State v. Williams ( 2020 )

[Cite as State v. Williams, 2020-Ohio-472.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 29434
Appellant
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
EMORY LEE WILLIAMS COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellee CASE No. CR-2018-11-3677
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: February 12, 2020
CALLAHAN, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals an order that dismissed the charges against
Appellee, Emory Lee Williams. This court reverses.
I.
{¶2} On February 22, 2018, a complaint charging Mr. Williams with forgery was filed
in the Barberton Municipal Court. Mr. Williams was incarcerated as the result of another
conviction at that time. According to his recollection, Mr. Williams filled out a form entitled
“Inmate’s Notice of Place of Imprisonment and Request for Disposition of Indictments,
Information or Complaints” with the intention of making himself available for prosecution under
R.C. 2941.401. That form listed Mr. Williams’ place of incarceration, the case number of the
charge filed against him in Barberton Municipal Court, and a request for appointed counsel. The
form was signed by Mr. Williams and a witness, and it was addressed as follows:
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BARBERTON MUNICIPAL COURT
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
576 WEST PARK AVENUE
BARBERTON, OHIO 44203
Mr. Williams testified that he did not know whether the form was sent by certified mail.
{¶3} On November 13, 2018, an indictment issued in the Summit County Court of
Common Pleas charging Mr. Williams with forgery, a fifth-degree felony. He was arraigned on
March 29, 2019. On April 30, 2019, Mr. Williams moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that
the State had failed to bring him to trial within 180 days pursuant to R.C. 2941.401. Following a
hearing on the motion, the trial court granted Mr. Williams’ motion to dismiss, and the State of
Ohio filed this appeal.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING WILLIAMS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS BASED ON ITS FINDING THAT WILLIAMS SERVED THE
PROSECUTOR WITH WRITTEN NOTICE OF HIS AVAILABILITY AND
REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION AS REQUIRED IN R.C. 2941.401.
{¶4} The State argues that the trial court erred by granting Mr. Williams’ motion to
dismiss because the trial court applied a standard of substantial, rather that strict, compliance.
The State argues in the alternative that even if a standard of substantial compliance is the
appropriate measure, Mr. Williams did not substantially comply with the terms of R.C.
2941.401.
{¶5} R.C. 2941.401 sets forth the timeframe within which an incarcerated defendant
must be brought to trial on unrelated charges that arise during the period of incarceration once
the prisoner makes a request for disposition of the new charges. “In its plainest language, R.C.
2941.401 grants an incarcerated defendant a chance to have all pending charges resolved in a
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timely manner, thereby preventing the state from delaying prosecution until after the defendant
has been released from his prison term.” State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St. 3d 308, 2004-Ohio-969,
¶ 25. Under R.C. 2941.401, a prisoner must “be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days
after he causes to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney and the appropriate court in which the
matter is pending, written notice of the place of his imprisonment and a request for a final
disposition to be made of the matter[.]”
{¶6} R.C. 2941.401 sets forth specific requirements for a request for disposition. A
certification from the warden or superintendent with custody over the inmate must accompany
the request for disposition, and that certification must state “the term of commitment under
which the prisoner is being held, the time served and remaining to be served on the sentence, the
amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of
the adult parole authority relating to the prisoner.” Id. The prisoner must send the request for
disposition to the warden or superintendent, who must in turn “promptly forward it with the
certificate to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court by registered or certified mail, return
receipt requested.” Id. When an inmate requests disposition as provided in R.C. 2941.401, “[i]f
the action is not brought to trial within the time provided, subject to continuance allowed
pursuant to this section, no court any longer has jurisdiction thereof, the indictment, information,
or complaint is void, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the action with prejudice.” Id.
{¶7} R.C. 2941.401 is not ambiguous. State v. Gilbert, 9th Dist. Lorain No.
14CA010600, 2016-Ohio-3209, ¶ 14-15. Compare Hairston at ¶ 13-20. Consequently, this
Court’s role is to apply the statute as written and not to interpret it. Gilbert at ¶ 15. Noting “the
mandatory nature of R.C. 2941.401” and the “straightforward and unambiguous procedure for an
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inmate to invoke his statutory speed trial rights,” this Court has rejected the argument that R.C.
2941.401 requires only substantial compliance with its terms. Id. at ¶ 12-14.
{¶8} In Gilbert, the incarcerated defendant sent a purported notice under R.C.
2941.401 directly to the recipients instead of sending it through the warden or superintendent,
and the notice itself did not contain a certificate of the warden or superintendent. Id. at ¶ 16.
This Court concluded that because strict compliance with the terms of R.C. 2941.401 is required,
the defendant did not preserve his speedy trial rights. Id. at ¶ 14, 16. That conclusion, standing
alone, resolved the appeal, but this Court went on to address the issue of substantial compliance,
having observed that “[d]espite the mandatory nature of R.C. 2941.401 listing procedures that
‘shall’ be followed, some Ohio courts have held that an inmate need only substantially comply
with the statute to trigger the 180-day time limitation.” Id. at ¶ 12. In doing so, this Court
“assume[d] for the sake of argument” that substantial compliance was the appropriate standard
and noted that the defendant in Gilbert would not prevail even in that case. Id. at ¶ 17-18.
{¶9} It appears that this dicta was a source of confusion in this case. The trial court
recognized that “In Ohio some courts have held that an inmate need only substantially comply”
with R.C. 2941.401 and cited Gilbert for this Court’s description of the circumstances in which
other courts have done so. The trial court recognized that this Court has disagreed with
application of substantial compliance in this context, then noted that our decision in Gilbert
“included in its reasoning, that even if it were to apply the substantial compliance analysis, since
Defendant did not deliver the notice to both the court and prosecutor, the State’s duty under R.C.
2941.[]401 was not triggered.” This Court did not reach this conclusion as part of our
“reasoning” in connection with the disposition of Gilbert, however: as described above, we held
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that R.C. 2941.401 required strict compliance, and the defendant in that case did not strictly
comply with its requirements. Gilbert at ¶ 14, 16.
{¶10} The trial court in this case, however, applied the dicta in Gilbert instead of the
holding. Specifically, the trial court’s analysis hinged upon whether Mr. Williams substantially
complied with R.C. 2941.401 by “serv[ing] written notice to both the appropriate prosecuting
attorney as well as the appropriate court[.]” Having determined that Mr. Williams did so, the
trial court concluded that his notice was “sufficient per the Ninth District’s reasoning in
Gilbert[]” to comply with R.C. 2941.401. This is incorrect because Gilbert unequivocally
requires strict compliance with the terms of R.C. 2941.401 and did not in any manner approve
application of a lesser standard.
{¶11} Accordingly, this Court agrees that the trial court erred in this case by failing to
analyze Mr. Williams’ motion to dismiss under a standard of strict compliance with the terms of
R.C. 2941.401. This Court declines to do so in the first instance, so this matter must be
remanded so that the trial court can apply the correct standard.
{¶12} The State’s assignment of error is sustained.
III.
{¶13} The State’s assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the Summit County
Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and
cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
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We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
LYNNE S. CALLAHAN
FOR THE COURT
CARR, J.
SCHAFER, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN DIMARTINO GUEST,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellant.
ALAN M. MEDVICK, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.