referred to it as “low
    ready.” Detective Klubnick could not recall where Lieutenant Stask’s gun was when
    they ordered the two males to the ground. The males complied with the officers’
    orders.
    When asked what they did next, Detective Klubnick stated that they
    handcuffed the males and searched them. While searching E.H., Detective Klubnick
    found what felt like a “weapon” in the “crotch” of E.H.’s pants. Detective Klubnick
    asked E.H. what it was and he responded, “a gun.”            Detective Klubnick and
    Lieutenant Stask then waited for patrol officers, who arrived in another couple of
    minutes. Patrol officers transported E.H. and the other male to the police station.
    On direct examination, Detective Klubnick did not specify when he
    arrested E.H. On cross-examination, he agreed that “within a minute of hearing the
    call,” he and Lieutenant Stask “hop[ped] out of [their] car and arrested them.” On
    redirect examination, the state asked Detective Klubnick, “Regarding the procedure,
    you said you got out on cross-examination, you ordered them to the ground[,] [a]t
    that point were they under arrest for any offense at that specific point?” Detective
    Klubnick responded, “Not at that specific point, no.” The state went on to ask, “So
    at what point did you decide to place [E.H.] under arrest?” Detective Klubnick
    replied, “When the gun was found.”
    Detective Klubnick agreed on cross-examination that when they
    ordered the two males to the ground, “all [he] knew about what allegedly took place
    was what [he] heard on dispatch.” He explained on redirect examination that based
    upon the call of a possible carjacking, he had reason to believe that the males were
    “possibly armed, dangerous and violent.”
    In response to the court’s questioning, Detective Klubnick stated that
    he did not see anyone else walking on the street when he saw E.H. and the other
    young male. He agreed that it was common to see young males walking together in
    this area because it was near Bedford High School.
    At the close of the evidence, the magistrate recommending denying
    E.H.’s motion to suppress. E.H. filed a motion to set aside the magistrate’s order
    pursuant to Juv.R. 40(D). The trial court overruled E.H.’s motion and adopted the
    magistrate’s decision. The trial court continued the matter for trial, which was held
    a couple of weeks after the suppression hearing.
    The trial court found E.H. delinquent of all charges. The trial court
    then ordered that for carrying a concealed weapon, E.H. should be placed in the legal
    custody of the Ohio Department of Youth Services for an indefinite term of six
    months to a maximum “period not to exceed” the age of 21 years old, but the court
    then suspended this sentence. For having a weapon while under disability, the court
    placed E.H. in the custody of “probation officer, for placement at Glen Mills School”
    in Pennsylvania. The court ordered that upon termination of placement at Glen
    Mills, E.H. was “to participate in aftercare supervision programming, subject to the
    rules of probation of this court.” For criminal trespassing, the court ordered that
    E.H. be “credited with time served.” It is from this judgment that E.H. now appeals.
    II. Motion to Suppress
    In his first assignment of error, E.H. argues that the trial court erred
    when it denied his motion to suppress. He raises three issues within this assigned
    error: (1) his “seizure” amounted to an arrest without probable cause, (2) assuming
    that his seizure was an investigatory stop, the officers lacked reasonable suspicion
    to investigate because the citizen’s “tip was insufficient to create reasonable
    suspicion to justify the stop,” and (3) assuming the officers had reasonable suspicion
    to stop him and investigate, they did not have reasonable suspicion to pat him down.
    Appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
    presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 
    100 Ohio St.3d 152
    ,
    
    2003-Ohio-5372
    , 
    797 N.E.2d 7
    , ¶ 8. This court accepts the trial court’s findings of
    fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. 
    Id.
     Accepting these facts
    as true, this court must independently determine, as a matter of law and without
    deference to the trial court’s conclusion, whether those facts meet the applicable
    legal standard. 
    Id.
    We will address E.H.’s second issue first for ease of discussion.
    The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
    “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
    against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The Fourth Amendment is applicable
    to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 
    367 U.S. 643
    ,
    660, 
    81 S.Ct. 1684
    , 
    6 L.Ed.2d 1081
     (1961). Searches and seizures conducted outside
    of the judicial process, without a warrant based on probable cause, are per se
    unreasonable, unless they come within one of a few well-established exceptions.
    Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
    412 U.S. 218
    , 219, 
    93 S.Ct. 2041
    , 
    36 L.Ed.2d 854
     (1973).
    If evidence is obtained through actions that violate a person’s Fourth Amendment
    rights, exclusion of the evidence is mandated. Mapp at syllabus.
    An officer may perform an investigatory stop without violating the
    Fourth Amendment as long as the officer is “able to point to specific and articulable
    facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
    warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 21, 
    88 S.Ct. 1868
    , 
    20 L.Ed.2d 889
    (1968). The reasonable suspicion necessary for such a stop eludes precise definition.
    It has been described by courts as requiring more than an inchoate suspicion or a
    “hunch,” but less than the heightened level of certainty required for probable cause.
    State v. Shepherd, 
    122 Ohio App.3d 358
    , 364, 
    701 N.E.2d 778
     (2d Dist.1997). Rather
    than involving a strict, inflexible standard, determination of whether reasonable
    suspicion exists in any given case requires review of the totality of the surrounding
    facts and circumstances. State v. Bobo, 
    37 Ohio St.3d 177
    , 
    524 N.E.2d 489
     (1988),
    paragraph one of the syllabus. Those circumstances must be viewed through the
    eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to
    events as they unfold. State v. Andrews, 
    57 Ohio St.3d 86
    , 89, 
    565 N.E.2d 1271
    (1991).
    The “‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.’”
    Ohio v. Robinette, 
    519 U.S. 33
    , 39, 
    117 S.Ct. 417
    , 
    136 L.Ed.2d 347
     (1996), quoting
    Florida v. Jimeno, 
    500 U.S. 248
    , 250, 
    111 S.Ct. 1801
    , 
    114 L.Ed.2d 297
     (1991). The
    “reasonableness” determination hinges upon objective factors, not the actual
    subjective motivation of the officer or officers involved. Whren v. United States, 
    517 U.S. 806
    , 813, 
    116 S.Ct. 1769
    , 
    135 L.Ed.2d 89
     (1996).
    E.H. maintains that the “officers did not have an independent factual
    basis for stopping” him. The officers, however, were acting upon a dispatch that
    they had had just received that two young black males had possibly committed a
    carjacking on Avalon Drive and were walking up Avalon toward another road. One
    to two minutes later, the officers saw two males matching that description walking
    on a street very close to Avalon Drive. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that “where
    an officer making an investigative stop relies solely upon a dispatch, the state must
    demonstrate at a suppression hearing that the facts precipitating the dispatch
    justified a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Maumee v. Weisner, 
    87 Ohio St.3d 295
    , 
    720 N.E.2d 507
     (1999), paragraph one of the syllabus.
    The Supreme Court explained in Weisner that informants typically fit
    into one of three categories: the anonymous informant, the known informant, who
    is generally someone from the criminal world who has provided reliable tips in the
    past, and an identified citizen informant. Id. at 300. An anonymous informant is
    generally considered relatively unreliable and requires independent police
    corroboration. Id. But a tip from a known informant — an identified citizen
    informant — is afforded a greater degree of reliability. Id. at 301. The Supreme
    Court explained: “We believe that greater credibility may be due an informant * * *
    who initiates and permits extended police contact rather than one who phones in a
    tip and retreats from any further police interaction.” Id. at 302.
    A determination of the reasonableness of a stop under Weisner, just
    as any investigatory stop, “involves a consideration of ‘the totality of the
    circumstances.’” Id. at 299, citing United States v. Cortez, 
    449 U.S. 411
    , 
    101 S.Ct. 690
    , 
    66 L.Ed.2d 621
     (1981). “Under this analysis, ‘both the content of information
    possessed by police and its degree of reliability’ are relevant to the court’s
    determination.” 
    Id.,
     quoting Alabama v. White, 
    496 U.S. 325
    , 
    110 S.Ct. 2412
    , 
    110 L.Ed.2d 301
     (1990). Thus, where the only information possessed by police prior to
    the stop is from an informant’s tip, “the determination of reasonable suspicion will
    be limited to an examination of the weight and reliability due that tip,” specifically,
    “whether the tip itself has sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the investigative
    stop.”   
    Id.
       The most important factors in determining the reliability of an
    informant’s tip are “the informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge.”
    
    Id.,
     citing White.
    According to the facts in Weisner, the police received a call from an
    identified citizen who gave his name and cell phone number. The caller reported “a
    suspected crime of drunk driving in progress.” Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d at 295, 
    720 N.E.2d 507
    . The caller stated that he was following the vehicle in question, reported
    the make, model, and license plate of the car, and “described it as ‘weaving all over
    the road.’” 
    Id.
     The Weisner court observed that the informant made his report from
    the perspective of a motorist sharing the road with an impaired motorist who posed
    a threat to the informant and to other motorists. Id. at 300. In view of this factual
    predicate, the court concluded that the informant had a high degree of credibility
    and therefore, “the dispatch based upon [the informant’s] tip was issued on
    sufficient facts to justify [the arresting officer’s] investigative stop.” Id. at 303.
    Credibility,   however,     is   only   one   criteria.     See    Weisner
    (“categorization of the informant as an identified citizen informant does not itself
    determine the outcome of this case[;] [i]nstead it is one element of our totality of the
    circumstances review of this informant’s tip, weighing in favor of the informant’s
    reliability and veracity”). As this court stated in State v. Cisternino, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 94674, 
    2010-Ohio-6027
    , “[e]very time a citizen informant reports
    what he or she considers suspicious activity,” the police are not “given carte blanche
    to stop and search an alleged suspect.” Id. at ¶ 19. Rather, the citizen informant
    must give sufficient detail — specific and articulable facts — to warrant intrusion on
    an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. See United States v. Hensley, 
    469 U.S. 221
    , 231, 
    105 S.Ct. 675
    , 
    83 L.Ed.2d 604
     (1985) (“If the [dispatch] has been issued in
    the absence of a reasonable suspicion, then a stop in the objective reliance upon it
    violates the Fourth Amendment.”).
    Viewing the totality of the circumstances in this case through the eyes
    of a reasonable and prudent police officer, we conclude that Williams’s information
    amounted to sufficient “specific and articulable facts” that formed an objective basis
    for suspecting that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime. In this
    case, the concerned citizen identified herself in her 911 call to police and gave her
    telephone number.      Thus, we have no issue with her credibility, veracity, or
    reliability. Williams then explained in the 911 call that “two black males just tried to
    car jack our neighbor.” When further describing what she saw, Williams stated that
    she and her “husband” watched the two males cross the street and approach their
    neighbor, who had just pulled into her driveway. One male crossed her neighbor’s
    yard and one male began to walk up her neighbor’s driveway. Williams told the 911
    operator that the neighbor did not even know that the men were there. Williams
    then said that her “husband” walked out on their front porch and told them to “keep
    walking,” and the males left her neighbor’s property and began walking on Avalon
    Drive toward Columbus Road. Williams’s information gave the dispatcher sufficient
    indicia of reliability and details to justify the investigative stop of the males. See
    Weisner at 299.
    Because we have determined that the tip contained sufficient indicia
    of reliability and veracity such that it afforded reasonable suspicion to the officers,
    we must next address E.H.’s first issue and determine whether his “seizure”
    amounted to an arrest without probable cause rather than just a Terry stop to
    investigate.
    It is settled law that a person arrested without probable cause violates
    the Fourth Amendment. State v. Mauer, 
    15 Ohio St.3d 239
    , 254, 
    473 N.E.2d 768
    (1984). “The magic words ‘you are under arrest’ are not necessary to constitute an
    arrest.” 
    Id.
     “Any police confinement beyond the parameters in Terry * * * is the key
    to what constitutes an arrest.” 
    Id.
    E.H. argues that because Detective Klubnick exited his vehicle with
    his gun at his side, immediately ordered him to the ground, and handcuffed him,
    Detective Klubnick “demonstrated his intent to arrest [him].”           E.H. further
    maintains that he was “seized” for purposes of effectuating an arrest. In support of
    his argument that he was seized, E.H. points to State v. Nelson, 
    72 Ohio App.3d 506
    , 
    595 N.E.2d 475
     (8th Dist.1991), which held:
    The existence of an arrest is dependent upon the existence of four
    requisite elements: “(1) An intent to arrest, (2) under real or pretended
    authority, (3) accompanied by an actual or constructive seizure or
    detention of the person, and (4) which is so understood by the person
    arrested.”
    Id. at 508, quoting State v. Barker, 
    53 Ohio St.2d 135
    , 
    372 N.E.2d 1324
     (1978), cert.
    denied, 
    439 U.S. 913
    , 
    99 S.Ct. 285
    , 
    58 L.Ed.2d 260
     (1978).
    Nelson is distinguishable from the facts in this case. Although we did
    find that handcuffing the defendant “under the circumstances” in that case
    amounted to a seizure, we found that the defendant’s arrest was improper because
    there was no probable cause. Id. at 509. We explained:
    [Detective] Campbell’s observations of Nelson did not warrant a
    prudent man in believing a felony was in progress. Campbell stated
    that he observed a group of people standing in front of an apartment in
    a high crime area. He observed the movement of hands without
    anything being exchanged. Upon the police’s arrival, the group
    dispersed and Nelson was found sitting in a puddle on the third floor
    porch. Nelson and the female juvenile told Campbell that they had
    been engaged in an argument. Nelson’s behavior did not give rise to a
    reasonable inference that he was a participant in a felony. Sibron v.
    New York (1968), 
    392 U.S. 40
    , 
    88 S.Ct. 1889
    , 
    20 L.Ed.2d 917
    . Based
    on the totality of the circumstances, we find that Campbell did not have
    probable cause to believe Nelson was committing or had committed a
    drug offense. As a result, the discovery of drugs subsequent to such
    arrest was improper. Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 
    371 U.S. 471
    ,
    
    83 S.Ct. 407
    , 
    9 L.Ed.2d 441
    .
    
    Id. at 508
    .
    The fact that E.H. was not free to leave “was not outcome
    determinative. No suspect is ever ‘free to leave’ an investigatory stop.” State v.
    Raine, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90681, 
    2008-Ohio-5993
    , ¶ 22, quoting State v.
    Martin, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19186, 
    2002-Ohio-2621
     (Raine addressed
    whether a suspect was arrested and “in custody” for Miranda purposes). Indeed, a
    police officer may restrain an individual’s movement with handcuffs even during a
    Terry stop if the facts warrant it. This court has stated:
    There is no bright line rule either prohibiting or endorsing officers
    handcuffing individuals during Terry stop situations. Under State v.
    Lozada, 
    92 Ohio St.3d 74
    , 78, 
    2001-Ohio-149
    , 
    748 N.E.2d 520
    , the
    protection of an officer and the individual is a legitimate reason to
    infringe upon the liberty of an individual. However, the means used to
    restrain the liberty of the individual must be reasonable under the
    circumstances. State v. Dabney, Belmont App. No. 02BE31, 2003-
    Ohio-5141.
    State v. McKinney, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83722, 
    2004-Ohio-4356
    , ¶ 29
    (Gallagher, J., concurring).
    “Force may be used, even in the form of handcuffs, during a Terry
    stop if it is reasonably necessary and is limited in scope and duration.” State v.
    White, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 18731, 
    2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 145
    , 18 (Jan. 18,
    2002), fn. 1, citing United States v. Chavez, 
    812 F.2d 1295
    , 1301 (10th Cir.1987),
    and United States v. Bautista, 
    684 F.2d 1286
     (9th Cir.1982). “Handcuffing a suspect
    in the course of an investigative detention does not necessarily turn that
    investigative detention into an arrest, so long as handcuffing is reasonable under the
    circumstances; for instance, to maintain the status quo and prevent flight.” State v.
    Carter, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21145, 
    2006-Ohio-2823
    , ¶ 20.
    “Handcuffing generally only occurs during a Terry stop if the
    individual is dangerous or resisting the officers and it is necessary to complete the
    frisk.” White at 18, fn. 1.
    “Whether handcuffing or other methods of detention are reasonable
    ‘depends on whether the restraint was temporary and lasted no longer
    than was necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, and whether
    the methods employed were the least intrusive means reasonably
    available to verify the officers’ suspicions in a short period of time.’”
    State v. Payne, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 13898, 
    1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1925
    , 4
    (May 4, 1994), quoting United States v. Glenna, 
    878 F.2d 967
     (7th Cir.1989).
    In this case, the officers ordered the suspects to the ground and to put
    their hands out, and then they handcuffed them. But the officers were acting very
    quickly on a dispatch containing very little information except the description of the
    males and of a possible carjacking — which Detective Klubnick explained “does
    mean someone’s probably armed, dangerous and violent.” Detective Klubnick
    further explained that their actions were for “officer’s safety and the public’s safety.”
    Based upon these facts, we conclude that the officers’ acts were reasonable under
    the circumstances and provided them the means to search the males for weapons,
    which addresses E.H.’s third issue presented as well (where he argued that assuming
    the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop him and investigate, they did not have
    reasonable suspicion to pat him down). The officers certainly had reasonable
    suspicion to pat the males down acting on a dispatch of possible carjacking. Thus,
    E.H.’s first and third issues are without merit as well.
    Accordingly, E.H.’s first assignment of error is overruled.
    III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    In his second assignment of error, E.H. argues that the state failed to
    present sufficient evidence to support his criminal trespassing delinquency
    adjudication beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.
    “‘[S]ufficiency’ is a term of art meaning that legal standard which is
    applied to determine whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is
    legally sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Thompkins,
    
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 386, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
     (1997), citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1433
    (6th Ed.1990).    When an appellate court reviews a record upon a sufficiency
    challenge, “the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most
    favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
    elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 
    61 Ohio St.3d 259
    , 
    574 N.E.2d 492
     (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
    E.H. was found delinquent of criminal trespassing under R.C.
    2911.21(A)(1), which provides that “[n]o person, without privilege to do so, shall * *
    * [k]nowingly enter or remain on the land or premises of another[.]” E.H. does not
    contest the elements of criminal trespassing. Rather, he maintains that the state
    failed to present sufficient evidence of his identity, namely, that he was one of the
    two males who walked onto Williams’s neighbor’s property at 63 Avalon Drive,
    Bedford, Ohio. He also contends that no one identified him out of or in court as the
    person who was on the property at 63 Avalon Drive, Bedford, Ohio.
    Every criminal prosecution requires proof that the person accused of
    the crime is the person who committed the crime. This truism is reflected in the
    state’s constitutional burden to prove the guilt of “the accused” beyond a reasonable
    doubt. In re Winship, 
    397 U.S. 358
    , 364, 
    90 S.Ct. 1068
    , 
    25 L.Ed.2d 368
     (1970). Like
    any fact, the state can prove the identity of the accused by “circumstantial or direct”
    evidence. Jenks at 272-273. The relevant question in a sufficiency-of-the-evidence
    review is whether, “after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
    prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
    crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
    Id.,
     at paragraph two of the syllabus,
    following Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 
    99 S.Ct. 2781
    , 
    61 L.Ed.2d 560
     (1979).
    Further, a witness need not physically point out the defendant in the courtroom as
    long as there is sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence proving that the
    defendant was the perpetrator. See Jenks at 272-273.
    In this case, the state presented Williams and Detective Klubnick,
    who testified to essentially the same facts as they did at the suppression hearing.
    The state also presented Lieutenant Stask, who corroborated the events as told by
    Detective Klubnick, and Lawrence White, Jr., the owner of the home located at 63
    Avalon Drive, Bedford, Ohio. White testified that E.H. was not permitted to be on
    his property.
    Regarding E.H.’s identity, Williams testified that she saw two young
    black males walk across her neighbor’s lawn and up her driveway. Williams said
    that the males were wearing a black “hoodie” and a gray “hoodie,” and that they were
    walking up Avalon Drive toward Columbus Road.               Detective Klubnick and
    Lieutenant Stask testified that they were driving in the area where the suspects were
    reported as walking toward. Within a minute or two, the officers saw two males who
    matched the description given to them. Both officers testified in court that E.H. was
    the male who was wearing the gray “hoodie.” This is sufficient, circumstantial
    evidence that E.H. was one of the two males who had just walked onto White’s
    property without his permission.
    E.H.’s second assignment of error is overruled.
    Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue of this court directing the common
    pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
    of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE
    EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
    LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR