U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. Robinson , 2020 Ohio 32 ( 2020 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. Robinson, 2020-Ohio-32.]
    COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, :
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                   :
    No. 108526
    v.                                    :
    TERRENCE ROBINSON, ET AL.,                             :
    Defendants-Appellants.                :
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 9, 2020
    Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CV-15-841611
    Appearances:
    McGlinchey Stafford, and James W. Sandy, for appellee.
    John Wood, for appellants.
    KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:
    Defendants-appellants, Terrence and Kelene Robinson (collectively
    “the Robinsons”) appeal the trial court’s decision granting a decree of foreclosure in
    favor of U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for the Holders of the Specialty
    Underwriting and Residential Finance Trust Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2007-BCI (“U.S. Bank”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm
    the trial court’s decision.
    In 2006, Terrence Robinson (“Terrence”) executed a note in the
    amount of $368,000 in favor of FMF Capital, L.L.C. (“FMF Capital”) to secure funds
    used to purchase property located on Tinkers Valley Drive in Glenwillow, Ohio. The
    Note contains an allonge with an endorsement in blank from FMF Capital.
    In order to secure payment on the note, the Robinsons jointly
    executed a mortgage in favor of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
    (“MERS”) as mortgagee and nominee for FMF Capital, and its successors and
    assigns. The mortgage was recorded on October 4, 2006. On July 24, 2007, MERS,
    as nominee for FMF Capital, its successors and assigns, assigned the mortgage to
    U.S. Bank, National Association as Trustee for the MLMI SURF Trust Series, 2007-
    BC1 (“original assignment”).    On May 23, 2014, a corrective assignment was
    executed by MERS as nominee for FMF Capital, its successors and assigns, to U.S.
    Bank (“corrective assignment”). The corrective assignment provides that it was
    “being recorded to clarify the full name of the assignee” on the original assignment.
    In 2015, U.S. Bank initiated a foreclosure action against the
    Robinsons alleging that Terrence had defaulted under the terms of the note and
    failed to make monthly mortgage payments. Due to the default, U.S. Bank alleged
    that it was entitled to foreclose on its mortgage interest. Because Terrence’s
    obligation on the note was discharged through a 2008 bankruptcy, U.S. Bank did
    not seek a personal monetary judgment against Terrence. Nevertheless, the trial
    court granted summary judgment in favor of the Robinsons finding that any action
    on the note, including foreclosure on the mortgage, was time-barred.
    U.S. Bank appealed this decision contending that enforcing the debt
    obligation under the note and foreclosing on the property are separate and distinct
    causes of action. U.S. Bank v. Robinson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105067, 2019-
    Ohio-5585 (“Robinson I”). This court agreed, concluding that U.S. Bank can
    maintain an action in equity to enforce its mortgage lien on the Robinsons’ real
    property for the unsatisfied debt. Id. at ¶ 13. “U.S. Bank is entitled to maintain an
    action in foreclosure to secure its interest as the mortgagee — upon default, ‘legal
    title to the mortgaged property passes to the mortgagee as between the mortgagor
    and mortgagee.’” Id. at ¶ 8, quoting Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Holden, 
    147 Ohio St. 3d 85
    , 2016-Ohio-4603, 
    60 N.E.3d 1243
    , ¶ 23. Additionally, this court
    stated that whether the Note was discharged in bankruptcy or barred by the relevant
    statute-of-limitations period to pursue a judgment on the note had no effect on
    whether U.S. Bank could foreclose on the mortgage.          Robinson I at ¶ 8, 11.
    Accordingly, this court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the matter
    for further proceedings.
    On remand, a magistrate conducted a bench trial on U.S. Bank’s
    foreclosure action and subsequently issued a decision in favor of U.S. Bank’s claim.
    The Robinsons filed timely objections.      The trial court denied the objections,
    adopted the magistrate’s decision, and entered judgment in favor of U.S. Bank on its
    mortgage interest and ordering a decree of foreclosure. The proceedings were
    stayed pending appeal.
    The Robinsons now appeal contending in their sole assignment of
    error that “the trial court erred in finding that [the Robinsons were] liable for a
    default on the [m]ortgage.”
    I. Standard of Review
    In reviewing a civil appeal from a bench trial, this court applies a
    “manifest weight standard of review.” Benton Village Condominium Owners Assn.
    v. Bridge, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106892, 2018-Ohio-4896, ¶ 13. A reviewing court
    “will not reverse the judgment as being against the manifest weight of the evidence
    if some competent, credible evidence supports all the essential elements of the case.”
    Huntington Natl. Bank v. Miller, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-586, 2016-Ohio-
    5860, ¶ 13, citing C.E. Morris v. Foley Constr. Co., 
    54 Ohio St. 2d 279
    , 280, 
    376 N.E.2d 578
     (1978). Further, “[i]n determining whether a civil judgment is against
    the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court is guided by a presumption
    that the findings of the trial court are correct.” Id., citing Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v.
    Cleveland, 
    10 Ohio St. 3d 77
    , 80, 
    461 N.E.2d 1273
     (1984).
    II. Law of the Case
    In Robinson I, this court held that although Terrence’s personal
    obligation under the note was discharged through a bankruptcy proceeding, U.S.
    Bank could maintain an action to enforce its mortgage lien on the property for the
    unsatisfied debt. Robinson I, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105067, 2017-Ohio-5585, ¶ 13.
    This court also specifically concluded that any statute of limitations prohibiting
    enforcement of the note had no application on enforcing the mortgage lien on the
    property. Id. at ¶ 11. Accordingly, the law of the case is that U.S. Bank may pursue
    its foreclosure action against the Robinsons. Any argument raised in this appeal by
    the Robinsons on this issue is barred by res judicata. The only issue that is left to be
    decided is whether the trial court’s decision granting U.S. Bank a decree of
    foreclosure on the Robinsons property is against the manifest weight of the
    evidence.
    III. Foreclosure
    In a foreclosure action, the plaintiff is required to prove at trial (1) that
    it was either the holder of the note and mortgage or a party entitled to enforce those
    instruments; (2) the chain of assignments and transfers; (3) that the mortgagor was
    in default under the terms of the loan; (4) that all conditions had been met; and (5)
    the amount due. Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Najar, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    98502, 2013-Ohio-1657, ¶ 62.
    A. Consideration of the Note
    The crux of this appeal centers around the idea that because
    Terrence’s obligation under the note has been discharged and no judgment can be
    rendered on the note, “it would seem that no claim upon the Mortgage remains,”
    unless “the mortgage sets forth independent grounds for a money judgment.”
    (Appellants’ Brief, p. 12). Essentially, the Robinsons contend that U.S. Bank cannot
    use a default on the note as grounds to foreclose on the mortgage. Their argument
    is without merit.
    As previously addressed, the law of the case is that U.S. Bank can
    maintain an action in equity to enforce its mortgage lien on the property despite
    Terrence’s obligation under the note being discharged in bankruptcy. Robinson I.
    Moreover, the Ohio Supreme Court held, when considering facts
    virtually identical to those in this case, that an action on a note and an action on a
    mortgage are separate and distinct remedies a lender can pursue as a result of a
    borrower’s default. Holden, 
    147 Ohio St. 3d 85
    , 2016-Ohio-4603, 
    60 N.E.3d 1243
    ,
    at paragraph one of the syllabus. Because these actions are separate and distinct,
    even if one instrument is unenforceable, the lender can still pursue a judgment on
    the other. Id. at ¶ 25. In fact,
    [w]hen debt on a promissory note secured by a mortgage has been
    discharged by a bankruptcy court, the holder of the note may not
    pursue collection against the maker of the note; however, the holder of
    the mortgage has standing to foreclose on the property and to collect
    the deficiency on the note from the foreclosure sale of the property.
    Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
    Accordingly, and contrary to the Robinsons’ second issue raised on
    appeal, Terrence’s bankruptcy discharge of the note obligation did not extinguish
    the Robinsons’ obligation on the mortgage lien that U.S. Bank held on the secured
    property. Even when an action on the note is barred, in order to foreclose on the
    mortgage, the lender must still establish it was the entity entitled to enforce the note
    secured by the mortgage, a default, and the amount due on the note. Holden at ¶ 26,
    28. And generally, the promissory note is the primary evidence of the debt and the
    borrower’s history of payments is evidence of the amount due. Holden at id.
    Accordingly, while no personal judgment may be entered against the maker of the
    note, the note is still relevant to determine the amount due to the holder of the
    mortgage. Holden at ¶ 35.
    B. Privity
    The Robinsons also assert that U.S. Bank was not a party to enforce
    the note or mortgage. Specifically, the Robinsons contend that U.S. Bank was
    required to establish contractual privity with the original lender and provide proof
    of a chain of title in order to establish that it had an interest in the note and to
    foreclose on the mortgage. This exact argument was raised and rejected in Bank of
    Am. v. Rogers, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107464, 2019-Ohio-1443. In Rogers, this
    court stated:
    Ohio courts have held that “by virtue of its possession of the note
    endorsed in blank,” a bank “was the holder of the note and entitled to
    enforce the note under Ohio law.” Najar at [8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    98502, 2013-Ohio-1657, ¶ 62]. Here, [the bank] was the holder of the
    note, and the note was endorsed in blank, thereby empowering it to
    enforce the note.
    Rogers at ¶ 17, citing R.C. 1303.25 and Nationstar Mtge. LLC v. Payne, 2017-Ohio-
    513, 
    85 N.E.3d 249
    , ¶ 1 (10th Dist.).
    Nevertheless, the Robinsons contend that this decision is in conflict
    with our decision in Everbank v. Katz, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100603, 2014-Ohio-
    4080. We disagree, finding that Katz is easily distinguishable because the note in
    Katz was not endorsed in blank, which required the bank to prove chain of title to
    show it validly obtained the note.
    In this case, U.S. Bank produced at trial the original note, endorsed
    in blank, meaning that anyone who possessed it was a “holder” of the note. And
    being in possession of a note endorsed in blank, U.S. Bank was automatically an
    entity entitled to enforce the note. See R.C. 1303.25(B). Accordingly, U.S. Bank was
    not required to establish contractual privity with the original lender in order to
    enforce the note and foreclose on the mortgage.
    C. The Assignments
    The final issue the Robinsons raised on appeal involves whether U.S.
    Bank presented admissible evidence that it is a valid assignee of the mortgage.
    Specifically, they contend that the trial court should not have permitted evidence of
    the assignments due to a discovery violation, and that the assignments that were
    presented were invalid.
    First, “[i]t is settled in this appellate district that a mortgagor lacks
    standing to challenge the assignment of his mortgage directly if the mortgagor is
    neither a party to, nor a third-party beneficiary of, the assignment contract.” Bank
    of New York Mellon v. Froimson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99443, 2013-Ohio-5574,
    ¶ 17, citing Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co. v. Unger, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    97315, 2012-Ohio-1950, ¶ 35. This is because “the assignment does not alter the
    borrower’s obligations under the note or mortgage.” Deutsche Bank Trust Co. of
    Ams. v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105778, 2018-Ohio-587, ¶ 30.
    In this case, the Robinsons are not parties to or third-party
    beneficiaries of the assignment and the assignment does not alter any of the
    Robinsons’ obligations. Much like in Jones, “the default exposed [them] to the
    foreclosure action regardless of the identity of the plaintiff who may prosecute such
    action.” Jones at ¶ 31. The Robinsons attempt to create standing by alleging that
    the assignments were fraudulent. However, no evidence was presented supporting
    this allegation. Accordingly, the Robinsons lack standing to challenge the validity of
    the assignments.
    And considering the merits despite the Robinsons’ lack of standing,
    the trial court’s decision finding that U.S. Bank proved it was the assignee of the
    mortgage was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Alan Blunt, Senior
    Principal of Litigation, Assistant Vice President for Mr. Cooper f.k.a. Nationstar
    Mortgage L.L.C., who is the servicing agent for U.S. Bank, testified that U.S. Bank
    was the current mortgagee of record under a corrective assignment. He stated that
    MERS, as nominee for FMF Capital assigned the Mortgage to U.S. Bank National
    Association as Trustee for MLMI SURF Trust Series 2007-BCI. On May 23, 2014,
    U.S. Bank was named in a corrective assignment, which was “being recorded to
    clarify the full name of the assignee on the Assignment Recorded 7/24/2007
    #200707240323.” Accordingly, the corrective assignment proves that U.S. Bank
    possessed the mortgage at the time the foreclosure complaint was filed.
    Nevertheless, the Robinsons contend that the corrective assignment
    was invalid because it named an entirely different entity from that in the original
    assignment. In support, the Robinsons assert that because U.S. Bank named the
    original assignee as a defendant to the action, it is “apparent” that the two entities
    were distinct, and the corrective assignment was not being used to merely clarify the
    full name of the assignee in the original assignment. We disagree. The record
    reveals that the original assignee was named as a party defendant in the foreclosure
    action because it may have had an interest in the secured property pursuant to an
    assignment of a different mortgage recorded on October 4, 2006, in Instrument
    Number 200610040119. See Paragraph 7 of the Complaint and Preliminary Judicial
    Report filed December 2, 2015.
    The Robinsons also contend that the corrective assignment was
    invalid because FMF Capital, the original lender, was no longer in existence at the
    time the corrective assignment was executed. We disagree.
    It cannot be disputed that the mortgage clearly identifies MERS as
    “nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns,” and “is the mortgagee
    under this Security Instrument.” Under well-settled Ohio law, MERS has the
    authority to assign a mortgage when that mortgage designates MERS as both
    nominee and mortgagee. See Bank of New York Mellon v. Argo, 5th Dist. Richland
    No. 14CA59, 2015-Ohio-268, ¶ 19. Accordingly, MERS had the right and ability to
    assign the mortgage to U.S. Bank.
    MERS’s authority renders the fact that FMF Capital was no longer in
    existence at the time of the assignment to U.S. Bank “legally irrelevant.” See Slorp
    v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss, E.D.Ohio. No. 2:12-CV-498, 
    2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94938
     (July 19, 2016) (Courts have uniformly held that ”it is legally irrelevant
    whether the originating lender was out of existence at the time MERS assigned the
    mortgage.”), citing Ghuman v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
    989 F. Supp. 2d 994
    , 1001
    (E.D.Ca. 2013) (“the fact Lender became defunct did not strip MERS’s authority to
    act under the Deed of Trust”); Handfield v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., N.D.Ga No. 12-
    cv-01080, 
    2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55594
    , 6 (Jan. 23, 2013) (“This Court is unaware
    of any legal authority that would invalidate the assignment from MERS to Wells
    Fargo, simply because Utah Financial, the original lender, was defunct.”); Kiah v.
    Aurora Loan Servs., L.L.C., D.Mass. No. 10-40161-FDS, 
    2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121252
    , 4 (Mar. 4, 2011) (“dissolution would not prevent its successors and assigns
    from seeking transfer of the mortgage from MERS”). Accordingly, the Robinsons’
    argument fails.
    Even if the corrective assignment were invalid, the fact that U.S. Bank
    was the holder of the note endorsed in blank means that U.S. Bank also had an
    equitable assignment of the mortgage. “The physical transfer of the note endorsed
    in blank, which the mortgage secures, constitutes an equitable assignment of the
    mortgage, regardless of whether the mortgage is actually (or validly) assigned or
    delivered.” Najar, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98502, 2013-Ohio-1657, at ¶ 65.
    Finally, the Robinsons contend that the trial court abused its
    discretion in admitting evidence of the assignments because U.S. Bank violated
    Civ.R. 26 by failing to completely answer or supplement its answer to the Robinsons’
    interrogatories. At issue is the response to the Robinsons’ interrogatory requesting
    U.S. Bank to “identify every entity that has or has had an interest in the Mortgage,
    including any trust, and including any claimed equitable assignment of mortgage or
    claimed assignment by operation of law, and the date thereof.” U.S. Bank responded
    that the information sought was irrelevant but answered that the mortgage was
    assigned to U.S. Bank prior to the filing of the complaint.
    In this case, even assuming that U.S. Bank somehow violated Civ.R.
    26 by not fully answering the interrogatory or supplementing its response, the
    Robinsons suffered no prejudice. The information sought by the Robinsons existed
    in the record prior to trial by virtue of the Preliminary Judicial Report that was filed
    on December 3, 2015, with subsequent updated reports filed thereafter. The report
    contains all relevant information regarding the secured property, including how the
    Robinsons acquired title to the property, tax liabilities, and all old and current liens
    in the form of mortgages and assignments. Accordingly, it was not an abuse of
    discretion to allow U.S. Bank to provide evidence of the assignments because the
    record already contained such information.
    IV. Conclusion
    The record before this court demonstrates that the weight of the
    evidence supports the trial court’s decision in granting U.S. Bank a decree of
    foreclosure on the Robinsons’ real property. U.S. Bank presented the original note
    at trial, and Mr. Blunt testified that U.S. Bank, through its servicer, is in possession
    of the note and was in possession of the note at the time the foreclosure action was
    filed. The note is endorsed in blank, making it payable to bearer. Accordingly, U.S.
    Bank is the holder of the note and mortgage and, thus, is a party entitled to enforce
    the mortgage.
    U.S. Bank also provided a corrective assignment of mortgage
    evidencing it is the assignee of the mortgage.         Accordingly, U.S. Bank has
    demonstrated it has an equitable assignment of the mortgage. U.S. Bank further
    demonstrated that the Robinsons are in default of the terms of the mortgage because
    Terrence did not pay according to the terms of the Note and therefore also breached
    the terms and covenants of the mortgage. Mr. Blunt testified to the amounts due to
    U.S. Bank and that it complied with the conditions precedent as set forth in the Note
    and mortgage. Accordingly, a decree of foreclosure was properly granted; the
    assignment of error is overruled.
    Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
    into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
    of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
    MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and
    MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 108526

Citation Numbers: 2020 Ohio 32

Judges: Keough

Filed Date: 1/9/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/9/2020