State on behalf of Ryley G. v. Ryan G. , 306 Neb. 63 ( 2020 )


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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    STATE ON BEHALF OF RYLEY G. v. RYAN G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 63
    State of Nebraska on behalf of Ryley G., a minor
    child, appellee, v. Ryan G., defendant and
    third-party plaintiff, appellant,
    and Rashell K., third-party
    defendant, appellee.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed June 5, 2020.     No. S-19-892.
    1. Paternity: Appeal and Error. In a filiation proceeding, questions con-
    cerning child custody determinations are reviewed on appeal de novo on
    the record to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion
    by the trial court, whose judgment will be upheld in the absence of an
    abuse of discretion.
    2. Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion exists if the
    reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriv-
    ing a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in matters
    submitted for disposition.
    3. Evidence: Appeal and Error. In a de novo review, when the evidence
    is in conflict, the appellate court considers, and may give weight to, the
    fact that the trial court heard and observed the witnesses and accepted
    one version of the facts rather than another.
    4. Child Custody. In order to prevail on a motion to remove a minor child
    to another jurisdiction, the custodial parent must first satisfy the court
    that he or she has a legitimate reason for leaving the state. After clearing
    that threshold, the custodial parent must next demonstrate that it is in the
    child’s best interests to continue living with him or her.
    5. Child Custody: Visitation. The purpose of requiring a legitimate rea-
    son for leaving the state in a motion to remove a minor child to another
    jurisdiction is to prevent the custodial parent from relocating the child
    because of an ulterior motive, such as frustrating the noncustodial par-
    ent’s visitation rights.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    STATE ON BEHALF OF RYLEY G. v. RYAN G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 63
    6. Child Custody. In considering a motion to remove a minor child to
    another jurisdiction, the paramount consideration is whether the pro-
    posed move is in the best interests of the child.
    7. Child Custody: Visitation. In determining whether removal to another
    jurisdiction is in the child’s best interests, the trial court considers (1)
    each parent’s motives for seeking or opposing the move; (2) the poten-
    tial that the move holds for enhancing the quality of life for the child
    and the custodial parent; and (3) the impact such a move will have on
    contact between the child and the noncustodial parent, when viewed in
    the light of reasonable visitation.
    8. Parental Rights: Child Custody. The custodial parent has the right to
    travel between states and the right to migrate, resettle, find a new job,
    and start a new life.
    9. Child Custody. An award of custody to a parent should not be inter-
    preted as a sentence to immobility.
    10. ____. Career advancement of a new spouse is a legitimate reason to
    remove a child to another jurisdiction.
    11. ____. The desire to form a new family unit through remarriage is a
    legitimate reason to remove a child to another jurisdiction.
    12. Judgments: Final Orders. If a judgment looks to the future in an
    attempt to judge the unknown, it is a conditional judgment. A condi-
    tional judgment is wholly void because it does not “perform in prae-
    senti” and leaves to speculation and conjecture what its final effect
    may be.
    13. Child Custody. The standard for approval of a motion to remove a
    child to another jurisdiction applies both when a custodial parent seeks
    to move a child from Nebraska to a different state and in considering a
    subsequent move to yet another state.
    14. Courts: Child Custody: Visitation. The authority to determine custody
    and visitation cannot be delegated, because it is a judicial function.
    15. Modification of Decree: Child Custody. A court cannot delegate to
    a custodial parent, who has obtained permission only for removal of a
    child from Nebraska to one state, the authority to move the child to yet
    another state without permission.
    16. ____: ____. Removal of a child from the state, without more, does not
    amount to a change of circumstances warranting a change of custody.
    Nevertheless, such a move, when considered in conjunction with other
    evidence, may result in a change of circumstances that would warrant a
    modification of the decree.
    Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Robert
    R. Otte, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    STATE ON BEHALF OF RYLEY G. v. RYAN G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 63
    David V. Chipman, of Monzón, Guerra & Associates, for
    appellant.
    Linsey A. Camplin, of McHenry, Haszard, Roth, Hupp,
    Burkholder & Blomenberg, P.C., L.L.O., for appellee
    Rashell K.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Cassel, J.
    INTRODUCTION
    A noncustodial parent appeals from a modification of a fili-
    ation judgment granting the custodial parent “leave to remove
    the minor child from the State of Nebraska and to determine
    his primary place of residence” without specifying where the
    child could be moved or placing any limitation on further
    moves. Two questions predominate.
    First, did a deployment of the custodial parent’s new mili-
    tary spouse for 1 year to a base near Washington, D.C., coupled
    with a change in employment conditions after the deployment
    ended, constitute a legitimate reason for leaving the state? It
    did. Second, did the district court’s open-ended permission vio-
    late the standard for approval and, thus, amount to an improper
    delegation of judicial authority? It did.
    Because the court did not otherwise abuse its discretion, we
    affirm the order below as modified to limit the permission to
    move the child only to the military base near Washington, D.C.
    BACKGROUND
    Prior Proceedings
    Rashell K. and Ryan G. are the natural parents of Ryley
    G., born in 2007. In 2009, the State initiated a filiation pro-
    ceeding, which resulted in a support judgment against Ryan.
    At that time, neither Rashell nor Ryan sought any orders
    regarding child custody. In 2015, Ryan sought a modification,
    which in June 2016 resulted in an order and formal parenting
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    STATE ON BEHALF OF RYLEY G. v. RYAN G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 63
    plan awarding Rashell legal and physical care, custody, and
    control of Ryley, subject to Ryan’s parenting time. It con-
    sisted of every other Friday from 7:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. on
    Sunday and all but 3 weeks of each summer vacation from
    school.
    Modification Sought
    In November 2018, Rashell sought a modification of the
    judgment, asserting that she had married and had a newborn
    child; that her husband was active in the National Guard and
    was scheduled to be deployed to the District of Columbia
    in mid-2019; that he would likely be stationed outside of
    Nebraska following the deployment; and that it was in Ryley’s
    best interests to permit removal from Nebraska. She specifi-
    cally requested permission “to move with the minor child to
    the District of Columbia, and thereafter to where her husband
    is stationed” and sought other related relief.
    Ryan filed an answer opposing the removal and a “counter-
    complaint” seeking a change of custody and other associated
    relief. The matter proceeded to trial.
    Evidence at Trial
    At trial, the parties avoided Ryley’s participation by stipulat-
    ing that Ryley would testify he had a good relationship with his
    father, he had a stronger bond with his mother, and he wanted
    to remain living with his mother. The district court heard
    testimony from three witnesses: Ryan, Rashell, and Rashell’s
    husband, Joshua Chubb.
    Chubb testified that he was a Blackhawk helicopter instruc-
    tor pilot for the Missouri National Guard. He had been working
    40 to 42 hours per week, compressed into 3 days each week,
    and had been commuting from Lincoln, Nebraska, to Whiteman
    Air Force Base in Missouri for his employment.
    Chubb stated that he had been called to active duty and
    ordered to report for processing in North Carolina, where he
    expected to be ordered to report to Fort Belvoir in Washington,
    D.C., for 1 year. Although the parties at times characterized
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    306 Nebraska Reports
    STATE ON BEHALF OF RYLEY G. v. RYAN G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 63
    Fort Belvoir as being located in the District of Columbia, they
    also described it as situated in Virginia, near Washington, D.C.
    Chubb testified that while at Fort Belvoir, his family would
    have on-base housing. The house would have three bedrooms
    and would be located in a low-crime area within one-half mile
    from the school that Ryley could attend. Chubb would receive
    a housing allowance, and Rashell would not need to work out-
    side of the home.
    After completion of this deployment, Chubb testified, he
    would be ordered to return to Missouri for demobilization.
    Thereafter, he explained, there were only two places in the
    country where he would be able to work as a Blackhawk heli-
    copter instructor pilot: Missouri or Alabama. He anticipated
    moving to Alabama for an instructor position in a nondeploy-
    able unit. If he received that position, he would work shorter
    days and be paid more.
    Chubb did not expect to return to Lincoln. He testified that
    if he returned to Missouri, the chances were “slim to none” that
    he could resume the same schedule he had while commuting
    from Lincoln. Instead, he would not be allowed to have Fridays
    off. He would have to work Tuesday through Friday, with only
    Saturday, Sunday, and Monday off. He explained that he would
    not have the same flexibility and schedule as before, because
    he would become a “legitimate full-time employee working
    there.” So at that point, his family would reside with him in
    Missouri as opposed to his living in Lincoln and commuting.
    Moreover, there was no opportunity as a Blackhawk instructor
    closer to Lincoln than Whiteman Air Force Base.
    Rashell stated that her intention was to move to Fort Belvoir
    for 1 year and then move to wherever Chubb found a job. She
    did not have an address for their home in Fort Belvoir. She was
    a registered nurse, and she explained that in order to receive
    a nursing license in Virginia, she would need a specific home
    address. She stated that if she could find a flexible, part-time
    nursing job, she would work; otherwise, she would stay at
    home with her children.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    STATE ON BEHALF OF RYLEY G. v. RYAN G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 63
    Rashell explained that at Fort Belvoir, the elementary school
    consists of “K” to sixth grade. Ryley would be entering sixth
    grade. By the end of the trial, she testified regarding the base’s
    recreational amenities and sports programs.
    Ryley’s community and extended family were in Lincoln.
    Rashell’s and Ryan’s families were also there. And so were
    Ryley’s friends and school classmates. Ryley had participated
    in several sports teams in Lincoln.
    Ryan actively participated in Ryley’s life. Ryan exercised
    all of his parenting time. Rashell allowed Ryan to take Ryley
    to and from school on snowy or rainy days. Ryan attended the
    majority of Ryley’s sports games. Ryan had made plans that if
    he was awarded physical custody, family members would care
    for Ryley when Ryan had to work late or on weekends.
    Rashell had made all of Ryley’s doctor appointments and
    taken care of his medical needs. Ryley takes asthma shots
    every other week, and in a previous summer, Ryan had for-
    gotten to take Ryley to receive his shots. Ryan had never met
    Ryley’s primary care doctor or his dentist.
    Rashell explained that she did not yet have any informa-
    tion regarding who would be Ryley’s primary care physician
    or dentist or where he would receive his asthma shots at Fort
    Belvoir. This, she said, was because their “insurance [was]
    through Tri-Care, [which was] divided into an east and a west
    and [they were] currently in the west.” This meant, she testi-
    fied, that they could not “move it to the east until [they] actu-
    ally move there.”
    According to Rashell, if Ryley was not allowed to move with
    her, it would have a negative effect on Ryley. She based this
    upon her observations of Ryley after he returned from Ryan’s
    house. On such occasions, she testified, Ryley was withdrawn
    and worried as to how she would react to small things. Rashell
    calculated that if Ryley moved with her, Ryan would lose
    40 days of overnight parenting time. However, according to
    Rashell, if Ryley stayed with Ryan, she would lose 180 days of
    overnight parenting time.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    STATE ON BEHALF OF RYLEY G. v. RYAN G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 63
    District Court’s Orders
    The district court first entered an interlocutory order address-
    ing the custody and removal issues and reserving the support
    and related matters. The court later entered a final order, incor-
    porating a copy of the first order and disposing of the remain-
    ing issues.
    In the first order, the court found that Rashell met the
    threshold requirement of proving a legitimate reason for mov-
    ing. It explained that she had a desire to establish a family unit
    with her new husband, her new child, and Ryley. It stated that
    Chubb would see an income increase and “secure his position
    with a solid upside.” This, the court found, was a legitimate
    reason for the move.
    After clearing the threshold requirement, the court then con-
    sidered the best interests factors, addressing (1) the parents’
    motives for seeking or opposing the move, (2) the potential
    the move holds for enhancing the quality of life for the child
    and custodial parent, and (3) the impact the move will have on
    contact between the child and the noncustodial parent.
    Regarding the parents’ motives, the court determined that
    both parents had valid reasons for and against removal and that
    this factor did not weigh for or against removal.
    The court then considered nine elements of the quality-of-
    life factor. The court’s order discussed each element.
    First, it assessed Ryley’s emotional, physical, and develop-
    mental needs. Concluding that this factor disfavored the move,
    the court explained:
    The . . . minor child is thriving in Nebraska and his
    needs are being met. He spends a lot of time with his
    father and . . . they have a good relationship. . . . A move
    would take Ryley away from extended family and friends
    at a time that is significant in his development.
    Rashell has a substantial number of her family mem-
    bers in Lincoln. Ryan also has family members in
    Lincoln. A move would take Ryley away from these fam-
    ily members.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    STATE ON BEHALF OF RYLEY G. v. RYAN G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 63
    Ryley has a number of interests including music,
    lacrosse, baseball, basketball, and flag football. Ryan
    attends Ryley’s activities. Rashell had done little at the
    time of trial, if anything, to investigate any of those activ-
    ities if the move were allowed. There is little doubt Ryan
    is actively involved in Ryley’s life and willing to take on
    the custodial role here.
    Second, it stated that Ryley’s preference to stay with Rashell
    favored the move. The court noted that “[w]hile Ryan suggests
    this factor should be neutral, he should not be surprised that the
    court finds [Ryley’s preference] is important to the determina-
    tion here.”
    Third, the court considered the extent to which the custodial
    parent’s income or employment would be enhanced. It observed
    that although the move was not based on Rashell’s career,
    the family considerations were no less important. Because of
    Chubb’s career, Rashell would be allowed to stay home and
    care for the children. Although her future prospects were not
    clear and it did not appear that her employment opportunities
    were enhanced, Chubb was “on a career path that overall will
    be favorable in the long-run to the family.” It concluded that
    this was a neutral factor.
    Fourth, addressing housing or living conditions, the court
    reasoned that because Rashell eventually presented evidence
    that the housing options on the military base would be suitable
    and that Ryley’s education needs could be met, the factor was
    generally neutral or slightly negative.
    Fifth, regarding educational advantages, the court deter-
    mined that Ryley’s educational needs were being met and that
    Rashell had provided “only scant” evidence of any advantages
    from the move. This factor, the court concluded, “slightly
    disfavor[ed]” the move.
    Sixth, the court discussed the quality of the relationships
    between the child and each parent, which, the court found,
    favored the move. Although the relationships with each par-
    ent were strong and Ryan had been very active in Ryley’s
    life, Rashell had “provided most of the support for education,
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    STATE ON BEHALF OF RYLEY G. v. RYAN G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 63
    medical needs, and for extracurricular activities . . . , and ha[d]
    been the parent most focused on [Ryley’s] essential well-being
    and care.” The court concluded that Rashell’s “parenting time
    pretty substantially outweigh[ed] that of Ryan and her day-to-
    day life show[ed] the overall attentiveness to [Ryley’s] needs
    emotionally, spiritually, educationally, and socially.”
    Seventh, it discussed the strength of the child’s ties to the
    community and extended family. It explained that Ryley was
    “fully ingrained” in Lincoln and had significant ties that would
    be diminished or lost with the move. This factor, the court
    determined, disfavored the move.
    Eighth, in discussing the likelihood that allowing or deny-
    ing the move would antagonize hostilities between the par-
    ents, the court noted that the parties refrained from being
    “deeply critical” and showed a level of maturity and under-
    standing. It explained that Rashell offered several concessions
    to Ryan’s parenting time that would be “difficult to execute,
    but not so impossible as to prevent the move.” It found that
    the parties were “very focused” on Ryley’s best interests
    and that Rashell’s commitment to Ryan’s parenting time was
    credible. According to the court, this factor slightly favored
    the move.
    Addressing the last element of the quality-of-life factor, the
    court determined that the living conditions and employment
    opportunities of the custodial parent slightly favored the move.
    Here, the court found that the best interests were “interwoven
    with the well-being of the custodial parent.” Rashell had, the
    court observed, provided most of Ryley’s care and support.
    Chubb would “support Rashell being a stay-at-home mother”
    and would make a sufficient income. It reasoned that “[t]he
    fact that Rashell would be home parenting is at least as posi-
    tive as having her base the move on improving employment
    opportunities in a new environment.”
    Turning to the third best interests factor, the court reasoned
    that it “must make some pretty aggressive assumptions to
    believe that moving the minor child would not have a signifi-
    cant negative impact on the parenting time of Ryan. Rashell,
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    STATE ON BEHALF OF RYLEY G. v. RYAN G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 63
    to her credit, has offered substantial parenting time.” But the
    court also recognized that “a reduction in visitation time does
    not necessarily preclude a custodial parent from relocating for
    a legitimate reason.”
    Ultimately, the court found that “the reasons for Rashell’s
    move, the weight of Ryley’s preference, and the opportunities
    that are provided for Rashell and Ryley in the long-run, satisfy
    the burdens placed on Rashell to establish a good reason for
    the move and that the move is in the best interests of Ryley.”
    Accordingly, the court stated, Rashell’s “request to move Ryley
    is approved. Ryan’s Cross-Petition is dismissed.” The first
    order, the court stated, was not final, because there were unre-
    solved issues of parenting time and child support. It specified
    procedures for adjudicating the remaining issues.
    One month later, the court entered a final order. This order
    “granted [Rashell] leave to remove the minor child from the
    State of Nebraska and to determine his primary place of resi-
    dence.” It did not specify the location of the move or place any
    restriction on further moves.
    Ryan filed a timely appeal, which we moved to our docket. 1
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Ryan assigns that the district court erred in (1) finding that
    Rashell demonstrated a legitimate reason for leaving Nebraska
    with Ryley; (2) finding that it was in Ryley’s best interests to
    relocate to Washington, D.C.; (3) granting Rashell the “open-
    ended right” to relocate outside of Nebraska to Washington,
    D.C., and then to Chubb’s next job regardless of where it is
    located; and (4) “not finding a material change of circumstance
    that the best interests of [Ryley] required custody to be placed
    with [Ryan].”
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1,2] In a filiation proceeding, questions concerning child
    custody determinations are reviewed on appeal de novo on the
    1
    See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106
    (3) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
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    STATE ON BEHALF OF RYLEY G. v. RYAN G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 63
    record to determine whether there has been an abuse of discre-
    tion by the trial court, whose judgment will be upheld in the
    absence of an abuse of discretion. 2 A judicial abuse of discre-
    tion exists if the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly
    untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and
    denying just results in matters submitted for disposition. 3
    [3] In a de novo review, when the evidence is in conflict, the
    appellate court considers, and may give weight to, the fact that
    the trial court heard and observed the witnesses and accepted
    one version of the facts rather than another. 4
    ANALYSIS
    We have said that parental relocation issues are among the
    most difficult that courts face. 5 That is true here. For this rea-
    son, such determinations are matters initially entrusted to the
    discretion of the trial judge, and the trial judge’s determination
    is to be given deference. 6
    Framework for Removal Decisions
    [4,5] Before we address Ryan’s specific arguments, we first
    recall the legal framework governing the removal of a minor
    child to another jurisdiction. In order to prevail on a motion
    to remove a minor child to another jurisdiction, the custodial
    parent must first satisfy the court that he or she has a legiti-
    mate reason for leaving the state. 7 After clearing that threshold,
    the custodial parent must next demonstrate that it is in the
    child’s best interests to continue living with him or her. 8 The
    2
    State on behalf of Kaaden S. v. Jeffery T., 
    303 Neb. 933
    , 
    932 N.W.2d 692
    (2019).
    3
    
    Id.
    4
    
    Id.
    5
    See, e.g., Steffy v. Steffy, 
    287 Neb. 529
    , 
    843 N.W.2d 655
     (2014);
    Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 
    257 Neb. 242
    , 
    597 N.W.2d 592
     (1999).
    6
    Steffy v. Steffy, supra note 5.
    7
    Daniels v. Maldonado-Morin, 
    288 Neb. 240
    , 
    847 N.W.2d 79
     (2014).
    8
    
    Id.
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    STATE ON BEHALF OF RYLEY G. v. RYAN G.
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    306 Neb. 63
    purpose of requiring a legitimate reason for leaving the state in
    a motion to remove a minor child to another jurisdiction is to
    prevent the custodial parent from relocating the child because
    of an ulterior motive, such as frustrating the noncustodial par-
    ent’s visitation rights. 9
    [6,7] In considering a motion to remove a minor child to
    another jurisdiction, the paramount consideration is whether
    the proposed move is in the best interests of the child. 10 In
    determining whether removal to another jurisdiction is in
    the child’s best interests, the trial court considers (1) each
    parent’s motives for seeking or opposing the move; (2) the
    potential that the move holds for enhancing the quality of
    life for the child and the custodial parent; and (3) the impact
    such a move will have on contact between the child and the
    noncustodial parent, when viewed in the light of reason-
    able visitation. 11
    [8] Fundamental constitutional rights underlie this frame-
    work. The custodial parent has the right to travel between
    states and the right to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and
    start a new life. 12 Both parents, custodial and noncustodial,
    have the constitutional right to the care, custody, and control
    of their children. 13
    Ryan does not assert that the district court employed the
    wrong framework. Instead, he quarrels with its application to
    the facts of this case.
    Legitimate Reason for Removal
    Ryan first argues that the district court erred in finding
    that Rashell had a legitimate reason for moving to another
    9
    Steffy v. Steffy, supra note 5.
    10
    Id.
    11
    McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 
    264 Neb. 232
    , 
    647 N.W.2d 577
     (2002).
    12
    Shapiro v. Thompson, 
    394 U.S. 618
    , 
    89 S. Ct. 1322
    , 
    22 L. Ed. 2d 600
    (1969), overruled on other grounds, Edelman v. Jordan, 
    415 U.S. 651
    , 
    94 S. Ct. 1347
    , 
    39 L. Ed. 2d 662
     (1974).
    13
    Troxel v. Granville, 
    530 U.S. 57
    , 
    120 S. Ct. 2054
    , 
    147 L. Ed. 2d 49
     (2000).
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    STATE ON BEHALF OF RYLEY G. v. RYAN G.
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    306 Neb. 63
    jurisdiction. He contends that we have never “found that a par-
    ent’s desire to relocate to a spouse’s temporary job relocation is
    a legitimate reason to relocate with the minor child.” 14
    [9-11] We have long held that an award of custody to a
    parent should not be interpreted as a sentence to immobility. 15
    Thus, we have held that career advancement of a new spouse is
    a legitimate reason to remove a child to another jurisdiction. 16
    Another legitimate reason is the desire to form a new family
    unit through remarriage. 17 Both reasons factor into the situa-
    tion here.
    We disagree with Ryan’s characterization of Rashell’s reason
    for moving as a temporary job relocation. Chubb, a member of
    the Missouri National Guard, was called to active service in the
    U.S. Army and deployed to a base near Washington, D.C. This
    activation and deployment is mandatory and not in any sense
    voluntary. It is true that this aspect of his job will end after
    1 year. But many job opportunities involve a risk of transfer
    after only a short period. And at the end of the 1-year deploy-
    ment, he clearly intends to continue his military career as a
    Blackhawk helicopter pilot.
    14
    Brief for appellant at 18 (emphasis omitted).
    15
    See, Daniels v. Maldonado-Morin, supra note 7; Vogel v. Vogel, 
    262 Neb. 1030
    , 
    637 N.W.2d 611
     (2002); Brown v. Brown, 
    260 Neb. 954
    ,
    
    621 N.W.2d 70
     (2000); Harder v. Harder, 
    246 Neb. 945
    , 
    524 N.W.2d 325
     (1994); Sabatka v. Sabatka, 
    245 Neb. 109
    , 
    511 N.W.2d 107
     (1994);
    Demerath v. Demerath, 
    233 Neb. 222
    , 
    444 N.W.2d 325
     (1989); Hicks v.
    Hicks, 
    223 Neb. 189
    , 
    388 N.W.2d 510
     (1986); Vanderzee v. Vanderzee,
    
    221 Neb. 738
    , 
    380 N.W.2d 310
     (1986); Boll v. Boll, 
    219 Neb. 486
    , 
    363 N.W.2d 542
     (1985); Gotschall v. Gotschall, 
    210 Neb. 679
    , 
    316 N.W.2d 610
     (1982).
    16
    See, McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 
    supra note 11
    ; Vogel v. Vogel, 
    supra note 15
    ; Harder v. Harder, 
    supra note 15
    ; Demerath v. Demerath, 
    supra note 15
    .
    17
    See, Daniels v. Maldonado-Morin, supra note 7; Jack v. Clinton, 
    259 Neb. 198
    , 
    609 N.W.2d 328
     (2000); Harder v. Harder, 
    supra note 15
    ; Gerber v.
    Gerber, 
    225 Neb. 611
    , 
    407 N.W.2d 497
     (1987); Maack v. Maack, 
    223 Neb. 342
    , 
    389 N.W.2d 318
     (1986).
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    306 Neb. 63
    While Chubb’s immediate job placement is time limited, the
    job- and matrimonial-related reasons for removal are perma-
    nent. He has a career plan based upon military service. Rashell
    desires to join him in this military life. He knows that he will
    return to Missouri for demobilization. But there, the chances
    are “slim to none” that he could return to the schedule which
    made commuting from Lincoln possible. We cannot say that
    the desire to live a normal life with his family near the location
    of his job is illegitimate. Likewise, Rashell’s desire to live with
    her new spouse at that job location is a legitimate reason for
    removal of the child from Nebraska.
    Best Interests
    Under the framework set forth above, Rashell had the bur-
    den to show that it was in the child’s best interests to continue
    living with her. 18 As we have already noted, Ryan quarrels only
    with the weight accorded by the court to the evidence bearing
    on the factors prescribed by that framework.
    Ryan emphasizes the “temporary nature of the relocation.” 19
    But as we have already explained, the relocation is permanent
    in the sense that the family will not be returning to Lincoln.
    Above, we set forth the district court’s analysis in consid-
    erable detail. Here, the deference we accord to the court’s
    factual findings becomes important. We find no abuse of dis-
    cretion in the court’s best interests analysis.
    Removal Beyond Washington, D.C.
    Ryan argues that the district court erred in granting an “open-
    ended” right to relocate the minor child first to Washington,
    D.C., and then to Chubb’s next job location. 20 To support this
    argument, he tenders two rationales. One lacks merit but the
    other is valid.
    18
    Daniels v. Maldonado-Morin, supra note 7.
    19
    Brief for appellant at 24.
    20
    Brief for appellant at 26.
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    STATE ON BEHALF OF RYLEY G. v. RYAN G.
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    In one rationale, Ryan challenges the district court’s order
    as a void conditional order, “to the extent” the court “granted
    Rashell permission to relocate to wherever [Chubb] finds
    another job.” 21 In making this argument, he relies upon our
    decision in Vogel v. Vogel. 22
    [12] There, we relied on two related propositions. If a judg-
    ment looks to the future in an attempt to judge the unknown,
    it is a conditional judgment. A conditional judgment is wholly
    void because it does not “perform in praesenti” and leaves
    to speculation and conjecture what its final effect may be. 23
    Applying those principles, we vacated provisions of a removal
    order which (1) imposed a new schedule for physical pos-
    session of the children “in the event [the mother’s spouse] is
    transferred overseas and [the mother] elects to join him” and
    (2) dictated a new visitation schedule “in the event [the mother
    and the father] establish residences within 50 miles of one
    another.” 24 In both instances, the Vogel orders were to become
    effective only upon the happening of certain future events
    which might or might not occur. Whether the orders would
    ever have become effective was speculative.
    Here, however, the district court’s final order did not include
    similar language. Instead, this order simply stated that Rashell
    was “granted leave to remove the minor child from the State of
    Nebraska and to determine his primary place of residence.” It
    did not, as Ryan contends, state any location to which such per-
    mission extended. To the extent that the court’s first order can
    be read to incorporate Rashell’s prayer into its relief, the final
    order expressly states that it “shall supersede and control.” The
    final order may have been carefully crafted to avoid the use of
    conditional language. But in avoiding that pitfall, it ran afoul
    of another principle.
    21
    Id. at 27.
    22
    Vogel v. Vogel, 
    supra note 15
    .
    23
    
    Id.
    24
    
    Id. at 1038-39
    , 
    637 N.W.2d at 619
    .
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    [13] In the other rationale, Ryan argues that the district
    court’s order violated a standard articulated by the Nebraska
    Court of Appeals in Maranville v. Dworak. 25 There, after
    obtaining the trial court’s permission to move the children to
    Illinois, followed by an unsuccessful appeal by the noncus-
    todial parent, the custodial parent sought further permission
    to move the children to Ohio, based upon her spouse’s job
    change. The trial court granted that permission. On appeal, the
    Court of Appeals determined that the standard for approval of
    a motion to remove a child to another jurisdiction applies both
    when a custodial parent seeks to move a child from Nebraska
    to a different state and in considering a subsequent move to yet
    another state. 26
    [14,15] Although the Court of Appeals did not say so, we
    believe that this standard derives from a more fundamental
    principle: The authority to determine custody and visitation
    cannot be delegated, because it is a judicial function. 27 And we
    restate that principle in the specific context of a parental relo-
    cation: A court cannot delegate to a custodial parent, who has
    obtained permission only for removal of a child from Nebraska
    to one state, the authority to move the child to yet another state
    without permission. Here, because the authority to determine
    custody and visitation is a judicial function, it cannot be del-
    egated to Rashell.
    Rashell responds that the district court’s order expressly
    gave her permission to “relocate with Ryley to Fort Belvoir,
    and also subsequently to relocate in accordance with known
    25
    Maranville v. Dworak, 
    17 Neb. App. 245
    , 
    758 N.W.2d 70
     (2008).
    26
    
    Id.
    27
    See, VanSkiver v. VanSkiver, 
    303 Neb. 664
    , 
    930 N.W.2d 569
     (2019);
    Ensrud v. Ensrud, 
    230 Neb. 720
    , 
    433 N.W.2d 192
     (1988), disapproved on
    other grounds, State on behalf of Kaaden S. v. Jeffery T., supra note 2;
    Deacon v. Deacon, 
    207 Neb. 193
    , 
    297 N.W.2d 757
     (1980), disapproved
    on other grounds, Gibilisco v. Gibilisco, 
    263 Neb. 27
    , 
    637 N.W.2d 898
    (2002); Lautenschlager v. Lautenschlager, 
    201 Neb. 741
    , 
    272 N.W.2d 40
    (1978).
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    employment opportunities to either Whiteman Air Force Base,
    Missouri, or Fort Rucker, Alabama.” 28 But one has only to read
    the order to see that this is not so.
    The order below does not undertake comparisons to Missouri
    or Alabama or make any findings regarding those locations’
    advantages or disadvantages in the best interests framework.
    Of course, we recognize that a court cannot make bricks with-
    out straw. Rashell failed to present evidence regarding those
    locations. Her evidence focused on Fort Belvoir. That limited
    the information available to the district court.
    Even if she had furnished detailed information on both loca-
    tions in Missouri and Alabama, her strategy would have failed.
    The court below could not have crafted an order permitting a
    move to the location of Rashell’s or Chubb’s choice without
    either employing a void conditional order or improperly del-
    egating judicial authority.
    The court’s order supported the move to Fort Belvoir, but
    nothing more. We modify the order to make it clear that
    the permission granted to remove Ryley from the State of
    Nebraska extends only to move him to Fort Belvoir, in the
    State of Virginia, near Washington, D.C.
    Denial of Ryan’s Request for Custody
    Finally, Ryan argues that the district court erred in not find-
    ing a material change of circumstance such that Ryley’s best
    interests required custody to be placed with him. This assign-
    ment lacks merit.
    As Ryan’s argument makes clear, it is founded upon his con-
    tention that the court erred in granting permission for Rashell
    to relocate Ryley to Fort Belvoir. He relies upon our decision
    in Tremain v. Tremain. 29 There, the trial court denied permis-
    sion to move the child, but changed custody without determin-
    ing whether the custodial parent would relocate to Nebraska
    28
    Brief for appellee at 26.
    29
    Tremain v. Tremain, 
    264 Neb. 328
    , 
    646 N.W.2d 661
     (2002).
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    in order to retain custody of the children. On appeal, we
    reversed the order changing custody and remanded the cause
    for further proceedings to ascertain whether the custodial par-
    ent would relocate.
    [16] But here, we have determined that the district court
    properly granted Rashell permission to move with Ryley to
    Fort Belvoir. Thus, the premise underlying Ryan’s argument
    failed. Removal of a child from the state, without more, does
    not amount to a change of circumstances warranting a change
    of custody. Nevertheless, such a move, when considered in
    conjunction with other evidence, may result in a change of cir-
    cumstances that would warrant a modification of the decree. 30
    Here, there is no other evidence that would warrant a modifica-
    tion of the judgment.
    CONCLUSION
    Rashell established a legitimate reason for leaving Nebraska
    and moving with Ryley to Fort Belvoir. The district court did
    not abuse its discretion in determining that it was in Ryley’s
    best interests to continue living with her. Similarly, the court
    did not abuse its discretion in declining to change custody of
    Ryley from Rashell to Ryan. To the extent that the court’s order
    can be read to authorize Rashell to move later with Ryley to
    either Missouri or Alabama, we modify the order to eliminate
    that authority. Permission for any further move must be sought
    in a new proceeding. The permission granted in the proceed-
    ing before us permits Rashell to move with Ryley only to Fort
    Belvoir, in the State of Virginia, near Washington, D.C. As so
    modified, we affirm the order of the district court.
    Affirmed as modified.
    30
    Vogel v. Vogel, 
    supra note 15
    .