Pro's Closet v. City of Boulder , 2019 COA 128 ( 2019 )

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
August 22, 2019
2019COA128
No. 18CA1275, Pro’s Closet v. City of Boulder — Local
Government — Pawnbrokers
A division of the court of appeals interprets the definition of
“pawnbroker” in section 29-11.9-101(7), C.R.S. 2018, and holds
that it includes persons regularly engaged in making “purchase
transactions,” as that term is defined in section 29-11.9-101(8), and
not just persons regularly engaged in making “contracts for
purchase,” as that term is defined in section 29-11.9-101(1), who
also make purchase transactions.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2019COA128
Court of Appeals No. 18CA1275
Boulder County District Court No. 17CV30652
Honorable Patrick Butler, Judge
The Pro’s Closet, Inc., a Delaware corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
City of Boulder, Colorado, and Michael Dougherty, in his official capacity as the
District Attorney for the 20th Judicial District of Colorado,
Defendants-Appellees.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES
Román and Lipinsky, JJ., concur
Announced August 22, 2019
LaszloLaw, Theodore E. Laszlo, Jr., Michael J. Laszlo, Boulder, Colorado; Sean
Connelly, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Thomas A. Carr, City Attorney, Luis Toro, Senior Assistant City Attorney,
Boulder, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee City of Boulder
Ben Perlman, County Attorney, David Hughes, Deputy County Attorney,
Catherine R. Ruhland, Assistant County Attorney, Boulder, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellee Michael Dougherty
¶1 Plaintiff, The Pro’s Closet, Inc., appeals the district court’s
summary judgment in favor of defendant, the City of Boulder. The
court ruled that Pro’s Closet is a “pawnbroker” as defined in section
29-11.9-101, C.R.S. 2018, and is therefore subject to the
requirements, restrictions, and potential sanctions of the state
pawnbroker laws, sections 29-11.9-101 to -104, C.R.S. 2018.
Because we conclude that the district court didn’t err in
interpreting the pawnbroker statutes, we affirm the judgment.
I. Background
¶2 Pro’s Closet is licensed in Boulder as a secondhand dealer
under the Boulder Revised Code. It sells used bicycles, bicycle
parts, and bicycle gear. Though it has a warehouse in Boulder,
Pro’s Closet does most of its business online.
¶3 In 2016, the Twentieth Judicial District’s District Attorney’s
Office told the Boulder Police Department to treat Pro’s Closet as a
“pawnbroker” under state law, meaning, among other things, that
Pro’s Closet must hold used goods it buys for thirty days before
reselling them instead of ninety-six hours as required by the
Boulder Revised Code’s secondhand dealer ordinances. See § 29-
11.9-103(6), C.R.S. 2018; Boulder Rev. Code 4-17-10. Pro’s Closet
1
filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that it isn’t subject to
state pawnbroker laws.
¶4 Both Pro’s Closet and the City moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the City’s motion, concluding that, since
Pro’s Closet regularly makes “purchase transaction[s]” as defined by
section 29-11.9-101(8), it is a pawnbroker under state law.
II. Discussion
¶5 Pro’s Closet argues on appeal that (1) the district court erred
in ruling that it is a pawnbroker under section 29-11.9-101; and (2)
because Colorado’s and the City’s secondhand dealer laws are more
specific to its business, it isn’t subject to state pawnbroker laws. 1
We reject both arguments.
A. Pro’s Closet is a Pawnbroker Under State Law
¶6 Pro’s Closet argues first that the district court incorrectly
interpreted section 29-11.9-101 in concluding that it is a
“pawnbroker.”
1Pro’s Closet asserted four more arguments in its opening and reply
briefs, but later withdrew them.
2
1. Standard of Review and Interpretive Principles
¶7 We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Colo. Oil
& Gas Conservation Comm’n v. Martinez, 2019 CO 3, ¶ 19.
¶8 In construing a statute, we look to the entire statutory scheme
to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts,
and we apply words and phrases in accordance with their plain and
ordinary meanings. Id.; Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter, 255 P.3d 1083,
1088-89 (Colo. 2011). When the statutory language is clear, we
apply it as written, without resorting to other principles of statutory
interpretation. Martinez, ¶ 19; Denver Post Corp., 255 P.3d at 1088.
2. Analysis
¶9 Article 11.9 of title 29 of the Colorado Revised Statutes
regulates certain activities of “pawnbrokers.” §§ 29-11.9-101
to -104. It both requires and prohibits specified acts by
pawnbrokers, §§ 29-11.9-103, -104, and it creates criminal
penalties for noncompliance, § 29-11.9-104(3)(b), (4).2 The required
2 The pawnbroker statutes also allow for local licensing and
regulation of pawnbrokers, subject to limitations, § 29-11.9-102,
C.R.S. 2018, and dictate a criminal penalty for any customer who
knowingly gives certain kinds of false information to a pawnbroker,
§ 29-11.9-104(5), C.R.S. 2018.
3
act that Pro’s Closet apparently considers the most onerous is the
requirement to “hold all property purchased by [the pawnbroker]
through a purchase transaction for thirty days following the date of
purchase . . . .” § 29-11.9-103(6).
¶ 10 Section 29-11.9-101(7) defines a “pawnbroker” as “a person
regularly engaged in the business of making contracts for purchase
or purchase transactions in the course of his or her business.”
(Emphasis added.) Section 29-11.9-101(1) defines a “contract for
purchase” as
a contract entered into between a pawnbroker
and a customer pursuant to which money is
advanced to the customer by the pawnbroker
on the delivery of tangible personal property by
the customer on the condition that the
customer, for a fixed price and within a fixed
period of time, to be no less than thirty days,
has the option to cancel said contract.
And section 29-11.9-101(8) defines a “purchase transaction” as
the purchase by a pawnbroker in the course of
his or her business of tangible personal
property for resale, other than newly
manufactured tangible personal property that
has not previously been sold at retail, when
the purchase does not constitute a contract for
purchase.
4
¶ 11 The City doesn’t claim that Pro’s Closet makes “contracts for
purchase”; it claims that Pro’s Closet regularly engages in the
business of making “purchase transactions,” as that term is
statutorily defined. For its part, Pro’s Closet doesn’t dispute that it
regularly makes purchase transactions. Instead, it argues that to
be a “pawnbroker” under the state statutes, a person or business
must regularly make contracts for purchase. A business that
makes purchase transactions only counts as a “pawnbroker,” Pro’s
Closet says, if its primary business is making contracts for
purchase.
¶ 12 Pro’s Closet’s reading of the definitional statute is untenable.
Giving the language in that statute its plain and ordinary meaning
— that is, applying well-established rules of grammar and the
common understanding of the words’ usage — we conclude that
section 29-11.9-101(7) expressly provides two alternative means of
qualifying as a “pawnbroker.” See § 2-4-101, C.R.S. 2018 (“Words
and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to
the rules of grammar and common usage,” unless they have
otherwise “acquired a technical or particular meaning.”). It does so
by articulating those means — regularly making contracts for
5
purchase or regularly making purchase transactions — in the
disjunctive by use of the word “or.” See Lombard v. Colo. Outdoor
Educ. Ctr., Inc., 187 P.3d 565, 571 (Colo. 2008) (“Generally, we
presume the disjunctive use of the word ‘or’ marks distinctive
categories.”); Bloomer v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 799 P.2d 942, 946
(Colo. 1990) (“The legislature’s use of the disjunctive ‘or’ demarcates
different categories.”), overruled on other grounds by Bertrand v. Bd.
of Cty. Comm’rs, 872 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1994). A “pawnbroker” within
the meaning of section 29-11.9-101(1), (7), (8) is therefore an entity
that regularly engages either in the business of making contracts for
purchase or in the business of making purchase transactions.
¶ 13 It is undisputed that Pro’s Closet regularly engages in the
business of making purchase transactions. It is therefore a
“pawnbroker” under state law.
¶ 14 Pro’s Closet’s proposed interpretation of “pawnbroker” — that
only businesses that regularly make contracts for purchase qualify
— fails for two main reasons. First, accepting it would require us to
contravene the principle that a court must give sensible effect to all
parts of a statute. § 2-4-201(1)(b), C.R.S. 2018 (court must
presume the General Assembly intended all parts of a statute to be
6
effective); Martinez, ¶ 19. After all, if, as Pro’s Closet argues, a
business must regularly make contracts for purchase to be a
“pawnbroker,” then the General Assembly would have had no
reason to include the phrase “or purchase transactions” in
subsection 101(7)’s definition of a “pawnbroker”: businesses
regularly engaged in making contracts for purchase but that also
regularly make purchase transactions would be a mere subset of
businesses regularly engaged in making contracts for purchase. 3
Put a bit differently, every business that regularly makes contracts
for purchase qualifies as a “pawnbroker” under subsection 101(1),
regardless of whether it also makes purchase transactions: saying,
as Pro’s Closet proposes, that “pawnbroker” only includes
businesses that regularly make contracts for purchase, including
those that also make purchase transactions, is no different, in
3 Pro’s Closet’s position can be expressed in an algebraic form as
follows: a (regularly making contracts for purchase, see § 29-11.9-
101(1), C.R.S. 2018) = x (pawnbroker); and a (regularly making
contracts for purchase, see § 29-11.9-101(1)) + b (regularly making
purchase transactions, see § 29-11.9-101(8)) = x (pawnbroker); but
b (regularly making purchase transactions, see § 29-11.9-101(8)) ≠
x (pawnbroker). Another way to conceptualize Pro’s Closet’s
position as contrasted with our interpretation — in terms of sets
and subsets — is shown in Appendix A to this opinion.
7
terms of defining covered entities, from saying “pawnbroker”
includes only businesses that regularly make contracts for
purchase. So Pro’s Closet’s proposed interpretation impermissibly
renders the last phrase of subsection 101(7) — “or purchase
transactions in the course of his or her business” — and all of
subsection 101(8) — defining a “purchase transaction” —
superfluous. Kinder Morgan CO2 Co., L.P. v. Montezuma Cty. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 2017 CO 72, ¶ 24 (we must strive to avoid any
interpretation that would render words or phrases superfluous).
¶ 15 Second, Pro’s Closet’s position is inconsistent with and would
undermine certain purposes of the pawnbroker statutes, as
reflected in the entire statutory scheme. Martinez, ¶ 19 (we must
consider the entire statutory scheme when discerning legislative
intent). Those purposes include enabling law enforcement to track
and recover stolen tangible personal property and assisting law
enforcement officials in apprehending those trafficking in stolen
tangible personal property. To those ends, the statutes imposing
record-keeping, holding, and other related requirements apply
expressly, and largely to the same extent, to both property held via
contracts for purchase and property obtained via purchase
8
transactions. § 29-11.9-103(1)-(7); § 29-11.9-104(1). Pro’s Closet
hasn’t explained why the General Assembly would want to exempt
from this scheme that category of persons regularly engaged in
making purchase transactions who aren’t primarily in the business
of making contracts for purchase. See Metal Mgmt. W., Inc. v. State,
251 P.3d 1164, 1173 (Colo. App. 2010) (rejecting a proposed
limitation on the meaning of a statutory term because doing so
would “undermine the legislature’s intent and defeat the purpose of
the statute”).
¶ 16 Our interpretation of the definitional statute also finds support
in its history, particularly when considered in light of other states’
pawnbroker laws. The General Assembly enacted the first version
of Colorado’s pawnbroker-regulating statutes in 1897. See Ch. 66,
1897 Colo. Sess. Laws 250. It initially defined “pawnbroker” as
“[a]ny person or persons loaning money on personal property and
charging as much as the maximum rate of interest herein
provided . . . .” Ch. 66, sec. 16, 1897 Colo. Sess. Laws 254. Save
for the interest rate aspect, that definition tracked in substance the
traditional understanding of pawnbroker, as now reflected in
subsection 101(1)’s definition of “contract for purchase.” And that
9
definition remained unchanged, see § 12-56-101, C.R.S. 1978, until
1984 when the General Assembly repealed the existing statutes and
replaced them with the substantially amended versions applicable
today. See §§ 12-56-101 to -104, C.R.S. 1984; Ch. 246, sec. 3,
2017 Colo. Sess. Laws 1038-41 (relocating the statutes to title 29,
article 11.9). In doing so, the General Assembly abandoned the old
unitary definition of a pawnbroker, which, again, was in line with
the traditional understanding of the term, and replaced it with a
plainly more expansive, disjunctively phrased definition. Had the
General Assembly wished to keep the traditional understanding, its
amendment to the definition, if any, would have looked much
different.
¶ 17 This latter point is further borne out by comparing the current
definition of “pawnbroker” in subsection 101(7) with those that
appear in other states’ pawnbroker statutes, most of which have
been on the books for many decades. Almost every state, as well as
the District of Columbia, has laws regulating pawnbrokers. Their
definitions of pawnbroker can be sorted into three broad categories.
First, a few states’ statutes limit their definitions to the traditional
understanding — a person who lends money in exchange for a
10
pledge of personal property. E.g., Alaska Stat. § 08.76.590(21)-(23)
(2018); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 646.010 (2017); R.I. Gen. Laws § 19-26-1
(2018). Second, many states’ statutes, perhaps in the service of
loophole closing, include not just persons who lend money secured
by personal property, but also persons who buy personal property
on the condition that the seller may buy back the property for a
stipulated price within a fixed or variable period of time. E.g., Ala.
Code § 5-19A-2(4) (2019); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1621 (2019);
205 Ill. Comp. Stat. 510/1 (2019); Minn. Stat. § 325J.01 (2018);
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 367.011(3) (2018); Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-4000
(2019). 4 Third, some states’ statutes, in addition to covering those
who lend money on pledged personal property, or sometimes also in
addition to covering those who buy personal property subject to the
seller’s right to buy it back, also cover other specific persons, such
as those who hold themselves out as pawnbrokers (usually via
signage) or who warehouse furniture and lend money on pledge of
4 For those wondering whether this category might track “purchase
transactions” under Colorado law, we observe that Colorado’s
definition of “purchase transaction” isn’t limited to transactions
where the seller has the right to buy back the property for a
stipulated price within a fixed or variable period of time. We think
the lack of any such limitation is significant.
11
goods. E.g., Fla. Stat. § 539.001(2)(h), (i) (2018); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 45:22-1 (West 2019); Utah Code Ann. § 13-32a-102(22), (23) (West
2019); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 3861 (2018).
¶ 18 Colorado’s definition of “pawnbroker” is unlike any of those: it
is unique. The General Assembly certainly had a lot of material
from other jurisdictions from which it could have drawn in 1984,
but it decided to go its own way.
¶ 19 Undaunted, Pro’s Closet’s argues that its interpretation is
warranted for two reasons, both of which we reject.
¶ 20 Pro’s Closet asserts that the language “when the purchase
does not constitute a contract for purchase” in subsection 101(8)’s
definition of “purchase transaction” evinces an intent to limit
“pawnbrokers” to those primarily engaged in the business of
making contracts for purchase. But that phrase obviously serves to
further distinguish contracts for purchase and purchase
transactions: if a transaction meets the definition of contract for
purchase, then that’s what it is; if it doesn’t, then it may be a
purchase transaction.
¶ 21 Pro’s Closet also points to the use of the term “pawnbroker” in
subsection 101(8). It argues that to cure a circularity in the
12
definition of “pawnbroker” created when subsections 101(7) and
101(8) are read together, “pawnbroker,” as used in subsection
101(8), must be given its commonly understood meaning — that is,
the one reflected in subsection 101(1). See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v.
Dep’t of Revenue, 397 P.3d 1111, 1117 (Colo. App. 2011) (“When a
definition uses the term being defined, or a synonym, as the
definition it is circular and provides little guidance.”), rev’d on other
grounds, 2014 CO 59. But, as discussed, doing that would in turn
render subsection 101(8), as well as the last phrase of subsection
101(7), meaningless. Again, if only persons who qualify as
“pawnbrokers” under subsection 101(1) are “pawnbrokers” under
subsection 101(7), the last phrase of subsection 101(7) and all of
subsection 101(8) do no work.
¶ 22 As well, Pro’s Closet’s proposed fix for the potential partial
circularity merely substitutes one oddity for another. For if the
commonly understood meaning of pawnbroker (as opposed to the
statutory definition) must be given to “pawnbroker” in subsection
101(8), it follows that it must also be given to “pawnbroker” in
subsection 101(1). And that would render the definition of
“contract for purchase” in that subsection internally repetitive. As
13
Pro’s Closet concedes, subsection 101(1), as written, describes
transactions ordinarily considered pawnbroker transactions —
those where a person lends money in exchange for personal
property that is deposited as security by the borrower, and which
property the lender may sell if the borrower fails to repay the loan
by a certain time. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1362 (11th ed. 2019);
see also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1658 (2002).
To superimpose that commonly understood meaning of pawnbroker
on the term “pawnbroker” in that subsection would result in the
following reading of subsection 101(1):
“Contract for purchase” means a contract
entered into between [one who lends money in
exchange for personal property that is
deposited as security by the borrower, and
which the lender may sell if the borrower fails
to repay the loan by a certain time] and a
customer pursuant to which money is
advanced to the customer by the [one who
lends money in exchange for personal property
that is deposited as a security by the borrower,
and which the lender may sell if the borrower
fails to repay the loan by a certain time] on the
delivery of tangible personal property by the
customer on the condition that the customer,
for a fixed price and within a fixed period of
14
time, to be no less than thirty days, 5 has the
option to cancel said contract.
¶ 23 The definition would therefore end with one description of a
pawnbroker transaction on top of a virtually identical description.
We see no reason to believe the General Assembly intended such
redundancy, nor, as previously discussed, do we see any reason the
General Assembly would have intended to use “pawnbroker” in
subsection 101(8) in a way that, considered in connection with
subsections 101(7) and 101(1), renders subsection 101(8) and the
last phrase of subsection 101(7) of no effect. A more sensible
reading of “pawnbroker” in subsections 101(1) and 101(8) is a
“person” who regularly enters into the described transactions. This
is so because (1) subsection 101(7) — defining “pawnbroker” —
defines a “pawnbroker” as “a person” who regularly makes either of
two types of transactions; and (2) reading the term as Pro’s Closet
proposes creates the problems identified above. See Martinez, ¶ 19
5 The phrase “to be no less than thirty days” is seemingly intended
to limit the definition to be consistent with the holding requirement
of section 29-11.9-103(6), C.R.S. 2018. It doesn’t pertain to the
nature of the covered transactions.
15
(we must strive to give harmonious and sensible effect to all parts of
a statute).
¶ 24 Lastly, we reject Pro’s Closet’s argument that our
interpretation will lead to absurd results. Pro’s Closet says this is
so because the statutes will have very broad application. But it is a
mistake to equate breadth with absurdity. To be sure, reading a
term broadly may, in a particular situation, lead to an absurd
result. But such a result isn’t the inevitable result of any
interpretation that can be characterized as broad. Because breadth
is a relative concept, whether a broad construction of a statute
would lead to an absurd result necessarily depends on an analysis
of the particular circumstances in which it could apply in light of
the statutory objectives. Undertaking such an analysis here, we see
no absurdity arising from our enforcement of the unambiguous
definition of “pawnbroker.” See Oracle Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue,
2017 COA 152, ¶ 40 (“An absurd result is one ‘so irrational,
unnatural, or inconvenient that it cannot be supposed to have been
within the intention of persons with ordinary intelligence and
discretion.’” (quoting Evans Withycombe, Inc. v. W. Innovations, Inc.,
159 P.3d 547, 550 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006))), aff’d, 2019 CO 42; see
16
also Smith v. Exec. Custom Homes, Inc., 230 P.3d 1186, 1191 (Colo.
2010) (“The rule that we will deviate from the plain language of a
statute to avoid an absurd result must be reserved for those
instances where a literal interpretation of a statute would produce a
result contrary to the expressed intent of the legislature.”).
¶ 25 To be sure, the potential scope of the statutes’ application
gives us some pause. But we must enforce the statutes as written.
To the extent the result of doing so may be perceived by some as
undesirable, “the legislature must determine the remedy. Courts
may not rewrite statutes to improve them.” Dep’t of Transp. v. City
of Idaho Springs, 192 P.3d 490, 494 (Colo. App. 2008) (citation
omitted); accord Smith, 230 P.3d at 1191 (“Where a statute leads to
undesirable results, it is up to the General Assembly, not the
courts, to determine the remedy.”). 6
6 At oral argument, Pro’s Closet’s counsel sought to argue, for the
first time in this case, that the phrase “in the course of his or her
business” in subsections 101(7) and 101(8) somehow indicates that
the General Assembly intended that only businesses that are
primarily engaged in making contracts for purchase, see § 29-11.9-
101(1), be regarded as pawnbrokers. We don’t address arguments
raised for the first time at oral argument. McGihon v. Cave, 2016
COA 78, ¶ 10 n.1. But even if we are wrong about whether Pro’s
Closet preserved this argument, we reject it. We don’t see anything
17
B. The Secondhand Dealer Statutes Do Not Prevail Over the
Pawnbroker Statutes
¶ 26 Pro’s Closet also contends that Colorado’s secondhand dealer
statutes, sections 18-13-114 and -118, C.R.S. 2018, trump the
pawnbroker statutes because they are more specifically applicable
to Pro’s Closet’s business.
1. Standard of Review and Governing Law
¶ 27 Again, we review issues of statutory construction de novo.
Martinez, ¶ 19.
¶ 28 “[I]n the event of irreconcilable conflict, specific provisions
trump general provisions.” Colo. Mining Ass’n v. Bd. of Cty.
Comm’rs, 199 P.3d 718, 733 (Colo. 2009); see also § 2-4-205, C.R.S.
2018; Delta Sales Yard v. Patten, 892 P.2d 297, 298 (Colo. 1995) (“It
is a well-accepted principle of statutory construction that in the
case of conflict, a more specific statute controls over a more general
one.”).
in that language, considered in the context of the other relevant
parts of section 101, that affects our analysis. The natural reading
of that phrase is that it distinguishes transactions entered into in
the course of a person’s business from those entered into by a
person (who may be a pawnbroker) acting in his personal capacity.
18
2. Analysis
¶ 29 The secondhand dealer statutes that Pro’s Closet cites
criminalize certain conduct with respect to the sale of secondhand
property in Colorado. A secondhand dealer 7 must record certain
sales or trades it makes. § 18-13-114(1). It must then provide that
record to local law enforcement officials and keep a copy of the
record for inspection. Id. A first-time violation of these
requirements is a class 1 misdemeanor; a subsequent violation
within three years of the conviction for the first offense is
punishable as a class 5 felony. § 18-13-114(6)(a).
¶ 30 We see no conflict between the record-keeping requirements
for secondhand dealers in the criminal code and the record-keeping
and holding requirements for pawnbrokers in title 29. Nor has
Pro’s Closet shown how following one set of laws impacts a
7 A “secondhand dealer” is “any person whose principal business is
that of engaging in selling or trading secondhand property.” § 18-
13-114(5)(c), C.R.S. 2018. That definition doesn’t exclude persons
who may also be pawnbrokers. Cf. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 21-39a(3)
(2019) (defining “secondhand dealer” expressly to exclude
pawnbrokers); Utah Code Ann. § 13-32a-102(29) (West 2019)
(same).
19
business’s ability to follow the other. 8 We therefore see no conflict
that would trigger the canon of statutory construction on which
Pro’s Closet relies.
III. Conclusion
¶ 31 We affirm the district court’s judgment.
JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.
8 Pro’s Closet also argues that the pawnbroker statutes conflict with
the City’s secondhand dealer ordinances. But it cites no authority
for the proposition that such a conflict renders a state statute a
nullity, either generally or as applied to particular persons.
20
APPENDIX A
Pro’s Closet’s Proposed Interpretation
Regularly makes Regularly makes
contracts for purchase purchase transactions
(§ 29-11.9-101(1)) (§ 29-11.9-101(8))
The shaded area represents Pro’s Closet’s position as to who
qualifies as a “pawnbroker” under subsection 101(7).
Our Interpretation
Regularly makes Regularly makes
contracts for purchase purchase transactions
(§ 29-11.9-101(1)) (§ 29-11.9-101(8))
The shaded area represents our interpretation of the meaning
of “pawnbroker” under subsection 101(7).
21