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Percy L. and Lois V. Bell, et al., Bell v. CommissionerDocket Nos. 22733-84, 25769-84, 37219-84, 37220-84
United States Tax Court May 9, 1988; As amended May 19, 1988 May 9, 1988, Filed*60 R obtained a copy of a criminal indictment, after it had been filed in open court, and used the information contained therein as a basis for the notices of deficiency issued to Ps. Ps contend that R's obtention and use of the indictment was a violation of
rule 6(e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (rule 6(e) ), which shields from public disclosure matters occurring before the grand jury. R's position is that the filed indictment is a public record and the procurement of a copy thereof and the subsequent use of the information contained therein is reasonable and proper. Neither Ps nor R ever filed a petition for disclosure pursuant torule 6(e) with the U.S. District Court seeking matters occurring before the grand jury.Held , the indictment filed in the U.S. District Court on Sept. 30, 1982, is a public record.Held, further , R's obtention of a copy of the indictment and his use thereof in formulating the notices of deficiency was reasonable and proper and, hence, did not violate the secrecy provisions ofrule 6(e) .Held, further , Ps' motion to shift the burden of going forward with untainted evidence and motion to suppress evidence improperly attained is denied.*61James L. Norris Benjamin A. de Luna Whitaker,Judge . Cantrel,Special Trial Judge .WHITAKER; CANTREL*879 OPINION
Petitioners' motions to shift the burden of going forward with untainted evidence and motion to suppress evidence improperly attained filed herein were assigned to Special Trial Judge Francis J. Cantrel. Cantrel,
Special Trial Judge : These cases are presently before the Court on petitioners' motion to shift the burden of going forward*62 with untainted evidence and motion to suppress evidence improperly attained filed in each case. *880 these years, UFO was in the business of promoting and administering tax shelters.In 1979, UFO, Kilpatrick, Declan O'Donnell (O'Donnell), and Shiela Lerner (Lerner) promoted Alpha*63 V Real Estate (Alpha V), Information Realty, Ltd. (Information Realty), North Sea Realty, Ltd. (North Sea), and Xanadu Realty, Ltd. (Xanadu), 4 of approximately 21 methanol limited partnerships which were to involve the development of methanol production processes and plants. *64 It appears that investments in the methanol partnerships were structured to facilitate a deduction on the Federal income tax return for each partner/investor equal to four (4) times the amount of said investor's cash investment through the use of nonrecourse financing. *65 called petitioners Jamtgaard) filed a joint Federal income tax return with the IRS for the taxable year 1979. Thereon they claimed a loss of $ 99,022 attributable to Information Realty. On the date their timely petition was filed they resided in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. *881 income tax returns with the IRS for the taxable years 1979 and 1980. Thereon they claimed losses attributable to Alpha V in the respective amounts of $ 49,500 and $ 36,921. On the date their timely petition was filed, they resided in Littleton, Colorado. *66 Petitioners Donald V. Osborne and Nancy E. Osborne (hereinafter sometimes called petitioners Osborne) filed joint Federal income tax returns with the IRS for the taxable years 1979 and 1980. Thereon they claimed losses attributable to Xanadu in the respective amounts of $ 49,511 and $ 37,094. On the date their timely petition was filed, they resided in Overland Park, Kansas. *68 Special Agent Paul E. Raybin (Raybin) and Revenue Agent Ralph Tanner (Tanner) began a joint investigation of these mineral*67 partnerships in November 1979. *882 Sea, and Xanadu. Additionally, the informer provided a list of investors for some of the methanol partnerships, which list included investors in Alpha V and Information Realty. Two of the investors included in that list are James L. Ramsey, a limited partner in Alpha V, and Glen A. Jamtgaard, a limited partner in Information Realty. *69 Information Realty; November 14, 1980, for Xanadu; and January 29, 1981, for North Sea. Other than processing the tax return requests for the methanol partnerships and the related partners, getting transcripts of the partners' returns, and coordinating the statute of limitations periods with IRS District Director's Offices outside of the Denver, Colorado District (hereinafter called Denver District Office), no other action was taken by her. The identities of the partners in the methanol partnerships were obtained from the list of investors provided by the informer and from information on the Form K-1 attached to each of the methanol partnership returns. *70 On May 12, 1980, the Chief, CID, of the Denver District Office requested, by memorandum addressed to the Regional Commissioner, Southwest Region, a grand jury investigation of Kilpatrick, O'Donnell, and Lerner in accordance with section 9267.2 of the Internal Revenue Manual (hereinafter referred to as IRM). *883 On July 30, 1980, the Office of Chief Counsel for the IRS pursuant to
section 6103(h)(3)(A) forwarded a letter to the Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division, Department of Justice (hereinafter called Department of Justice) recommending that a grand jury investigation be conducted of Kilpatrick and others to gather additional evidence pertaining to the promotion of the methanol partnerships. *71 it would have difficulty developing a case through its normal criminal administrative process. It was further concerned that Kilpatrick, his related entities, and others would be uncooperative and would frustrate any attempt by the IRS to gain access to records by criminal administrative means. It further believed that it would be faced with time consuming challenges to any administrative summonses it issued. This belief was supported by the problems encountered by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in an unrelated matter regarding some of the entities involved with the methanol partnerships, when it issued administrative subpoenas to Kilpatrick, O'Donnell, and related corporations in August and September 1978. All parties refused to comply with the subpoenas. Numerous hearings were held, and in January 1979, a Federal District Court ordered the parties to comply with the subpoenas. This decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, and, as of May 12, 1980, the SEC had received no records.*72 In making its recommendation, the IRS noted that its investigation to date had disclosed the names and addresses of some 360 methanol shelter investors. The IRS also advised, in transmitting some 55 exhibits to the Department of Justice, that its file contained a good deal of information developed outside of any grand jury.
The Department of Justice approved the IRS' recommendation on December 18, 1980, on which date it requested the U.S. Attorney's Office at Denver, Colorado, to institute a grand jury investigation.
*884 Soon after December 18, 1980, the Department of Justice assigned attorney Steven L. Snyder (Snyder) to conduct the grand jury investigation of Kilpatrick and others. In late December 1980, Raybin and Special Agent Richard Mendrop (Mendrop) were assigned to assist Snyder in that investigation. Immediately after their assignments, Raybin and Mendrop received specific instructions from Snyder regarding their duty to safeguard all matters occurring before the grand jury from being disclosed to unauthorized third parties. *74 Additionally, their names were placed on a disclosure list as provided by
rule 6(e) . *73 assigned attorney Thomas Blondin (Blondin) to assist Snyder in the grand jury investigation. Snyder and Blondin were responsible for conducting that investigation.In January 1981, a grand jury convened in Denver, Colorado, to investigate, among others, activities involving the promotion of the methanol partnerships by UFO, Kilpatrick, O'Donnell, and Lerner.
At varying times throughout the grand jury investigation of Kilpatrick, et al., the Department of Justice attorneys directing the investigation requested and received assistance *885 from numerous IRS personnel. At no time did Raybin, Mendrop, or the other IRS personnel whose assistance was requested by Snyder and/or Blondin disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, nor were matters occurring before the grand jury disclosed to them for civil audit purposes.
By memorandum dated January 16, 1981, the Chief, CID, Denver District Office, notified*75 the Chief of its Examination Division (hereinafter referred to as the Examination Division), pursuant to section 9267.4(1) of the IRM that the examination division must suspend all examinations of taxpayers and relevant tax periods which are under grand jury investigation. *76 In March 1981, the methanol partnerships' audits were reassigned from Daugherty to Revenue Agent Co-op Gloria Fuentez (Fuentez), a college student working part-time for the IRS. Fuentez was not required to audit the methanol partnerships' returns. She was to see that all statute of limitations controls were in place, that all tax returns were requested, that all out-of-State District Directors were notified that the Denver District Office was the control district for the methanol partnership audits, and to coordinate any audits of the individual partners with the Denver District Office.
*886 In August 1981, Revenue Agent Stacy Williams (Williams), a computer audit specialist (i.e., a revenue agent with computer training) was assigned to assist in the grand jury investigation of Kilpatrick, et al. Upon commencement of his assignment, he was notified of the secrecy requirements respecting matters occurring before the grand jury and that he was not to disclose such matters in any form or fashion to other revenue agents. His primary duties consisted of computerizing and automating the records and information accumulated by the attorneys responsible for conducting the grand jury*77 investigation. From September 1981 until March 1982, Williams, with assistance from other IRS personnel assigned to assist in the grand jury investigation, caused information contained in records obtained for possible presentment to the grand jury to be placed in computers and automated. *78 be placed into a computer. *887 manner with any of the computer facilities or who assisted in the computerization/automation process disclosed matters occurring before the grand jury, nor were matters occurring before the grand jury disclosed to them for civil audit purposes.
The original partnership*79 returns of Xanadu, North Sea, and Alpha V for 1979 and 1980 were obtained by the Examination Division from the Internal Revenue Service Centers beginning in May 1980 and ending in June 1981. Sometime in 1981, these returns were provided to CID by the examination division.
In July or August 1982, the audits of the methanol partnerships, which included the partnerships, were reassigned to Revenue Agent Richard Gullion (Gullion). At that time, he was advised by his group manager, Greg Lendorf (Lendorf) that the methanol partnerships were related to an ongoing grand jury investigation and that, because of the ongoing grand jury investigation, the examination division would not conduct any civil audits. When Gullion actually received the files for the methanol partnerships, in late October or early November of 1982, he familiarized himself with the names of the various methanol partnerships, the deductions which were claimed, and the number of partners involved. His immediate task, however, was to gain control of some
620 investors who resided in some41 IRS districts. The files contained the January 16, 1981, memorandum, notifying the examination division to suspend the audits*80 of the methanol partnerships. It was Gullion's understanding at the time he received these assignments that the methanol partnerships were assigned to him for civil audit examination when such an examination could be conducted. *888 defendants with mail fraud and/or tax fraud, and Kilpatrick with obstruction of justice. None of the petitioners was indicted.*81 In early October 1982, Gullion learned that the grand jury had returned an indictment in the Kilpatrick, et al. investigation. He was informed of this development by Lendorf, who showed Gullion a newspaper article reporting the indictment. Thereafter, he contacted Mendrop for the purpose of obtaining a copy thereof. Mendrop provided Gullion with a copy of the indictment in October 1982, at which time Gullion studied that part of the indictment which related to the methanol partnerships.
From July or August 1982 through December 1982, Gullion followed CID's instructions by keeping the audits of the methanol partnerships in suspense. During this period, he controlled the methanol partnerships' returns for the purpose of protecting the statute of limitations.
On December 1, 1982, the Chief, CID, by memorandum, informed the Chief, Examination Division, that CID had been advised by the Department of Justice attorneys assigned to the grand jury investigation, that the examination division could proceed with all necessary civil actions on all investors and general partners involved in the methanol partnerships except for Kilpatrick, O'Donnell, and Lerner. No civil action was to be taken*82 regarding Kilpatrick, O'Donnell, Lerner, or any other named defendant without approval from the Department of Justice. Any position taken by the IRS was to be consistent with the Government's position as set forth in the indictment. Any question relating to the positions of the Department of Justice or requests for additional information were to be directed to Mendrop or Raybin.
After receiving a copy of this memorandum in December 1982, Gullion continued in his efforts to get the returns for the methanol partnerships' investors under control. On January 12, 1983 Gullion forwarded notification letters to the partnerships advising that its 1979 and 1980 tax returns had been assigned to him for audit. The letters stated in part:
A report will be issued in the near future containing a position consistent with facts as presented in the Federal Grand Jury indictment *889 of September 30, 1982 for the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.
If you, as the general partner, have questions concerning the partnership examination(s), please call me at the number shown above. Please instruct your limited partners that, for purposes of convenience, I will only discuss*83 the partnership examination(s) at the general partner level and that limited partners should not contact me by phone. All partners will receive letters containing instructions pertaining to their claimed partnership losses, including an offer at the examination level for settlement based on out-of-pocket (cash) investment contribution in the initial year.
Due to the imminent expiration of the statute of limitations respecting the limited partners' returns for the taxable year 1979, and due to the anticipated lack of cooperation by the general partners of the partnerships, Gullion decided to disallow all the deductions claimed on the returns of the partnerships based on the information contained in the indictment. A report dated January 31, 1983, based on information set forth in the indictment, was prepared by Gullion for each of the partnerships. At the time Gullion prepared the reports, at least the following information had been made available to the IRS: (a) Information pertaining to the methanol partnerships, which included the four before the Court, and information concerning the list of investors, which included petitioners Jamtgaard and petitioners Ramsey, which had been*84 derived from the lists that were obtained by Raybin and Tanner in the course of their joint investigation; (b) information originating from the returns of three of the partnerships and accompanying Schedules K-1, which contained the names of limited partners/investors (these returns were received by the examination division between May 1980 and June 1981); and (c) a copy of the indictment returned by the grand jury, which was filed in the District Court on September 30, 1982.
When Gullion prepared the reports, he knew the indictment had been returned by the grand jury which investigated Kilpatrick, et al., and, as he understood it, an indictment is a public record and its use did not constitute the unauthorized use of grand jury information. *890 knew that any position taken by the IRS was to be consistent with the Government's position as set forth in the indictment.
*85 Gullion's reports were prepared to facilitate preparation of notice of deficiency language for those limited partners/investors who would not execute consents to extend the statute of limitations for assessment and collection of income tax for 1979. At the time he prepared his reports, he had not obtained nor examined the books and records of the partnerships because he assumed the books and records were not in the possession of the general partners. This assumption was made prior to the time the notification letters were sent to the general partners on January 12, 1983. Subsequent to January 12, 1983, Gullion was contacted by a general partner of one of the methanol partnerships assigned to him, who informed him that all of his partnership's records had been previously subpoenaed by the grand jury. *86 With the assistance of the Quality Review Section of the Denver District Office, Gullion prepared language to be used in notices of deficiency to be issued, if necessary, to the limited partners (investors). A memorandum containing this language was transmitted to the District Counsel's Office, Denver, Colorado, for approval. By memorandum dated February 14, 1983, said District Counsel's Office, in approving language to be used in the notice of deficiency, advised that said language was based solely on the criminal indictment returned in Kilpatrick, et al., and that a notice of deficiency should be issued as a protective measure only for those limited partners/investors who reject an offer to settle for out-of-pocket (cash) investment and who refuse to consent to extend the statute of limitations. *891 According to the examination division's procedures in the partnerships' audits, the revenue agent assigned the*87 partnerships' returns would forward Gullion's report to the various IRS districts where the investors resided. That report was accompanied by instructions that a statutory notice of deficiency disallowing the flowthrough loss deduction would only be issued to protect the statute of limitations after the investor refused to extend the statute of limitations for assessment and collection of taxes attributable to the claimed partnership loss from his or her partnership and there was no out-of-pocket settlement. This procedure was followed in the four cases now before the Court. Consistent with this procedure, Gullion prepared an information package to be sent to the various districts where the partners/investors resided, for the purpose of notifying these districts of the status of the examinations of the partnerships. These packages included: (1) A copy of Gullion's report, (2) the approved notice of deficiency language, (3) a listing of the partners/investors who resided in each respective district together with an identification of each partnership in which they were investors, and (4) instructions for the issuance of a notice of deficiency.
After the information packages were*88 sent out, Gullion then worked on gaining control of the taxable year 1980. In February 1984, Gullion received assistance in his examination of the methanol partnerships when all but two of them were reassigned to other revenue agents. *89 partnerships *892
except for any defendant named in the indictment. This problem was of particular concern to Gullion at the time Revenue Agent Rick Hector (Hector) was assigned to the audit of Information Realty in February 1984.Subsequent to the reassignment of the audit of Information Realty, Gullion met with Hector to provide him with background information about Information Realty and discuss the overall status of the partnership. During the course of this transitional meeting, Gullion instructed Hector to withhold auditing the partnership until he received some guidance on how to proceed if a named defendant was present during a revenue agent's initial interview with a partner/investor. He informed Hector that he had contacted Mendrop for assistance, who in turn contacted the Department of Justice attorneys conducting the grand jury investigation. Shortly thereafter, Mendrop informed Gullion to proceed with the civil examination as normal, and Gullion then transmitted this information to Hector.
Neither Gullion nor Hector at any time disclosed matters occurring before the grand jury, nor were matters occurring before the grand jury disclosed to them for civil audit*90 purposes.
The Examination Division of the various District Director's Offices requested petitioners to extend the statute of limitations for 1979 and 1980. *91
Enclosed is a copy of consent Form 872-A for your records. *893 If you terminate this agreement, the Service may mail you a notice of deficiency.
Similar letters were sent to petitioners Bell for the taxable year 1980 and to petitioners Ramsey and Osborne for the taxable years 1979 and 1980. Such a letter was sent to petitioners Jamtgaard for the taxable year 1979, which was the only year they had at issue.
Prior to the expiration of the time prescribed by section 6501(a) for the assessment of income tax due for the taxable year 1979, petitioners timely executed agreements pursuant to the provisions of section 6501(c)(4) extending the period for assessment of the tax due for the taxable year 1979.
Prior to the expiration of the time prescribed by section 6501(a) for the assessment of income tax due for the taxable year 1980, petitioners Osborne timely executed an agreement pursuant to the provisions of section 6501(c)(4) extending the period for assessment of the tax due for 1980.
On advice of their duly authorized representative, petitioners Jamtgaard (for taxable year 1979), petitioners Ramsey (for taxable year 1979), and petitioners Osborne (for taxable years 1979 and*92 1980) each signed a Form 872-T and submitted same to the Examination Division. *93 The notices were based on Gullion's reports and on language approved by District Counsel's Office, which were based solely on the indictment. *894 In February 1983, after a hearing on various motions to dismiss the indictment filed by defendants in the District Court, the Court (Judge Kane) dismissed 26 of the 27 counts of the indictment due to failure to state a criminal offense and as improperly pleaded. *94 was presided over by Judge Winner, because it would be his first opportunity to learn of the information obtained by the Department of Justice in its grand jury investigation of Kilpatrick, et al. Gullion intended to utilize any relevant information presented at the trial or entered into the public record in any other public hearing in his examination of the methanol partnerships. On May 9, 1983, Kilpatrick was convicted by the jury of obstruction of justice.
On August 9, 1983, the Court of Appeals, upon request made after briefing but before oral argument, partially remanded the dismissal of the 26 counts of the indictment to the District Court to determine whether misconduct on the part of Government attorneys in connection with the grand jury investigation and presentation constituted additional grounds for dismissal.
On August 25, 1983, following the partial remand but before later hearings before another judge (Judge Kane) relating specifically to the matters partially remanded by the Court of Appeals, the District Court (Judge Winner) issued an opinion which, among other things, summarized the status of the cases (which were being reassigned to Judge Kane), granted Kilpatrick's*95 motion for a new trial on the obstruction of justice count, and ordered disclosure of the grand jury transcript to the defendants. *895 States appealed the Court's order granting a new trial to Kilpatrick. *96 Nowhere in its opinion or in the District Court transcripts which are before this Court, did the District Court find as a fact that matters occurring before the grand jury were disclosed for civil audit purposes. *98 On June 18, 1987, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court and ordered reinstatement of
all counts of the indictment. no support in the voluminous record before it for the District Court's finding that IRS agents manipulated the grand jury *896 to obtain materials*97 to be used for civil litigation. supra is a party in the criminal litigation with the United States.*99 Any relevant information that was presented in open court during the obstruction of justice trial or the three hearings, all of which were conducted in the District Court, would have been available to the IRS as a matter of public record for civil audit purposes. *100 Information Realty for 1979 was transferred from Gullion to Revenue Agent Mary Wright (Wright). On February 16, 1984, the file was transferred from Wright to Hector, who attempted to acquire its books and records. He was advised by its general partner, Robert Caddell, that he had never seen any partnership records and if there were any that they would be in the control of UFO. On January 28, 1985, the file was transferred from Hector to Cofone, who is presently assigned to the audit of that partnership.
The audit file pertaining to the taxable years 1979 and 1980 of petitioners Bell was in the possession and control of the following additional IRS personnel, for varying periods of time, from the beginning of the audit until sometime in August 1984:
(a) Revenue Agent James M. Rodgers;
(b) Revenue Agent Janice Spence;
(c) Sanford Warren, Chief, Quality Review; and
*897 (d) Nancy Richardson, Form 872-A clerk.
In August 1984, petitioners Bell's file was transferred to District Counsel's Office in Birmingham, Alabama, for purposes of answering the petition. In February 1985, the file was transferred to District Counsel's Office in Denver, Colorado, the designated place of trial.
*101 The audit file pertaining to the taxable years 1979 and 1980 of petitioners Osborne was in the possession and control of the following additional IRS personnel, for varying periods of time, from the beginning of the audit until sometime in December 1984:
(a) Tax Auditor B. Phillips;
(b) Revenue Agent James Gaume; and
(c) B.R. Williamson, 90-day clerk.
In December 1984, petitioners Osborne's file was transferred to District Counsel's Office in Kansas City, Missouri, for purposes of answering the petition. Later in the same month, the file was transferred to District Counsel's Office in Denver, Colorado, the designated place of trial.
The audit file pertaining to the taxable year 1979 of petitioners Jamtgaard was in the possession and control of the following additional IRS personnel, for varying periods of time, from the beginning of the audit until sometime in August 1984:
(a) Revenue Agent John Van Sloten; and
(b) R. Graf, 90-day clerk.
In August 1984, petitioners Jamtgaard's file was transferred to District Counsel's Office in St. Paul, Minnesota, for purposes of answering the petition. In December 1984, the file was transferred to District Counsel's Office in Denver, Colorado, *102 the designated place of trial.
The audit file pertaining to the taxable years 1979 and 1980 of petitioners Ramsey was in the possession and control of the following additional IRS personnel, for varying periods of time, from the beginning of the audit until sometime in December 1984:
(a) Revenue Agent Sharon Christianson; and
(b) Mary Sponenberg, 90-day clerk.
In December 1984, petitioners Ramsey's file was transferred to District Counsel's Office in Denver, Colorado, for *898 purposes of answering the petition. The file is presently in the possession and control of that office.
The following IRS personnel did not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury nor were matters occurring before the grand jury disclosed to them for civil audit purposes (including the preparation of the notices of deficiency involved herein):
(a) Tanner;
(b) Daugherty;
(c) Fuentez;
(d) Cofone;
(e) Simmons;
(f) Revenue Agent James M. Rodgers;
(g) Revenue Agent Janice Spence;
(h) Sanford Warren, Chief, Quality Review;
(i) Tax Auditor B. Phillips;
(j) Revenue Agent James Gaume;
(k) B.R. Williamson, 90-day clerk;
(l) Revenue Agent John Van Sloten;
(m) R. Graf, 90-day clerk;
(n) Revenue Agent Sharon*103 Christianson;
(o) Mary Sponenberg, 90-day clerk;
(p) Nancy Richardson, Form 872-A clerk; and
(q) Wright.
Personnel of the District Counsel's Offices in Birmingham, Alabama; Kansas City, Missouri; St. Paul, Minnesota; and Denver, Colorado, at no time disclosed matters occurring before the grand jury nor were matters occurring before the grand jury disclosed to them for civil audit purposes.
No petition for disclosure pursuant to
rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) , *899 ULTIMATE*104 FINDINGS OF FACTOn July 30, 1980, when the IRS recommended that a grand jury investigation be conducted of Kilpatrick and others, it advised the Department of Justice that its file then contained a good deal of information developed "outside of any grand jury." *105 and accompanying Schedules K-1, which contained the names of limited partners/investors.
(d) A copy of the indictment returned by the grand jury, which was filed in the District Court on September 30, 1982.
At the time the statutory notices of deficiency were prepared by the respective District Director's Offices, at least the following information was available to those offices:
(a) The reports prepared by Gullion for the partnerships before the Court.
(b) A listing of the partners/investors who resided in each respective district together with an identification of each partnership they were investors in.
(c) Instructions for the issuance of a notice of deficiency.
The Court of Appeals found
no support in the voluminous record before it for the District Court's finding that IRS agents manipulated the grand jury to obtain materials to be used for civil litigation.No personnel of the IRS disclosed matters occurring before the grand jury nor were matters occurring before the *900 grand jury disclosed to them for civil audit purposes, including the preparation of the notices of deficiency herein involved.
No personnel of the Department of Justice or the U.S. Attorney's Office, *106 Denver, Colorado, disclosed matters occurring before the grand jury nor were matters occurring before the grand jury disclosed to them for civil audit purposes.
No other person involved in the grand jury investigation of Kilpatrick, et al., disclosed matters occurring before the grand jury nor were matters occurring before the grand jury disclosed to them for civil audit purposes.
None of the petitioners in these four cases nor any of the petitioners listed in note 1
supra is a party toUnited States v. Kilpatrick, et al ., Criminal No. 82-CR-222.No petition for disclosure pursuant to
rule 6(e) was ever filed with the District Court on behalf of the IRS or petitioners seeking disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury.The unsealed indictment filed in the District Court on September 30, 1982, is a public record, and the receipt of a copy thereof and its use as a basis for the issuance of the notices of deficiency herein involved was reasonable and proper.
OPINION
In our view, and the parties are in agreement, the critical issue we must decide herein is whether
matters occurring before the grand jury , in violation ofrule 6(e) , were received and used by respondent*107 for civil audit purposes, including the preparation of the notices of deficiency involved herein. *108 forward with untainted *901 evidence to respondent and to suppress evidence improperly attained. As grounds therefor, they assert:(1) Respondent is estopped by the doctrines of comity, res judicata, estoppel by judgment and collateral estoppel to contest that his revenue agents had access to and used for civil audit purposes matters occurring before the grand jury without an order from the District Court under
rule 6(e) *109 the grand jury and, hence, the receipt and use of such matters for such purposes was improper and a violation of law since respondent did not seek or receive an order from the District Court pursuant torule 6(e) .Petitioners' arguments on brief in support of the grounds raised in their motion are:
(1) Respondent is collaterally estopped from denying that the grand jury investigation of Kilpatrick, O'Donnell, Lerner, and others illegally included IRS agents as grand jury agents, illegally disclosed grand jury information to IRS agents for use in civil cases, illegally failed to disclose IRS personnel on the required disclosure notices, illegally used the grand jury to obtain evidence for use in later civil litigation, illegally disclosed the targets of the grand jury to embarrass and hinder the ongoing operation of the targets' business during the grand jury investigation, illegally imposed secrecy obligations on grand jury witnesses, illegally used pocket immunity to gather grand jury evidence, and illegally made witnesses assert their privilege against self-incrimination before the grand jury.
(2) Respondent's use of grand jury information in preparing petitioners' statutory notices*110 of deficiency was illegal *902 and unconstitutional conduct, which shifts the burden of going forward with untainted evidence to respondent.
(3) Respondent's civil use of grand jury information or materials and other illegal activity in the grand jury is unlawful and unconstitutional conduct which requires the Court to suppress all grand jury information, materials, or leads respondent has received and to exclude from evidence all leads derived therefrom.
Respondent, on the other hand, opposes petitioners' arguments in maintaining:
(1) That he is not estopped from denying that he improperly received and used matters occurring before the grand jury in violation of law.
(2) That, other than information contained in the indictment returned against Kilpatrick, et al., respondent did not receive or use matters occurring before the grand jury in the preparation of the notices of deficiency issued to petitioners.
(3) Use of the information contained in the indictment in the preparation of the deficiency notices involved herein was proper and reasonable.
(4) In these circumstances, the remedies sought by petitioners, i.e., suppression of evidence and shifting the burden of going forward*111 with the evidence to respondent, are not available to petitioners.
The "General Rule of Secrecy" explicitly set forth in
rule 6(e) provides that certain persons, including an attorney for the Government and persons to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(A)(ii), "shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules."United States v. John Doe, Inc. I , 481*112 U.S. (1987)rule 6(e) prohibits those with information about the workings of the grand jury from revealing such information to *903 other persons who are not authorized to have access to it under the Rule." The purpose of the rule is to protect the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. The rule was not intended to cloak individuals under investigation in a protective mantle of concealment.United States v. ( Under Seal) , 783 F.2d 450">783 F.2d 450Raven's Hollow, Ltd. v. United States , 481 U.S. (1987)United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc ., 280 F.2d 52">280 F.2d 52In Re Grand Jury Investigation , 630 F.2d 996">630 F.2d 996Rittenhouse Consulting Enterprises, Ltd. v. New Jersey State Comm. of Investigation , 449 U.S. 1081 (1981)rule 6(e) does not shield for all time revelation of information that was previously presented to a grand jury. Accordingly, inUnited States ex rel. Woodard v. Tynan , 757 F.2d 1085">757 F.2d 1085
Thus, when testimony or data is sought for its own sake -- for its intrinsic value in the furtherance of a lawful investigation -- rather than to learn what took place before the grand jury,it is not a valid defense to disclosure that the same information was revealed to a grand jury or that the same documents had been, or were presently being, examined by a grand jury . *114 With the above background and based on the record now before us, we think it essential to first address two additional matters over which counsel for the parties are deeply divided. The first concerns respondent's obtention and use of the indictment filed in the District Court on September 30, 1982, for civil audit purposes, that is, his reception and use as a basis for the notices of deficiency *904 which are before the Court.Respondent's position is that the filed indictment is a public record and that the procurement of a copy thereof and the use of the information contained therein in the formulation of the deficiency*115 notices is reasonable and proper and
not a violation of the secrecy provisions ofrule 6(e) . Petitioners, on the other hand, in opposing that position, would have us hold that the filed indictment is information which discloses matters occurring before the grand jury. In such posture, according to petitioners, its obtention and use by respondent, as a basis for the deficiency notices, is violative of the secrecy strictures ofrule 6(e) . We agree with respondent.It is hornbook law that indictments cannot be considered as evidence.
United States v. Cox , 536 F.2d 65">536 F.2d 65Central South Carolina Chapter, etc. v. Martin , 431 F. Supp. 1182">431 F. Supp. 1182556 F.2d 706">556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied434 U.S. 1022">434 U.S. 1022 (1978). An indictment is only an accusation. It is the physical means by which a defendant is brought to trial, and its sole purpose is to identify the defendant's alleged offense.United States v. Glaziou , 402 F.2d 8">402 F.2d 8393 U.S. 1121">393 U.S. 1121 (1969).rule 6(e) clearly does not, nor could it be construed to apply to the collective findings in the form of an indictment by the grand jurors acting as a judicial body.United States v. Ahmad , 329 F. Supp. 292">329 F. Supp. 292rule 6(e) . *905 See and compareKirkland v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1986-492rule 6(e) does not, nor could it, prohibit respondent's obtention and use of the publicly filed indictment. See and compareUnited States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc., supra at 54Collateral Estoppel It has long been established that the doctrine known as collateral estoppel precludes litigation of any issue of fact or law that is actually litigated and necessarily determined by a valid and final judgment.
Montana v. United States , 440 U.S. 147">440 U.S. 147Restatement, Judgments 2d, sec. 27 (1982).rule 6(e) . Specifically, petitioners claim that the District Court inUnited States v. Kilpatrick , 594 F. Supp. 1324">594 F. Supp. 1324Kilpatrick II ), "found" that respondent illegally used the grand jury to obtain evidence for use in later civil litigation and that respondent illegally received and used grand jury information for use in civil cases in violation ofrule 6(e) . *120 *906 The District Court, inKilpatrick II , stated that "the evidencesuggests that information was disclosed to other IRS agents for use in civil cases." (Emphasis added.)United States v. Kilpatrick , 594 F. Supp. at 1331possibility that the extraordinary powers of the grand jury were manipulated in order to obtain evidence useful in later civil litigation." (Emphasis supplied.)United States v. Kilpatrick , 594 F. Supp. at 1332United States v. Kilpatrick , 594 F. Supp. at 1345United States v. Kilpatrick , 821 F.2d 1456">821 F.2d 1456not abused to obtain evidence for civil purposes." (Emphasis supplied.)United States v. Kilpatrick , 821 F.2d at 1471Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore , 439 U.S. 322">439 U.S. 322The existence of a legal wrong (i.e., improper*122 obtention and use of matters occuring before the grand jury, in *907 violation of
rule 6(e) ) is a completely separate question from the remedy to be afforded upon proof of that legal wrong. SeeGraham v. Commissioner , 82 T.C. 299">82 T.C. 299770 F.2d 381">770 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1985).rule 6(e) , were received and used by respondent for civil audit purposes. Our holding herein is to the contrary. Therefore, since no wrong has been proved, the remedies petitioners seek are not now available to them. *123Other Matters We think it necessary to conclude this opinion with a few observations. In their brief and reply brief, petitioners make a number of misleading statements and misrepresentations. Some of them are:
(1) At page 63 of their brief, petitioners' state --
Revenue agent Gullion knew that he wasn't supposed to use grand jury information, and he was aware of both
Sells Engineering, Inc . andBaggot before he prepared the partnership RAR's [Revenue Agent's Reports] and before he prepared the statutory notice language. Additionally, Denver District Counsel approved the use of grand jury information for the statutory notices afterSells Engineering, Inc . andBaggot had been issued.
The record shows without equivocation that Gullion received a copy of the indictment inOctober 1982 (Stip. par. 26); that the Revenue Agent's reports are datedJanuary 31, 1983 (Stip. par. 29 and Exhibits 17-Q through 20-T); and that the memorandum from District Counsel, approving the statutory language, is datedFebruary 14, 1983 (Stip. par. 38 and Exhibit 34-AH).United States v. Baggot , 476">463 U.S. 476United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc ., 463 U.S. 418">463 U.S. 418June 30, 1983 .(2) At page 61 of their brief, petitioners' assert --
*908 In this case, the limited partners, the petitioners herein, are trapped in the middle of the government's unconstitutional misconduct. The IRS and the Department of Justice have all the partnerships'
books and records in the sealed grand jury files. * * * [The] government made sure that all thebooks and records are out of the petitioners' reach * * * [Emphasis supplied.]
Petitioners could have sought access to these books and records for their own intrinsic value.United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc ., 280 F.2d at 54Anaya v. United States , 815 F.2d 1373">815 F.2d 1373(3) At page 13 of their reply brief, petitioners' state -- "Judge Kane concluded that Agent Gullion's use of the indictment was a disclosure of grand jury information." An exhaustive consideration of Judge Kane's opinion reveals no such conclusion. *125
An appropriate order will be issued .Footnotes
1. Cases of the following petitioners are consolidated herewith: Glen A. Jamtgaard and Barbara Jamtgaard, docket No. 25769-84; Donald V. Osborne and Nancy E. Osborne, docket No. 37219-84; and James L. Ramsey and Patricia A. Ramsey, docket No. 37220-84. It has been stipulated that the Court's decision in disposition of these motions will be binding on the following related cases: Edward W. Blanch, Jr., and Jane R. Blanch, docket No. 25768-84; Jack G. Rentschler and Joyce E. Rentschler, docket No. 25770-84; Rudolph J. Hoffman and Shiela J. Hoffman, docket No. 25771-84; Richard C. Garbe and Margaret S. Garbe, docket No. 37218-84; John E. Lawton and Amy S. Lawton, docket No. 1294-85; and Michael T. Peak and Marian O. Peak, docket No. 10551-85.↩
2. These cases were assigned pursuant to sec. 7456 (redesignated as sec. 7443A by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, sec. 1556, 100 Stat. 2755) and Rule 180. All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended, unless otherwise indicated, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, unless indicated to the contrary.↩
3. Since each motion is identical in all material respects we will hereinafter characterize them as petitioners' motion.↩
4. Methanol is defined as: "a light volatile flammable poisonous liquid alcohol CH OH formed in the destructive distillation of wood or made synthetically and used esp. as a solvent, anti-freeze, or denaturant for ethyl alcohol and in the synthesis of other chemicals." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary p. 747 (1983).↩
5. Hereafter, these four partnerships will be referred to collectively as "the partnerships." Use of the words, "methanol partnerships," will refer to the 21 partnerships, which include Alpha V, Information Realty, North Sea, and Xanadu.↩
6. In this connection, it further appears that the methanol partnerships offered a $ 50,000 tax deduction for every investment of $ 12,500. With over 300 known investors as of July 30, 1980, the methanol program has already produced first year deductions of over $ 15 million for 1979.↩
7. In the absence of a stipulation of the parties to the contrary, venue on appeal of this case would lie in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See sec. 7482(b)(1)(A) and (2).↩
8. Venue on appeal of this case, in the absence of a stipulation to the contrary, would lie in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.↩
9. Venue on appeal of this case, in the absence of a stipulation to the contrary, would lie in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit.↩
10. Venue on appeal of this case, in the absence of a stipulation to the contrary, would lie in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the Court of Appeals). Moreover, our research has disclosed that venue on appeal of the
Peak case (see note 1supra↩ ), in the absence of a stipulation to the contrary, would lie in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit.11. These mineral leases also include coal partnerships which were to involve the mining and development of coal properties. Some 25 limited partners/investors in the coal partnerships are now before this Court in a separate proceeding. A hearing was conducted at Denver, Colorado, pertaining to four motions filed by petitioners and that matter will be the subject of a separate opinion.↩
12. In a joint investigation, the Examination Division and the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) of the IRS cooperate in determining whether a taxpayer has violated any of the criminal provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. The primary duty of a revenue agent, who is part of the Examination Division, is to investigate the civil tax liability of a taxpayer, whereas, the prime responsibility of a special agent, who is part of CID, is to investigate whether any of the criminal provisions of the Internal Revenue Code have been violated by a taxpayer.↩
13. Additional investors included in that list are E.W. Blanch, Jr., R.J. Hoffman, Jr., Richard C. Garbe, Jr., and A.S. Lawton & Co., all limited partners in Information Realty. See note 1
supra↩ .14. Copies of the partnership returns are a part of the record except that for Information Realty for the taxable year 1979. That return has been misplaced by the Internal Revenue Service Center. While diligent efforts have been made to locate that return they have been fruitless. Although Forms K-1 (Partner's Share of Income, Credits, Deductions, etc.) are attached to the original of each partnership return, copies thereof are not included in this record as the parties have stipulated that they are unnecessary for these proceedings.↩
15. Sec. 9267.2 of the IRM provides for Requests for Grand Jury Investigations.↩
16.
Sec. 6103(h) , pertaining to "Disclosure to Certain Federal Officers and Employees for Purposes of Tax Administration, Etc." provides in relevant part --(3) Form of request. -- In any case in which the Secretary is authorized to disclose a return or return information to the Department of Justice pursuant to the provisions of this subsection --
(A) if the Secretary has referred the case to the Department of Justice * * * the Secretary may make such disclosure on his own motion * * *↩
17.
Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "rule 6(e) ") pertains to the grand jury and subpart (e) thereof relates to recording and disclosure of proceedings. Our recitation of relevant language from specific parts ofrule 6 throughout this opinion will set forth the language in effect for purposes of this proceeding. Thus,rule 6(e) states in pertinent part:(e) * * *
(2) General Rule of Secrecy. * * * [An] attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (e)(3)(A)(ii) of this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules. * * *
(3) Exceptions.
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand jury * * * may be made to --
(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attorney's duty; and
(ii) such government personnel * * * as are deemed necessary by an attorney for the government to assist an attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law.
(B) Any person to whom matters are disclosed under subparagraph (A)(ii) of this paragraph shall not utilize that grand jury material for any purpose other than assisting the attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law. * * *↩
18.
Rule 6(e)(3)(B) states:(B) * * * An attorney for the government shall promptly provide the district court, before which was impaneled the grand jury whose material has been so disclosed, with the names of the persons to whom such disclosure has been made, and shall certify that he has advised such persons of their obligation to secrecy under this rule.↩
19. Sec. 9267.4(1), IRM, dealing with responsibility for Control of Returns and Solicitation of Civil Consents provides:
"Once a grand jury request has been approved by Service and Department of Justice officials, the District Director will notify the Chief, Examination Division * * * that the taxpayer is under grand jury investigation and that civil action must either be suspended or not initiated on the subject taxpayer for the type of tax involved and all subsequent periods except as otherwise hereinafter provided."↩
20. This technique was utilized primarily for the purpose of maintaining an accurate inventory of those records, particularly financial records, in the event it was decided to present them to the grand jury.↩
21. Computer facilities at the following locations were utilized by Williams: (1) Ogden, Utah, Internal Revenue Service Center; (2) Air Force Accounting and Financial Center, Lowry Air Force Base, Denver, Colorado; and (3) the Dallas, Texas District Office of the IRS.↩
22. In a civil examination of a partnership, an agent must contact the IRS Service Centers and District Offices where the investors reside in order to secure the Federal income tax returns of the investors for placement in his inventory.↩
23.
Rule 6(f) respecting Finding and Return of Indictment states -- "The indictment shall be returned by the grand jury to a federal magistratein open court↩ ." (Emphasis supplied.)24. Sec. 4567.5, IRM, states: "Once grand jury information has been introduced into the public record, the information is no longer covered by grand jury secrecy and can be used in an investigation. Examples of public record are: trial transcripts,
indictments↩ , pleadings and sentencing procedures." (Emphasis added.)25. The identity of this individual and of which limited partnership he is the general partner is not revealed in the record.↩
26. The partnership cases were determined to be settlement vehicles by the Examination Division.↩
27. The specific reassignments are set forth hereinafter. See page 896
infra↩ .28. See note 31
infra↩ . Generally, in the absence of a consent duly executed by the parties, the 3-year period for assessment and collection of tax for the taxable year 1979 would expire on Apr. 15, 1983. See sec. 6501(a).29. Form 872-A is a Special Consent to Extend the Time to Assess Tax.↩
30. As noted earlier, Form 872-T is a "Notice of Termination of Special Consent to Extend the Time to Assess Tax."↩
31. A notice of deficiency was issued to petitioners Bell on Apr. 5, 1984, by the Office of the District Director, Jackson, Mississippi; to petitioners Jamtgaard on June 26, 1984, by the Office of the District Director, Aberdeen, South Dakota; to petitioners Ramsey on Oct. 4, 1984 by the Office of the District Director, Denver, Colorado; and to petitioners Osborne on Oct. 5, 1984, by the Office of the District Director, Wichita, Kansas.↩
32. See pars. 29 and 38 of the stipulation of facts and Exhibit 34-AH.↩
33. Included in our record is a 15-page excerpt of proceedings (Court's ruling) respecting the District Court hearing on this matter on Feb. 21, 1983. See Exhibit 35-AI.↩
34.
United States v. Kilpatrick , 575 F. Supp. 325">575 F. Supp. 325↩35. See Exhibit 45-AS, which contains volumes 5 through 11 of the record on appeal to the Court of Appeals and which embraces transcripts of testimony (pp. 1 through 1317) received by the District Court in regard to the hearing on Kilpatrick's motion for a new trial on count XXVII and motion to dismiss count XXVII on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. A portion of the record on appeal is sealed and, therefore, Exhibit 45-AS, is only a portion of that record. In addition, except for Exhibits 10 and 11-K, which are part of this Court's record, the exhibits referred to in the aforesaid transcripts are not part of the record in this proceeding.↩
36. The District Court, after the obstruction of justice trial and after the hearing on Kilpatrick's motions to dismiss and for a new trial, makes it abundantly clear in its opinion, which was issued on Aug. 25, 1983, that the record before it was incomplete, that proof was needed for the charges of repeated misconduct and, therefore, further hearings were necessary to prove the charges of misconduct.
United States v. Kilpatrick , 575 F. Supp. at 340↩37.
United States v. Kilpatrick , 594 F. Supp. 1324">594 F. Supp. 1324↩38. See Exhibit 44-AR, which contains volumes XIV through XXIV of the record on appeal to the Court of Appeals and which embraces transcripts of testimony (pp. 1 through 24; 1 through 1251) received by the District Court during its hearings on the matter partially remanded by the Court of Appeals. A portion of the record on appeal is sealed and, consequently, Exhibit 44-AR is only a portion of that record. Further, except for Exhibits 10 and 11-K, which are part of the record herein, the exhibits referred to in the beforementioned transcripts are not part of the record in this proceeding.↩
39.
United States v. Kilpatrick , 821 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1987)infra . In its reversal, the Court of Appeals considered and decided the appeals insofar as they embraced misconduct on the part of Government attorneys, failure to state a criminal offense, and improper pleading. The court advised that a separate opinion addressing the appeal of the granting of Kilpatrick's motion for a new trial was to follow. SeeBlondin v. Winner , 822 F.2d 969">822 F.2d 969484 U.S. (1988) ↩, where the Government's appeal was dismissed.40. See
United States v. Kilpatrick , 594 F. Supp. at 1345821 F.2d at 1470-1471 . The Court of Appeals issued its opinion after its review and consideration of the District Court opinions, the records of the hearings, and the grand jury proceedings.821 F.2d at 1470↩ .41. In this connection, we note that the date of the last hearing before Judge Kane on the matter partially remanded by the Court of Appeals was Feb. 8, 1984, whereas the date of the earliest notice of deficiency involved in this proceeding (including those petitioners listed in note 1
supra↩ ) is Apr. 5, 1984.42.
Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) provides:(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand jury may also be made --
(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding;↩
43.
Rule 6(e)(3)(D) reads, in pertinent part --(D) A petition for disclosure pursuant to subdivision (e)(3)(C)(i) shall be filed in the district where the grand jury convened.↩
44. As found earlier, the IRS, in making its recommendation, transmitted therewith some 55 exhibits, all of which were obtained independent of the grand jury's investigation.↩
45. We note, in the interest of fairness, that the opinion of the Court of Appeals was not available to counsel for the parties until some time after the reply briefs were filed in this proceeding. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court on Jan. 11, 1988, granted, in part, the petitions for a writ of certiorari filed by Kilpatrick, O'Donnell, Lerner, and the Bank of Nova Scotia.
The Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States (docket No. 87-578),Kilpatrick v. United States (docket No. 87-602),487 U.S. (1988) ↩. However, the Supreme Court, which has consolidated the cases, has limited its review to the question of whether the District Court is authorized to dismiss an indictment before trial under its inherent supervisory power, without a finding of prejudice to the defendants, to protect the integrity of the grand jury process.46. See notes 42 and 43
supra↩ .47. At the hearing and in their briefs petitioners argue only the applicability of collateral estoppel. Therefore, we assume they have abandoned the remaining grounds raised.↩
48. For the convenience of the reader, we again here recite the relevant provisions of rule 6(e)(3) concerning exceptions --
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any grand juror, may be made to --
(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attorney's duty; and
(ii) such government personnel * * * as are deemed necessary by an attorney for the government to assist an attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law.↩
49. See
Hajecate v. Commissioner , 90 T.C. 280">90 T.C. 280Hajecate is factually distinguishable from the cases at bar and it involves arule 6(e)↩ order.50. See also
United States ex rel. Woodard v. Tynan , 776 F.2d 250">776 F.2d 250757 F.2d 1085">757 F.2d 1085 , but choose to dispose of the case on the basis discussed herein;"United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc ., 280 F.2d 52">280 F.2d 5251. Respondent concedes that the language used in these notices is based on that indictment. Our research has disclosed no reported case where respondent has used a filed indictment per se as a basis for his deficiency notice, and no such case has been presented to the Court by the parties.↩
52. See p. 887 and note 23
supra↩ .53. See also
United States v. Ciambrone , 601 F.2d 616">601 F.2d 61654. Petitioners alternatively claim that an indictment is grand jury information. We reject this claim out of hand. While the indictment may be construed as a matter occurring before the grand jury, once it is filed in open court, it is a public record, and the secrecy provisions of
rule 6(e)↩ are not applicable to it.55. Petitioners' reliance on
United States v. Baggot , 476">463 U.S. 476United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc ., 463 U.S. 418">463 U.S. 418rule 6(e) order. Neither case involved the use of an indictment filed in open court for civil audit purposes.Baggot addressed and answered the issue of whether a civil tax audit is "preliminary to or in connection with a judicial proceeding" within the meaning ofrule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) .Sells Engineering, Inc↩ . addressed and answered the issue of under what conditions may civil attorneys for the Government obtain access to grand jury materials for the purpose of preparing for and pursuing a civil cause of action.56. We observe that the principal substantive issue raised by the petitions filed herein relates to respondent's disallowance of passthrough partnership losses claimed by the limited partners/petitioners.↩
57. Petitioners also contend that other facts found in
Kilpatrick II estop respondent from denying that respondent's grand jury investigation of Kilpatrick, et al., illegally included IRS agents as grand jury agents, illegally imposed secrecy obligations on grand jury witnesses, illegally used pocket immunity to gather grand jury evidence, and illegally made witnesses assert their privilege against self-incrimination before the grand jury. These findings do not involverule 6(e) disclosure violations and are not relevant to these proceedings.Petitioners also seek to estop respondent from denying that he illegally failed to disclose IRS personnel on the required disclosure notices and illegally disclosed the targets of the grand jury to embarrass and hinder the ongoing operation of the targets' business during the grand jury investigation. While the District Court and the Court of Appeals found these to be
rule 6(e)↩ violations, there is absolutely no evidence in this record showing that these violations resulted in the disclosure of matters occuring before the grand jury for civil audit purposes.58. Petitioners' place heavy emphasis on
Kluger v. Commissioner , 83 T.C. 309 (1984)rule 6(e)↩ order, is also factually distinguishable from the matters we herein consider.59. Petitioners' undue reliance on
Graham v. Commissioner , 82 T.C. 299 (1984)770 F.2d 381">770 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1985), is unwarranted. Suffice it to say, that case, which involvedrule 6(e)↩ orders, is factually distinguishable from the cases at bar.60. Petitioners also place undue emphasis upon
Cohen v. Commissioner , a Memorandum Sur Order of this Court (which carries no precedential value) unofficially reported at42 T.C.M. (CCH) 312">42 T.C.M. 312 (1981). Moreover, the facts inCohen↩ bear no semblance to those herein under consideration.61. In view of our disposition of petitioners' motion we need not and do not address other arguments raised by petitioners.↩
Document Info
Docket Number： Docket Nos. 22733-84, 25769-84, 37219-84, 37220-84
Citation Numbers： 1988 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 60, 90 T.C. No. 59, 90 T.C. 878
Judges： Whitaker,Cantrel
Filed Date： 5/9/1988
Precedential Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 11/14/2024