Victor v. Kaplan , 2020 Ohio 3116 ( 2020 )


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  • [Cite as Victor v. Kaplan, 
    2020-Ohio-3116
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    VLADIMIR B. VICTOR,                                  :
    Plaintiff-Appellant/                         :
    Cross-Appellee,
    :       No. 108252
    v.
    :
    MARINA KAPLAN, ET AL.,
    :
    Defendants-Appellees/
    Cross-Appellants.                            :
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN
    PART; AND REMANDED
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 28, 2020
    Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Domestic Relations Division
    Case No. DR-15-358403
    Appearances:
    Cavitch, Familo & Durkin, Co., and Roger L. Kleinman, for
    appellant/cross-appellee.
    Rosenthal | Thurman | Lane L.L.C., and Scott S. Rosenthal
    for appellee/cross-appellant M.K.
    Skirbunt & Skirbunt L.L.C., James R. Skirbunt, and
    Sharon A. Skirbunt, for cross-appellee Skirbunt &
    Skirbunt, L.L.C.
    MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J.:
    Plaintiff-appellant Vladimir B. Victor (“Husband”) appeals from the
    judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations
    Division, adopting the magistrate’s decision primarily regarding distribution of
    marital assets, as modified. Defendant-appellee/cross-appellant Marina Kaplan
    (“Wife”) also appeals the judgment. Third-party defendant/cross-appellee Skirbunt
    & Skirbunt, L.L.C. (“Skirbunt”) answers Wife’s cross-appeal concerning the trial
    court’s granting of Skirbunt’s motion to intervene and the trial court’s award of
    attorney fees. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and
    remand.
    I. Procedural History and Substantive Facts
    Husband and Wife married on February 22, 2000. One child, J.V.,
    was born as issue of the marriage and is now emancipated. Wife has one adult
    daughter, Rachel, from a previous marriage.
    During the marriage, Husband worked at various jobs. Initially, he
    worked as a computer and financial consultant with Richler Victor & Associates. He
    was also employed by Ameriprise as a financial advisor. At some point in time,
    however, Husband’s license as a financial advisor was suspended. He then worked
    in real estate, primarily purchasing, managing, and rehabilitating rental properties.
    Throughout the marriage, Wife worked in the medical sales industry
    for several different companies. She worked at Bayless-Pathmark (“Bayless”) as a
    contractual employee from 1996 through 1998, and then under a different contract
    for the entirety of 1999, before marrying Husband in early 2000. Wife continued
    employment with Bayless into the marriage. According to Wife, at the end of 1999,
    she learned that her contract would not be renewed, so she began negotiations with
    Bayless. (Tr. 539, exhibit No. 69.) Wife continued working at Bayless in 2000, under
    different employment terms that expired on December 31, 2000. (Tr. 515, exhibit
    No. 9, 1495.) In 2000, Bayless offered Wife a new contract but she declined the
    offer. (Tr. 1501.)
    On October 12, 2001, Wife procured a structured settlement with
    Bayless for $350,000. Bayless agreed to make payments to Wife over five years,
    with the first payment payable within seven days of execution of the agreement.
    During the marriage, Husband and Wife had acquired numerous
    bank or investment accounts including the following: (1) FCI Global Chase Checking
    #5390; (2) FCI Global Chase Savings #8060; (3) A1 Huntington Money Market
    #9122; (4) A1 Huntington Checking #3639; (5) 1612 Wood Huntington Checking
    #8192; (6) 1534 Parkhill Huntington Checking #8189; (7) H Huntington #9122; (8)
    4208 Cedar Huntington Checking #8202; (9) 3259 Desota Land Huntington #8163;
    (10) 3675 Randolph Huntington #7173; (11) Gevaldig Enterprises KeyBank
    Checking #2679; (12) H KeyBank Checking #2679; (13) MA Kaplan Living Trust
    Chase Checking #5660; (14) MA Kaplan Living Trust Chase Savings #7146; (15) MA
    Kaplan Living Trust NYCB Checking #3715; (16) MA Kaplan Living Trust KeyBank
    Checking #0198; (17) MA Kaplan Living Trust T.Rowe Price [#916]; (18) MA Kaplan
    Living Trust Fidelity #4424; (19) W Fifth Third Checking #1516; and (20) MA
    Kaplan Living Trust Vanguard #9847.
    Throughout the marriage, the parties maintained the following
    retirement accounts: (1) FCI Global 401(k) Trust (Chase); (2) W Fidelity IRA
    #7888; (3) W Fidelity SEP IRA #6625; and (4) W Oppenheimer.
    Husband and Wife had also acquired interest in certain real estate.
    Husband claims an interest in the following real properties: (1) 1534 Parkhill Road;
    (2) 1612 Wood Road; (3) 3259 Desota Avenue; (4) 3316 Desota Avenue; (5) 3675
    Randolph Road; (6) 3744 Berkeley Road; and (7) 4208 Cedar Avenue. Wife owned
    the following properties: (1) 3494 Shannon Road (the marital residence); (2) 3631
    Bendemeer Road; (3) 2664 Brentwood Road; and (4) 2547 Edgewood Road.
    Husband and Wife accumulated credit card debt during the
    marriage, including the following: (1) Home Depot; (2) FCI Global Chase #8017;
    (3) Discover; (4) Amex #84008, #11001, #43007, and #9-71001; (5) Capital One
    #5299 and 1118; (6) British Airlines #2242; (7) Nordstrom; and (8) Citicards.
    On August 17, 2015, Husband filed a complaint for divorce, alleging
    gross neglect of duty and extreme cruelty and requesting that he be designated the
    residential parent of the minor child. On September 14, 2015, Wife filed an answer
    denying Husband’s allegations and a counterclaim. The court issued restraining
    orders against both parties.
    The matter was heard before the court magistrate on May 8, 2017,
    June 12-14, 2017, June 19-20, 2017, July 24-28, 2017, and September 12, 2017. At
    the time of trial, numerous motions filed by both Husband and Wife were pending,
    including several motions for attorney fees, motions to show cause, and motions to
    compel. On April 5, 2018, the magistrate issued a 42-page decision that also
    addressed the pending motions.
    The magistrate made initial findings of fact concerning the parties’
    credibility and conduct throughout the proceedings:
    The court finds both [Husband] and [Wife] lack credibility, generally.
    This finding is based on the totality of the parties’ conduct during the
    pendency of this action, and more specifically their conduct during
    trial both in and out of court. This finding is based on the court’s
    consideration and evaluation of the parties’ testimony when
    compared to the testimony of the other witnesses, and also in
    comparison to each other’s testimony.
    The magistrate noted in support that Husband refused to permit
    Wife’s real estate appraisal expert witnesses to enter the structures he owns or to
    provide Wife with copies of the lease agreements for Husband’s rental properties.
    Additionally, Husband “consistently feigned a lack of memory on matters of
    substance when it suited his purposes, yet conveniently remembered even
    seemingly insignificant details about matters [that] advanced his positions or
    arguments.”
    Regarding Wife’s behavior, the magistrate noted that Wife sold a
    piece of real estate in violation of the mutual restraining orders during trial, then
    “conveniently failed to disclose this fact while on the witness stand and under oath,”
    despite being questioned about the real estate. The magistrate found that Wife had
    knowledge of the restraining orders, yet knowingly sold the property and
    intentionally concealed this fact from the court. The magistrate further noted that
    Wife “frustrated the court’s efforts to efficiently complete the trial and caused an
    undeterminable amount of delay by consistently refusing to answer the simplest and
    most straightforward questions during cross-examination.”
    The magistrate then made findings concerning the parties’ real and
    personal property, including the Bayless settlement proceeds, financial and
    retirement accounts, debt, allocation of parental rights, child support, and spousal
    support. And the magistrate entered a disposition concerning the approximately 31
    pending motions. Both parties filed objections. In particular, Husband objected to
    nearly the entirety of the magistrate’s decision, including the magistrate’s
    disposition of various pending motions.
    On January 28, 2019, the trial court adopted the magistrate’s
    decision as modified. The court addressed each of the Husband’s objections as
    follows: objection Nos. 1-10, 12-13, and 16, overruled; objection No. 11, sustained in
    part; objection No. 14, sustained; and objection No. 15, sustained in part.
    The trial court’s modifications to the magistrate’s decision included
    the following: Husband’s objection No. 11 addressing the magistrate’s granting of
    Wife’s motion and amended motion to compel response to records subpoena issued
    to [the attorney] and motion for attorney fees and expenses (motion No. 400500).
    The magistrate determined that Husband failed to provide discovery and ordered
    Husband to complete 50 hours of community service in lieu of a monetary sanction.
    The trial court found the community service order inappropriate and vacated the
    sanction. The court instead ordered Husband to pay Wife’s attorney fees in the
    amount of $2,000.
    In 0bjection No. 14, Husband argued that the magistrate erred in
    ordering Husband to pay for the minor child’s annual health care costs. Finding the
    magistrate made a clerical error, because Wife “offered and requested to be
    responsible for” the minor child’s health care in her closing arguments, the trial
    court sustained this objection and amended the magistrate’s decision to reflect
    Wife’s responsibility for the child’s health care costs.
    In objection No. 15, Husband argued that the magistrate erred in
    adopting the guardian ad litem’s (“GAL”) proposed shared parenting plan, which
    designated Wife as the residential parent for school purposes. Husband proposed
    instead that both parents be designated as residential parent. Because J.V. is now
    emancipated, a shared parenting plan is moot, and we therefore decline to address
    the court’s judgment pertaining to Husband’s objection No. 15.
    Finally, the trial court overruled all six of Wife’s objections.
    This appeal now follows.
    II. Assignments of Error
    Husband assigns the following 12 errors for our review:
    I. The trial court’s finding that the proceeds of an employment discrimination
    claim is Wife’s separate property was error as a matter of law, an abuse of
    discretion, and contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
    II. The trial court’s finding that the assets in Wife’s living trust and in Wife’s
    name are Wife’s separate property is error as a matter of law, an abuse of
    discretion, and contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
    III. The magistrate erred in determining Wife’s separate property interest in
    four pieces of real estate owned by Wife and by Wife’s living trust.
    IV. The trial court’s finding that Husband had an ownership interest in 5333
    Antisdale is error as a matter of law, an abuse of discretion, and contrary to
    the manifest weight of the evidence.
    V. The trial court’s valuation of marital real estate was error as a matter of
    law and abuse of discretion.
    VI. The trial court’s allocation of all marital debt to husband was error as a
    matter of law and an abuse of discretion.
    VII. The trial court’s failure to award husband spousal support is an abuse of
    discretion.
    VIII. The trial court’s rulings on contempt motions/motions for attorney fees
    were contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
    IX. The trial court’s determination of attorney fees was an abuse of discretion.
    X. The trial court’s support order is an abuse of discretion.
    XI. The magistrate erred in adopting the GAL’s proposed shared parenting
    plan.
    XII. The trial court’s failure to order a distributive award sufficient to
    effectuate an equitable division of the marital estate was an abuse of
    discretion and contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
    Wife cross-appeals, assigning the following 9 errors for our review:
    I. The trial court erred in prohibiting Wife from filing supplemental
    objections on the basis that Wife did not file a praecipe, when Wife
    gave notice of her intent to file supplemental objections in her
    preliminary objections, and when opposing counsel filed a praecipe.
    II. The trial court erred by granting Wife’s former counsel’s motion to
    intervene.
    III. The trial court erred when issuing a sua sponte award of attorney
    fees with no such motion pending, after the magistrate’s decision but
    before the judgment of entry of divorce.
    IV. The trial court erred and abused its discretion by imposing a
    $50,000 penalty against Wife for the alleged violation of the court’s
    temporary restraining orders.
    V. The trial court erred and abused its discretion when it failed to
    credit Wife for advancing $77,000 of attorney fees to Wife’s counsel,
    and for Wife’s payment of all of the GAL’s fees in the amount of
    $20,000 from the final calculation of the division of assets and
    liabilities.
    VI. The trial court erred and abused its discretion when concluding
    that Husband should be awarded $12,250 for personal property.
    VII. The trial court erred and abused its discretion when including
    $58,418.64 in the division of property in addition to awarding Cross-
    Appellee a sum of $50,000, as this was a “double dip” of the proceeds
    from the sale of the property.
    VIII. The trial court erred and abused its discretion in the division of
    personal property as failing to be substantiated by any credible
    testimony.
    IX. The trial court erred and abused its discretion when it failed to
    award Cross-Appellant any child support during the pendency of the
    litigation.
    III. Standard of Review
    We review a trial court’s determination in domestic relations cases
    for an abuse of discretion. Booth v. Booth, 
    44 Ohio St.3d 142
    , 144, 
    541 N.E.2d 1028
    (1989).
    Since it is axiomatic that a trial court must have discretion to do what
    is equitable upon the facts and circumstances of each case, * * * it
    necessarily follows that a trial court’s decision in domestic relations
    matters should not be disturbed on appeal unless the decision
    involves more than an error of judgment.
    
    Id.,
     citing Cherry v. Cherry, 
    66 Ohio St.2d 348
    , 355, 
    421 N.E.2d 1293
     (1981).
    An abuse of discretion “connotes more than an error of law or
    judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or
    unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 
    5 Ohio St.3d 217
    , 219, 
    450 N.E.2d 1140
    (1983). And where there is some competent, credible evidence in the record to
    support the trial court’s decision, there is no abuse of discretion. Trolli v. Trolli, 8th
    Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101980, 
    2015-Ohio-4487
    , ¶ 29, citing Kapadia v. Kapadia, 8th
    Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94456, 
    2011-Ohio-2255
    , ¶ 24.
    Concerning Husband’s assigned errors regarding the trial court’s
    distribution of the marital property, this court reviews a trial court’s property
    division “as a whole, in determining whether it has achieved an equitable and fair
    division of marital assets.” Tyler v. Tyler, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93124, 2010-
    Ohio-1428, ¶ 24, citing Briganti v. Briganti, 
    9 Ohio St.3d 220
    , 222, 
    459 N.E.2d 896
    (1984).
    R.C. 3105.171(C)(1) mandates an equal division of marital property,
    or “if an equal division is inequitable, the court must divide the marital property
    equitably.” Neville v. Neville, 
    99 Ohio St.3d 275
    , 
    2003-Ohio-3624
    , 
    791 N.E.2d 434
    ,
    ¶ 5. In order to determine what is equitable, the trial court must consider the factors
    outlined in R.C. 3105.171(F). 
    Id.
     These factors include the duration of the marriage,
    the assets and liabilities of the spouses, tax consequences of the property division,
    any retirement benefits of the spouses, and “[a]ny other factor the court expressly
    finds to be relevant and equitable.” R.C. 3105.171(F)(1)-(10); Kehoe v. Kehoe, 2012-
    Ohio-3357, 
    974 N.E.2d 1229
    , ¶ 14 (8th Dist.) (stating that the trial court must take
    into account the parties’ marital debt when dividing marital property). The trial
    court “‘must indicate the basis for its division of the marital property in sufficient
    detail to enable a reviewing court to determine whether the award is fair, equitable,
    and in accordance with the law.’” Johnson v. Mills, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102241,
    
    2015-Ohio-4273
    , ¶ 19, quoting Franklin v. Franklin, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-
    713, 
    2012-Ohio-1814
    , ¶ 4.
    IV. Husband’s Appeal
    A. Bayless Settlement
    Husband’s first assignment of error pertains to the Bayless
    settlement proceeds. The magistrate determined that the settlement proceeds were
    Wife’s separate property because Wife’s claim arose prior to the marriage:
    [T]he evidence establishes, and the court finds, [Wife’s] claim against
    Bayless arose prior [to] the marriage. [Husband] disputed the
    chronology of events at trial, however, the court agrees [Wife’s]
    timeline is supported by the evidence. [Wife’s] premarital claim,
    which ultimately led to her acquisition of the settlement proceeds, was
    therefore separate, not marital, on temporal grounds.
    Husband objected to the magistrate’s decision on the basis that
    Wife’s claim against Bayless arose after the marriage and the settlement proceeds
    represented income that would have been earned during the marriage. He also
    testified at trial and argued in his objections that his marital labor in assisting Wife’s
    negotiations with Bayless produced a significantly better settlement and therefore
    the proceeds were marital.
    In his decision, the magistrate rejected, “without hesitation,”
    Husband’s “preposterous and narcissistic claim” that his marital labor produced a
    successful settlement with Bayless, finding that Wife’s attorneys negotiated the
    settlement with Bayless. The magistrate stated that he based this decision upon the
    testimony of the parties and a consideration of the evidence. The magistrate stated
    that although Husband “inserted himself into the negotiations process and was
    included in some communications between those involved, * * * there is nothing in
    the record to show [Husband] was actually responsible for settling the dispute.” The
    magistrate therefore concluded that Wife’s premarital claim against Bayless was not
    converted from separate property to marital property based on Husband’s actions.
    The trial court overruled Husband’s objections and adopted the
    magistrate’s decision on this issue in its entirety. In so doing, the court stated as
    follows:
    The magistrate properly found [Wife] presented ample evidence that
    this premarital claim, which ultimately led to [Wife’s] acquisition of
    settlement proceeds, occurred well before her marriage to [Husband].
    The parties were married on February 22, 2000. It appears the
    underlying action for [Wife’s] claim occurred in 1999, prior to the
    marriage. Additionally, [Husband] was not involved in negotiations
    or responsible for settling the dispute.
    On appeal, Husband contends that the trial court’s finding that the
    proceeds from Wife’s claim against her former employer is separate property is error
    as a matter of law. In support, he argues once again that Wife’s claim against Bayless
    arose after the marriage, the settlement proceeds represented income that would
    have been earned during the marriage, and Husband’s marital labor in assisting
    Wife’s negotiations with Bayless produced a significantly better settlement and
    therefore converted the funds to marital property.
    When distributing property in a divorce proceeding, the trial court
    must first determine what constitutes marital property and what constitutes
    separate property. Comella v. Comella, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90969, 2008-Ohio-
    6673, ¶ 38, citing R.C. 3105.171(B). The determination of whether property is
    marital or separate is a mixed question of law and fact that will not be reversed
    unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.            Kobal v. Kobal,
    
    2018-Ohio-1755
    , 
    111 N.E.3d 804
    , ¶ 27 (8th Dist.). Once the characterization of the
    property is made, the reviewing court will not disturb the trial court’s distribution of
    the property absent an abuse of discretion. Id.; Williams v. Williams, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 95346, 
    2011-Ohio-939
    , ¶ 8.
    Property acquired during a marriage is generally presumed to be
    marital property, unless it can be shown to be separate.           Johnson, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 102241, 
    2015-Ohio-4273
    , at ¶ 18. The party seeking to have certain
    property classified as “separate property” has the burden of proof, by a
    preponderance of the evidence, in tracing the separate property. Strauss v. Strauss,
    8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95377, 
    2011-Ohio-3831
     at ¶ 49, citing Peck v. Peck, 
    96 Ohio App.3d 731
    , 734, 
    645 N.E.2d 1300
     (12th Dist.1994).
    Marital property includes:
    (i) All real and personal property that currently is owned by either or
    both of the spouses, including, but not limited to, the retirement
    benefits of the spouses, and that was acquired by either or both of the
    spouses during the marriage;
    (ii) All interest that either or both of the spouses currently has in any
    real or personal property, including, but not limited to, the retirement
    benefits of the spouses, and that was acquired by either or both of the
    spouses during the marriage;
    (iii) Except as otherwise provided in this section, all income and
    appreciation on separate property, due to the labor, monetary, or in-
    kind contribution of either or both of the spouses that occurred during
    the marriage * * *.
    R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a)(i)-(iii).
    Marital property does not, however, include separate property. R.C.
    3105.171(A)(3)(b). “Separate property” is any real and personal property or any
    interest in real or personal property that is any of the following:
    (i) an inheritance by one spouse by bequest, devise, or descent, during
    the marriage;
    (ii) any real or personal property or interest in real or personal
    property that was acquired by a spouse prior to the date of the
    marriage;
    (iii) passive income and appreciation acquired from separate property
    by one spouse during the marriage;
    (iv) any real or personal property or interest in real or personal
    property acquired by one spouse after a decree of legal separation
    * * *;
    (v) any real or personal property or interest in real or personal
    property that is excluded by a valid antenuptial agreement;
    (vi) compensation to a spouse for the spouse’s personal injury, except
    for loss of marital earnings and compensation for expenses paid from
    marital assets;
    (vii) Any gift of any real or personal property or of an interest in real
    or personal property that is made after the date of the marriage and
    that is proven by clear and convincing evidence to have been given to
    only one spouse.
    R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(i)-(vii).
    The commingling of separate property with other property does not
    destroy the identity of the separate property “except when the separate property is
    not traceable.” R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(b); Woyt v. Woyt, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
    Nos. 107312, 107321, 107322, 
    2019-Ohio-3758
    , ¶ 22.
    Here, Wife contends that she is entitled to the Bayless proceeds as
    separate property because her “employment dispute” with Bayless (Wife’s Brief,
    p. 4), which stemmed from the nonrenewal of her contract, predated the marriage.
    In support, she testified at trial that her claim was based upon her contract with
    Bayless for 1996-1999. Although Wife stated at her deposition that she retained an
    attorney in 2000 (tr. 397), she testified at trial that she retained an attorney in 1999
    to renegotiate this contract, stating that she “started talking to Bayless in ‘99.”
    (Tr. 489.)
    Regardless, the record shows that contract negotiations in fact
    occurred in 2000, and at some point, the subject of the negotiations changed:
    Attorney: You would agree with me that on October 3, 2000, you had
    a meeting with your lawyers * * * ?
    Wife: That’s correct.
    Attorney: And this was regarding contract negotiations?
    Wife: It was ongoing, yes.
    Attorney: Right. And it was negotiations regarding a new
    employment contract for you, true?
    Wife: Right. We were trying to negotiate.
    Attorney: And you would agree with me that at some point in time
    after you began the contract negotiations, the negotiations changed
    from the terms of a new employment contract to a severance contract,
    correct?
    Wife: At some point, yes.
    (Tr. 490.)
    And during this period of contract negotiations, Wife continued to
    work at Bayless in some fashion in 2000 and into 2001:
    Attorney: And you say that your employment agreement ended in
    1999?
    Wife: Contractual.
    Attorney:  You’re contractual. And were the terms of your
    employment after the end of the contract better or worse?
    Wife: They were not the same terms.
    Attorney: Okay. They were just different?
    Wife: There was no contract.
    Attorney: But you had a commission schedule, correct?
    Wife: Right. Because I was bringing in business.
    ***
    Attorney: Okay. I’m looking at your income tax return that was
    attached as part of [an exhibit to your expert’s report] for 2000. And
    I see that you made $197,253 in the year 2000; does that sound right?
    That’s employment income.
    Wife: Yeah.
    Attorney: So although you’re saying your employment contract ended
    in ‘99, you were still making the same amount of money in 2000, true?
    Wife: I was bringing more business.
    Attorney: Okay. And when did you ever work for Bayless as an
    independent contractor?
    Wife: I think in 2001. * * * If I remember correctly.
    Attorney: So your employment really had three stages to it. There
    was a period of time where you had an employment contract that
    renewed itself every year?
    Wife: Right.
    Attorney: There was a period of time where you were still an employee
    but not with an employment contract?
    Wife: Transition.
    Attorney: Right. And then there was a third period in which you were
    an independent contractor * * * or consultant.
    Wife: Right.
    ***
    Attorney: [Y]ou worked for Bayless throughout 2001, true?
    Wife: Right. As a consultant.
    ***
    Attorney: But while you were with Bayless, you weren’t working for
    any other companies? * * *
    Wife: No.
    (Tr. 532-535, 539; exhibit No. 69.)
    Then on October 12, 2001, Wife executed a settlement agreement
    with Bayless in the amount of $350,000. Bayless agreed to make payments to Wife
    over five years, with the first payment payable within seven days of execution of the
    agreement. The settlement represented the income Wife would have earned over
    the next 18 months going forward:
    Attorney: Now did you tell me that at the time you settled the case,
    your case with Bayless, that the $350,000 reflected the amount you
    would have earned over the next 18 months as an employee of
    Bayless?
    Wife: That’s correct, yeah
    Attorney: You believe that during the next year alone you would have
    made $300,000, plus a contribution to the profit sharing plan, true?
    Wife: Yes.
    (Tr. 408.)
    Attorney: Your claim against Bayless arose from the Bayless’s
    nonrenewal of your contract from 1999, true?
    Wife: Correct.
    Attorney: Okay. And * * * your claim was that you should have been
    earning more money in 2000, 2001, and forward, true?
    Wife: Correct.
    (Tr. 1496.)
    Wages earned during a marriage constitute marital property.
    Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95346, 
    2011-Ohio-939
    , at ¶ 12, citing
    R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a)(iii); Blevins v. Blevins, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2018-CA-23,
    
    2019-Ohio-297
    , ¶ 23. Likewise, “compensation for the loss of those wages during
    the marriage must also be marital property.” Id.; see Collins v. Collins, 5th Dist.
    Stark Nos. 2010CA00283 and 2010CA00299, 
    2011-Ohio-4973
     (finding the trial
    court’s determination that the proceeds from the settlement of a sexual harassment
    lawsuit were separate property was against the manifest weight of the evidence
    where Husband and Wife testified the settlement was awarded as lost wages); see
    also Budd v. Budd, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25469, 
    2011-Ohio-565
    , ¶ 18, quoting
    McKenzie v. McKenzie, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2006-CA-34, 
    2006-Ohio-6841
    , at ¶ 15,
    quoting McClure v. McClure, 
    98 Ohio App.3d 27
    , 41, 
    647 N.E.2d 832
     (2d Dist. 1994)
    (stating that “‘“severance pay received during the marriage is marital property to the
    same extent that wages paid during the marriage are marital property”’”).
    While Wife testified that she began contract negotiations with
    Bayless in 1999, before the marriage, the evidence shows that the settlement was
    executed in October 2001, during the marriage, and payments would begin within
    seven days of execution of the agreement. Moreover, Wife admits that the proceeds
    from the settlement reflected lost future wages — income she would have earned
    during the marriage. Wife also testified that she paid income tax on at least a portion
    of the settlement proceeds. (Tr. 535-536.) And there is no evidence that Wife was
    owed compensation for her employment with Bayless in 1999. In fact, Wife testified
    that she was under contract for the entirety of 1999 and that year proved to be her
    highest year of compensation with Bayless. (Tr. 531.) The settlement proceeds are
    therefore marital property.
    To the extent Wife argues that her “employment dispute” with
    Bayless included a discrimination claim against her former employer and, therefore,
    the settlement proceeds are her separate property, we find no merit.
    Although there is some reference in the trial transcripts to Wife
    having a discrimination claim against Bayless,1 Wife presents no testimony or
    documentary evidence supporting such a claim or itemizing any amount of the
    settlement proceeds that purportedly resulted from Wife’s settlement of a
    discrimination claim. Moreover, the settlement agreement does not categorize any
    of the settlement proceeds as compensation for a discrimination claim.            Wife
    therefore fails to satisfy her burden.      Beagle v. Beagle, 10th Dist. Franklin
    No. 07AP-494, 
    2008-Ohio-764
    , ¶ 25 (finding Husband’s claim that settlement
    proceeds from a personal injury lawsuit was compensation for his emotional
    distress, and not income replacement, lacking merit where Husband presented no
    documentary evidence concerning the lawsuit); Barrientos v. Barrientos, 3d Dist.
    Hancock No. 5-12-13, 
    2013-Ohio-424
    , ¶ 21 (finding Husband failed to sustain his
    burden of demonstrating what amount of the personal injury settlement was
    1   Under cross-examination, Husband’s attorney questioned Wife about
    conversations she had with her employment attorney regarding a possible discrimination
    claim. Husband’s attorney asked Wife if her employment attorney told her she had no
    actionable claim for employment discrimination or that “just because Dr. Schwartz was a
    jerk didn’t make [the claim] actionable.” Wife replied that she did not recall, and she
    stated that “anything is possible.”
    attributable to “personal injury” as opposed to “loss of marital earnings” and
    therefore his claim of separate property failed).
    Husband, however, testified regarding an email he sent to Wife’s
    employment attorney, Alan Schabes, on Wife’s behalf on July 4, 2001 (exhibit
    No. 72) that references discrimination. According to Husband, the email addressed
    “what [he] thought would be [their] claim [against Bayless.]” (Tr. 633.) The email
    stated that “[e]ver since March 2000 with the relocation to the Brecksville facilities,
    my quality of life has been diminished due to the harassment and tactics played at
    Bayless.” The email then delineates Wife’s claim against Bayless, which includes a
    claim for six months’ severance pay following her contract termination in November
    2000; salary owed for January 1 through December 31, 2000; salary owed for
    January 1 through April 2, 2001; unpaid commissions “for the term of my
    employment”; and profit-sharing contributions. Additionally, the email specifically
    asserts that Wife “ha[s] been harassed by Dr. Schwartz from March 2000 to the day
    I was asked to leave my office and not come back on April 2, 2001” and this
    harassment was allegedly because Wife “was the only woman in an executive
    position, which [Dr. Schwartz] wanted to dispose of.”
    Therefore, even if we find that Wife in fact had a discrimination
    claim against Bayless, the record shows that this claim began in March 2000, which
    was during the marriage. Moreover, an employment discrimination claim in and of
    itself is not a personal injury claim, and therefore, a settlement awarded as
    compensation for employment discrimination is not separate property under R.C.
    3105.171(A)(6)(a)(vi). Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95346, 
    2011-Ohio-939
    , at
    ¶ 11.
    In light of the foregoing, we find the trial court’s characterization of
    the Bayless settlement proceeds as Wife’s separate property was against the
    manifest weight of the evidence.
    Husband’s first assignment of error is sustained.
    B. Financial Accounts
    In Husband’s second assignment of error, he contends that the trial
    court erred in finding the assets contained in the following accounts to be separate
    property: assets in Wife’s Living Trust (Vanguard #9847, T.Rowe Price #916, and
    Fidelity #4424); and two retirement accounts (Fidelity IRA #7888 and Ameriprise
    IRA). In support, Husband argues that (1) the court erred in accepting the tracing
    methodology used by Wife’s expert, John Davis; (2) the court erred in accepting
    Davis as an expert in retirement plans; and (3) the court erred in failing to find the
    growth in value of Wife’s accounts with T. Rowe Price and Fidelity resulted from
    Husband’s marital labor.
    Prior to the marriage, Wife had substantial assets, including several
    financial accounts, some of which were commingled with marital assets. Wife
    retained John D. Davis, C.P.A., to trace certain assets in these accounts as her
    separate property. Husband objected to Davis’s methodology in tracing the separate
    property and to his qualifications as an expert in retirement plans. Over Husband’s
    objection, the court found Davis to be qualified as an expert and permitted his
    testimony.
    The court found, based on Davis’s testimony regarding separate
    property, that the following financial accounts should be divided proportionally
    among the parties: (1) Vanguard #9847 — $42,744 (marital) and $582,102 (Wife’s
    separate); (2) Fidelity #4424 — $179,725 (marital) and $308,656.00 (Wife’s
    separate); and (3) Fidelity IRA #7888 — $180,902 (marital) and $363,149 (Wife’s
    separate). Additionally, the court found that the T.Rowe Price account (valued at
    $300,950) shall be awarded to Wife as separate property. The court rejected
    Husband’s contention that his marital labor on the accounts caused the growth in
    value of Wife’s accounts.
    1. Expert Testimony
    A trial court should generally admit expert testimony when it is
    material and relevant, and in accordance with Evid.R. 702. Terry v. Caputo, 
    115 Ohio St.3d 351
    , 
    2007-Ohio-5023
    , 
    875 N.E.2d 72
    , ¶ 16. Evid.R. 702 governs the
    admissibility of expert testimony and provides that a witness may testify as an expert
    if all of the following apply:
    The witness’ testimony either relates to matters beyond the
    knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons or dispels a
    misconception among lay persons; (B) The witness is qualified as an
    expert by specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
    education regarding the subject matter of the testimony; (C) The
    witness’ testimony is based on reliable scientific, technical, or other
    specialized information. * * *
    Therefore, under this rule, a witness may testify as an expert if he is
    qualified as an expert, the testimony relates to matters beyond the understanding of
    lay persons, and the testimony is based upon reliable information. Azzano v.
    O’Malley-Clements, 
    126 Ohio App.3d 368
    , 373, 
    710 N.E.2d 373
     (8th Dist.1998),
    citing Nichols v. Hanzel, 
    110 Ohio App.3d 591
    , 597, 
    674 N.E.2d 1237
     (4th Dist.1996).
    “Qualifications [that] may satisfy the requirements of Evid.R. 702
    are multitudinous.” State v. Mack, 
    73 Ohio St.3d 502
    , 511, 
    653 N.E.2d 329
     (1995).
    There is no requirement that an individual possess a certain educational degree to
    qualify as an expert; rather, an individual’s professional experience and training in
    a particular field may be sufficient to qualify one as an expert. Id. at 511; State v.
    Harris, 
    2018-Ohio-578
    , 
    107 N.E.3d 658
    , ¶ 40 (8th Dist.). Nor does a witness need
    to be the best witness on the subject in order to qualify as an expert. Scott v. Yates,
    
    71 Ohio St.3d 219
    , 221, 
    1994-Ohio-462
    , 
    643 N.E.2d 105
    .              “The expert must
    demonstrate some knowledge on the particular subject superior to that possessed
    by an ordinary [factfinder].” 
    Id.
    A determination of whether a witness is qualified to testify as an
    expert is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed
    “‘unless there is a clear showing’” that the trial court abused its discretion. State v.
    Lumbus, 
    2016-Ohio-380
    , 
    59 N.E.3d 580
    , ¶ 95 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Wages,
    
    87 Ohio App.3d 780
    , 786, 
    623 N.E.2d 193
     (8th Dist.1993), citing State v. Maupin,
    
    42 Ohio St.2d 473
    , 
    330 N.E.2d 708
     (1975).
    In determining whether an expert’s opinion satisfies the
    requirements of Evid.R. 702(C), i.e., whether the opinion is reliable and therefore
    admissible, we consider whether the principles and methods employed by the expert
    to reach that opinion are reliable — “not whether his [or her] conclusions are
    correct”— and whether the expert’s testimony “assist[s] the trier of fact in
    determining a fact issue or understanding the evidence.” Miller v. Bike Athletic Co.,
    
    80 Ohio St.3d 607
    , 611, 
    687 N.E.2d 735
     (1998), citing Staff Notes to Evid.R. 702; see
    also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
    509 U.S. 579
    , 592-593, 
    113 S.Ct. 2786
    , 
    125 L.Ed.2d 469
     (1993). Thus, the “‘“ultimate touchstone is helpfulness
    to the trier of fact, and with regard to reliability, helpfulness turns on whether the
    expert’s technique or principle [is] sufficiently reliable so that it will aid the jury in
    reaching accurate results.”’” Miller at 614, quoting DeLuca v. Merrell Dow
    Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
    911 F.2d 941
    , 956 (3d Cir.1990), quoting 3 Weinstein,
    Evidence, Section 702[03], at 702-35 (1988).
    And the credibility to be afforded the expert’s conclusions remains a
    matter for the trier of fact. State v. Nemeth, 
    82 Ohio St.3d 202
    , 210, 
    1998-Ohio-376
    ,
    
    694 N.E.2d 1332
    . Thus, “‘[a]ny relevant conclusions [that] are supported by a
    qualified expert witness should be received unless there are other reasons for
    exclusion.’” 
    Id.,
     quoting State v. Williams, 
    4 Ohio St.3d 53
    , 57, 
    446 N.E.2d 444
    (1983).
    A trial court’s ruling as to the admission or exclusion of expert
    testimony is within its broad discretion and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
    that discretion. Chattree v. Chattree, 
    2014-Ohio-489
    , 
    8 N.E.3d 390
    , ¶ 38 (8th
    Dist.), citing Miller at 616; State v. Primeau, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97901, 2012-
    Ohio-5172, ¶ 57.
    a. Qualifications
    Here, Davis testified concerning his qualifications as an expert
    witness. He has been a certified public accountant since 1986; he is accredited in
    business valuation since 1998; and he is a certified fraud examiner since 2006. He
    has previously been qualified as an expert on tracing approximately 25-30 times and
    has testified as an expert on tracing in five Ohio counties, he is currently writing a
    course for the American Association of Matrimonial Lawyers (“AAML”), and he is a
    frequent lecturer on tracing. At the time of trial, Davis was preparing materials for
    his lecture for the AAML that included the acceptable methodologies of tracing, such
    as direct tracing, proportional share, and lowest intermediate balance. Additionally,
    Davis stated that he recently testified as an expert regarding asset tracing in an
    ERISA case and asset tracing in a divorce case. In the most recent divorce case, his
    testimony included an opinion on proportional share tracing methodology.2
    Regarding his qualifications as an expert in retirement plans, Davis
    stated that his practice as a certified public accountant qualifies him as an expert on
    ERISA, or retirement plans, because a substantial part of his practice involves 401(k)
    profit sharing and the firm performs audits. Davis testified that although he does
    2   See Forcier v. Forcier, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2019-G-0192, 
    2019-Ohio-5052
    .
    not possess certain specialized certifications as a pension consultant or pension
    administrator, he possesses the knowledge and 30 years of experience necessary to
    testify as an expert in the area of retirement plans.
    Based upon the foregoing, we do not find the trial court abused its
    discretion in finding Davis’s accounting expertise useful in this case and qualifying
    Davis as an expert.
    There is no dispute that Davis’s testimony concerning the tracing of
    the parties’ financial and retirement accounts relates to matters beyond the
    understanding of lay persons. We therefore turn to the methodology Davis used in
    tracing Wife’s separate property.
    b. Methodology
    Husband contends that the proportional share methodology Davis
    used in tracing Wife’s separate property is not reliable. In support, he argues that
    the proportional share method is contrary to the tracing requirements of R.C.
    3105.171 because it eliminates any possibility of commingling, it “avoids the hard
    work of tracking the history” of the marital investments, and it violates Evid.R. 703,
    because the method “assumed significant withdrawals were proportionately marital
    and separate.” He also argues that Davis’s report does not account for a certain
    “gap” in records pertaining to particular funds and that Davis did not account for a
    large withdrawal from the Vanguard account, thus making Davis’s analysis
    unreliable.
    As previously stated, the party attempting to classify property as
    “separate property” has the burden to establish such traceability. Strauss, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 95377, 
    2011-Ohio-3831
    , at ¶ 49. Once that party has met his or her
    burden in tracing the property as separate, the burden shifts to the other spouse to
    show that the particular funds were not separate, i.e., were marital, or to provide
    some evidence challenging the spouse’s ability to trace the assets. Bauer v. Bauer,
    12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2019-04-033 and CA2019-04-040, 
    2020-Ohio-425
    , ¶ 35;
    Johnson v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2018-CA-36, 
    2019-Ohio-1024
    , ¶ 15. Here,
    Husband failed to provide his own expert to challenge Davis’s testimony concerning
    the tracing of the various financial accounts or to discredit Davis’s method of tracing.
    And a trier of fact “‘may not disregard credible and uncontradicted expert
    testimony[.]’” Cromer v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Akron, 
    2016-Ohio-7461
    , 
    64 N.E.3d 1018
    , ¶ 26 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. White, 
    118 Ohio St.3d 12
    , 2008-Ohio-
    1623, 
    885 N.E.2d 905
    , ¶ 74; Beachwood v. Pearl, 
    2018-Ohio-1635
    , 
    111 N.E.3d 620
    ,
    ¶ 42 (8th Dist.).
    The statute governing the division of marital and separate property,
    and the commingling of such funds, provides that “[t]he commingling of separate
    property with other property of any type does not destroy the identity of the separate
    property as separate property, except when the separate property is not traceable.”
    R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(b). The statute, however, does not specify the methodologies
    that must be used to trace the property. Davis’s proportional share method is
    therefore not proscribed by the statute.        Moreover, Davis asserted that the
    proportional share method has been adopted by courts in Ohio. And Husband
    provided no evidence that the proportional share method is not a valid method of
    tracing for purposes of satisfying the statute.
    Davis testified that he in fact used two methods for analyzing the
    parties’ assets: (1) direct tracing, and (2) proportional share. He explained that
    direct tracing is most useful when the identified funds are identified in a separate
    account with no additional activity, or the funds were used entirely to acquire
    another item of value, or “when you can trace one item of value directly to another
    item of value.”     (Exp. Report) (Tr. 983.)      Davis further explained that the
    proportional share method is necessary “once the funds became commingled.”
    (Tr. 1009.) It is a way of “accomplishing allocating income.” (Tr. 1037.)
    Davis described proportional share as follows:
    Proportional shares deals with assets that have become commingled.
    What you have now is you have two categories of assets. In this case,
    in Domestic Relations, you have marital and nonmarital. And what
    proportional share does, it measures any of the income that is being
    earned based on the relationship of each of those categories to the
    total. And it would treat dissipation of those assets the same way
    based on its proportion of the fund to the total.
    ***
    An example would be if you had a fund that was entirely nonmarital
    at $90,000, and then $10,000 was added to that that was marital.
    You now have a fund worth $100,000. Then what would happen is if
    there’s income earned of a thousand, you would prorate it, 90 percent
    of that income would be deemed to be earned by the nonmarital, in
    this example, and 10 percent would be for marital. Then if the fund
    were dissipated, they would be dissipated[, meaning withdrawn or
    spent,] the same way, the 90/10. That ratio stays the same until any
    other nonmarital funds would be added to the fund.
    According to Davis, the methodology used depends upon the facts
    of the case, stating that the data and “flow of funds” dictate which method is most
    appropriate. And in this case, Davis explained, he used the direct tracing method
    on certain funds (Fund 9) that existed at the date of marriage, had only investment
    appreciation, and then was exchanged for a different fund (Fund 21). (Tr. 1008.)
    Davis stated that in that case he was able to trace the assets directly from one fund
    to another. On the other hand, for example, Davis analyzed Fund 51 (nonmarital
    property) under the proportional share method because assets from Fund 123,
    which contained marital and nonmarital assets, commingled with Fund 51.
    Therefore, according to Davis, once those funds became commingled, it became
    necessary to use the proportional share method. Husband provided no expert
    testimony to refute Davis’s testimony.
    In light of the foregoing, we find the trial court did not err in
    accepting the proportional share method utilized by Davis.
    Husband claims that, in using the proportional share method, Davis
    “missed” a $36,584 withdrawal from the Vanguard account. Specifically regarding
    the Vanguard account, however, Davis testified that he accounted for the
    $36,584.64 withdrawal (tr. 1047) and he directed counsel to Appendix H of his
    report. Davis explained that the $36,584.64 came from Fund 51 and was noted on
    Appendix C-1, and of that amount, he calculated $7,151 as marital assets. Davis
    further explained that the funds then dissipated and once they dissipated, he no
    longer traced them.
    Regarding the Fidelity account, Husband claimed that Davis
    “missed” marital deposits: (1) $32,166.24, “added after the date of the marriage”;
    (2) $10,000, allegedly deposited on May 11, 2000; and (3) $18,000, allegedly
    deposited on September 29, 2000. Husband argues that Davis was therefore
    precluded from properly tracing the funds in this account. In support of his
    argument, Husband refers to Davis’s cross-examination in which counsel presented
    copies of two checks purportedly deposited into a Fidelity account:
    Q: Now, I want to show you what we’ve marked as Plaintiff’s Exhibit
    67. And I direct you to page 4 of that exhibit. And I want you to look
    at the two checks at the top of that page. Just take a second and look
    at those.
    A: Okay.
    Q: Okay. Now, I want you to accept for a moment that these are true
    and accurate copies of the original. You would agree with me that
    those two checks from [Wife’s] KeyBank account indicate that there
    was a deposit made on May 19, 2000 of $18,000 into account number
    424?
    A: That’s what this check says.
    Q: And those two deposits are not recounted on your Exhibit L-1,
    correct?
    A: They are not.
    However, Husband has failed to provide expert evidence to
    demonstrate that Davis’s methodology is faulty or that the purportedly “missed”
    deposits resulted in Davis’s inability to accurately trace Wife’s separate property.
    And on re-direct examination, Davis testified that he reviewed the statements for
    every account that is in his report, with the exception of “those few Ameriprise
    [accounts] indicated in [his] report.” He stated that he has accounted for every
    transaction, and with a reasonable degree of certainty, his report addressed every
    deposit and withdrawal for all the accounts he analyzed. (Tr. 1082.)
    Husband also claims that there is a two-year gap in the Vanguard
    records for 2006-2007, and therefore, Husband argues, “the court cannot know
    what assets were deposited or withdrawn” and Davis’s analysis is unreliable.
    Husband’s support for this claim is a reference to Davis’s testimony:
    Q: * * * I’m going to turn to document J-3 and –4. Now, it would
    appear that J-3 is simply a summary of all accounts, correct?
    A: It’s [a] summary of those three mutual funds, that’s correct.
    Q: Of those three mutual funds. And I don’t see anything in your
    exhibit, John, that tells me what the activity in those funds were for
    that year. Am I missing something?
    A: For those? Not on this statement, no. It’s just showing me the
    total. But there’s an — if there was activity, it would have been
    detailed out inside that report.
    Q: My question to you is I can’t tell from looking at J-3 whether your
    analysis is correct with respect to 2006 on these three Vanguard
    mutual funds.
    A: Why not?
    Q: How do I know what was — if no money came into one of these
    three accounts for 2006, how would I tell on J-3?
    A: I didn’t attach all the statements, the pages I see.
    Q: So the answer is I wouldn’t know?
    A: The documents that were produced though would have it. We
    should have all those documents. * * * For some reason they are just
    not copied here. I don’t know why.
    Q: And the same is true for J-4, correct?
    A: That’s correct. I see that those pages are missing too.
    Q: So based on your report, there is no way of verifying with a
    document what occurred in this Vanguard [account], these three
    Vanguard funds during the calendar years 2006 and 2007?
    A: Not as attachments, no. My work paper file should contain all
    those.
    (Tr. 1054-1055.)
    This testimony, however, does not demonstrate that a “gap” from
    2006-2007 existed or that Davis failed to consider information from 2006 and
    2007. While conceding that he failed to attach relevant documents from these years
    to the summary documents, Davis testified that the documents were produced and
    he in fact considered the information in his analysis. And Husband, once again,
    failed to provide any evidence that this alleged “gap” of information caused Davis’s
    expert analysis to be unreliable.
    Husband further claims that Davis’s analysis ends prior to trial and
    is therefore incomplete, because the court lacked information regarding deposits,
    withdrawals, and growth since the completion of Davis’s report. The evidence
    shows, however, that the trial in this matter was continued four times since the
    court’s order for expert reports, and Davis’s report was likely prepared long before
    the ultimate trial date. Additionally, Davis reserved the right to update or amend
    his report as more information became available. And once again, Husband failed
    to establish that this lack of information resulted in an incomplete and consequently
    unreliable report.
    Finally, Husband claims error concerning the two retirement
    accounts — Fidelity and Ameriprise. The evidence shows that Wife transferred the
    Bayless settlement funds to the Ameriprise account (tr. 1400), and the Ameriprise
    IRA was then rolled into the Fidelity IRA.         We concluded in Husband’s first
    assignment of error that the Bayless settlement proceeds are marital property and
    reversed the court’s finding on this issue. To the extent that Davis attributes the
    Bayless funds in the retirement accounts as separate property, we reverse and
    remand.
    2. Husband’s Marital Labor
    Within this assignment of error, Husband also claims that the trial
    court erred in failing to find that the growth in value of the T. Rowe Price and Fidelity
    accounts can be attributed to Husband’s marital labor.
    The general rule in Ohio is that income earned by labor performed
    during the marriage is marital property whether received during or after the
    marriage. Schweinfurth v. Meza, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80506, 
    2002-Ohio-6316
    ,
    ¶ 19; R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a)(iii) (“Marital property includes * * * all income and
    appreciation on separate property, due to the labor * * * of either or both of the
    spouses that occurred during the marriage.”). And where the wife established the
    appreciation of funds as separate property, the husband has the burden to
    demonstrate that his marital labor caused the appreciation. See Bauer, 12th Dist.
    Warren Nos. CA2019-04-033 and CA2019-04-040, 
    2020-Ohio-425
    , at ¶ 35.
    Here, Husband claims that he was a licensed financial advisor
    throughout the first half of his marriage, he used his skills as an investment advisor
    to guide Wife in her investment choices, and these skills caused the appreciation in
    the value of the T. Rowe Price and Fidelity accounts. He provided his own testimony
    that he advised Wife on how to manage her accounts and the appreciation in those
    accounts resulted from his involvement. He testified that Wife did not list any
    financial advisor on her accounts and that he conducted periodic reviews of all of
    her accounts, making notes on account statements, beginning “from the time [he
    and Wife] spoke” until 2011, when Wife “stopped seeking [Husband’s] advice.”
    (Tr. 727-728.)    In support of his “tremendous” efforts, Husband provided a
    spreadsheet from one month in 2007. Wife, however, testified that Husband was
    not her advisor and he had little involvement in her accounts. She further testified
    that when Husband was involved, it was through his professional capacity as an
    employee of American Express, and he was compensated by his employer
    accordingly.
    Additionally, Wife presented the expert testimony of John Davis,
    who testified concerning Wife’s separate property interests in these accounts. The
    court found Davis to be credible and found that Wife “met her burden to prove
    certain accounts were her separate property.” The court further found that Husband
    “offered little evidence to rebut Davis’s testimony.” Finally, the court found “the
    magistrate was in the best position to weigh the evidence.”
    In light of the foregoing, we find the court did not abuse its discretion
    in concluding that Husband failed to rebut Davis’s expert testimony concerning
    Wife’s traceable separate property and Husband’s marital labor did not contribute
    to the growth of Wife’s financial accounts.
    Husband’s second assignment of error is therefore overruled in all
    respects with the exception of Davis’s analysis of Wife’s retirement accounts. To the
    extent that Davis’s conclusion that Wife’s IRAs are Wife’s separate property is based
    upon his determination that the Bayless settlement proceeds contained within
    Wife’s retirement accounts are Wife’s separate property, we sustain Husband’s
    assignment of error.
    C. The Bendemeer, Brentwood, and Edgewood Properties
    In his third assignment of error, Husband claims the trial court erred
    in determining Wife’s separate property interest in four real estate properties owned
    by Wife and by Wife’s living trust. On appeal, however, he provides an argument for
    only three of the properties: (1) 3691 Bendemeer Road (“the Bendemeer property”);
    2664 Brentwood (“the Brentwood property”); and 2547 Edgewood (“the Edgewood
    property”). At the time of the divorce, the properties were titled in Wife’s name or
    in the name of her revocable trust. Husband argues that Wife’s expert real estate
    appraiser, Charles Flagg, improperly valued the properties. Husband also argues
    that the trial court erred in determining the extent of Wife’s separate property
    interests.
    Wife purchased the Bendemeer property in June 1995 for $79,000.
    (Tr. 435, 561.) She made a down payment of $16,000 and obtained a 15-year loan
    for the remaining $63,200. (Tr. 562.) Wife owed approximately $44,867 on the
    house at the time of the parties’ marriage in 2000. (Tr. 645-646.) Wife testified that
    she made monthly mortgage payments on the Bendemeer property until she paid
    off the balance of the loan in one lump sum, during the marriage, with the proceeds
    she received from the Bayless settlement. (Tr. 435, 562.) Husband likewise testified
    that the mortgage for the Bendemeer property was fully paid with the Bayless
    proceeds in 2001. (Tr. 645-46.) Wife sold this property for $135,000 during the
    pendency of this divorce proceeding, in violation of the court’s order.
    The parties purchased the Brentwood property in 2002 with
    proceeds from the Bayless settlement. (Tr. 436, 528, 648.) Flagg testified that the
    Brentwood property’s fair market value is $210,000.
    Finally, the parties purchased the Edgewood property in 2004,
    during the marriage. Wife testified that the parties purchased this property with the
    Bayless settlement proceeds. (Tr. 437, 651.)     Husband testified that the Bayless
    settlement proceeds were used to make a deposit for both the Brentwood and
    Edgewood properties. (Tr. 653.) The Brentwood property was destroyed by fire in
    2012. The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Court, in Cuyahoga C.P. No.
    CV-13-810080, determined that Husband had no insurable interest in this property,
    and Wife received an insurance settlement in the amount of $149,121.08. Flagg
    appraised the site of the Brentwood property (vacant land) for $90,000. (Tr. 1299.)
    The trial court found that the Bendemeer property is Wife’s separate
    property because she purchased the home before the marriage and she paid off the
    mortgage with the proceeds from the Bayless settlement, which the trial court
    determined was Wife’s separate property. Regarding the Brentwood property, the
    trial court found that Wife used $53,800 of the Bayless settlement proceeds as a
    down payment toward the purchase of this property, and because the Bayless
    proceeds are Wife’s separate property, Wife is entitled to the $53,800 down
    payment. The court further found that the appraised value of the Brentwood
    property was $156,200. Therefore, reducing the appraised value by Wife’s down
    payment, the court concluded that the parties have a joint interest in the remaining
    $102,400 equity in the Brentwood property. Finally, the trial court awarded the
    Edgewood property to Wife.
    In light of our determination that the Bayless settlement proceeds
    are marital assets, we find the trial court erred in awarding to Wife the entirety of
    the Bendemeer property, the $53,800 down payment toward the purchase of the
    Brentwood property, and the entire $90,000 appraised value of the Edgewood
    property.
    Husband’s third assignment of error is sustained to the extent the
    trial court based its award of Wife’s separate property interests in the
    aforementioned properties on its erroneous conclusion that the Bayless settlement
    proceeds are Wife’s separate property.
    D. The Antisdale Property
    In his fourth assignment of error, Husband contends, without any
    legal authority in support, that the trial court erred in finding he had an ownership
    interest in 5333 Antisdale Avenue (“the Antisdale property”). Husband claims that
    he loaned $23,085.11 to his sister, Liliana Weiser, to help her purchase the property
    and his sister owns the property. Therefore, according to Husband, his marital
    interest in the property “at best” is $23,085.11.
    Husband testified that when he loaned his sister the money, he asked
    her to sign a partnership agreement providing him an interest in the house, but she
    refused. In support, he asserts that only an unsigned copy of the agreement was
    produced at trial. Husband also asserted that the property is titled in Weiser’s name
    and she has paid all of the property taxes and utilities at the house.
    The evidence shows, however, that Husband petitioned the
    Cuyahoga County Probate Court, in Cuyahoga P.C. No. 2017-GRD-227666, for legal
    guardianship over his sister. Although Husband testified that his sister is in good
    health and of sound mind, Weiser did not testify at trial as to her purported
    ownership interest in the property. Furthermore, Wife testified that Husband used
    marital funds to purchase the Antisdale property.
    In awarding Husband the Antisdale property, which was valued at
    $82,500, the magistrate questioned Husband’s credibility and “the true nature of
    [Husband’s] ownership interest,” stating:
    [Husband] claims he merely provided funds (approximately $23,000)
    to his sister, Liliana Weiser, to assist her in the purchase of this
    property, but that it belongs to her. [Wife], however testified that
    [Husband] used $70,000 of marital funds to buy the Antisdale
    property, and that it is actually marital.
    Suspiciously, [Husband] testified that his sister is in fine health
    physically and mentally, yet he petitioned the Cuyahoga County
    Probate Court * * * for legal guardianship over Weiser shortly after the
    trial was finished. Subsequently, [Husband] has been granted legal
    guardianship over his sister and all of her assets, which directly
    contradicts his trial testimony regarding her health.
    The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision regarding the
    Antisdale property, stating that the magistrate did not find Husband’s testimony
    credible and based on the evidence before him, the magistrate made an equitable
    division of property as it relates to the Antisdale property. The court found that the
    magistrate was in the best position to weigh the evidence before him and the
    credibility of the witnesses and therefore found Husband’s objection without merit.
    Without additional evidence to support Husband’s claim that his
    sister owns the Antisdale property, the trial court was free to disbelieve Husband’s
    self-serving testimony. Strauss, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95377, 
    2011-Ohio-3831
    , at
    ¶ 56; Deacon v. Deacon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91609, 
    2009-Ohio-2491
    , at ¶ 43,
    citing Tokar v. Tokar, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89522, 
    2008-Ohio-6467
     (trial court
    properly rejected Husband’s testimony regarding negative value of marital property
    because he failed to submit independent evidence); Smith v. Smith, 12th Dist. Butler
    No. CA2001-11-259, 
    2002-Ohio-5449
     (trial court did not abuse its discretion in
    rejecting Husband’s claim that he used money withdrawn from savings plan on
    marital household expenses when Husband failed to substantiate his self-serving
    testimony).
    In light of the lack of documentary or testimonial evidence to support
    Husband’s self-serving testimony and the magistrate’s finding that Husband lacked
    credibility, we cannot conclude the trial court erred in finding Husband had an
    ownership interest in 5333 Antisdale Avenue.
    Husband’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
    E. Rental Properties
    In Husband’s fifth assignment of error, he claims that the trial court
    erred in its valuation of seven rental properties in which he has an interest, including
    six properties in which Husband claims only a “fractional” interest (3259 Desota
    Avenue, 1534 Parkhill Road, 4208-4212 Cedar Road, 3744 Berkeley Road, 1612
    Wood Road, 3675 Randolph Road) and one property that is titled in Husband’s
    name (3316 Desota Avenue).
    Regarding the property titled only in Husband’s name (3316 Desota
    Avenue), Husband argues that he had a third-party investor, I.G., and this investor
    demanded the return of her investment. Husband claims, therefore, that he owes
    I.G. $44,000. Regarding the other six properties in which Husband claims a
    fractional interest, Husband disagrees with Wife’s expert appraisal of the properties.
    Husband essentially argues, without providing his own expert opinion, that Wife’s
    expert should not have valued the property on the basis of a single owner and that
    the trial court erred in accepting this valuation. Husband, however, fails to cite to
    any legal authority in support of his argument that the trial court erred.
    Under App.R. 16(A)(7), an appellant must include in its brief, under
    the headings and in the order indicated, “[a]n argument containing the contentions
    of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error presented for review and
    the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes,
    and parts of the record on which appellant relies.” Id.; State v. Caver, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga Nos. 90945 and 90946, 
    2008-Ohio-6155
    , ¶ 22.
    An appellate court may disregard an assignment of error pursuant to
    App.R. 12(A)(2) if an appellant fails to cite to any legal authority in support of an
    argument as required by App.R. 16(A)(7). Strauss, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95377,
    
    2011-Ohio-3831
    , at ¶ 72, citing State v. Martin, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA99-01-003,
    1999-Ohio-App. LEXIS 3266 (July 19, 1999); Siemientkowski v. State Farm Ins.,
    8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85323, 
    2005-Ohio-4295
    ; Meerhoff v. Huntington Mtge.
    Co., 
    103 Ohio App.3d 164
    , 
    658 N.E.2d 1109
     (3d Dist.1995). We may also disregard
    an assignment of error where an appellant fails to cite to the record. Najjar v.
    Najjar, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91789, 
    2009-Ohio-3880
    , ¶ 9. “‘If an argument exists
    that can support [an] assigned error, it is not this court’s duty to root it out.’”
    Strauss, quoting Cardone v. Cardone, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 18349 and 18673, 
    1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2028
     (May 6, 1998).
    Accordingly, we decline to address Husband’s fifth assignment of
    error.
    F. Marital Debt
    In Husband’s sixth assignment of error, he contends the trial court
    erred in its allocation of the marital debt. In support, he argues that all of the debt
    he incurred during the marriage resulted from improvements to real estate and for
    other marital purposes.      Husband asserts that this debt should therefore be
    presumed marital because Wife has not satisfied her burden that the debt is
    nonmarital. Husband also claims that the court erroneously dismissed evidence
    that Wife engaged in “gross misconduct” that resulted in Husband’s inability to
    complete property renovations and repairs, pay for the properties’ expenses such as
    utilities and taxes, and “successfully conduct” business.
    When a court divides marital property, it must take into account the
    parties’ marital debt as well. Chattree, 
    2014-Ohio-489
    , 
    8 N.E.3d 390
    , at ¶ 8, citing
    Kehoe, 
    2012-Ohio-3357
    , 
    974 N.E.2d 1229
    , ¶ 14. Marital debt includes any debt
    incurred during the marriage for the joint benefit of the parties or for a valid marital
    purpose. Stratton v. Stratton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107798, 
    2019-Ohio-3279
    , ¶
    41, citing Rossi v. Rossi, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 100133 and 100144, 2014-Ohio-
    1832, ¶ 62. Therefore, debts incurred during the marriage are presumed to be
    marital unless proven otherwise. Turner v. Davis-Turner, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    106002, 
    2018-Ohio-2194
    , ¶ 12.
    Here, Husband claimed consumer credit card debt related to the
    rehabilitation of several rental/investment properties in the amount of $52,272.48.
    These properties include 5333 Antisdale Avenue, 3316 and 3259 Desota Avenue,
    1534 Parkhill Road, 4208-4212 Cedar Road, 3744 Berkeley Road, 1612 Wood Road,
    and 3675 Randolph Road. Husband also claimed indebtedness to two apparent
    investors in some of his real estate properties — Goldschmidt ($148,000) and
    Genken ($44,000). According to Husband, the two investors have asked Husband
    to refund their investments.
    Regarding the indebtedness to Husband’s investors, the magistrate
    found that Husband is the sole owner of the relevant investment properties, “since
    the only testimony regarding his fractional ownership of that real estate was his
    own” and Husband lacks “credibility and believability,” which the magistrate found
    “problematic.” The magistrate further noted:
    [Husband] provided inconsistent and conflicting testimony regarding
    the leases, tenants, and rents he collects for the [rental] properties, as
    well as their respective conditions. [Husband] claimed multiple
    vacant properties will require more repairs before he can rent them
    out. In contrast, however, he also testified extensively and in specific
    detail about the rehabilitation work he has performed on them.
    [Husband] also claims his interests in the above-mentioned
    properties are frequently “fractional,” based on his relationships with
    several investors, including * * * Goldschmidt and * * * Genken.
    [Husband] testified about the existence of several entities and/or
    retirement accounts which possess ownership interests in these
    properties, including for example, Gavaldig, A-1 Development,
    Tomorning, FCI Global, and perhaps others.
    To describe the intertwined nature of these purported investors and
    business entities and retirement accounts with [Husband’s] financial
    affairs as confusing would be an understatement. Despite
    [Husband’s] claim he is merely a part owner of these properties, his
    tax returns indicate he claims 100 percent of the income from the
    rental properties and deducts 100 percent of the expenses. He also
    testified he will be reimbursed the $52,272.48 in credit card [debt] he
    exclusively accrued for the renovation of the properties from the
    rental income.
    The magistrate therefore concluded that Husband is solely
    responsible for disposing of the claims of Goldschmidt and Genken.
    Regarding the consumer credit card debt related to the rehabilitated
    properties, the magistrate found that Husband’s testimony regarding the condition
    of the properties, “together with his refusal to allow the appraisers inside for
    evaluations and his admitted lack of motivation to find paying tenants, leads the
    Court to infer [Husband] has intentionally refused to lease these rental properties
    as a means of artificially decreasing his income while the case is pending.” The
    magistrate therefore concluded that Husband is solely responsible for the balance
    on any personal credit cards in his name, including the credit card consumer debt
    of $52,272.48, “which [Husband] testified is exclusively attributable to the
    rehabilitation and/or maintenance of the [properties awarded to Husband].”
    Finally, the magistrate found that the parties would be solely
    responsible for any other consumer debt, including credit cards and lines of credit,
    held in their own respective names. Specifically, the magistrate determined that
    Husband is solely liable for his KeyBank cash reserve line of credit (#2679,
    $4,899.83) and KeyBank line of credit (#5818, $9,710.37), and Wife is solely liable
    for the following credit cards: British Airways (#2242, $95.00), Nordstrom (#184,
    $48.60), Citicards (#7940, $1,972.71), and American Express ($8,360.15).
    We find the magistrate’s allocation of the parties’ debt is supported
    by the record. None of Husband’s purported investors testified concerning their
    investments, nor was any evidence provided other than Husband’s own self-serving
    testimony. Moreover, the magistrate found Husband lacked credibility, specifically
    noting Husband’s “inconsistent and conflicting testimony.” And we defer to the trier
    of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses, including resolving any
    inconsistencies. Allan v. Allan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107142, 
    2019-Ohio-2111
    ,
    ¶ 80, citing State v. Wilson, 
    113 Ohio St.3d 382
    , 
    2007-Ohio-2202
    , 
    865 N.E.2d 1264
    ,
    ¶ 24.
    Accordingly, under the facts of this case, and in light of the
    magistrate’s finding that Husband lacked credibility, we cannot say the court’s
    distribution of the parties’ debt was inequitable.
    Husband’s sixth assignment of error is overruled.
    G. Spousal Support
    In his seventh assignment of error, Husband contends that the trial
    court’s failure to award Husband spousal support is an abuse of discretion. In
    support, he argues that the statutory factors supported such an award in his favor.
    A trial court has broad discretion in awarding spousal support.
    Williams v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103975, 
    2016-Ohio-7487
    , ¶ 9; Kunkle
    v. Kunkle, 
    51 Ohio St.3d 64
    , 67, 
    554 N.E.2d 83
     (1990) (stating that a trial court has
    broad discretion in deciding “what is equitable upon the facts and circumstances of
    each case”). However, in making a determination concerning “whether spousal
    support is appropriate and reasonable, and in determining the nature, amount, and
    terms of payment,” as well as the “duration of spousal support,” the court must
    consider the statutory factors. R.C. 3105.18(C)(1); Woyt, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos.
    107312, 107321, and 107322, 
    2019-Ohio-3758
    , at ¶ 39.
    These spousal support factors include: the parties’ income, the
    relative earning abilities, the ages and physical and mental conditions of the parties,
    retirement benefits, duration of the marriage, the custodial status of a party
    concerning a minor child of the marriage, standard of living, the parties’ education,
    the parties’ assets and liabilities, time and expense necessary for a spouse’s job
    training, tax consequences, a party’s lost income production resulting from that
    party’s marital responsibilities, and a party’s contribution to the other party’s
    education or acquisition of a professional degree.        R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(a)-(m).
    Additionally, the court may consider “any other factor it expressly finds ‘relevant
    and equitable.’” 
    Id.,
     quoting R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(n).
    A trial court does not abuse its discretion in awarding spousal
    support where the court’s order is supported by competent, credible evidence. Woyt
    at ¶ 40, citing Deacon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91609, 
    2009-Ohio-2491
    , at ¶ 14.
    Although the trial court need not comment on each statutory factor, the record
    should demonstrate that the court considered the factors when making its award.
    Saks v. Riga, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101091, 
    2014-Ohio-4930
    , ¶ 65. A reviewing
    court will affirm an award of spousal support “so long as the record reflects that the
    trial court considered the requisite statutory factors, and the judgment contains
    sufficient detail for us to determine that the award is fair, equitable, and in
    accordance with the law.” Woyt at ¶ 40, citing Chattree, 
    2014-Ohio-489
    , 
    8 N.E.3d 390
    , at ¶ 71.
    Husband argues that he should be awarded spousal support because
    he was 66 years old at the time of the trial, he was too young to collect social security,
    and he was unemployed. He claims that he stopped working as a financial advisor,
    allowing his license to lapse, in order to manage the rental properties and care for
    their then-minor child. Husband also argues that Wife destroyed his reputation, she
    is younger and more educated than he, and Wife has a longer work life.
    Here, in his decision concerning spousal support, the magistrate
    noted the “inherent difficulties in imputing income” to the parties in this divorce.
    Indeed, the magistrate found: both Husband and Wife are voluntarily unemployed;
    Husband appears to be “waiting until the case is complete to [secure tenants for his
    rental] properties as a means to artificially suppress his actual present earning
    capacity”; and because Husband “has refused access to his properties and has
    provided no credible evidence to show his actual income since at least 2014,”
    imputed income of $100,000, representing approximately 55 % of the total income
    Husband would earn for the rented properties at the Husband’s suggested amounts,
    is reasonable under the circumstances.          The magistrate then stated that he
    considered R.C. 3105.18(B) and the factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) and (2)
    and concluded that spousal support “is neither appropriate nor reasonable” under
    the circumstances.
    In adopting the magistrate’s decision, the trial court found the
    magistrate was in the best position to weigh the evidence and the magistrate in fact
    applied the relevant statutory factors to his determination concerning spousal
    support. The court further found that Husband’s claim that Wife caused Husband
    lost business opportunities was unsupported, and despite Husband’s “evasiveness
    and lack of credibility creating a challenge for the magistrate when determining
    [Husband’s] income,” the magistrate reviewed all the evidence and properly
    imputed income to Husband.
    Regarding Husband’s income, the trial court further stated:
    [Husband] testified he was a former financial advisor and “self-
    employed in the real estate business.” He also claimed to be a
    consultant and property manager. The evidence overwhelmingly
    supported a finding that [Husband] was voluntarily unemployed.
    After considering the relevant factors * * *, the magistrate determined
    an annual income of $100,000 should be imputed to [Husband]. This
    figure represents approximately 55% of the total income [Husband]
    would earn from his rental properties if each property was being
    rented for the amounts that [Husband] has suggested for each unit
    respectively. The court finds the magistrate was in the best position
    to weigh the evidence before him.
    Moreover, the record demonstrates that at the time of trial, Husband
    was less than one month from meeting the full retirement age of 66 years, and
    Husband needed two employment credits to meet the minimum income
    requirements of social security in order to receive social security benefits. Yet
    Husband failed to obtain those credits, choosing instead to wait:
    Q: If you really wanted to find a way to get those two credits, you could
    have found a way to get those two quarters of credits for social
    security, right?
    A: Yeah. * * * I don’t intend to take social security until I’m 70 because
    I would be receiving a much higher amount. * * * It’s a financial
    decision. It’s in my best interest to wait until I’m 70.
    In light of the foregoing, we cannot find the trial court abused its
    discretion in failing to award spousal support to Husband. The judgment contains
    sufficient detail demonstrating that the court’s decision not to award spousal
    support to Husband is fair, equitable, and in accordance with the law.
    Husband’s seventh assignment of error is overruled.
    H. Contempt Motions
    In his eighth assignment of error, Husband claims the trial court
    erred in failing to find Wife in contempt following Husband’s motions filed on July 1,
    2016, July 29, 2016, and July 28, 2017. Within this assignment of error, Husband
    essentially summarizes each motion, arguing that the evidence shows Wife should
    have been found in contempt for numerous reasons. Husband fails, however, to cite
    any legal authority in support of his argument that the trial court erred. We
    therefore decline to address Husband’s eighth assignment of error. See Strauss, 8th
    Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95377, 
    2011-Ohio-3831
    , at ¶ 72, citing Martin, 12th Dist. Warren
    No. CA99-01-003, 
    1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3266
    ; Siemientkowski, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 85323, 
    2005-Ohio-4295
    ; Meerhoff v. Huntington Mtge. Co., 
    103 Ohio App.3d 164
    , 
    658 N.E.2d 1109
     (3d Dist.1995).
    I. Attorney Fees
    In his ninth assignment of error, Husband generally, and with
    virtually no legal authority in support of his argument, contends the trial court erred
    in failing to award him attorney fees. Citing only to “the factors in [R.C.] 3105.73,”
    Husband claims that he should have been awarded attorney fees because (1) his
    lawyer expended more time on complex issues “that served Wife’s interests only,”
    including the tracing of Wife’s separate financial accounts, Wife’s interest in the
    Bendemeer, Edgewood, and Brentwood properties, and Wife’s claim that the
    Bayless proceeds are her separate property; and (2) Wife engaged in “egregious
    misconduct,” including Wife’s “campaign of slander,” her violations of court orders,
    and her transfer of marital funds to Wife’s daughter.
    We note initially that “there are ‘no automatic attorney fees’ in
    domestic relations cases.” Rossi, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 100133 and 100144, 2014-
    Ohio-1832, at ¶ 100, quoting Packard v. Mayer-Packard, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    85189, 
    2005-Ohio-4392
    , ¶ 8. And when determining whether to award attorney
    fees in divorce cases, “the court must start with a presumption that attorney fees are
    the responsibility of the party who retains the attorney.” Walpole v. Walpole, 8th
    Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99231, 
    2013-Ohio-3529
    , ¶ 33.
    A court may award reasonable attorney fees if it determines that the
    award is equitable. Allan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107142, 
    2019-Ohio-2111
    , at ¶ 100.
    In determining whether attorney fees are equitable, the court may consider the
    factors set forth in R.C. 3105.73(A). 
    Id.
     This statute, which governs attorney fees in
    divorce proceedings, provides that a court may award all or part of reasonable
    attorney’s fees and litigation expenses to either party if the court finds the award
    equitable. In determining whether an award is equitable, the court may consider the
    parties’ marital assets and income, any award of temporary spousal support, the
    conduct of the parties, and any other relevant factors the court deems appropriate.
    While the statute enumerates factors that the trial court may
    consider, the statute also permits the trial court to consider any other factors it
    deems appropriate. Iacampo v. Oliver-Iacampo, 11th Dist. Geauga No.
    2011-G-3026, 
    2012-Ohio-1790
    , ¶ 149. The court is not required to make any specific
    findings regarding attorney fees. Welty v. Welty, 11th Dist. Ashtabula Nos. 2007-A-
    0013 and 2007-A-0015, 
    2007-Ohio-5217
    , ¶ 41. And an award of attorney fees is
    within the sound discretion of the trial court and its award will not be overruled
    absent an attitude that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Cyr v. Cyr,
    8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84255, 
    2005-Ohio-504
    , ¶ 70, citing Rand v. Rand, 
    18 Ohio St.3d 356
    , 359, 
    481 N.E.2d 609
     (1985).
    Regarding attorney fees, the magistrate found it equitable for the
    parties to be responsible for their respective attorney fees, and the court adopted the
    magistrate’s decision with respect to the magistrate’s finding. The record
    demonstrates that both parties have assets and income to pay their own attorney
    fees, both parties engaged in obstructive behavior or other misconduct, and
    Husband elected not to retain an expert to rebut Wife’s tracing expert or to trace his
    own purported separate property, which arguably frustrated the proceedings.
    Additionally, the record shows that the magistrate repeatedly addressed Husband’s
    lack of credibility throughout his decision.
    Moreover, the court addressed Wife’s purported misconduct when it
    granted Husband’s motion to show cause, finding Wife in contempt:
    [T]he court finds [Wife] did withdraw funds from multiple accounts
    in violation of the mutual restraining orders issued in this case.
    However, the court is unable to determine the exact amount
    attributable to these violations. More egregious is [Wife’s] conduct
    with respect to [Wife’s actions in selling the Bendemeer property] in
    violation of the mutual restraining orders, and that she absolutely
    knew she was not permitted to sell that property, but did so
    nonetheless. The fact [Wife] testified about this parcel at trial after
    she had sold it, yet made no mention of the sale, is the best evidence
    of her consciousness of guilt as it relates to this violation. The court
    finds it unreasonable to conclude that significant detail merely slipped
    [Wife’s] mind.
    As a result of Wife’s contempt, the court awarded Husband the
    $50,000 Bendemeer proceeds Wife had already advanced Husband
    as a sanction for her conduct, awarding the sum to Husband “as
    compensation for the funds [Wife] knowingly withdrew in violation of
    the mutual restraining orders and as sanction for her multiple
    contempt findings * * *.
    Regarding Husband’s request that Wife pay him $5,000 for attorney
    fees he incurred to litigate the foregoing show cause motions, the
    magistrate noted Wife’s request that Husband pay $10,000 for
    attorney fees she incurred in order to access a safe deposit box
    Husband failed to disclose and refused to provide access to and stated
    as follows:
    The court finds it is equitable for the parties to bear all of these costs
    themselves. The additional roughly $5,000 [Wife] incurred for fees
    in this equation shall be credited against her as further sanction for
    her early withdrawal of funds in violation of the mutual restraining
    orders as discussed above.
    In light of the foregoing, we cannot find the trial court abused its
    discretion in not awarding Husband attorney fees.
    Husband’s ninth assignment of error is overruled.
    J. Child Support
    In his tenth assignment of error, Husband claims the trial court’s
    child support order is an abuse of discretion.
    In support of his argument that the trial court erred, Husband
    asserts that the court’s order is based upon “$100,000 of non-existent income” and
    provides five “reasons,” including his age and “very little” income and Wife’s
    misconduct and her “income-generating” separate property that the magistrate
    allegedly did not consider. Husband, however, provides no citation to portions of
    the transcript and, once again, fails to cite any legal authority to support his
    argument. Under the authority cited above, we therefore decline to address
    Husband’s tenth assignment of error.
    K. Shared Parenting Plan
    In his eleventh assignment of error, Husband claims that the court
    erred in adopting the GAL’s proposed shared parenting plan. Husband concedes,
    however, in his reply brief that this issue is now moot because the parties’ child is
    now emancipated. We therefore find this alleged error moot and decline to consider
    it.
    L. Division of Marital Estate
    In his twelfth and final assignment of error, Husband claims the trial
    court abused its discretion when it failed to order a distributive award in order to
    effectuate an equitable division of the marital estate. In support of his argument,
    Husband cites only to the trial court’s authority under R.C. 3107.171(E) to make such
    an award and claims that the evidence “established the massive financial
    misconduct in which Wife had engaged.”
    R.C. 3105.171(E)(1) permits a trial court to make a distributive award
    to “facilitate, effectuate, or supplement a division of marital property.” Under
    R.C. 3105.171(E)(4), “if a spouse has engaged in financial misconduct, including, but
    not limited to, the dissipation, destruction, concealment, nondisclosure, or
    fraudulent disposition of assets, the court may compensate the offended spouse with
    a distributive award or with a greater award of marital property.” A spouse commits
    “financial misconduct” where he or she “engages in intentional conduct by which he
    or she either profits from the misconduct or intentionally defeats the other spouse’s
    interest in marital assets. Rodgers v. Rodgers, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105095,
    
    2017-Ohio-7886
    , ¶ 30; Best v. Best, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-239, 2011-Ohio-
    6668, ¶ 17 (stating that financial misconduct occurs when one spouse intentionally
    interferes with the other spouse’s property rights). The offended spouse bears the
    burden of proving the financial misconduct. 
    Id.
    “‘The distributive award concept is consistent with the well-
    established principle that trial courts have broad discretion when creating an
    equitable division of property in a divorce proceeding.’” Strauss, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
    No. 95377, 
    2011-Ohio-3831
    , at ¶ 39, quoting Adams v. Chambers, 
    82 Ohio App.3d 462
    , 466, 
    612 N.E.2d 746
     (12th Dist.1992), citing Teeter v. Teeter, 
    18 Ohio St.3d 76
    ,
    
    479 N.E.2d 890
     (1985). Thus, a trial court has broad discretion in determining
    whether a distributive award is equitable and appropriate under R.C. 3105.171(E).
    Gentile v. Gentile, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97971, 
    2013-Ohio-1338
    , ¶ 55; Tilmant v.
    Tilmant, 5th Dist. Knox No. 2004CA000024, 
    2005-Ohio-5939
    , ¶ 21, citing Adams.
    And a reviewing court may reverse a trial court’s division of property only upon a
    showing of an abuse of that discretion. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d at 219, 
    450 N.E.2d 1140
    .
    In overruling Husband’s sixteenth objection to the magistrate’s
    decision, the trial court found that the magistrate was not required to make a
    distributive award. The court stated that the magistrate sanctioned Wife for alleged
    financial misconduct and found “it would be unreasonable to subject [Wife] to both
    sanctions and make a distributive award for the same alleged violations.” The court
    then concluded that the magistrate made an equitable division of property based
    upon the evidence before him, and it overruled Husband’s objections.
    Husband claims on appeal that Wife engaged in several acts of
    financial misconduct, including a withdrawal of $150,274.93.         Wife testified,
    however, that she withdrew these funds on the same day that she received the
    complaint for divorce and did not understand the significance of the documents
    because she had no legal representation at the time. Wife further testified that she
    redeposited $148,775.93 less than one week after withdrawing the funds. Husband
    also claims that Wife engaged in financial misconduct by issuing a check in the
    amount of $100,000 to Wife’s daughter. Wife testified, however, that her daughter
    returned those funds. Husband claims that Wife paid $45,000 for her daughter’s
    wedding and “Husband was not invited to the wedding, although marital funds had
    been used.” Husband fails to demonstrate, however, that this expenditure is
    financial misconduct.
    Husband claims that several other checks purportedly issued by Wife
    for Wife’s daughter’s college expenses and minor son’s school expenses are evidence
    of Wife’s financial misconduct.       Husband fails to demonstrate that these
    expenditures were the deliberate dissipation or fraudulent disposition of marital
    assets made with the intent to defeat Husband’s interest in the marital assets.
    Finally, Husband claims that Wife engaged in “significant divorce
    planning,” had not spoken to Husband since 2011-2012, consulted with “several
    divorce lawyers prior to being served with the divorce complaint,” and paid an
    attorney $900 in 2015. Husband fails to show how Wife’s consultation with divorce
    attorneys and her failure to speak with Husband is financial misconduct.
    Moreover, the record demonstrates that where the magistrate found
    Wife had engaged in misconduct, he sanctioned her. As discussed previously in this
    opinion, the magistrate sanctioned Wife for withdrawing funds and for selling the
    Bendemeer property in violation of the mutual restraining orders by awarding
    Husband the $50,000 Wife had already advanced Husband from the Bendemeer
    proceeds.
    In light of the foregoing, and upon a thorough review of the record,
    we cannot find the trial court abused its discretion in failing to order a distributive
    award. Husband’s twelfth assignment of error is overruled.
    V. Wife’s Cross-appeal
    A. Wife’s Supplemental Objections
    In Wife’s first cross-assignment of error, she claims the trial court
    abused its discretion in prohibiting her from filing supplemental objections to the
    magistrate’s decision on the basis that she failed to file a praecipe. In support, Wife
    argues that she gave notice of her intent to file supplemental objections as required
    when she filed her preliminary objections, and Husband had already filed a
    praecipe.
    Pursuant to Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii), a party that files timely
    objections to a magistrate’s decision prior to the date on which a transcript is
    prepared “may seek leave of court to supplement the objections.” Loc.R. 27(1)(c) of
    the Cuyahoga County Domestic Relations Court provides that “[a] party filing
    objections that require a transcript must file his or her objections within the fourteen
    (14) day time period * * * , and must file a Notice of Intent to supplement objections
    after the transcript has been completed, for which leave will automatically be
    granted.” If a party is objecting to factual findings in the Magistrate’s decision, a
    transcript of the record of proceedings must be filed. Loc.R. 27(2)(a). And under
    the local rules, the party filing objections must order the transcript and file a
    praecipe “within the initial fourteen (14) day period after the date the magistrate’s
    decision is filed.” Loc.R. 27(2)(c). The failure to timely file the praecipe “shall result
    in the objections as to factual findings being overruled.” Loc.R. 27(2)(f).
    Here, on April 30, 2018, Wife filed timely objections to the
    magistrate’s decision, entitled “Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to Magistrate’s
    Decision.” In that same document, Wife filed a “Motion for Extension of Time to
    Submit Supplemental Objections.” Within the motion, Wife stated:
    Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Local Rule 7, Defendant hereby reserves her
    right to file Supplemental Objection to the within the matter.
    Defendant respectfully requests 45 days after the filing of the
    transcript to supplement her Objections with additional arguments or
    to remove arguments made based upon the transcript and review of
    the evidence. As the Court is aware, Defendant’s prior counsel
    recently withdrew from this matter and successor counsel, having
    literally just filed his Notice of Appearance in this matter, needs time
    to review the file and the pleadings and the Decision prior to
    Supplementing the Objections.
    Thereafter, also on April 30, 2018, the trial court granted Wife’s
    former counsel’s motion to withdraw as counsel of record, and Wife’s new counsel
    filed a notice of appearance. On May 14, 2018, the court addressed Wife’s motion
    for extension of time to submit supplemental objections filed on April 30, stating as
    follows:
    Pursuant to Loc.R. 27, [Wife] has fourteen (14) days following the
    completion of the transcript and the filing of the notice of availability
    of transcript, to file her supplemental objections. As the transcript has
    not yet been prepared, the pending motion for an extension of time is
    premature. Should [Wife] require additional time beyond the
    fourteen (14) days to file her supplemental objections, she must follow
    the procedures outlined in Local Rule 27.
    Following several intervening motions, on June 11, 2018, Wife filed
    a motion for extension of time to submit supplemental objections and to respond to
    Husband’s supplemental objections. On June 15, 2018, however, the court issued
    an order denying Wife’s motion, stating, “[Wife] is not permitted to file
    supplemental objections, as she did not file a praecipe []or a notice [of intent] to
    supplement objections.”
    We find that although Wife did not caption her motion filed on April
    30, 2018, as a “Notice of Intent to Supplement Objections,” in accordance with
    Loc.R. 27(1)(c), this motion undoubtedly provided sufficient notice to the court of
    Wife’s intent to file supplemental objections. Within this motion, Wife expressly
    stated that she “reserved” her right to file supplemental objections.    Indeed, the
    record demonstrates that the court was aware of Wife’s intent to file supplemental
    objections when it advised her on May 14, 2018, that her motion for an extension of
    time to file supplemental objections was “premature.”
    Moreover, the record demonstrates that Husband filed a praecipe
    requesting a transcript on April 19, 2018. The local rules provide that if a party is
    objecting to factual findings in a magistrate’s decision, he or she must file a
    transcript of the proceedings, if one is available. Loc.R. 27(2)(a). And as previously
    stated, in order to obtain the transcript, the party filing objections must file a
    praecipe requesting the court reporter prepare the transcript. Loc.R. 27(2)(c). The
    local rules do not expressly require that each objecting party file a praecipe. And
    because the purpose of the praecipe is to order a transcript of the proceedings to be
    filed with the court, so that the magistrate may properly review the facts set forth in
    the transcript, the filing of a second praecipe would be redundant.
    Under the foregoing circumstances, we find the trial court’s order in
    prohibiting Wife from filing supplemental objections was arbitrary and
    unreasonable.       Although Wife filed numerous preliminary objections that
    extensively addressed the magistrate’s findings, and we are hard-pressed to discern
    what objections remain to be made, we are constrained to find the trial court abused
    its discretion.
    Wife’s first cross-assignment of error is sustained.
    B. Motion to Intervene
    In Wife’s second cross-assignment of error, she contends the trial
    court erred when it granted her former counsel’s motion to intervene in the action.
    In support, Wife claims that the court’s order permitting the law firm of Skirbunt &
    Skirbunt L.L.C. to intervene in the pending divorce action allowed Skirbunt to
    assume a position directly adverse to its former client.
    We note initially that Skirbunt filed a “notice of intent to brief” with
    this court on April 10, 2019, which Wife opposed, arguing that Skirbunt lacked
    standing to file a brief. Because we find Skirbunt’s notice an appropriate vehicle in
    which to protect its interests in its attorney fees, we consider Skirbunt’s argument
    on appeal.
    Skirbunt represented Wife during the trial.        Thereafter, in his
    decision issued on April 5, 2018, the magistrate determined that, aside from
    attorney fees relating to the parties’ contempt and “general misconduct,” Husband
    and Wife would be responsible for their own respective attorney fees.             The
    magistrate found the parties’ respective attorney fees “to be both reasonable and
    appropriate under the circumstances, and based on the evidence presented at trial.”
    On April 16, 2018, the trial court ordered the payment of $54,269.83 to Husband’s
    attorneys and $44,262.40 to Skirbunt. On April 27, 2018, Skirbunt filed a motion
    to withdraw as counsel, which the court granted on April 30, 2018. On May 8, 2018,
    Wife filed a motion to partially vacate the court’s order of April 16 and a motion to
    stay disbursement and for temporary restraining orders, arguing that she was
    engaged in a fee dispute with Skirbunt. Skirbunt denies this claim. On May 15, 2018,
    Skirbunt filed a motion to intervene pursuant to Civ.R. 24(A)(2), claiming a third-
    party interest in the outcome of the trial. On May 30, 2018, the trial court granted
    Skirbunt’s motion to intervene. Skirbunt then, as a third-party defendant, filed a
    brief in opposition to Wife’s motion to vacate. On January 28, 2019, the trial court
    issued its final divorce decree, reiterating its adoption of the magistrate’s decision
    concerning the parties’ respective attorney fees.
    The granting or denial of intervention is discretionary and will not
    be disturbed on appeal without a showing that the trial court abused its discretion.
    Likover v. Cleveland, 
    60 Ohio App.2d 154
    , 158-159, 
    396 N.E.2d 491
     (8th Dist.1978).
    Under Civ.R. 24(A), intervention as of right, one shall be permitted
    to intervene in an action
    when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or
    transaction that is the subject of the action and the applicant is so
    situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter
    impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that interest, unless
    the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
    Civ.R. 24(A)(2).
    Although intervention as a matter of right is to be liberally construed
    in favor of the putative intervenor, the intervenor must establish all of the following
    requirements under Civ.R. 24(A)(2):
    “(1) the intervenor must claim an interest relating to the property or
    transaction that is the subject of the action; (2) the intervenor must be
    so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter,
    impair or impede the intervenor’s ability to protect his or her interest;
    (3) the intervenor must demonstrate that his or her interest is not
    adequately represented by the existing parties; and (4) the motion to
    intervene must be timely.”
    Cleveland v. State, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92735, 
    2009-Ohio-6106
    , ¶ 6, quoting
    Fairview Gen. Hosp. v. Fletcher, 
    69 Ohio App.3d 827
    , 830-831, 
    591 N.E.2d 1312
    (10th Dist.1990), quoting Blackburn v. Hamoudi, 
    29 Ohio App.3d 350
    , 
    505 N.E.2d 1010
     (10th Dist.1986), syllabus.
    In Ohio, however, in the absence of a statute, third persons generally
    do not have a right to intervene in a divorce action. Rielinger v. Rielinger, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 90614, 
    2009-Ohio-1236
    , ¶ 68, citing Civ.R. 75(B); Maher v. Maher,
    
    64 Ohio App.2d 22
    , 
    410 N.E.2d 1260
     (6th Dist.1978) (citations omitted). “Indeed,
    the object of Civ.R. 75(B) is to prevent the intervention of a third-party to a divorce
    action.” Chrisman v. Chrisman, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA99-01-006, 
    2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 937
    , 5, citing Foster v. Foster, 9th Dist. Medina No. 1735, 
    1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 57
    , 5 (Jan. 11, 1989) (affirming the trial court’s denial of an attorney’s
    motion to intervene for attorney fees because a “contract between attorney and
    client is to be litigated and reviewed in an action separate from the divorce action”).
    Outlining the circumstances that permit intervention in divorce
    cases, Civ.R. 75(B) provides as follows:
    Civ.R. 14, 19, 19.1, and 24 shall not apply in divorce, annulment, or
    legal separation actions, however:
    (1) A person or corporation having possession of, control of, or
    claiming an interest in property, whether real, personal, or mixed, out
    of which a party seeks a division of marital property, a distributive
    award, or an award of spousal support or other support, may be made
    a party defendant;
    (2) When it is essential to protect the interests of a child, the court
    may join the child of the parties as a party defendant and appoint a
    guardian ad litem and legal counsel, if necessary, for the child and tax
    the costs;
    (3) The court may make any person or agency claiming to have an
    interest in or rights to a child by rule or statute, including but not
    limited to R.C. 3109.04 and R.C. 3109.051, a party defendant;
    (4) When child support is ordered, the court, on its own motion or
    that of an interested person, after notice to the party ordered to pay
    child support and to his or her employer, may make the employer a
    party defendant.
    Therefore, third parties may intervene when “‘they have a claim or
    interest in property involved in the divorce action, which claim or interest may be
    adversely affected by the divorce proceeding.’” Chrisman, quoting Maher at 22.
    Here, Skirbunt does not have an interest in the marital property.
    Rather, its interest is only in recovering its own attorney fees. And Skirbunt has an
    alternate means to protect its interests in the form of civil litigation to collect its fees.
    Foster.
    We therefore find the trial court abused its discretion in allowing
    Skirbunt to intervene in the divorce proceeding to collect its attorney fees.
    Wife’s second cross-assignment of error is sustained.
    C. Attorney Fees
    In her third cross-assignment of error, Wife claims the trial court
    erred when it issued a “sua sponte award of attorney fees with no such motion
    pending, after the magistrate’s decision but before the judgment of entry of divorce.”
    Because Wife’s argument is completely devoid of citations to portions of the
    transcript or any legal authority in support of her position, we decline to address it.
    Strauss, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95377, 
    2011-Ohio-3831
    , ¶ 72, citing Martin, 12th
    Dist. Warren No. CA99-01-003, 
    1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3266
     (July 19, 1999); Najjar,
    8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91789, 
    2009-Ohio-3880
     at ¶ 9.
    D. Penalty for Wife’s Violation of Restraining Orders
    In her fourth cross-assignment of error, Wife claims the trial court
    erred by imposing a sanction of $50,000. Although Wife initially states that the trial
    court “abused its discretion when it imposed 100 hours of community service and a
    $50,000 penalty” for her alleged violation of the mutual restraining orders by selling
    the Bendemeer property, her assignment of error is directed only at the $50,000
    sanction. Indeed, the only legal authority cited within the entire assignment is
    Robiner v. Robiner, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 67195, 
    1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5425
    (Dec. 7, 1995), in which this court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion
    when it determined that money spent by the wife in violation of a restraining order
    was offset by the husband’s failure to pay temporary spousal support, and therefore,
    the husband was not entitled to reimbursement. We therefore will only address the
    $50,000 sanction here.
    Wife argues that the Bendemeer property was premarital and she did
    not know that the restraining order “prevented her from having control over her own
    pre-marital property.”
    When a party violates the terms of a restraining order, the court has
    the discretion to make a distributive award to the party aggrieved by the violation of
    the restraining order or compensate the offended spouse with a greater award of
    marital property. R.C. 3105.171(E)(4); Rodgers, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105095,
    
    2017-Ohio-7886
    , at ¶ 30.
    Here, the magistrate found Wife in contempt of the court’s
    restraining orders where she sold the Bendemeer property and withdrew funds
    “from multiple accounts.” And in awarding the sanction, the magistrate found
    Wife’s actions especially egregious in light of the fact that Wife testified about the
    Bendemeer property at trial after she sold the property, yet “she made no mention
    of the sale.”   The magistrate found this behavior “the best evidence of her
    consciousness of guilt” and “unreasonable to conclude that significant detail merely
    slipped [Wife’s] mind.”
    Additionally, although Wife claims on appeal that she was not aware
    that she could not sell “her own pre-marital property,” Wife’s own testimony belies
    that fact. When questioned about the Bendemeer sale, Wife explained that she was
    approached by potential buyers, but she initially told them, “I’m going through a
    divorce and, you know, I cannot sell it right now.” But, as she testified, the buyers
    pressured her to make the sale and she acquiesced: “So I told my tenant until trial
    is over, I’m not — I don’t want to go through [with a] transaction. And then in
    February, [the buyers] approached me again and they said to me that ‘we are going
    to go move forward with a purchase of [another] property.’” At the time of the sale,
    the divorce proceedings were ongoing, the temporary restraining orders were in
    place, and Wife acknowledged that she was aware that some of her assets were
    “frozen.” Moreover, the Bendemeer property was purchased with the Bayless
    settlement proceeds, and the determination of whether these proceeds were
    separate or marital property was in fact the subject of the divorce litigation. Wife
    therefore could not reasonably assume that the Bendemeer property was her
    separate property at the time of the sale. In adopting the magistrate’s decision, the
    court found that the magistrate was in the best position to weigh the evidence.
    In light of the foregoing, we cannot find the court’s sanction of
    $50,000 against Wife was an abuse of discretion.
    Wife’s fourth cross-assignment of error is overruled.
    E. Credit for Attorney Fees and GAL Fees
    In Wife’s fifth cross-assignment of error, she claims the trial court
    abused its discretion when it failed to credit her for advancing $77,000 of attorney
    fees to Husband’s counsel and for Wife’s payment of $20,000 of GAL fees. She
    contends that she made these payments and they were not factored into the division
    of marital assets and liabilities.
    Wife objected to the magistrate’s decision on the foregoing basis. In
    overruling her objection, the trial court stated in the divorce decree as follows:
    In [Wife’s] second objection, she argued the magistrate erred and
    abused his discretion when he failed to credit [Wife] for advancing
    attorney fees totaling $77,000.00 to [Husband’s] counsel, and for
    paying all of the GAL fees totaling $20,000 in the final calculation of
    the division of the parties’ assets and liabilities. [Wife] claimed the
    court erred upon failing to either credit her for these payments or to
    reallocate them in the financial calculation of the division of the
    parties’ assets and liabilities and property. A review of the docket
    reveals in the judgment entry journalized on August 1, 2016, the court
    ordered an equal allocation between the parties for GAL fees. As
    discussed previously, the magistrate found the Bendemeer property
    was sold in violation of the temporary restraining order. In the
    judgment entry journalized on July 14, 2017, this court allocated
    proceeds from the sale of the Bendemeer property for [Husband’s]
    attorney fees, [Wife’s] attorney fees, and a portion for mutual GAL
    fees. [Wife] did not present any evidence to support her argument
    [that] she paid $77,000 toward [Husband’s] attorney fees. There is
    nothing in the [Wife’s] argument to show there was an order by this
    court for her to pay $77,000 toward [Husband’s] attorney fees. [Wife]
    failed to establish she paid all the GAL fees.
    As it relates to Wife’s argument concerning attorney fees, however,
    on September 29, 2016, the trial court ordered Wife to pay Husband’s attorney fees
    as an advance against the eventual property division awarded to Husband as follows:
    IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Ex
    Parte Temporary Restraining Order dated August 17, 2015 be and
    hereby is released such that Fidelity Investments shall issue a check
    payable to Cavitch, Familo & Durkin in the sum of $77,731.83 of which
    $27,142.85 is currently due and payable and $50,588.98 shall be
    further retainer for attorney fees and expenses relative solely to the
    law offices representation of [Husband] in the within matter. * * *
    IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
    distribution to Cavitch, Familo Durkin shall be an advance against the
    ultimate property division awarded to [Husband] and, further, that
    [Husband] shall not be prevented from making any arguments
    relative to the final allocation of the $77,731.83 in this matter.
    Moreover, the record supports Wife’s contention that the attorney
    fees were in fact paid and they served as an advance against Husband’s property
    division.     On     cross-examination,   Husband’s   counsel,    Roger   Kleinman,
    acknowledged receipt of payment for attorney fees:
    Q: And do I have that right that through August 31, 2017, your fees
    were $125,265.12?
    A: That was the unpaid portion.
    Q: Okay. And that was through the end of trial, correct?
    A: Correct.
    Q: The amounts that you have received as advances against your
    client’s property division, you received the sum of $77,731.83 on
    September 29, 2016, correct?
    A: Correct.
    (Tr. 1611.)
    In light of the above, the record establishes that the trial court did
    indeed order Wife to pay $77,731.83 to Husband’s attorney as an advance against
    Husband’s interest in the property division. And the record further establishes that
    Wife paid these fees. The court’s failure to credit Wife with the payment is therefore
    an abuse of discretion.
    Wife also claims that she paid all of the $20,000 GAL fees and the
    court’s failure to credit her with the same was error.
    On August 1, 2016, in an agreed judgment entry, the parties agreed
    to pay equal shares of the GAL fees:
    It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the parties shall each
    make regular payments, upon presentation of the invoices of the GAL,
    for one-half of the fees as billed ([Husband] shall pay one-half and
    [Wife] shall pay one-half), which fees shall be subject to the court’s
    ability to entertain an application by any party for a different
    allocation of those fees between the parties.
    And within this order, the trial court ordered that “monies to pay
    GAL ($5,000) shall be released from Wife’s KeyBank account which was the subject
    of [a] prior hearing before the magistrate.”
    In support of her claim that she paid all of the fees, rather than her
    equal share, Wife cites to her own testimony at trial in which she testified on direct
    examination concerning payment to the GAL:
    Q: Did you write a check to cover the fees of [the GAL] and payable to
    * * * the IOLTA account of my law firm?
    A: Right. And I paid you.
    Q: Did you write a check to my firm?
    A: Yes.
    Q: All consistent with the court’s order, correct?
    A: Absolutely. * * *
    (Tr. 1343.)
    This testimony, however, does not establish that Wife paid the GAL
    fees of $20,000. In fact, the GAL testified that he “received a check by agreement of
    the parties — I don’t know who [it] came from, that was a partial release of a
    restraining order back in the late summer of 2016.” (Tr. 1594.) And the GAL’s fourth
    motion and application for fees (GAL’s exhibit No. 1) includes a single payment of
    $5,000 made on August 29, 2016. Therefore, at most, the record establishes that
    Wife paid $5,000 to the GAL, which is far short of the total GAL fees of $20,000
    Wife claims she paid.
    In light of the foregoing, Wife has failed to demonstrate that, despite
    the court’s order that the parties pay their equal share, she paid all of the GAL fees
    amounting to $20,000. The court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion when it
    overruled her objection concerning payment of the GAL fees.
    Wife’s fifth cross-assignment of error is sustained as it relates to
    attorney fees and overruled as it relates to GAL fees.
    F. Compensation for Personal Property
    In her sixth cross-assignment of error, Wife claims the trial court
    erred when it awarded $12,250 to Husband for personal property in the division of
    the marital estate due to “lost items of personal property stored at the Bendemeer
    residence [that Wife] sold.”
    The magistrate determined that awarding Husband $12,250 for
    Husband’s purported “lost” items when comparing the appraised values of the
    parties’ respective real estate was “equitable.” The trial court overruled Wife’s
    objection and adopted the magistrate’s decision regarding the “lost” personal
    property.
    Husband testified that he stored some personal items on the third
    floor of the Bendemeer house while the property was rented. According to Husband,
    he drove by the property one day and noticed his personal items on the tree lawn.
    He learned that Wife had instructed the tenant to discard the items on the lawn with
    the garbage. When asked about the personal items he recovered from the lawn, the
    following discussion concerning the items and their purported value, in its entirety,
    occurred:
    Husband: Well, there [are] tools. There [are] golf clubs. There [are]
    some very expensive faucets. Probably $3,000. There is lot[s] of —
    some of the stuff, I picked things. Some valuable stuff [was] gone.
    Attorney: What is your personal belief about the value, the total value
    of your things that were store at Bendemeer that are missing?
    Husband: Honestly, I don’t know. I would have to sit down and really
    think about it. It’d been sitting there for a while. Some of it
    appreciated. Some of it lost value. You know, I don’t want to — I
    would have to — I don’t know. Few thousand dollars for sure. $5,000.
    Attorney: Okay. Somewhere between 2 and 5 thousand dollars?
    Husband: There you go. * * * Yes.
    The record shows that Wife sold the Bendemeer property during the
    pendency of this divorce action and against the court’s order, and Husband
    apparently learned about the sale after driving through the neighborhood. Although
    a trial court enjoys broad discretion in deciding what is equitable upon the facts and
    circumstances of each case, and in this case the magistrate deemed equitable the
    $12,250 awarded to Husband in light of the appraised values of the parties’
    respective real estate, there is nothing in the record that supports the magistrate’s
    assigned value to Husband’s purportedly lost items. In fact, other than Husband’s
    general recollection of a few items that may have been located in storage at the
    Bendemeer property and his best guess as to the items’ value, there is no evidence
    of the purportedly lost items. At most, the record arguably supports an award of
    $5,000 to Husband.
    Wife’s sixth cross-assignment of error is sustained.
    G. Double Dip
    In her seventh cross-assignment of error, Wife claims the trial court
    erred when it awarded Husband $58,418.64 for his share of the Bendemeer property
    when Wife had previously paid Husband $43,000 for his share of the property, thus
    constituting a duplicate award, or a “double dip.” Within this assignment of error,
    Wife identifies her own testimony that she paid Husband $43,000 from the
    proceeds of the sale and asserts that because the trust account that contained the
    remainder of the proceeds was also divided between the parties, Husband’s receipt
    of $29,209.32 from the trust was a “double dip.”
    A trial court abuses its discretion when it counts a marital asset twice
    — once in the property division and again in the spousal support award. Dean v.
    Dean, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95615, 
    2011-Ohio-2401
    , ¶ 31, citing Heller v. Heller,
    10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-871, 
    2008-Ohio-3296
    , ¶ 19.
    The court awarded Husband $50,000 from the proceeds of the sale
    of the Bendemeer property as “compensation for the funds [Wife] knowingly
    withdrew in violation of mutual restraining orders and as a sanction for [Wife’s]
    multiple contempt findings.” Therefore, because the $50,000 was a sanction, it does
    not constitute a double dip.
    Wife’s seventh cross-assignment of error is overruled.
    H. Division of Personal Property
    In her eighth cross-assignment of error, Wife claims the trial court
    abused its discretion in the division of certain personal property located in a safe
    deposit box, including “rings,” a gold watch, “bracelets,” and cuff links. Wife
    essentially argues that the trial court erred in believing Husband’s testimony,
    because the property is unsubstantiated, unknown to Wife, or does not exist.
    Regarding the personal property, the magistrate concluded as
    follows:
    To the extent the [gold watch, rings, bracelets, and cuff links] exist and
    can be identified, the court awards them to [Husband]. It is inherently
    problematic [that] these items were not described in further detail, as
    the description of, for example, “rings” is so ambiguous it lends itself
    to the possibility of confusion, especially between these parties.
    Nonetheless, if [Wife] is in possession of any of the above items, the
    court orders her to turn them over to her counsel within 30 days of
    the journalization of the divorce decree, so they may be returned to
    [Husband] through his attorney.
    Husband claimed that the jewelry in the safe deposit box is his
    separate property. He provided pictures of items purportedly in the box. Husband
    testified specifically regarding an engagement ring for which he paid $12,000 in
    cash, and he provided an appraisal for the ring. Although the magistrate found both
    parties in this divorce action lacked credibility, the magistrate evidently found some
    of Husband’s testimony credible concerning items in the safe deposit box for which
    Husband provided supporting documentation. We defer to the magistrate as the
    factfinder to determine the credibility of the witnesses. Allan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
    No. 107142, 
    2019-Ohio-2111
    , at ¶ 80. And we have no basis for concluding that the
    magistrate lost his way in finding that these jewelry items are Husband’s separate
    property.
    Wife’s eighth cross-assignment of error is overruled.
    I. Child Support
    In her ninth and final assignment of error, Wife contends that the
    trial court erred when it failed to order Husband to pay child support during the
    pendency of the divorce.
    Civ.R. 75(N) governs the granting of temporary spousal and child
    support and permits a trial court to grant temporary support “for the party’s
    sustenance and expenses” that occur during the pendency of a divorce action. “A
    temporary order is merely an order to provide for the needs of the parties during the
    pendency of the divorce action.” Schumann v. Schumann, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos.
    83404 and 83631, 
    2005-Ohio-91
    , ¶ 50. The award and the amount of temporary
    spousal and child support rests within the broad discretion of the trial court. Davis
    v. Davis, 
    12 Ohio App.3d 38
    , 40, 
    465 N.E.2d 917
     (8th Dist.1983).
    On September 6, 2016, the magistrate held a hearing on the parties’
    motions for support. On September 27, 2016, following the hearing and after
    consideration of documents submitted by the parties, including income and expense
    affidavits, briefs containing tax returns and pay stubs, lists of real estate properties,
    and other financial information, the magistrate found as follows:
    [The parties] * * * have one minor child. [Wife] lives in the marital
    residence. The minor child is enrolled in a boarding school * * *.
    There is no monthly mortgage payment for the marital residence. The
    monthly real estate taxes and homeowner’s insurance are $420. It is
    unknown where [Husband] lives currently.
    The Court finds that for purposes of temporary support the [Wife’s]
    annual gross income is a base salary of $105,000 and $35,000 per
    year in commissions. She also has net rental income, exclusive of
    depreciation expense, of approximately $29,755.
    [Husband’s] 2014 tax return shows adjusted gross income of $15,034.
    He states in his brief that he is self-employed in the real estate
    business. He has nine rental properties, some of which are in LLC’s
    and some of which are multiple units. [Husband] executed a loan
    agreement with the Telshe Alumni Gemilus Chesed Fund where he
    lists his occupation as “financial advisor.” [Husband’s] 2014 income
    tax return states his principal business or profession as “financial &
    real estate consulting.”
    The magistrate determined that Wife has sufficient income available
    to cover all of the child’s needs while he is staying in her home and she has been
    paying the child’s private boarding school expenses. The magistrate then ordered
    that “no child support order is made at this juncture of the proceedings * * * as the
    child is enrolled in a residential school and does not reside permanently with either
    parent.” The magistrate reserved jurisdiction to make a retroactive child support
    determination, if any, at the final hearing.
    On March 8, 2017, Wife filed a motion to modify the temporary
    support. She claimed in her motion that she was involuntarily terminated from her
    employment and her gross income “has decreased by $140,000.” She also claimed
    that she did not have sufficient funds to continue to pay for the entirety of the
    expenses related to the minor child. Wife failed to present any evidence in support
    of her argument, and she failed to cite to any legal authority to support a
    modification.    Following a hearing, the magistrate denied Wife’s motion for
    modification.   Rather, the magistrate concluded that Husband’s child support
    obligation should commence on January 1, 2018. In overruling Wife’s objections,
    the trial court found that Wife failed to present any evidence or cite to any legal
    authority in support of her argument regarding temporary child support and the
    magistrate was in the best position to weigh the evidence.
    From the record before us, and in light of the fact that Wife did not
    effectively contest the magistrate’s findings, we fail to find the trial court abused its
    discretion in denying Wife’s motion for temporary child support.
    Wife’s final cross- assignment of error is overruled.
    Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the
    trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    It is ordered that appellant and appellee share the costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
    common pleas court, domestic relations division, to carry this judgment into
    execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
    of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    _____________________________
    MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, JUDGE
    EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, A.J., and
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., CONCUR