Skyward Learning Servs., Inc. v. Gray , 2020 Ohio 1182 ( 2020 )

[Cite as Skyward Learning Servs., Inc. v. Gray, 2020-Ohio-1182.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
SKYWARD LEARNING SERVICES, INC. : CASE NO. CA2019-08-140
dba SKYWARD ACADEMY,
: OPINION
Appellee, 3/30/2020
:
- vs - :
:
ANGELA GRAY,
:
Appellant.
CIVIL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY AREA II COURT
Case No. CVF1801078
Skyward Learning Services, Inc. dba Skyward Academy, 9994 Zig Zag Road, Cincinnati,
Ohio 45242, pro se
Angela Gray, 2662 Apex Court, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, pro se
S. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Angela Gray, appeals the decision of the Butler County Area II
Court granting a monetary judgment to appellee, Skyward Learning Services, Inc. dba
Skyward Academy ("Skyward"), in this dispute over unpaid fees Gray allegedly owed to
Skyward after Gray withdrew her son from Skyward and enrolled him in another school.
For the reasons outlined below, we reverse the trial court's decision.
Butler CA2019-08-140
No Appellee Brief
{¶ 2} We note that while Skyward did file an appellee brief with this court, its brief
was thereafter stricken from the record since it was filed on Skyward's behalf by a non-
lawyer. See Skyward Learning Services Inc. dba Skyward Academy v. Gray, 12th Dist.
Butler No. CA2019-08-140 (Feb. 11, 2020) (Entry Striking Appellee's Brief and Granting
Time to File a Motion for Continuance). When an appellee brief is stricken from the record,
it is as if the appellee did not file a brief at all. Under these circumstances, App.R. 18(C)
provides that this court "may accept the appellant's statement of the facts and issues as
correct and reverse the judgment if appellant's brief reasonably appears to sustain such
action." Whether to accept an appellant's statement of facts and issues as correct under
these circumstances is within this court's sound discretion. See Moore v. Guyton, 3d Dist.
Paulding No. 11-12-01, 2013-Ohio-143, ¶ 9. Therefore, exercising our discretion as
provided to this court by App.R. 18(C), this court will accept Gray's statement of facts and
issues as alleged in her brief in determining this appeal. See In re M.J., 12th Dist. Fayette
No. CA2007-07-026, 2008-Ohio-3217, ¶ 2, fn. 2.
The Parties
{¶ 3} Skyward operates a private school for special needs students that receives
capital for its operational costs through a series of scholarship programs. One of these
scholarship programs is the Jon Peterson Special Needs Scholarship. Parents can use the
Jon Peterson Special Needs Scholarship to pay the tuition and fees for their special needs
child to attend Skyward. This is how Skyward receives the majority of its funding to stay in
business. Gray enrolled her son, Joshua, at Skyward for both the 2017-2018 and 2018-
2019 school years. Gray relied on the funds offered to her by the Jon Peterson Special
Needs Scholarship to pay for Joshua's tuition to attend Skyward. Melissa Amrein is the
founder and operator of Skyward and also serves as the school's superintendent.
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The Contract
{¶ 4} Skyward requires a signed contract for each student before the child may be
enrolled for any given school year. The contract provides that when a parent enrolls a child
at Skyward, it is "assumed" that the child will be enrolled at the school for the entire school
year. The contract also states that the parent will be responsible to pay for a full year of
attendance of his or her child regardless of whether the student subsequently withdrawals
from Skyward. The contract explains that this is necessary given the fact that private
schools like Skyward "must make commitments to employ teachers and purchase
equipment on an annual basis," which is "contingent on commitments made by those who
have contracted for the services." The contract also explains that there is a nonrefundable
$300 registration and materials fee charged for all students who enroll at Skyward.
{¶ 5} A parent has the option to cancel the contract and withdraw his or her child
from Skyward in accordance with the withdrawal and cancelation policy provided within the
contract. As stated in the contract, a parent wishing to cancel the contract and withdraw
his or her child from Skyward before the start of the school year must notify Skyward in
writing via e-mail or dated certified mail before June 1. A parent canceling the contract
before June 1 is not charged any additional cancelation charge. The parent instead forfeits
only the $300 nonrefundable registration and materials fee charged for all students who
enroll at Skyward. However, a parent wishing to cancel the contract and withdraw his or
her child from Skyward on or after June 1, but before the first day of the school year, is
charged an additional cancelation fee of $1,000.
{¶ 6} The contract further provides that a parent wishing to cancel the contract and
withdraw his or her child from Skyward between the first day of school and September 30
may do so. The contract, however, calls for that parent to be charged 20 percent of the
total tuition for the school year. But, after September 30, the contract "may be cancelled by
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the parent only at the end of the fiscal quarter, and only by providing Skyward with 30 days
written notice prior to the end of that fiscal quarter." The fiscal quarter ending dates for
Skyward are December 31 and March 31. Under these circumstances, the contract
provides that "[t]uition will be invoiced for that entire fiscal quarter." The contract also
provides that "[a]ny fees for services submitted but not reimbursed by the Autism
Scholarship or the Jon Peterson Scholarship will become the responsibility of the parent,
and the parent will be invoiced accordingly."
Amrein's Advice to Withdraw
{¶ 7} On October 30, 2018, Gray sent an e-mail to Amrein notifying her that she
would be withdrawing her son Joshua from Skyward effective immediately. Gray explained
that her decision to withdraw Joshua from Skyward came after Amrein had advised her that
she should withdraw Joshua from Skyward if she was unhappy with Skyward and its
services. This unhappiness, as Gray stated in her e-mail, resulted from her belief that
Skyward was neither looking out for Joshua's best interest nor meeting his specific needs.
Shortly after learning of Gray's decision to withdraw her son from Skyward, as well as the
reasons for his withdrawal, Skyward filed a complaint seeking a monetary judgment against
Gray in the amount of $3,626, the amount of unpaid fees for which Skyward had not been
reimbursed by the Jon Peterson Special Needs Scholarship after Gray withdrew Joshua
from Skyward and enrolled him in another school.
The Trial
{¶ 8} On March 1, 2019, the matter was tried to the bench. Two witnesses testified
at trial: Gray and Amrein. As part of her testimony, Gray testified that she withdrew Joshua
from Skyward because Amrein "told [her] to take him out" on two separate occasions after
it became clear she and Amrein "were no longer on the same page as far as Joshua." Gray
also testified that Amrein told her that Joshua was "no longer fit for Skyward Academy," so
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"[s]he said, take your son out." Amrein did not deny Gray's allegations. Amrein instead
testified and fully admitted that she had told Gray "if you are not happy, go somewhere
else." Yet, despite the record indicating Gray was merely following Amrein's advice by
withdrawing her son from Skyward and enrolling him in another school, the trial court
granted Skyward a monetary judgment against Gray in the requested amount of $3,626.
The trial court reached this decision based on the contractual language found within the
withdraw and cancellation policy outlined above.
The Appeal
{¶ 9} Gray now appeals the trial court's decision. Unfortunately, Gray has not
provided this court with any specific assignments of error for review as required by App.R.
16(A)(7). But, notwithstanding Gray not raising any explicit assignments of error, it is
nevertheless clear that Gray disagrees with the trial court's decision to grant a monetary
judgment to Skyward when she was merely following Amrein's advice by withdrawing her
son from Skyward and enrolling him in another school. Under these circumstances, we
review the trial court's decision under a manifest weight of the evidence standard. Holloway
v. Moritz, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2018-04-005, 2019-Ohio-83, ¶ 16 (applying a manifest
weight standard of review when analyzing a trial court's decision to grant a monetary
judgment following a trial in a civil case).
Standard of Review
{¶ 10} The standard of review for a manifest weight challenge in a civil case is the
same as that applied to a criminal case. Dunn v. Clark, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2015-06-
055, 2016-Ohio-641, ¶ 8, citing Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179,
¶ 17. In considering a manifest weight challenge, a reviewing court weighs the evidence
and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines
whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and
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created a manifest miscarriage of justice warranting reversal and a new trial ordered.
Hacker v. House, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2014-11-230, 2015-Ohio-4741, ¶ 21, citing
Eastley at ¶ 20. A judgment will not be reversed as being against the manifest weight of
the evidence where the judgment is supported by some competent, credible evidence going
to all essential elements of the case. Sterling Constr., Inc. v. Alkire, 12th Dist. Madison No.
CA2016-12-032, 2017-Ohio-7213, ¶ 8.
Analysis
{¶ 11} We find the trial court's decision to grant a monetary judgment to Skyward
under these circumstances was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record
indicates that Gray withdrew her son Joshua from Skyward after Amrein advised her on two
separate occasions that she should withdraw him from Skyward if she was unhappy with
Skyward and its services. Believing that Skyward was neither looking out for Joshua's best
interest nor meeting his specific needs, Gray followed Amrein's advice and withdrew Joshua
from Skyward and enrolled him in another school. The trial court determined that Gray
should pay Skyward $3,626 for relying on Amrein's advice. However, we find Gray should
not be punished for following Amrein's advice by acting in what she believed to be her son's
best interest. That is to say, a parent like Gray should not be held to account for adhering
to the advice provided by the superintendent of his or her child's school. To hold otherwise
under these circumstances would ignore what we find to be the clear application of the
doctrine of equitable estoppel.
{¶ 12} The doctrine of equitable estoppel "'prevents relief when one party induces
another to believe certain facts exist and the other party changes his position in reasonable
reliance on those facts to his [or her] detriment.'" State ex rel. Gmoser v. Village at Beckett
Ridge Condominium Owners' Assn., Inc., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2016-02-035, 2016-Ohio-
8451, ¶ 31, quoting State ex rel. Chavis v. Sycamore City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 71 Ohio
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St.3d 26, 34 (1994). The effect of this doctrine is to preclude "one party from taking unfair
advantage of another when, through false language or conduct, the person to be estopped
has induced another person to act in a certain way, with the result that the other person has
been injured in some way." Thompson v. McVey, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2006-03-006,
2006-Ohio-7036, ¶ 14. The doctrine may be employed even where a party is "asserting an
otherwise valid right." A.S. v. Fairfield School Dist., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2003-04-088,
2003-Ohio-6260, ¶ 8, citing Livingston v. Diocese of Cleveland, 126 Ohio App. 3d 299, 314
(8th Dist.1998). This is because one of the purposes behind the doctrine of equitable
estoppel is to "promote the ends of justice." Fontaine v. Flexi USA, Inc., 12th Dist. Butler
No. CA2001-02-047, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5100, *5 (Nov. 13, 2001), citing Jefferson Place
Condominium Assn. v. Naples, 125 Ohio App. 3d 394, 401 (7th Dist.1998).
{¶ 13} In so holding, we note that Gray did not specifically raise equitable estoppel
as a defense before the trial court. That is to say Gray never actually used that precise
legal terminology when defending against Skyward's complaint. Gray, however, did raise
the basic allegations that are needed to support such a claim on an "information sheet" filed
with the trial court, as well as with her arguments presented to the trial court during trial.1
Therefore, while Gray did not raise equitable estoppel as a defense specifically by name,
we find Gray did properly raise it as a defense by arguing she should not be punished for
following Amrein's advice to withdraw her son from Skyward and "go somewhere else" if
she was not happy with Skyward's services. This is true despite the fact that Gray did not
use the precise legal terminology to do so.
{¶ 14} This makes sense when considering this matter was tried in a small claims
1. "In order to show a prima facie case of equitable estoppel, one must show (1) a factual representation, (2)
that is misleading, (3) that induces actual reliance that is reasonable and in good faith, and (4) that causes
detriment to the relying party." Chase Manhattan Bank v. Parker, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2003-11-299, 2005-
Ohio-1801, ¶ 20, citing Heskett v. Paulig, 131 Ohio App.3d 221, 226-227 (3d Dist.1999).
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court. The purpose of a small claims court is to provide a simple, inexpensive, and just way
for individuals to resolve small financial disputes with a minimum of legal technicalities.
Bradley v. Talikka, 11th Dist. Astabula No. 2018-A-0098, 2019-Ohio-1948, ¶ 3. To that end,
proceedings in a small claims court "are informal and geared to allowing individuals to
resolve uncomplicated disputes quickly and inexpensively." Cleveland Bar Assn. v.
Pearlman, 106 Ohio St.3d 136, 2005-Ohio-4107, ¶ 15. "The process is an alternative to
full-blown judicial dispute resolution" where the parties often appear pro se. Mandzuch v.
Affordable Reasonable Rentals, LLC, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2018-G-0179, 2019-Ohio-
2092, ¶ 19. Pro se activity is in fact "'assumed and encouraged'" in small claims court.
Beckett v. Wisniewski, 3rd Dist. Hancock No. 5-09-17, 2009-Ohio-6158, ¶ 14 quoting
Pearlman. Such is the case here. Therefore, to deny Gray the benefit of the equitable
estoppel defense under these circumstances simply because she failed to use legally
precise terminology when arguing her case before the trial court would be fundamentally
unfair and thwart the purpose of a small claims court.
Conclusion
{¶ 15} When considering the record properly before this court, we find the trial court's
decision to grant a monetary judgment to Skyward was against the manifest weight of the
evidence. We find such a decision necessary as it promotes the end of justice, which is a
basic tenant underlying the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Such a decision is also
necessary due to the limited record before this court in accordance with App.R. 18(C).
Therefore, because we find the trial court erred by granting a monetary judgment to
Skyward under these facts and circumstances, Gray's argument challenging the trial court's
decision to grant a monetary judgment to Skyward is sustained and the trial court's decision
is reversed.
{¶ 16} Judgment reversed.
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M. POWELL, P.J., and PIPER, J., concur.
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