Communicare v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs. , 2019 Ohio 3757 ( 2019 )

[Cite as Communicare v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2019-Ohio-3757.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
COMMUNICARE D.B.A.
NORTHWESTERN
HEALTHCARE CENTER :
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
v. :
No. 106874
OHIO DEPARTMENT OF
JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 19, 2019
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-17-886013
Appearances:
Nicholas A. Kulik, for appellant.
Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, and Rebecca L.
Thomas, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:
Appellant Communicare d.b.a. Northwestern Healthcare Center
(“Communicare”), as authorized representative of Mohsen Fanous, appeals the trial
court’s judgment affirming the decision of the Ohio Department of Job and Family
Services (“ODJFS”) that denied Fanous’ application for Medicaid benefits. As
discussed below, because Fanous’ known countable resources exceeded the
Medicaid eligibility limit, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
As reflected in the trial court’s decision, Fanous’ Medicaid application
was initially denied by the Cuyahoga County Department of Job and Family Services
because Fanous failed to verify potential resources. Fanous sought review by
ODJFS. The agency remanded the matter to the county for re-evaluation.
The county subsequently determined that Fanous owned real estate
with an equity value of approximately $16,000. It also made subsequent requests
for Fanous to verify other potential resources. Fanous failed to respond to multiple
verification requests related to four active businesses and ten vehicles.
Because Fanous’ known resources exceeded the Medicaid eligibility
limit and he failed to verify other resources, the county denied his application.
Fanous again appealed to ODJFS. The agency determined that his
application was properly denied. Fanous appealed to the director of ODJFS and the
resulting administrative appeal decision affirmed the denial of Fanous’ application.
As reflected in the agency decision, at the time Fanous applied for Medicaid:
[Fanous] owned four pieces of real property and one was sold for
$9,000. Of the other properties, one had an equity value of $10,004,
the second had an equity of $3,667.51 and the third had an equity value
of $2,178. * * * The value of the properties all exceeded the resource
limit both individually and collectively * * *.
Fanous sought review of the agency decision by the Cuyahoga County
Court of Common Pleas. Following its review, the court found that the decision
denying Fanous’ application was “supported by reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence.” It cited a “two-fold” basis for denying the application: (1) Fanous’ real
property constituted resources in excess of the Medicaid limit and (2) Fanous failed
to verify other potential countable resources. The court found that Fanous’ real
property was an independent and sufficient basis for denying the application.
Regardless of whether Fanous was entitled to assistance in responding to the
outstanding verifications, the application was properly denied because Fanous “still
owns resources, in the form of real property, that exceed the Medicaid eligibility
limit.”
The court found an alternative basis for affirming the agency decision,
determining that Communicare lacked legal standing to pursue the appeal in the
trial court.
Assignments of Error
On appeal to this court, Communicare asserts three assignments of
error:
1. The court of common pleas erred in dismissing Mr. Fanous’ appeal
for lack of jurisdiction and the dismissal is inconsistent with this court’s
holding that a designated authorized representative has standing to
bring an appeal of a Medicaid denial on behalf of the applicant.
2. The court of common pleas erred in dismissing Mr. Fanous’ appeal
in concluding that he owns available resources that exceed the
Medicaid eligibility limit.
3. The court of common pleas erred in dismissing Mr. Fanous’ appeal
in concluding that Mr. Fanous and his authorized representation failed
to provide the required verification to ODJFS.
We address the assignments of error in an order that aids our analysis.
Law and Analysis
Standard of Review
In the context of this appeal, this court reviews whether the court of
common pleas abused its discretion in finding that the administrative agency’s
decision was supported by “reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.” Tiggs v.
Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2018-Ohio-3164, 118 N.E.3d 985, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.)
citing Kinasz-Reagan v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 164 Ohio App. 3d 458,
2005-Ohio-5848, 842 N.E.2d 1067 (8th Dist.), ¶ 11, fn. 2. The Supreme Court has
explained the extent of our review as follows:
In reviewing an order of an administrative agency, an appellate court’s
role is more limited than that of a trial court reviewing the same order.
It is incumbent on the trial court to examine the evidence. Such is not
the charge of the appellate court. The appellate court is to determine
only if the trial court has abused its discretion.
Id., quoting Lorain City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 40
Ohio St. 3d 257, 260-261, 533 N.E.2d 264 (1988); see also Brown v. Ohio Dept. of
Job & Family Servs., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92008, 2009-Ohio-1096, ¶ 11 (“[T]he
record must show more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court’s
attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or uncounscionable.”).
Real Property as a Countable Resource
In the second assignment of error Communicare argues that the trial
court erred by considering Fanous’ real property as a countable resource for purpose
of determining his Medicaid eligibility. Communicare does not dispute that the
value of Fanous’ real property exceeded the resource limit. Instead, it argues that
the properties should not have been considered as countable resources because
Fanous was not able to sell them.
At the time Fanous applied for Medicaid benefits, per the relevant
regulation, if an applicant’s countable resources exceeded the $2,000 “resource
limit,” that person was not eligible for coverage. See former Ohio Admin.Code
5160:1-3-05.1(B)(8)(a), effective Aug. 1, 2016 (“‘Resource limit’ means maximum
combined value of all resources an individual can have an ownership interest in and
still qualify for medical assistance.”). For this purpose, “resources” include:
[C]ash, other liquid asset, personal property, and real property an
individual * * * has an ownership interest in, has the legal ability to
access in order to convert to cash (if not already cash), and is not legally
prohibited from using for support and maintenance.
former Ohio Admin.Code 5160:1-3-05.1(B)(7), effective Aug. 1, 2016.
Communicare argues that the trial court erred by considering Fanous’
real property for eligibility purposes because Fanous was not able to sell the
properties. Fanous argues that because he could not sell the properties, he lacked
the “ability to convert [the properties] to cash.” Thus, according to its argument, the
properties fail to meet the definition of “resources.”
We disagree. As stated, the plain language of the rule required a
person to have the “legal ability to access in order to convert to cash (if not already
cash) * * *.” Whether Fanous was able to find a purchaser is a wholly different
consideration from what the regulation contemplated, namely whether Fanous had
the legal authority to sell the properties in the first place.
Additionally, Communicare argues that the trial court erred by
considering the properties as resources because Fanous was “unable to convert two
of his three real properties into cash within twenty (20) days.” As a basis for this
argument, he cites a definition of “liquid resources” from an unrelated federal
regulation.
We also reject this argument. Notwithstanding the federal regulation,
nothing in former Ohio Admin.Code 5160:1-3-05.1 imposed a requirement that a
resource must be able to be converted to cash within 20 days before it can be
considered for eligibility purposes.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in affirming the
administrative appeal decision. The record is clear: the value of Fanous’ real
property was in excess of the Medicaid resource limit. We overrule this assignment
of error.
Standing
In the first assignment of error, Communicare argues that the trial
court erred by determining it did not have standing to bring the appeal on the basis
of Tiggs v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2018-Ohio-3164, 118 N.E.3d 985 (8th
Dist.), which was decided during the pendency of this appeal.
In Tiggs, this court recognized that a long-term care nursing facility,
which had been designated as a resident’s Medicaid authorized representative, had
standing to file an appeal on behalf of the resident to challenge the termination of
his Medicaid benefits. See also Juanita Fowler Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. Ohio
Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106989, 2019-Ohio-1238,
¶ 10-13 (recognizing Tiggs is controlling and permits Medicaid authorized
representative to appeal to the trial court).
Similar to Tiggs, Fanous executed a “designation of authorized
representative” form authorizing Communicare to “[t]ake any action that may be
needed to ensure that I receive or continue to receive [Medicaid benefits].”
As to determining whether Communicare is a proper party to bring
this appeal, we find Tiggs to be indistinguishable and controlling. ODJFS disagrees
with this conclusion, but relies on arguments we have previously rejected, and has
thus “not identified any basis upon which to distinguish Tiggs from this case.”
Fowler at ¶ 13.
{¶ 21} However, regardless of whether the trial erred in determining that
Communicare did not have standing to appeal, Communicare suffered no prejudice.
See Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Thompson & Ward Leasing Co., 158 Ohio App. 3d 369,
2004-Ohio-3972, 815 N.E.2d 1126, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.), citing Smith v. Flesher, 12 Ohio
St.2d. 107, 233 N.E.2d 137 (1967) (“Claimed error alone may not support reversal;
the party assigning error must demonstrate prejudice resulting therefrom.”). As
previously discussed, the trial court addressed the merits of the appeal and found
sufficient basis to conclude that the agency’s decision was appropriate because
Fanous’ real property caused him to exceed the resource limit and we found the
court did not abuse its discretion in so concluding. Accordingly, the court’s error in
determining Communicare lacked standing is harmless.
{¶ 22} We overrule this assignment of error.
Assistance in Obtaining Verifications
{¶ 23} In the third assignment of error, Communicare argues that the trial
court abused its discretion in affirming the administrative appeal decision because
“the agency failed to assist Mr. Fanous in obtaining verifications * * *.”
{¶ 24} We disagree. Because Fanous’ known countable resources caused
him to exceed the eligibility limit, the status of the incomplete verifications is moot.
In affirming the agency decision, the trial court found as much, stating that “[e]ven
if this court found * * * Fanous was entitled to assistance from ODJFS in responding
to the verification forms, Mr. Fanous still owns resources, in the form of real
property, that exceed the Medicaid eligibility limit.” We find no abuse of discretion.
{¶ 25} We overrule this assignment of error.
{¶ 26} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR