Meekins v. Oberlin , 2019 Ohio 2825 ( 2019 )

[Cite as Meekins v. Oberlin, 2019-Ohio-2825.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
MATTHEW MEEKINS, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
No. 107636
v. :
CITY OF OBERLIN, ET AL., :
Defendants-Appellees. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: REVERSED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 11, 2019
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-16-869402
Appearances:
Harvey Abens Iosue Co., L.P.A., David L. Harvey III,
Matthew B. Abens, and Jason T. Hartzell, for appellant.
Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews, and Gregory A.
Beck; City of Oberlin Law Director, and Jon D. Clark, for
appellee.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:
Plaintiff-appellant Matthew Meekins appeals from the trial court’s
decision granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee the city of
Oberlin (“Oberlin” or the “city”) on Meekins’ claims of false arrest/imprisonment
and malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (“Section 1983”). Meekins
contends that he was wrongfully arrested and prosecuted after the Oberlin Police
Department failed to properly investigate false claims made by his son’s mother that
he had sent her threatening text messages and violated a civil protection order.
Meekins contends that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor
of the city because genuine issues of material fact exist as to the city’s liability under
Section 1983. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and
remand for further proceedings.
Factual and Procedural Background
Meekins and Kimberlee George were involved in a relationship; in
April 2015, they had a son. The couple’s relationship deteriorated and Meekins filed
an action in the Lorain County Juvenile Court to establish paternity and obtain
visitation with his son (the “juvenile court case”).
On December 30, 2015, George obtained an ex parte domestic
violence civil protection order from the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas
based on her claim that Meekins had sent her threatening emails on November 17,
2015 and December 29, 2015. The couple’s son was also listed as a protected party
under the ex parte civil protection order. A full hearing on George’s petition for a
civil protection order was scheduled for January 14, 2016.
On January 3, 2016, George went to the Oberlin Police Department
and claimed that Meekins had violated the civil protection order by sending her
screen shots of prior text conversations that they had exchanged. George indicated
that she wanted to pursue criminal charges against Meekins. Two days later, George
returned to the Oberlin Police Department and indicated that her attorney had
advised her to file a police report regarding threatening emails she had allegedly
received from Meekins in November and December 2015. George again indicated
that she wanted to pursue criminal charges against Meekins. Patrol Officer Melissa
Lett spoke with George on both occasions and prepared police reports regarding
George’s allegations. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Officer Lett ever
spoke with Meekins regarding the allegations.
Officer Lett forwarded the police reports to the city prosecutor for
consideration of the charges. After reviewing the allegations, the city prosecutor
recommended charging Meekins with domestic violence in violation of R.C.
2919.25(C) relating to the email allegedly sent on December 29, 2015.1 The
prosecutor indicated that charging Meekins with domestic violence based on the
November 2015 emails was “more problematic,” noting that “the statute requires
that the defendant knowingly believe that the offender will cause imminent physical
harm.” The Oberlin Police Department requested a warrant for Meekins’ arrest on
a charge of domestic violence based on the December 29, 2015 email.
The Oberlin Municipal Court refused to issue an arrest warrant based
on the December 29, 2015 email, finding a lack of probable cause for a charge of
domestic violence due to the absence of “imminent” harm.
1 The December 29, 2015 email allegedly stated: “I get off work tomorrow at 4 and
I will be at your house by 5:15. You better answer the door or I swear I will level your
entire f****** house killing everyone inside. Do not p*** me off. — Matthew M.”
Meekins denied sending any threatening emails to George. On
January 7, 2016, the Lorain County Common Pleas Court rescheduled the full
hearing on George’s petition for a domestic violence civil protection order from
January 14, 2016 to February 2, 2016 so that both parties could submit “all electronic
devices in their possession * * * to an independent forensic examiner.”
Meekins hired an expert to examine his cell phone and laptop in an
attempt to determine the source of the email messages allegedly sent to George. The
expert issued a report (the “January 31, 2016 expert report”) in which he concluded
that the Google searches and locations associated with the email account from which
the threatening emails were allegedly sent to George “more closely related” to
George than Meekins. The expert further stated that this fact, combined with the
“lack of corroborating artifacts” on Meekins’ electronic devices, strongly suggested
that Meekins did not send the threatening emails. The January 31, 2016 report was
shared with George’s counsel and, two days later, George dismissed her petition for
a domestic violence civil protection order.
On March 22, 2016, a final pretrial was held in the juvenile court case.
It was recommended that Meekins be granted regular visitation with his son.
George refused to agree to visitation and a trial was scheduled for April 14, 2016.
The next day, at approximately 11:30 a.m., George returned to the
Oberlin Police Department and reported that she had received a series of texts,
beginning on January 12, 2016 and continuing through March 16, 2016, from eight
different phone numbers, the content of which threatened her and her son. George
told Oberlin Patrol Officer Matthew Sustarsic that, although none of the phone
numbers was Meekins’ phone number, she believed the texts were from Meekins,
who was either using a “burner” phone or was sending the texts by “spoofing” other
telephone numbers, i.e., making the sender appear to be someone other than the
actual source. Officer Sustarsic testified that George appeared “very frightened” and
“very upset.” He stated that George told him that she had pursued “other avenues
* * * to try and get help” but “didn’t feel she was getting any help” and that she
“hadn’t heard anything back” regarding the prior complaints she had made to the
Oberlin police regarding Meekins.
Officer Sustarsic testified that George’s allegations were “unusual”
and “different” because (1) none of the numbers from the text messages were
identified as being associated with Meekins and (2) they involved threats by an
accused to his own child, which Officer Sustarsic had only seen once or twice before
in his 20-year career.
Officer Sustarsic testified that he had no knowledge of “spoofing,”
that he had never previously handled a “spoofing” complaint and that he had had no
training regarding “spoofing” or electronic evidence. He testified that he reviewed
the police reports regarding the prior complaints George had made against Meekins
and could not determine why no action had been taken on them. He confirmed that
there is nothing in the police reports to indicate that anyone from the Oberlin Police
Department ever spoke with Meekins about the emails he had allegedly sent in
November and December 2015. Officer Sustarsic prepared a supplement to the
January 5, 2016 report Officer Lett had prepared detailing the new allegations made
by George. He made no effort to contact Meekins, no effort to otherwise determine
whether Meekins had, in fact, sent any of the text messages at issue and no attempt
to speak with Patrol Officer Lett regarding the prior allegations George had made
against Meekins and the status of the investigation regarding those allegations.
Officer Sustarsic testified that because he was the sole patrol officer
on duty at the police department that day — as was the case “about 60 percent of the
work week or so” — he was unable to contact Meekins or otherwise investigate
George’s complaint, other than to ask Oberlin police detective Jessica Beyer, who
was more knowledgeable regarding electronic evidence, to explain “spoofing” to
him. He indicated that Detective Beyer “tr[ied] to look online and figure it out and
explain it to [him].”
Officer Sustarsic stated that he believed he may have tried calling
some of the numbers allegedly associated with the texts, but did not recall the results
of any such calls and did not note the results of any such calls in his report. He
likewise could not recall if he contacted the court to determine the status of any
pending cases involving the parties, including with respect to the civil protection
order referenced in George’s earlier complaint. Officer Sustarsic stated that he did
not ask to interview Meekins because it was not his “role” or “position” to interview
individuals, that his “job is patrol * * * to take calls” and that he knows “what [his]
boundaries are.” He stated that, at the time, there was no day shift sergeant to serve
as a supervisor, so “depending on the day,” his supervisor would have either been
Lieutenant Michael McCloskey or Chief Torres. Officer Sustarsic testified that he
gave Lieutenant McCloskey “a brief rundown” regarding George’s allegations, but
did not recall specifically what he or Lieutenant McCloskey said. Lieutenant
McCloskey testified that when George came in, Officer Sustarsic gave him a “heads
up” that there was a complainant “up front” regarding Meekins, but that they did
not discuss any details of the case.
Later that afternoon, before his shift ended at 3:00 p.m., Officer
Sustarsic executed a request for an arrest warrant and three complaints charging
Meekins with one count of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(C) and two
counts of aggravated menacing in violation of R.C. 2903.21(A). In these complaints,
Officer Sustarsic alleged that, on or about March 23, 2016, Meekins:
● did, knowingly cause [George] to believe that [Meekins] would
cause serious physical harm to a member of [George’s]
immediate family, to wit: G.G., in violation of Section
2903.21(A)(M-1) of the Ohio Revised Code;
● did, knowingly cause [George] to believe that [Meekins] would
cause serious physical harm to the person or property of
[George], in violation of Section 2903.21(A)(M-1) of the Ohio
Revised Code;
● did, by threat of force, knowingly cause [George] to believe that
he would cause imminent physical harm to her, [George] being
a member of [Meekins’] family; in violation of Section
2919.25(C)(M-4) of the Ohio Revised Code.
Officer Sustarsic also executed an affidavit in which he stated:
1. I am a Police Officer for the City of Oberlin and was at all times
pertinent to this matter.
2. Kimberlee George did state that she had received numerous
threats to herself and her son, [G.G.]. The threats, to her wellbeing and
mortality, are reported to have come from the father of her child [G.G.],
Matthew Meekins.
3. Factual matters set forth in the report and supplements, if
applicable, are true and accurate.
Once he completed these documents, Officer Sustarsic forwarded
them to “records” for filing with the Oberlin Municipal Court. Officer Sustarsic
could not recall whether he spoke with the prosecutor regarding the case before
preparing the request for an arrest warrant. However, there is no evidence in the
record that he did so. There is likewise nothing in the record to indicate that the
documents were reviewed, or approved, by a supervisor prior to filing. The following
morning, March 24, 2015, the request for an arrest warrant was filed with the
Oberlin Municipal Court, attaching the complaints and affidavit Officer Sustarsic
had executed the previous day. Officer Sustarsic could not recall whether the police
reports or any other information was included in the “packet” submitted to the court
with the request for an arrest warrant. The Oberlin Municipal Court granted the
request, finding probable cause based on the information submitted to the court, 2
and issued a warrant for Meekins’ arrest.
On March 25, 2016, the Oberlin Municipal Court granted another
request for an ex parte domestic violence temporary protection order filed by
George. Later that day, Meekins was arrested at the Ritz Carlton, in Cleveland, Ohio,
where he was employed as the manager, and taken to the Lorain County jail. No one
2 The arrest warrant issued by the Oberlin Municipal Court states that “[a]n
affidavit, statements and a report were filed with the complaints.”
from the Oberlin Police Department attempted to contact Meekins or in any way
investigate George’s allegations prior to his arrest. Meekins remained in jail until
March 29, 2016.
At his arraignment on March 28, 2016, Meekins pled not guilty to the
charges. The municipal court judge who conducted Meekins’ arraignment was the
same judge who denied Oberlin’s initial request for an arrest warrant in January
2016 and who issued the warrant for Meekins’ arrest on March 24, 2016. Meekins
denied sending any threatening texts to George and provided the prosecutor with a
copy of the January 31, 2016 expert report. The prosecutor advised the judge that
he had received “some developing information that may relate to [the] charges” and
that “would * * * suggest” that the text messages at issue were not, in fact, sent by
Meekins. He stated that he had not yet had time to evaluate the information and
determine “if there’s substance to it or not.” In response to the prosecutor’s
disclosure, the municipal court judge recounted the history of the court’s
involvement in the matter and his rationale for issuing a warrant for Meekins’ arrest:
I know the first round, we did not issue a warrant. * * * But when this
second round came in * * * it seemed like an urgent-type of matter. Yet,
if believed, I understood the statements that were read are of grave
concern, and so the Court, out of the grave concern, issued * * * the
warrant.
And then there was the motion for the protection order. And
once again, we had that hearing on Friday, and Ms. George appeared at
that time at least to be credible.
Meekins advised the judge that he believed George sent the text
messages to herself in an attempt to gain an advantage in the parties’ custody
dispute. He asked the judge what would happen if the party who sent the text
messages to George continued to send them. The judge responded:
THE COURT: Well, that’s a legitimate question. Let’s talk about that.
Obviously, you should talk to your attorney about it. But as a
matter of procedure, how would that happen?
What would happen is — what could happen is, if the alleged
victim receives — says she receives another communication and says it
is from you then what will have to happen is the police then will once
again go through the same procedure.
Now, there are — what appears — the telephone numbers you’re
giving * * * to the police, I don’t know how sophisticated and what type
of — you know, who’s looking into all this. We took this for face value
only because, once again, she appeared, she testified under oath. It’s a
serious matter, if believed, which was believable at the time. But there’s
lots of numbers on here. I’d have to assume that somebody might look
into that into your concern. Your attorney might be in contact with the
Oberlin Police Center or the prosecutor and say, look * * * this number
comes from this person. Look, this number comes from — I called this
person, this person answered.
I don’t know if the police actually went through and did that
before they presented this to the judge. I don’t know if they did or they
didn’t to see if these are credible or not. But once again, when this
information comes into court and we get it from the police department,
we presume that they’ve done something that they’re convinced that
otherwise they were not going to present it to the judge, They say, hey,
look, this is serious. This is a serious matter. We don’t know who all of
these numbers are. There’s no way to confirm them. Or we do know,
and we’ve checked on them.
We don’t have any of that information. If it happens again, it will
be vetted in that manner. In other words, it goes to the police. The
police then have to decide, do they give it to the prosecutor? Do they
give it to the judge? They have to make that decision.
Once they make that decision and it comes to the judge, now
having had this conversation with you and having this information, we
can do a number of different things. * * *
The municipal court judge further explained that if the police thought
any future complaints were credible, the police would ask for new charges to be filed
or the issue could come before the court as an alleged bond violation, in which case
the court would hold a hearing on the alleged bond violation “unless the Court
believes it’s * * * an urgent matter of someone’s safety.” The judge advised Meekins
that he should “be in contact with * * * whoever is looking into what these numbers
mean, who owns these” and indicated that “[s]ome phone company somewhere is
going to tell us who owns these numbers at some point, I presume —.”
On March 29, 2016, Meekins was released with a GPS monitoring
device and was barred from entering the city of Oberlin.
On April 7, 2016, George filed another report with the Oberlin Police
Department, alleging that Meekins had violated the protection order issued on
March 25, 2016. Detective Beyer took the report. Detective Beyer contacted
Meekins, who denied having any contact with George. The Oberlin Police
Department subpoenaed Meekins’ and George’s cell phone records. On April 12,
2016, the Oberlin Police Department took Meekins’ cell phone for safekeeping,
noting on the property receipt that George was not to be made aware that Meekins
had turned over his cell phone to the police “per the prosecutor [and] defense
attorney.” On May 3, 2016, Detective Beyer sent a report to the prosecutor detailing
the results of her review of the subpoenaed cell phone records. She noted that
George’s cell phone records showed more calls between George and Meekins than
Meekins’ cell phone records showed and that the cell service provider had advised
that this was because the calls had been “spoofed” to make it appear as if the calls
were coming from Meekins when, in fact, they did not originate from his phone.
Beyer further noted that George had been asked several times to allow her phone to
be forensically examined but that she refused to consent to a forensic examination
of her phone.
Meekins’ expert determined that seven of the numbers from which
George allegedly received text messages were landlines, incapable of sending text
messages, and that the eighth number belonged to an individual named J.B.
The following day, the city prosecutor filed a motion to dismiss the
charges against Meekins, asserting that “there is substantial doubt about whether
the defendant was the author of the threatening texts which were the basis of the
pending charges.” The prosecutor detailed the facts giving rise to the “uncertainty”
and stated that, given this uncertainty, the city did not wish to pursue the charges at
this time. The prosecutor indicated, however, that “[f]urther evidence or
investigation may clarify the facts giving rise to the complaints and further action
may be warranted.” The charges against Meekins were dismissed on May 4, 2016.
Meekins claimed that as a result of his unlawful arrest and imprisonment, he missed
Easter and his son’s first birthday party and that his employer put him on unpaid
administrative leave for more than a month.
On September 22, 2016, Meekins filed a complaint against Oberlin
and various John Doe defendants, i.e., “individuals and police officers with the
Oberlin Police Department whose names and addresses are currently unknown,”
asserting state-law claims of false arrest/imprisonment (Count 1) and battery
(Count 5) and three separate violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 — one for false
arrest/imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment (Count 2), one for
malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment (Count 3), and one for
“customs and policies causing constitutional violations and ratification” (Count 4)
— arising out of the events detailed above. Meekins alleged that the Oberlin Police
Department “knowingly, intentionally, and deliberately” failed to take any steps to
determine whether Meekins was the “actual source” of the threatening text
messages George claimed to have received or do any other “real investigative work
on the matter” before requesting an arrest warrant. He further alleged that if the
Oberlin Police Department had exercised “due diligence” in investigating George’s
allegations, it would have discovered that the text messages were not sent by
Meekins and would not have requested an arrest warrant. He also alleged that if the
request for an arrest warrant had not contained false statements and material
omissions, the Oberlin Municipal Court would not have found probable cause to
issue the warrant.
The city filed an answer denying Meekins’ allegations and asserting
various affirmative defenses, including failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted and statutory immunity.
On May 26, 2017, Oberlin filed a motion for summary judgment.
Oberlin argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on Counts 1, 3 and 5 of
Meekins’ complaint (Meekins’ claims for false arrest/imprisonment, malicious
prosecution and battery) on grounds of “governmental immunity” pursuant to R.C.
Chapter 2744. Oberlin also argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on
Counts 1, 2, 3 and 4 of his complaint because Meekins’ arrest was based on a warrant
issued by the Oberlin Municipal Court, there was probable cause for his prosecution
and Meekins had failed to identify any “official [municipal] policy” that caused a
deprivation of his constitutional rights.
Meekins opposed the motion. Meekins argued that statutory political
subdivision immunity did not apply to his Section 1983 claims and that summary
judgment was improper as to those claims because (1) the arrest warrant was based
on false or misleading statements or omissions and was, therefore, void ab initio, (2)
genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether there was probable cause for
Meekins’ arrest and prosecution and (3) evidence of the Oberlin Police Department’s
understaffing, lack of training and inadequate investigative policies and procedures
created genuine issues of material fact regarding “the customs [Oberlin] tolerated
and endorsed” and Meekins’ entitlement to relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
On July 26, 2017, the trial court granted the city’s motion for
summary judgment as to all Meekins’ claims on the grounds of statutory political
subdivision immunity.
Meekins settled his claims against the John Doe defendants and, on
July 28, 2017, voluntarily dismissed his claims against those defendants with
prejudice.
Meekins appealed to this court. This court affirmed the trial court’s
entry of summary judgment in favor of Oberlin as to Meekins’ state-law claims,
concluding that they were barred by statutory political subdivision immunity, but
reversed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment as to Meekins’ Section 1983
claims and remanded the case for further proceedings as to those claims. Meekins
v. Oberlin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106060, 2018-Ohio-1308, ¶ 20, 32.
On remand, the trial court, once again, granted summary judgment
in favor of Oberlin on Meekins’ Section 1983 claims. The trial court did not explain
the reasoning for its decision.
Meekins appealed, raising the following assignment of error for
review:
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Appellee City of
Oberlin on Appellant’s causes of action for violations of 42 U.S.C. §1983(Counts II, III and IV of the Complaint) as genuine issues of material
fact exist and Appellee is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Law and Analysis
Standard of Review
We review summary judgment rulings de novo, applying the same
standard as the trial court. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671
N.E.2d 241 (1996). We accord no deference to the trial court’s decision and conduct
an independent review of the record to determine whether summary judgment is
appropriate.
Under Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine
issue exists as to any material fact and, viewing the evidence most strongly in favor
of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion that is
adverse to the nonmoving party, entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter
of law.
On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party carries an
initial burden of identifying specific facts in the record that demonstrate his or her
entitlement to summary judgment. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293,
662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). If the moving party fails to meet this burden, summary
judgment is not appropriate; if the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving
party has the reciprocal burden to point to evidence of specific facts in the record
demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 293.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party fails to meet this burden.
Id.
Establishing a Section 1983 Claim
42 U.S.C. 1983 states, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress * * *.
Section 1983 itself grants no substantive rights; however, “a plaintiff
may use it as a conduit through which to allege that he [or she] suffered the violation
of a specific right guaranteed by the Constitution or federal law.” Hudkins v.
Indianapolis, S.D.Ind. 1:13-cv-01179-SEB-DML, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103039, 24-
25 (Aug. 6, 2015). To prevail on a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must prove
two essential elements: (1) that he or she was deprived of a right, privilege, or
immunity secured by the United States Constitution or federal law and (2) the
deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. 1946 St. Clair
Corp. v. Cleveland, 49 Ohio St.3d 33, 34, 550 N.E.2d 456 (1990); Harris v. Sutton,
183 Ohio App.3d 616, 2009-Ohio-4033, 918 N.E.2d 181, ¶ 20; Ellison v. Garbarino,
48 F.3d 192, 194 (6th Cir.1995).
In this case, Meekins seeks relief under Section 1983 on claims of false
arrest3 and malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The
Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons
* * * against unreasonable * * * seizures” and provides that “no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.” The Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. As a ‘“general rule,’” ‘“Fourth Amendment
seizures are ‘reasonable’ only if based on probable cause to believe that the
individual has committed a crime.’” Bailey v. United States, 568 U. S. 186, 192, 133
S.Ct. 1031, 185 L.Ed.2d 19 (2013), quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
213, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979).
3 Although Meekins labels his claim “false arrest/imprisonment,” his allegations of
false imprisonment concern his detention incident to, and arising out of, his alleged
unlawful arrest. Accordingly, we do not separately address his allegations of false
imprisonment.
The city asserts that because Meekins’ arrest was based on a warrant
issued by the Oberlin Municipal Court, it has a “complete defense” to his false arrest
claim. It further asserts that Meekins’ false arrest and malicious prosecution claims
must fail because (1) probable cause existed for the issuance of the arrest warrant
and (2) Meekins has not identified a specific municipal policy that led to the alleged
deprivation of his constitutional rights.
Meekins contends that there was no probable cause to arrest or
prosecute him for the crimes at issue and that the warrant that was issued for his
arrest was void ab initio. He further contends that the city’s policy or custom of
understaffing of its police department, its failure to provide adequate training to its
police officers regarding how to conduct a “proper investigation” and its lack of
police department policies or procedures governing various issues related to the
supervision, investigation and handling of criminal complaints caused Meekins to
be “illegally arrested” and prosecuted, violating his Fourth Amendment rights.
Elements of False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution Claims
To prevail on a claim of false arrest in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, a plaintiff must prove that the arresting officer lacked probable cause
to arrest the plaintiff. Henderson v. Euclid, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101149, 2015-
Ohio-15, ¶ 53; Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 305 (6th Cir.2010); Voyticky v.
Timberlake, 412 F.3d 669, 677 (6th Cir.2005).
To prevail on a claim of malicious prosecution in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant made, influenced,
or participated in the decision to criminally prosecute the plaintiff, (2) there was a
lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution, (3) as a consequence of the legal
proceeding, the plaintiff sustained a “deprivation of liberty” “apart from the initial
seizure” and (4) the criminal proceeding was resolved in favor of the plaintiff.
Henderson at ¶ 35; Sykes at 308-309.
“Probable cause” exists where the ‘“facts and circumstances within
the officer’s knowledge * * * are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of
reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.”’ Henderson at ¶ 37,
quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 61 L.Ed.2d 343(1979). Thus, “[a] police officer has probable cause only when he discovers
reasonably reliable information that the suspect has committed a crime.”
Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 318 (6th Cir.2000); see also Wesley v.
Campbell, 779 F.3d 421, 429 (6th Cir.2015) (“An officer possesses probable cause to
arrest when, at the moment the officer seeks the arrest, ‘the facts and circumstances
within [the officer’s] knowledge and of which [he or she] had reasonably trustworthy
information [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [plaintiff]
had committed or was committing an offense.’”), quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,
91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964).
A probable-cause determination is based on the “totality of the
circumstances” and must take into account both “inculpatory and exculpatory
evidence.” Gardenhire at 318. Police officers may not make “hasty, unsubstantiated
arrests with impunity” and cannot “simply turn a blind eye toward potentially
exculpatory evidence known to them.” Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 371-372 (6th
Cir.1999).
As this court explained in Henderson:
Probable cause is defined as reasonable grounds for belief, supported
by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion. United
States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 392 (6th Cir.1993); United States v.
McClain, 444 F.3d 556, 562 (6th Cir.2005). In this regard, a law
enforcement officer is entitled to rely on an eyewitness’s statements
because this comports with the general notion that an eyewitness’s
statements are based on firsthand observations, and are generally
entitled to a presumption of reliability and veracity. Ahlers v. Schebil,
188 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir.1999). An eyewitness’s statements may not
be relied upon however, where at the time of the arrest, there is an
apparent reason for the officer to believe that the eyewitness was lying,
did not accurately describe what he had seen, or was in some fashion
mistaken regarding his recollections. Id.Henderson, 2015-Ohio-15, at ¶ 38.
A “bare allegation” of criminal wrongdoing, in and of itself, is
insufficient to establish probable cause that an accused has committed a crime.
Gardenhire at 317. However, ‘“[a] finding of probable cause does not require
evidence that is completely convincing or even evidence that would be admissible at
trial; all that is required is that the evidence be sufficient to lead a reasonable officer
to conclude that the arrestee has committed or is committing a crime.’” Parsons v.
Pontiac, 533 F.3d 492, 501 (6th Cir.2008), quoting Harris v. Bornhorst, 513 F.3d
503, 511 (6th Cir.2008). The existence of probable cause in a Section 1983 action
generally ‘“presents a jury question, unless there is only one reasonable
determination possible.’” Pontiac at 501, quoting Fridley v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867,
872 (6th Cir.2002); see also Alman v. Reed, 703 F.3d 887, 896 (6th Cir.2013)
(‘“When no material dispute of fact exists, probable cause determinations are legal
determinations that should be made’ by the court. * * * But ‘[i]f disputed factual
issues underlying probable cause exist, those issues must be submitted to a jury for
the jury to determine the appropriate facts.’”), quoting Hale v. Kart, 396 F.3d 721,
728 (6th Cir.2005).
As a general matter, “[a]n arrest pursuant to a facially valid warrant
is normally a complete defense to a federal constitutional claim for false arrest or
false imprisonment made pursuant to [Section 1983].” Voyticky, 412 F.3d at 677,
citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143-144, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433(1979); Henderson, 2015-Ohio-15, at ¶ 53 However, this defense is not available if
an officer, in requesting the arrest warrant, (1) ‘“knowingly and deliberately, or with
reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create[d] a
falsehood’” and (2) ‘“such statements or omissions were material, or necessary, to
the finding of probable cause.’” Sykes, 625 F.3d at 305, quoting Wilson v. Russo,
212 F.3d 781, 786-787 (3d Cir.2000); see also Ruble v. Escola, 898 F.Supp.2d 956,
973 (N.D.Ohio 2012). If an affidavit used to obtain an arrest warrant contains false
statements or material omissions, a determination must be made as to whether the
affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause after the false statements are set
aside or the omitted information is included. Sykes at 305; Buchanan v. Metz, 647
Fed.Appx. 659, 664 (6th Cir.2016), citing Hill v. McIntyre, 884 F.2d 271, 275 (6th
Cir.1989), and Burleigh v. Detroit, 80 Fed.Appx. 454, 458 (6th Cir.2003).
In this case, Meekins contends that the arrest warrant lacked
probable cause and was, therefore, void ab initio because Officer Sustarsic’s
“rushed” investigation led him to omit material facts from the request for the arrest
warrant that the Oberlin Municipal Court should have had before it in determining
whether to issue a warrant for Meekins’ arrest. Specifically, although Officer
Sustarsic averred in his affidavit in support of the request for arrest warrant that the
threats were “reported to have come from [Meekins]” and that “[f]actual matters set
forth in the report and supplements, if applicable, are true and accurate,” he (1)
omitted the fact that each of the text message threats originated from phone
numbers that had no known connection to Meekins, (2) did not disclose that many
of the numbers from which the texts purportedly originated were landlines
incapable of texting and that he had made no effort to speak with Meekins or
otherwise confirm George’s allegations prior to seeking an arrest warrant and (3)
made no mention of the civil protection order case involving George and Meekins or
the parties’ ongoing custody dispute. He contends that if Officer Sustarsic had
accurately stated all of the relevant facts in his request for an arrest warrant, the
Oberlin Municipal Court would not have issued the arrest warrant.
In what remains of this case,4 however, Meekins seeks to impose
liability not on Officer Sustarsic or any other officer who allegedly violated his
constitutional rights, but rather, on the city that employed the officers. A
4 As stated above, Meekins allegedly settled and dismissed his claims against the
individual officer(s) involved.
municipality is not vicariously liable for the acts of its employees under Section 1983.
Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611(1978) (“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor
— or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a
respondeat superior theory.”) (Emphasis deleted.); Arrington-Bey v. Bedford Hts.
858 F.3d 988, 994 (6th Cir.2017) (“Municipalities are not vicariously liable in § 1983
actions merely because they employ someone who has committed a constitutional
violation.”). Under Section 1983, local governments are responsible only for “their
own illegal acts.” (Emphasis deleted.) Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479,
106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). Municipal liability exists under Section 1983
only where a plaintiff establishes that a municipal “policy or custom” was the
“moving force” behind the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights. Monell at 694; Brown
v. Chapman, 814 F.3d 447, 462 (6th Cir.2016); Gregory v. Shelby Cty., 220 F.3d
433, 441 (6th Cir.2000) (“For liability to attach, there must be execution of a
government’s policy or custom which results in a constitutional tort.”). There must
be a “direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged
constitutional deprivation” for the municipality to be subject to a Section 1983
action. Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989).
For purposes of municipal liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff may
establish the existence of a municipal policy or custom through evidence of (1) an
official policy or enactment; (2) actions taken by officials with final decision-making
authority; (3) a policy of inadequate training or supervision or (4) a custom of
tolerance of or acquiescence in federal rights violations. Sutton, 183 Ohio App.3d
616, 2009-Ohio-4033, 918 N.E.2d 181, at ¶ 21, citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480, 106
S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452, and Thomas v. Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th
Cir.2005).
Meekins does not contend that an express, written policy or
procedure was the “moving force” behind the deprivation of his constitutional
rights. Rather, he asserts that the city’s “inaction,” i.e., its failure to provide
adequate staffing, training and supervision, amounted to an “official [municipal]
policy” that “led to [his] constitutional harm.”
Inadequacy of police training or supervision may serve as the basis
for Section 1983 liability only where the failure to train or supervise amounts to
“deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into
contact.” Canton at 387 (“Only where a municipality’s failure to train its employees
in a relevant respect evidences a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its
inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city ‘policy or
custom’ that is actionable under § 1983.”).
Thus, to succeed on a Section 1983 claim against a municipality based
on inadequate police training or supervision, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the
training or supervision was inadequate for the tasks performed; (2) the inadequacy
was the result of the municipality’s deliberate indifference; (3) the inadequacy was
closely related to or actually caused the plaintiff’s injury and (4) the violated right is
clearly established. Brown, 814 F.3d at 463; Arrington-Bey, 858 F.3d at 994-995.
‘“[D]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring
proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his
action.” Bd. of Cty. Commrs. of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410, 117 S.Ct.
1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997); Shadrick v. Hopkins Cty., 805 F.3d 724, 737 (6th
Cir.2015) (observing that the Supreme Court has described “deliberate indifference”
as ‘“lying somewhere between the poles of negligence at one end and purpose or
knowledge at the other’” and that it is ‘“routinely equated * * * with recklessness”’),
quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811(1994).
Although a “pattern” of similar constitutional violations is “ordinarily
necessary” to demonstrate deliberate indifference, “a single violation of federal
rights, accompanied by a showing that a municipality has failed to train its
employees to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for such a
violation, could trigger municipal liability.” Bryan Cty. at 409; see also Shadrick,
805 F.3d at 738-739. ‘“[O]bvious potential for such a violation’ has two elements: It
must be obvious that the failure * * * will lead to certain conduct, and it must be
obvious (i.e., clearly established) that the conduct will violate constitutional rights.”
Arrington-Bey at 995. Thus, single-incident liability exists “in a narrow range of
circumstances” where a federal rights violation ‘“may be a highly predictable
consequence of a failure to equip law enforcement officers with specific tools to
handle recurring situations.’” Bryan Cty. at 409. “The high degree of predictability
may also support an inference of causation — that the municipality’s indifference
led directly to the very consequence that was so predictable.” Bryan Cty. at 409-
410.
In support of his claim that the city’s “policy” of inadequate staffing,
training or supervision was the “moving force” behind the violation of his
constitutional rights, Meekins points to Officer Sustarsic’s testimony that (1)
because he was the only patrol officer on duty on March 23, 2016 — as was the case
the majority of the time he worked — he was unable to speak with Meekins before
requesting an arrest warrant and (2) this “lack of staffing” caused Officer Sustarsic
to “cut short” his investigation and prevented him from substantiating George’s
allegations before seeking a warrant for Meekins’ arrest. With respect to the city’s
alleged inadequate training of officers, Meekins presented evidence that the city
lacked specific policies, procedures or training — beyond any field training upon hire
— on issues such as: how to take a police report from an individual, how to
investigate a criminal complaint, how to handle a domestic violence complaint, how
and when to interview potential defendants prior to arrest, “spoofing” or electronic
evidence, what to do after taking a criminal complaint and what should be included
with a warrant request. Meekins also presented evidence that the city had no
policies or procedures with respect to the supervision and oversight of patrol officers
when deciding to seek an arrest warrant. Meekins contends that the “appalling lack
of [employee] training” that the city “systematically tolerated” made “it all but
certain harms would arise” to individuals such as Meekins, and led to the violation
of Meekins’ Fourth Amendment rights.
Although “[a] Monell claim that survives summary judgment is
exceedingly rare, and rightly so,” Hanson v. Madison Cty. Detention Ctr., 736
Fed.Appx. 521, 542 (6th Cir.2018), we believe that this is such a case.
Following a thorough review of the record and construing the
evidence in the light most favorable to Meekins, we find that triable issues of fact
exist as to (1) whether Officer Sustarsic recklessly made misleading statements or
omitted material information when requesting a warrant for Meekins’ arrest and (2)
whether the municipal court judge would have issued the arrest warrant in the
absence of the alleged misleading statements or omissions. We further find, based
on the evidence before us, that reasonable jurors could disagree as to whether the
alleged inadequacy of the city’s staffing, policies, training or supervision was obvious
and so likely to result in the violation of the constitutional rights of potential
defendants that the city could be found to be deliberately indifferent. We further
find that reasonable jurors could disagree as to whether the city was a “moving force”
behind the alleged violation of Meekins’ constitutional rights, i.e., whether but for
the city’s alleged “policy or custom” of inadequate staffing, training or supervision,
Meekins’ constitutional rights would not have been violated.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in
favor of the city on Meekins’ Section 1983 claims. Meekins’ assignment of error is
sustained.
Judgment reversed.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the Cuyahoga County Court of
Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
___________________________
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCURS;
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE OPINION
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J., DISSENTING:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion reversing the trial
court’s decision granting summary judgment. As the majority points out, the only
defendant left in this case is the city of Oberlin, and “a local government may not be
sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell
v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
“Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom * * * inflicts the
injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id.
In expanding on this legal theory, the United States Supreme Court
held that “to infer a thoroughly nebulous ‘policy’ of ‘inadequate training’ on the part
of the municipal corporation from [a] single incident * * * provides a means for
circumventing Monell’s limitations altogether.” Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S.
808, 823, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985). In other words, “[p]roof of a single
incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under
Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing,
unconstitutional municipal policy * * *.” Id. at 823-824.
Accordingly, Meekins’s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims
cannot stand under Section 1983 unless his “customs and policies” claim
independently survives summary judgment. In the case at hand, Meekins simply
offers no evidence of systemic fault or deliberate indifference by the city of Oberlin
and no causal connection between an alleged unconstitutional policy and a violation
of Meekins’s constitutional rights. See Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109
S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (“the inadequacy of police training may serve as
the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact”).
I would find that Meekins cannot overcome summary judgment on
his federal claims against the city of Oberlin. Therefore, I would affirm the trial
court.