State v. Keating , 2020 Ohio 2770 ( 2020 )

[Cite as State v. Keating, 2020-Ohio-2770.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
CLERMONT COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, : CASE NO. CA2019-08-064
Appellant, : OPINION
5/4/2020
:
- vs -
:
ALLISON KEATING, :
Appellee. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM CLERMONT COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. 2018CR00576
D. Vincent Faris, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, Nicholas A. Horton, 76 South
Riverside Drive, 2nd Floor, Batavia, Ohio 45103, for appellant
W. Stephen Haynes, Clermont County Public Defender, Robert F. Benintendi, 302 East
Main Street, Batavia, Ohio 45103, for appellee
M. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, the state of Ohio, appeals a decision of the Clermont County Court
of Common Pleas granting the motion to suppress of appellee, Allison Keating.
{¶ 2} On February 18, 2018, Miami Township Police Officer Todd Taylor was
dispatched to a McDonald's restaurant to conduct a welfare check on the female passenger
Clermont CA2019-08-064
of a gold Caravan. The police had received a call indicating that the passenger had open
sores on her arms and was wearing bloody gloves. Officer Taylor and another police officer,
Sergeant Hirsch, responded to the scene in separate police cruisers. The officers located
the van and approached it. Upon contacting the driver and discovering that the subject of
the welfare check was not in the van, Officer Taylor indicated his intention to go into the
store, a gas station, and look for the woman. Sergeant Hirsch remained outside.
{¶ 3} Upon entering the store, Officer Taylor immediately observed a woman with
multiple bleeding sores on her arms. The woman was Keating. Officer Taylor approached
her and explained why he was there. Keating explained that her sores were caused by
impetigo, a skin condition, and that she was okay. Keating did not ask for assistance and
Officer Taylor did not call for medical assistance. The officer asked Keating for
identification. Keating replied she did not have any identification on her and instead verbally
provided her social security number. Officer Taylor and Keating subsequently exited the
store and returned to the van.
{¶ 4} Testimony differs as to what occurred once Keating provided her social
security number to Officer Taylor. Keating testified that after she provided her social
security number to Officer Taylor, he told her, "I could get back in the van. He'd be just a
minute or whatever. And he took my Social Security number and ran it." Officer Taylor
testified that as he "was out with [Keating]," he called the Clermont County Communication
Center to run a warrant check on Keating using her social security number. The officer
could not remember if Keating was in the van at that point or standing just outside the
vehicle. He, however, denied directing her to get into the van. Officer Taylor was never
asked whether he told Keating "he'd be just a minute."
{¶ 5} The dispatcher informed Officer Taylor that there was a warrant for Keating's
arrest. Subsequently, the officer advised Keating of the warrant. Keating was in the
-2-
Clermont CA2019-08-064
passenger seat of the van at that time. Keating asked if she could smoke a cigarette.
Officer Taylor replied that she could if she promised not to run off. The officer then asked
Keating "if she had anything illegal on her that could get her in trouble." Keating disclosed
there was a syringe in her backpack. The dispatcher subsequently confirmed the warrant.
Officer Taylor handcuffed Keating and asked her if he could retrieve the syringe from her
backpack. Keating acquiesced and further asked the officer to retrieve some money from
her backpack. While doing so, Officer Taylor observed a folded piece of paper and inquired
about its contents. Keating admitted it contained heroin.
{¶ 6} Testimony reveals that throughout the events, Sergeant Hirsch remained
outside, near or on the driver's side of the van. Testimony further indicates that after Keating
provided her social security number to Officer Taylor, and while the officer spoke with
Keating on the passenger side of the van, Sergeant Hirsch was on the other side of the van
speaking with the driver.
{¶ 7} Keating was indicted on one count of heroin possession. She moved to
suppress the evidence, arguing that she was unlawfully detained once Officer Taylor told
her she "could get back in the van. He'd be just a minute." The trial court conducted a
hearing on the matter; Officer Taylor and Keating both testified. Five weeks after the
suppression hearing, the state filed a memorandum in opposition to Keating's motion to
suppress, asserting that there was no seizure and implicitly arguing that the officer's
interaction with Keating was a consensual encounter until the officer discovered Keating's
arrest warrant.
{¶ 8} On August 5, 2019, the trial court granted Keating's motion to suppress. The
trial court found that while the initial encounter between Keating and Officer Taylor was
consensual, the officer's statement to Keating "he'd be just a minute," combined with the
presence of two police officers at the scene transformed the encounter into an investigatory
-3-
Clermont CA2019-08-064
detention without a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. The trial court
reasoned that "Officer Taylor's words and the presence of multiple police officers were
enough to make a reasonable person in the defendant's shoes feel that she would not be
free to leave and ignore Officer Taylor's implied request. As such, the defendant was
illegally detained at that moment." In so ruling, the trial court found Keating's "testimony
that Officer Taylor told her 'he'd be just a minute' credible," but acknowledged "that Officer
Taylor did not testify that he told [Keating] she 'could get back in the van' or that 'he'd be
just a minute.'"
{¶ 9} The state appeals the decision of the trial court, raising one assignment of
error:
{¶ 10} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEE'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS.
{¶ 11} The state argues that the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress.
Specifically, the state asserts that Officer Taylor's interaction with Keating was a consensual
encounter that did not implicate the Fourth Amendment until the officer told Keating there
was an active warrant for her arrest. The state further asserts that even if Keating was
illegally detained, the heroin should not have been suppressed because its discovery did
not arise from the illegal detention but rather, arose due to an intervening circumstance
and/or independent source, namely, Officer Taylor's discovery of the arrest warrant.
{¶ 12} Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed
question of law and fact. State v. Vaughn, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2014-05-012, 2015-
Ohio-828, ¶ 8, citing State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St. 3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. When
considering a motion to suppress, the trial court, as the trier of fact, is in the best position
to weigh the evidence in order to resolve factual questions and evaluate witness credibility.
Vaughn at ¶ 8. In turn, when reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress, an
-4-
Clermont CA2019-08-064
appellate court is bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by
competent, credible evidence. Id. An appellate court, however, independently reviews the
trial court's legal conclusions based on those facts and determines, without deference to
the trial court's decision, whether as a matter of law, the facts satisfy the appropriate legal
standard. Id.
{¶ 13} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals
from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Brown, 12th Dist. Clermont No.
CA2001-04-047, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5476, *5 (Dec. 10, 2001). However, not all
interactions between police officers and citizens are seizures under the Fourth Amendment.
Id. The United States Supreme Court has recognized three categories of police interactions
with members of the public: (1) a consensual encounter, which requires no objective
justification, (2) a brief investigatory detention, which must be supported by reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity, and (3) a full arrest, which must be supported by probable
cause. State v. Wynne, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-531, 2019-Ohio-1013, ¶ 12. The state
did not argue in the trial court that the encounter between Officer Taylor and Keating was
anything other than a consensual encounter that did not implicate the Fourth Amendment.
A consensual encounter occurs "where the police merely approach a person in a public
place, engage the person in conversation, request information, and the person is free not
to answer and walk away." State v. Tabler, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-386, 2015-Ohio-
2651, ¶ 21.
{¶ 14} In determining whether an encounter between a police officer and a citizen is
a seizure and thus implicates the Fourth Amendment, the question is whether, in light of all
the circumstances surrounding the encounter, a reasonable person would believe he or she
was not free to leave. Wynne at ¶ 13. Stated otherwise, the question is whether, taking
into account all the circumstances surrounding the encounter, a reasonable person would
-5-
Clermont CA2019-08-064
feel free to decline the officer's request or terminate the encounter. Brown at *5-6, citing
Florida v. Bostic, 501 U.S. 429, 436-437, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991). As long as a reasonable
person would feel free to disregard the officer, the encounter is consensual and no
reasonable suspicion is required. Bostic at 434. "Under this objective test, we consider not
whether the individual believed he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether
the officer's words and actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable person."
Columbus v. Body, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-609, 2012-Ohio-379, ¶ 14. Circumstances
indicating that a person has been seized include the threatening presence of several
officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person, the
use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might
be compelled, and blocking the person's path. Brown at *6, citing United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980); Wynne at ¶ 13.
{¶ 15} We recently addressed a similar situation to the case at bar in State v. Kirk,
12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2019-07-053, 2020-Ohio-323. While on routine patrol, a police
officer came upon Kirk who was attaching a band saw to the front of his bicycle near the
loading area of a store. Upon inquiry, Kirk told the officer he did not have any identification
on him and instead verbally provided his name and social security number. The officer told
Kirk, "I'll be back with [you] in a minute," then proceeded to his cruiser where he ran Kirk's
personal information through LEADS. Within a couple of minutes, the officer learned that
Kirk was subject to an extradition warrant. The officer returned to Kirk, advised him of the
warrant, and informed him that he was going to pat him down and secure him. Before the
officer could do so, Kirk fled. The officer caught Kirk and placed him under arrest. In
searching Kirk incident to the arrest, the officer discovered drugs on Kirk's person.
{¶ 16} Kirk moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that he was unlawfully detained
once the officer told him, "I'll be back with [you] in a minute." In opposing Kirk's motion to
-6-
Clermont CA2019-08-064
suppress, the state argued that the officer's interaction with Kirk was a consensual
encounter until the officer discovered Kirk's arrest warrant. The trial court granted Kirk's
motion to suppress. The trial court found that while the initial encounter between Kirk and
the officer was consensual, it evolved into an investigatory detention without a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity when the officer told Kirk, "I'll be back with [you] in
a minute." The trial court reasoned that the officer's "words alone were enough to make a
reasonable person in the defendant's shoes feel that he would not be free to walk away and
ignore [the officer's] implied request. As such, the defendant was illegally detained at that
moment." Id. at ¶ 5.
{¶ 17} On appeal, we reversed the trial court's grant of the motion to suppress.
Based upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the officer's interaction with Kirk,
we found that "the interaction was a consensual encounter until the officer told Kirk he was
going to pat him down. In other words, [the officer's] statement to Kirk, 'I'll be back with
[you] in a minute,' did not constitute a seizure of Kirk implicating the Fourth Amendment and
requiring reasonable suspicion." Kirk, 2020-Ohio-323 at ¶ 21. Hence, we found that the
officer's statement to Kirk, "I'll be back with [you] in a minute," did not convert the encounter
from a consensual one to an investigatory detention, and thus the trial court erred in granting
Kirk's motion to suppress. Id. at ¶ 24.
{¶ 18} Pertinent to our holding were the fact that the officer was the only officer at
the scene, the officer did not advise Kirk that he was returning to his police cruiser to use
Kirk's identifying information to check for warrants, and Kirk could have walked or pedaled
away from the encounter at any time before he was informed he would be pat down. Id. at
¶ 22-23.
{¶ 19} Turning to the case at bar, we consider whether, in light of all the
circumstances surrounding Officer Taylor's interaction with Keating, the officer's words and
-7-
Clermont CA2019-08-064
actions would have conveyed to a reasonable person that he or she was free to leave or
otherwise terminate the encounter. Body, 2012-Ohio-379 at ¶ 14. Based upon the totality
of the circumstances surrounding Officer Taylor's interaction with Keating, we find that while
the initial encounter was consensual, it evolved into an investigatory detention without a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity when the officer told Keating that she
"could get back in the van. He'd be just a minute."
{¶ 20} Similar to Kirk, many of the factors evidencing a seizure were absent. The
sirens and light bar of Officer Taylor's cruiser were not activated when the officer pulled up
to the scene or afterwards. There is no evidence Officer Taylor drew or displayed his
weapon, touched Keating, or accused her of a crime. Although he could not recall where
he had parked his cruiser, Officer Taylor did not believe it blocked the van's path.
{¶ 21} However, unlike in Kirk, Keating was not a pedestrian free to walk away, but
rather was a passenger in the van dependent on the van's driver. Unlike in Kirk, Officer
Taylor was not the only officer at the scene. Rather, there were two officers at the scene,
and both responded to the scene in separate police cruisers. During the entire time Officer
Taylor interacted with Keating, Sergeant Hirsch remained on the driver's side of the van
speaking with the driver. Unlike in Kirk, Keating knew Officer Taylor was conducting a
warrant check as he called the Clermont County Communication Center in her presence.
Furthermore, Officer Taylor's statement to Keating that she "could get back in the van. He'd
be just a minute," conveyed a sense he was in charge of Keating's movements. Finally, the
warrant check occurred while Officer Taylor and Sergeant Hirsch surrounded the van.
{¶ 22} In light of all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter between Officer
Taylor and Keating, we find that the officer's statement and actions, combined with the
presence of Officer Taylor and Sergeant Hirsch on both sides of the van, thereby
surrounding it, would have communicated to a reasonable person that he or she was not
-8-
Clermont CA2019-08-064
free to walk away or otherwise terminate the encounter. We therefore find that Keating was
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when Officer Taylor advised her she
"could get back in the van. He'd be a minute." Because the encounter between Officer
Taylor and Keating escalated from a consensual one into an investigatory detention before
the officer learned about the arrest warrant, the trial court did not err in granting Keating's
motion to suppress.
{¶ 23} Citing numerous cases, the dissent maintains that police officers may
constitutionally detain individuals absent suspicion of criminal activity to ensure the
individual's well-being. Although the state did not argue that Keating's detention was
justified pursuant to this community caretaking function, the dissent relies upon State v.
Peagler, 76 Ohio St. 3d 496 (1996), to assert that we should reverse the trial court's grant
of the motion to suppress on the ground Keating's detention was a reasonable detention
incident to the exercise of Officer Taylor's community caretaking duties. Alternatively, the
dissent relies on Peagler to assert we should order that the issue be briefed by the parties.
Peagler recognized the discretionary authority of a court of appeals "to address an issue
not briefed or raised below [so long as there is a] sufficient evidentiary basis in the record *
* * upon which it can decide a particular legal issue." Peagler at 499.
{¶ 24} In reviewing the record to determine whether there is some evidentiary basis
to justify resolving this case upon a legal theory not advanced below, we must be cognizant
of the burdens of production and proof in proceedings upon motions to suppress. This case
involves a warrantless seizure of the person. In such cases, it is the state which bears the
burdens of production and proof. See State v. Denune, 82 Ohio App. 3d 497, 505 (12th
Dist.1992). Thus, if the record is ambiguous or lacking upon an issue for which the state
bears the burden of production and proof, that ambiguity or omission must be resolved
against the state.
-9-
Clermont CA2019-08-064
{¶ 25} The record reflects that upon first being approached by Officer Taylor as she
stood in line in the store, Keating explained the sores on her arms and told Officer Taylor
that she was "ok." Based upon Keating's response, and apparently satisfied that Keating
was not in need of further attention, Officer Taylor did not call for medical assistance.1
Officer Taylor then asked Keating for her identification; she replied that she had none but
provided the information verbally. Keating's replies to Officer Taylor's inquiries were
responsive and appropriate. Officer Taylor testified that Keating was free to leave at the
time he asked her for identification, again indicating he had no concerns for her well-being.
Keating exited the store with Officer Taylor without assistance. There is nothing in the
record regarding this interaction between Keating and Officer Taylor to suggest that Keating
was in some acute distress. Finally, Officer Taylor's testimony refutes any implication that
checking Keating's identification information was related to the initial "welfare check." Upon
cross-examination, Officer Taylor rejected defense counsel's suggestion that he called in
Keating's identifying information to complete his report and testified that he did so to check
for warrants.2 This record discloses that Keating was detained for purposes of criminal
investigation, not for her own welfare. Under Peagler, there is no evidentiary basis for us
to consider whether Keating's detention was an exercise of community caretaking or order
additional briefing of the issue.
{¶ 26} We decline to address the state's argument regarding whether the trial court's
suppression of the heroin was the proper remedy. The state did not make this argument
either in its memorandum in opposition to Keating's motion to suppress or during the
1. When asked on cross-examination if he sought medical assistance for Keating, Officer Taylor testified,
"No. Once she explained what the sores were for – or, the reasoning for them, no. * * * Then she indicated
she was okay."
2. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Officer Taylor if he contacted dispatch for the purpose of
completing his report. Officer Taylor replied, "No. I was checking for warrants."
- 10 -
Clermont CA2019-08-064
suppression hearing. In fact, at the beginning of the suppression hearing, the prosecutor
plainly advised the trial court, "since [Keating's] issue is detention without a warrant, * * *
we would proceed just to counter that." The state now suggests it could not have known
this would be an issue it needed to raise until the trial court failed to correctly apply the law.
However, contrary to the state's assertion, this issue was one that was identifiable as a
ground to deny the motion to suppress, either from Keating's motion to suppress or from
defense counsel's statement during his cross-examination of Officer Taylor, "And then,
Judge, just so we cover the poisonous fruit argument that I'm going to have."
{¶ 27} It is well established that a party cannot raise new issues or legal theories for
the first time on appeal because such issues or theories are deemed waived. Kirk, 2020-
Ohio-323 at ¶ 25; State v. Mehta, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2000-11-232 and CA2000-12-
256, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3896, *8 (Sept. 4, 2001); State v. Walker, 1st Dist. Hamilton
No. C-150757, 2017-Ohio-9255, ¶ 26. This waiver "applies to arguments not asserted
either in a written motion to suppress or at the suppression hearing." Walker at ¶ 26;
Vaughn, 2015-Ohio-828; State v. Clay, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91942, 2009-Ohio-2725.
{¶ 28} The state's assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 29} Judgment affirmed.
HENDRICKSON, P.J., concurs separately.
PIPER, J., dissents.
HENDRICKSON, P.J., concurring separately.
{¶ 30} I concur in the majority opinion but write separately to address the
distinguishing circumstances between the case sub judice and this court's prior decision in
State v. Kirk, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2019-07-053, 2020-Ohio-323. In my view, the
- 11 -
Clermont CA2019-08-064
main distinction between the cases is that Kirk involved a legitimate Terry stop, whereas
the circumstances in the present case did not. In Kirk, the police officer personally observed
the defendant attaching a power tool to the front of his bicycle, which was extremely
unusual. The defendant was in the parking lot of a retail store, near the store's dumpster.
The defendant provided a suspicious explanation as to how he acquired the power tool.
Given these facts, the police officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion for a Terry
stop in order to determine whether the tool was stolen. As the officer in Kirk had authority
to continue his investigation based upon a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal
activity, the case turned on whether there was a valid Terry stop and not whether the
encounter was consensual. To that extent, I agree with the concurring opinion in Kirk.
{¶ 31} However, circumstances like those in Kirk are not present in the case before
us. Unlike in Kirk, whether the encounter was consensual is relevant in this case as there
are not facts giving rise to a valid Terry stop. Officer Taylor did not have reasonable
articulable suspicion that Keating was involved in any criminal activity. Although Officer
Taylor testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress that the bloody sores observed on
Keating's arms were "an indicator for drug use, meth" and Keating appeared to have "bags
under her eyes or dark circles under her eyes," these facts were not what led him to ask for
Keating's personal information or into running an outstanding warrants check. Rather than
associating any suspected drug usage to the likelihood that users typically have outstanding
warrants, Officer Taylor indicated he ran Keating's information for an investigatory reason
– "to check for warrants." As Officer Taylor explained, he is not required to check for
outstanding warrants on all individuals that he comes into contact with on his police calls.
Rather, the Miami Township Police Department only requires officers "take a report on
every call for service. So to do that, we have to detail the individual's name and the reason
for the contact."
- 12 -
Clermont CA2019-08-064
{¶ 32} When Officer Taylor made contact with Keating, Keating gave a reasonable
explanation for why she had blood sores on her arms – she had impetigo. Officer Taylor
admitted he was not familiar with impetigo, stating, "I didn't know what it was but apparently
it was the reason for the sores she had." Nonetheless, Officer Taylor determined Keating
did not need medical aid, and at this point in time, the welfare check was over.3 Thereafter,
Keating briefly engaged in a consensual encounter with Officer Taylor, providing him with
her name and social security number. However, the consensual encounter ended when
Officer Taylor told Keating to "get back in the van. He'd just be a minute[.]" When this
occurred, the encounter became nonconsensual, as fully laid out in the majority opinion.
Officer Taylor's ongoing investigation of Keating was improper without the officer having
reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. As none existed, Keating was
illegally detained in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. I therefore concur in the
majority's determination that the motion to suppress was properly granted. I further concur
with the majority's findings that (1) the state's second issue under its assigned error is not
properly before this court as it was not raised below and (2) there is no evidentiary basis in
the record below for us to consider the application of State v. Peagler, 76 Ohio St. 3d 496
(1996).
3. I recognize that "[t]he community caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement allows police officers to stop a person to render aid if they reasonably believe that there is an
immediate need for their assistance to protect life or prevent serious injury." State v. Dunn, 131 Ohio St. 3d
325, 2012-Ohio-1008, syllabus. While this exception allowed Officer Taylor to approach Keating to ensure
she was fine medically and did not need assistance, the exception did not permit him to detain Keating after
he ensured her health and safety. The caretaking/emergency-aid exception only permits "police to respond
to situations where life or limb [are] in jeopardy." Id. at ¶ 21. As discussed in the majority opinion, Keating
assured Officer Taylor she was "ok" and that the blood sores were caused by impetigo. At this point, there
was no threat to Keating's life or limbs, as evidenced by the fact that Officer Taylor did not call for medical
assistance. The nature of Officer Taylor's interaction with Keating changed, and, as discussed above, he
lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion and did not have cause to detain Keating.
- 13 -
Clermont CA2019-08-064
PIPER, J., dissenting.
{¶ 33} Respectfully, I dissent from the lead and separately concurring opinions in
affirming the trial court's determination that the welfare check resulted in an "illegal
detention." The trial court's analysis failed to consider the law regarding welfare checks, as
do my colleagues. A detention is only illegal if it is found to be unreasonable. It is not
unreasonable if the factual circumstances support application of an exception to the
requirement of a warrant. The idea that we cannot apply law that clearly governs the
circumstances ultimately works injustice upon a system designed to do the opposite.
{¶ 34} The motion to suppress raises the issue of the reasonableness of Keating's
welfare check. In conflating the law applicable to a welfare check, Keating argues "even a
momentary detention" must be supported by a suspicion of criminal activity. Keating argues
that as a matter of law once a person who is the subject of a welfare check explains his or
her condition, law enforcement must immediately terminate any concern for the individual.
Accepting this proposition of law means law enforcement cannot take the time necessary
to ascertain the totality of the circumstances. Such a proposition of law would also mean
law enforcement could never conclude a contact by verifying the person's identity who was
the subject of their welfare check. Neither my colleagues, the trial court, nor Keating's
motion cite caselaw that a limited detention cannot occur in the process of a welfare check.
None exists.
{¶ 35} As raised in Keating's motion to suppress, once she became subject to a brief
and limited detention, it must then be determined whether Keating's Fourth Amendment
rights were violated. The question becomes: was Keating unreasonably detained under a
totality of the circumstances, and therefore illegally detained as a matter of law, by an officer
who was confirming her identity in order to conclude his welfare contact? Stated differently,
as a matter of law is a brief detention to confirm a person's identity who is the subject of a
- 14 -
Clermont CA2019-08-064
welfare check beyond the scope of the community caretaking function? Since the
community caretaking function does not afront the Fourth Amendment, these questions
must be answered in the negative.
{¶ 36} The fact that the state was overly optimistic and responded to the issues
raised in Keating's motion in a limited way does not alter the need to fully apply widely
accepted case law. Evidence cannot be suppressed unless it can be said that Keating's
Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Determining whether an initial engagement is
consensual is the beginning of the legal analysis, it is not the end of the legal analysis.
A. The Circumstances Specific to Keating
{¶ 37} During the suppression hearing, the officer testified to receiving a dispatch
that requested a welfare check on a female passenger who was bloodied in a van with
another person. The officer was given specific information, including the location of the van
in a McDonald's parking lot along with its license plate number. The dispatch described the
female passenger as having "open wounds" on her arms and wearing bloody gloves. After
arriving at the location, one of the officers located the female inside a nearby store. The
officer testified that upon approaching the female, he immediately inquired if she was "okay"
and explained that they had received a request to perform a welfare check on her. The
female then gave the officer an explanation, which he considered uncertain considering his
experience and her appearance. Despite Keating's explanation, the officer testified he still
had concerns for her safety and welfare.4
{¶ 38} The officer testified that from his experience, the bleeding appeared to be drug
related. He further indicated the female appeared to be "not well, bags under her eyes or
4. My colleagues find the officer did not have continuing concerns for Keating's welfare, yet, this was not a
finding made by the trial court. To find such, despite the officer's testimony to the contrary, requires a
credibility determination best left to the trial court. Similarly, the trial court never made a finding that Keating's
explanation was "reasonable" despite the weight attributed to her explanation by the concurring opinion.
- 15 -
Clermont CA2019-08-064
dark circles under her eyes, appeared to be not feeling well." In concluding his inquiry into
her well-being, the officer asked the female for identification and she replied that she had
none. The female then volunteered a social security number, presumably to confirm the
name she gave. Then the officer called it in to dispatch. By this time, they had walked out
of the store to the van.5
{¶ 39} It was determined by the trial court that the officer contacted dispatch to
confirm her identity to complete his contact and conduct a check for warrants. Using the
social security number, dispatch confirmed Keating's identity but also reported an
outstanding warrant for Keating's arrest. In giving Keating the benefit of the doubt, the
officer asked dispatch to verify that the warrant was still active. The officer testified with
certainty it was only at this point, waiting for the reported warrant to be verified as active,
that Keating was instructed not to leave. Although Keating testified, she never testified she
felt she could not leave prior to this time.
{¶ 40} Despite the officer never being cross-examined on the subject, the trial court
found Keating's self-serving statement as reliable. The trial court found that the officer told
Keating he would be back in a minute because when Keating was asked to provide as much
detail as possible, she testified that either she asked him, or he told her, she could get into
the van and "he'd be just a minute or whatever." Even using the trial court's factual finding
that the officer told Keating it would take a minute, any detention was brief, limited in scope,
and does not alter the legal application of the community caretaking function. Unlike my
colleagues, the trial court never found the momentary detention was unrelated to the welfare
5. Testimony revealed that it was standard procedure for an officer to "take a report on every call for service"
and "detail the individual's name and the reasoning for the contact." Despite the trial court's finding, the lead
opinion finds the sole reason for asking Keating to wait a minute while he confirmed the social security number
she gave was for a warrant check constituting a "criminal investigation." Yet, the trial court specifically found
a person's identity is "information in every incident report."
- 16 -
Clermont CA2019-08-064
check, nor did the trial court find that confirming Keating's identity was unreasonable in
following through on the social security number Keating volunteered.6
B. Community Caretaking
{¶ 41} The United States and Ohio Supreme Courts have long held that an officer
performing community caretaking functions reasonably engages a person when necessary
to offer assistance. When discussing law enforcement duties and safety issues pertaining
to the public, the community caretaking function has been referenced by different names,
including welfare check, public welfare, emergency-aid, and exigent circumstance. "In their
community caretaking roles, officers may intrude on a person's privacy to carry out
community-caretaking functions to enhance public safety." State v. Street, 5th Dist. Stark
Nos. 2019CA00096 and 2019CA00097, 2020-Ohio-173, ¶ 22 (where the court also noted,
"the key to such permissible police action is the reasonableness required by the Fourth
Amendment"). This is because, at such a time, the officer may be "totally divorced from the
detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of criminal
statutes." Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S. Ct. 2523 (1973). See also State
v. Morris, 42 Ohio St. 2d 307 (1975).
{¶ 42} When officers focus on providing care and possible aid to persons, officers
are not required to possess reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Norman, 136
Ohio App. 3d 46 (3d Dist.1999). Given their community caretaking duties, officers frequently
investigate a myriad of instances where individuals may need help or care absent any
indication of criminal activity. State v. Weese, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-949, 2013-
Ohio-4056. These instances include responding to vehicle accidents, helping stranded
motorists, or providing aid to incapacitated individuals. See State v. Chrzanowski, 180 Ohio
6. The trial court made a specific finding of fact Keating volunteered her social security number for the officer.
- 17 -
Clermont CA2019-08-064
App.3d 324, 2008-Ohio-6993 (11th Dist.); and Street, 2020-Ohio-173. Thus, police officers
may, "intrude on a person's privacy to carry out community caretaking functions to enhance
public safety." State v. Telshaw, 195 Ohio App. 3d 596, 2011-Ohio-3373, ¶ 30 (7th Dist.).
{¶ 43} Despite the narrow interpretation in both the foregoing opinions regarding
when the community caretaking function is applicable, any serious accident, injury, jeopardy
to persons, or public safety may initiate law enforcement's duty to serve and protect. Merely
because "acute distress" was not immediately observed by the officer does not mean the
law requires a welfare check to terminate. To require such would vitiate the very purpose
of the community caretaking function. State v. Moiduddin, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-18-15,
2019-Ohio-3544, ¶ 34 (explaining that situations that might not fit under the emergency aid
or exigent circumstances may nevertheless fit under another facet of the community
caretaking function); and Street, 2020-Ohio-173 (even where there was no actual injury
observed, the dispatch relayed a citizen report that an individual may have been in need of
assistance).
{¶ 44} In Moiduddin, the trial court suppressed evidence where an officer pulled over
a car because it was driving too slowly, finding that the stop was not within the officer's
community caretaking function because a slow-moving vehicle did "not require immediate
need for assistance to prevent death or serious injury." However, the Third District found
that the officer was within his community caretaking function to stop and inquire of the driver
as part of his "legitimate role as a public servant designed to assist those in distress and to
maintain and foster public safety." ¶ 40.
{¶ 45} Even so, the bounds of an officer's ability to respond pursuant to the
community caretaking function are not limitless and the officer must possess "objectively
reasonable grounds to believe" that there is a need for aid. State v. Dunn, 131 Ohio St. 3d
325, 2012-Ohio-1008, ¶ 21. In Dunn, it was noted that law enforcement has a duty to
- 18 -
Clermont CA2019-08-064
protect those in danger. Dunn, who reportedly was suicidal, had his truck stopped by police.
He exited his vehicle and was detained, but subsequently charged with improper handling
of a firearm in a motor vehicle because a gun was located in the truck.
{¶ 46} So long as the officer is acting with reasonable grounds to believe his or her
aid is necessary, the Fourth Amendment is neither implicated nor violated by an officer
investigating safety concerns. State v. Clapper, 9th Dist. Medina No. 11CA0031-M, 2012-
Ohio-1382. See State v. Saunders, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2017-0052, 2018-Ohio-
2624, ¶ 25 (finding an encounter reasonable where the officer was "clearly in the scope of
his duties in making a 'welfare check' on someone walking in a staggering fashion on a
public street at 1:15 AM"). It is not speculation, but empirical knowledge that informs us if
an intoxicated person who disavows his or her condition and then walks out into traffic and
is killed because the officer failed to take a moment to access the person's condition, a civil
suit against the officer will almost certainly follow.
{¶ 47} In State v Johnson, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA99-06-01, 2000 Ohio App
LEXIS 1870, *10 (May 1, 2000), we noted an individual may be temporarily restrained for
his own safety. We explained that this is especially proper where the apparent detention is
either made clear, or simply obvious, that the detention is to be brief and in public. Johnson
was not illegally seized when briefly detained, first, to provide for Johnson's safety and to
secondly ascertain why he was dressed inappropriately for mid-winter freezing
temperatures, walking dangerously close to traffic and in the vicinity of a burning car. Even
before Dunn, we recognized an officer's responsibility to aid a member of the public may
require a brief detention.
{¶ 48} In the present case, the record clearly indicates that the officers were
dispatched in response to a request for a welfare check based on a reported observation
of a bloodied woman in a van in the McDonald's parking lot. The officers responded to
- 19 -
Clermont CA2019-08-064
perform a community caretaking function and not because an actual crime had been
reported.7 The officer's unrefuted testimony established that the woman, subsequently
identified as Keating, needed a welfare check. If nothing else, her being bloodied and acting
ill required a brief detention in an attempt to comprehend the circumstances and determine
what, if any, assistance should be rendered. At the very least, concluding a welfare check
by confirming the subject's identity is reasonable and not "illegal" as a matter of law. It is
only prudent to spend a few minutes with an apparently ill individual, and in that process,
find out who they are. Such is certainly within the purpose and scope of a welfare check.8
C. Not Always Bright Line Between Caretaking and Investigation
{¶ 49} In fact, officers may encounter many different situations where a momentary
detention is necessary to survey the circumstances. See Johnson, 12th Dist. Clermont No.
CA99-06-061 at *10, State v. Valenzuela-Pena, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2018-07-023,
2019-Ohio-1701 ¶19 (where a package was not seized but rather detained and we
emphasized the need to consider the purposes to be served by the encounter as well as
the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes).
{¶ 50} Courts have noted investigating criminal activity can overlap an officer's role
in providing a community care taking function. State v Young, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-
721, 2015-Ohio-2006, ¶ 34. An officer cannot always ascertain which hat the officer will be
wearing – his law enforcement hat (involving investigation) or his community caretaker hat
(involving assistance or aid). Moiduddin, 2019-Ohio 3544 at ¶ 40. Facts supporting a
7. Objectively, it cannot be denied that a reasonable probability existed that a person reported to be wearing
bloody gloves and bleeding with "wounds" is either a victim or a perpetrator of some sort of serious violence
or accident. The potential seriousness of what was to be discovered supported two cars being dispatched to
the scene.
8. Besides being a natural conclusion to an incident they were sent to respond to, law enforcement's
confirmation of a person's identity potentially aids in the need for further protection; an individual bleeding and
appearing ill could be, among many other things, a walkaway Alzheimer's patient, one with mental health care
concerns, a reported missing person, or a reported victim of various crimes – in other words individuals who
do not always report accurately to police, yet need assistance.
- 20 -
Clermont CA2019-08-064
welfare check may also form a reasonable, articulable suspicion providing a basis for a
Terry stop. State v. Saunders, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2017-0052, 2018-Ohio-2624 ¶
28.
{¶ 51} There is nothing per se unconstitutional in the brief detention of an individual
for purposes of limited inquiry during routine police response, even when the circumstances
are not such as to justify an arrest. State v. Kolb, 12th Dist. Warren No. 11, 1982 Ohio App.
LEXIS 14365, *4 (Jan. 20, 1982). Officers do not need ironclad proof as to the seriousness
of injury before responding to a potential need. State v Lindner, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27788,
2016-Ohio-3435. Instead, officers need only to possess a "reasonable basis." State v.
Wade, 5th Dist. Muskingum Nos. CT2019-0007 and CT2019-0008, 2019-Ohio-4565, ¶ 22.
It appears the officers were well within the caretaking function when they responded to the
McDonald's parking lot and assessed the situation, which included identifying the subject
involved. Unfortunately, sub judice, the trial court granted suppression merely upon a
factual determination a momentary detention had occurred and then automatically held as
a matter of law it was an "illegal detention" without further analysis.
{¶ 52} The officer briefly engaged the subject to ensure she was alright, and in doing
so, was proceeding to conclude matters by confirming her identity. The focus should be
upon the reasonableness of the detention and the limit to its scope. See Valenzuela-Pena,
2019-Ohio-1701 at ¶ 19. The trial court did not make a factual finding that confirming the
subject's identity was unreasonable. Instead, it drew a legal conclusion it was "illegal." Yet,
the detention was very limited in scope and duration. The momentary detainment even
allowed Keating the opportunity to smoke a cigarette when she agreed not to leave. Even
with the trial court's finding, she was told it would take a minute, confirming the social
security number she provided was clearly within the purpose and scope of the initial welfare
inquiry.
- 21 -
Clermont CA2019-08-064
{¶ 53} While the officer's wellness check was intended to conclude by verifying her
identity, the brief detention for purposes of completing the officer's contact was entirely
reasonable and does not render the momentary detention violative of Keating's rights
pursuant to protections otherwise provided by the Fourth Amendment.
D. Issues Raised Below by the Evidence
{¶ 54} Our lead opinion claims the evidence does not support the notion that
Keating's momentary detention was associated with her welfare check. Then, it claims
"waiver" to support its decision that a party's written argument submitted to the trial court
controls whether the officers were acting pursuant to their community caretaking function.9
However, the prosecutor's choice to focus on the encounter as entirely consensual cannot
ignore the fact that, in her motion, Keating submitted that the basis of suppression was the
momentary detention associated with her welfare check.
{¶ 55} The preference would have been that this court ask the parties to brief issues
related to the application of the community caretaking function before entering our
judgment. State v. Peagler, 76 Ohio St. 3d 496 (1996). In Peagler, the Ohio Supreme Court
referenced this specific preference by noting, "this court has often held that if a reviewing
court chooses to consider an issue not suggested by the parties on appeal but implicated
by evidence in the record, the court of appeals should give the parties notice of its intention
and an opportunity to brief the issue." Id. at fn. 2.
{¶ 56} The Peagler court was presented with a situation where the appellate court
addressed issues regarding an appellant's motion to suppress that were different from that
argued to the trial court. The Ohio Supreme Court determined that an appellate court has
9. Our appellate review is obligated to accept the trial court's determination of facts, resolving all factual
questions. State v. Lynn, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2017-08-129 and CA2017-08-132, 2018-Ohio-3335.
Appellate review is limited to applying the law to the facts as determined by the trial court.
- 22 -
Clermont CA2019-08-064
discretion "in deciding to address an issue not briefed or raised below" so long as the
appellate court bases any factual conclusions or legal issues on evidence that exists in the
record at the time the trial court made its decision. The court went on to state,
fairness, which is required for the proper operation of the
adversary system of justice, requires at least that the parties be
allowed in the trial court the opportunity to present evidence that
would support or refute the legal theory addressed by the court
of appeals. We therefore hold that while an appellate court may
decide an issue on grounds different from those determined by
the trial court, the evidentiary basis upon which the court of
appeals decides a legal issue must have been adduced before
the trial court and have been made a part of the record thereof.
Id. at 501. While I respect the opinions of my colleagues, they give weight to only portions
of the testimony in order to draw the conclusion the momentary detention was unassociated
with the community caretaking function.
{¶ 57} My conclusions are entirely based upon the trial court's findings of fact and
undisputed testimony. I draw an opposite legal conclusion and determine we would be
better to implement the preference for fairness and request the parties brief the law
applicable to the totality of the circumstances. It is only an alternative to their view of the
legal conclusion to be reached from the evidence that my colleagues' opinions argue
"waiver."
{¶ 58} Even so, the facts and circumstances attendant to the momentary detention
associated with the welfare check were not newly raised as my colleagues determine. In
order to determine whether Fourth Amendment protections were violated, it was the trial
court's obligation, and ours as well, to analyze the nature of the encounter, including
whether the detention was unreasonable. The basic constitutional principles raised in
Keating's pleadings must be fully considered to ensure the integrity of sound criminal
proceedings.
{¶ 59} It behooves us to remember that a party's waiver requires the "intentional
- 23 -
Clermont CA2019-08-064
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right." United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
733, 113 S. Ct. 1770 (1993) (explaining that reviewing courts have discretion to correct error
affecting the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings). Rather than being applicable to
arguments made by the parties, waiver is generally applied to personal, individual rights
accorded an accused. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041 (1973).
The application of waiver to the evidence before us is the anthesis of applying Peagler.
{¶ 60} Perhaps the state's limitation of its argument is better characterized as a
"forfeiture." Yet, forfeiture does not extinguish an error. Olano. Where a party has forfeited
an objection by failing to raise it, the appellate court may still review the issue using a plain
error standard. State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St. 3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642. In contrast to waiver,
forfeiture is the failure to object or make an assertion where the party complaining of the
trial court's error did not call the error to the trial court's attention at a time when such error
could have been avoided. State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St. 3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459 ¶ 21 (no
argument was made to seek merger of allied offenses of similar import and was thus
forfeited before the trial court, yet such was plain error on appellate review).
E. Conclusion
{¶ 61} Regardless of the prosecutor's decision to limit the state's argument to
consensual contact, the community caretaking function permits officers to initiate a brief
detention without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment. Both parties and the trial court
were aware of the facts elicited during the suppression hearing, which enabled the trial court
to properly perform the necessary Fourth Amendment analysis in its entirety.
{¶ 62} The opinions of my colleagues extrapolate from isolated portions of testimony
to envision a factual construct permitting them to dismiss the significance of State v.
Peagler. Simultaneously, this disallows the possibility for a reasonable conclusion to a
welfare check, which was merely confirming the reported subject's identity to complete the
- 24 -
Clermont CA2019-08-064
contact report. There is no doubt both Keating's motion and the testimony submitted raise
the issue of the reasonableness of the community welfare function.
{¶ 63} Suppression of evidence by virtue of the Exclusionary Rule is a judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect
upon government officials and law enforcement. State v. Mobley, 12th Dist. Warren No.
CA88-08-063, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 1878 (May 22, 1989). Attempting to deter officers
from verifying or confirming a person's identity while conducting a welfare check should not
be the subject of judicial fiat when considering the exercise of reasonable discretion needed
by police officers protecting individuals on a daily basis.
{¶ 64} The record is clear; the officers were dispatched to investigate a bloodied
woman, encountered that woman, and then reasonably detained her for a very short time
while concluding her welfare check. I therefore find Keating's Fourth Amendment rights
were not violated when applying the community caretaking function to the facts as
determined by the trial court. As such, I respectfully dissent from the lead and separately
concurring opinions, which affirm the trial court's suppression of evidence. I would reverse
the trial court's suppression of evidence and remand for further proceedings.
- 25 -