Calloway v. Chicago Board of Election Commissioners , 2020 IL App (1st) 191603 ( 2020 )


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    Appellate Court                         Date: 2020.10.30
    06:00:58 -05'00'
    Calloway v. Chicago Board of Election Commissioners,
    
    2020 IL App (1st) 191603
    Appellate Court         WILLIAM CALLOWAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CHICAGO
    Caption                 BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS, MARISEL A.
    HERNANDEZ, in Her Official Capacity as Commissioner and Chair
    of the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners; WILLIAM J.
    KRESSE and JONATHAN T. SWAIN, in Their Official Capacities as
    Commissioners of the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners;
    LANCE GOUGH, in His Capacity as Executive Director of the
    Chicago Board of Election Commissioners; and LESLIE HAIRSTON,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    District & No.          First District, Fifth Division
    No. 1-19-1603
    Filed                   January 17, 2020
    Decision Under          Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 19-COEL-34; the
    Review                  Hon. LaGuina Clay-Herron, Judge, presiding.
    Judgment                Affirmed.
    Counsel on              Joshua Burday, Matthew Topic, and Merrick Wayne, of Loevy &
    Appeal                  Loevy, of Chicago, for appellant.
    Ed Mullen, of Mullen Law Firm, of Chicago, and Michael Kreloff, of
    Northbrook, for appellee Leslie Hairston.
    Adam Lasker, of Lasker Law LLC, of Chicago, for other appellees.
    Panel                     PRESIDING JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the
    court, with opinion.
    Justices Connors and Rochford concurred in the judgment and
    opinion.
    OPINION
    ¶1         The plaintiff, William Calloway, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County
    dismissing his complaint contesting the results of the election for the office of alderman of the
    fifth ward held on April 2, 2019. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the circuit court erred in
    dismissing his complaint because he sufficiently alleged that four precincts in the fifth ward
    failed to comply with a mandatory provision of the Election Code. For the reasons that follow,
    we affirm.
    ¶2         On April 2, 2019, the plaintiff and Leslie Hairston were candidates in the runoff election
    for the office of alderman of the fifth ward. Preliminary results indicated that Hairston had won
    the election by a margin of 170 votes.
    ¶3         On April 8, 2019, the plaintiff filed a complaint contesting the election pursuant to section
    21-27 of the Revised Cities and Villages Act of 1941 (65 ILCS 20/21-27 (West 2018)) and
    Article 23 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/23-1.1a et seq. (West 2018)). The complaint named
    Hairston and the Board of Election Commissioners for the City of Chicago (BOE) as
    defendants and alleged various irregularities as to the voting procedure and count. The plaintiff
    stated that he was alleging “generalities subject to later amendment” because the relevant
    statute required him to file the complaint within five days after the election. The plaintiff
    sought, inter alia, a full recount of the vote in all precincts of the fifth ward and a determination
    that he was the winner of the election.
    ¶4         On April 18, 2019, the BOE declared Hairston the winner by a margin of 176 votes. The
    next day, on April 19, 2019, the plaintiff invoked his statutory right to a discovery recount of
    up to 25% of the precincts. The plaintiff selected the following precincts: 3, 7, 9, 10, 11, 22,
    27, 28, 33, and 35. On May 17, 2019, the plaintiff filed his amended complaint contesting the
    election. Therein, he alleged, inter alia, that four precincts in the fifth ward—5, 10, 17, and
    35—had a missing or incomplete election night certificate of results, also known as a “Form
    80,” and thus failed to comply with sections 18-9 and 18-14 of the Election Code (id. §§ 18-9,
    18-14). A Form 80 is completed by election judges for each precinct and “certifies” the
    following information: the hours the polls were open; the number of paper ballots received
    from the BOE; the number of provisional paper ballots received from the BOE; the number of
    voters; the number of unused ballots; the number of spoiled or damaged ballots; the number of
    ballots cast from public counters; the number of ballots cast from the “card activator”; and the
    number of write-in candidates and votes. The plaintiff alleged that the four precincts’ failure
    to complete a Form 80 means that “the results could have been tampered with” because the
    results “cannot be verified or certified.” The plaintiff further alleged that completing an
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    election night Form 80 is mandatory and that the remedy for failing to comply with mandatory
    provisions of the Election Code is to void the election and require a new election in each of the
    four affected precincts.
    ¶5        On May 23, 2019, Hairston filed a combined motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s amended
    complaint pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-
    619.1 (West 2018)). 1 Hairston argued that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action pursuant
    to section 2-615 of the Code (id. § 2-615) for the following reasons: (1) the plaintiff made no
    assertion that the missing or incomplete Form 80s actually impacted the outcome of the
    election; (2) an incomplete or missing Form 80 does not impact the final proclamation because
    there is a statutory procedure for the Board of Elections to follow to resolve issues when there
    are discrepancies with the election night Form 80 and the ballots cast; (3) section 18-4 of the
    Election Code does not provide for a new election as a remedy when election judges fail to
    properly complete a Form 80; and (4) the remedy of a new election would disenfranchise a
    substantial portion of the total vote because the allegations concerning Form 80 are
    inapplicable to early votes, vote-by mail ballots, and provisional votes. Hairston also argued
    that the plaintiff’s amended complaint should be dismissed pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of
    the Code (id. § 2-619(a)(9)) because the plaintiff’s amended complaint is defeated by an
    affirmative matter, namely, the discovery recount that confirmed the vote count for the 10
    selected precincts, including one precinct alleged to have no Form 80.
    ¶6        The plaintiff responded to Hairston’s motion to dismiss, contending that he was not
    required to allege that there was an actual discrepancy in the vote total because completing a
    Form 80 is a mandatory requirement and is necessary to preserve the integrity of the election.
    The plaintiff also maintained that Hairston failed to allege an affirmative defense and,
    therefore, did not meet the standard for a motion to dismiss under section 2-619(a)(9).
    ¶7        On July 19, 2019, the circuit court dismissed the plaintiff’s amended complaint with
    prejudice. In its oral pronouncement, the circuit court stated that failure to complete a Form 80
    on election day was directory, not mandatory, because the General Assembly did not expressly
    declare it to be mandatory or essential to the validity of the election. The circuit court further
    stated that the plaintiff failed to allege “specific errors or particularities” to support his
    contention that the failure to complete a Form 80 raises questions regarding the accuracy and
    integrity of the election. The circuit court noted that the complaint did not “allege how the
    election was affected at all.” The circuit court concluded that “the [complaint] is insufficient
    under the law under 2-615 and it is defeated by affirmative matters under 2-619.” In its written
    order, the circuit court stated that “[t]his is a final and appealable judgment order disposing of
    all issues raised.” This appeal followed.
    ¶8        On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing his amended
    complaint because he sufficiently stated a claim contesting the election. Specifically, he
    contends that his amended complaint sufficiently alleged that the plain language of section 18-
    14 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/18-14 (West 2018)) makes completion of Form 80 by
    election judges on election day mandatory and that, without a completed Form 80, the election
    results could not be verified or certified, undermining the integrity of the election.
    ¶9        Hairston’s motion to dismiss was brought pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code, which
    permits a party to move for dismissal under both sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code. 735
    1
    The BOE adopted the arguments made in Hairston’s combined motion to dismiss.
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    ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2018). A section 2-615 motion to dismiss attacks the legal sufficiency
    of a complaint. Lutkauskas v. Ricker, 
    2015 IL 117090
    , ¶ 29. A motion brought pursuant to
    section 2-619 admits the sufficiency of the complaint but asserts an affirmative matter that
    avoids or defeats the claim. 
    Id.
     We review a dismissal under either section 2-615 or section 2-
    619 de novo. 
    Id.
    ¶ 10       We turn first to Hairston’s motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code. When
    reviewing the sufficiency of the pleadings under a section 2-615 motion to dismiss, the circuit
    court must look at the allegations of the complaint when viewed in a light most favorable to a
    nonmoving party. 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2018); Borowiec v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 
    209 Ill. 2d 376
    , 382 (2004). Under a section 2-615 motion, a circuit court should dismiss the cause of
    action “only if it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proven which will entitle the
    plaintiff to recovery.” Borowiec, 
    209 Ill. 2d at 382-83
    .
    ¶ 11       The Election Code is a comprehensive scheme that regulates the way elections are to be
    carried out. Pullen v. Mulligan, 
    138 Ill. 2d 21
    , 46 (1990). Strict compliance with all applicable
    provisions in the Election Code is not necessary, however, to sustain a particular ballot. 
    Id.
    Rather, our courts draw a distinction between violations of “mandatory” provisions and
    violations of “directory” provisions. 
    Id.
     Failure to comply with a mandatory provision renders
    the affected ballots void, whereas technical violations of directory provisions do not affect the
    validity of the affected ballots. Hester v. Kamykowski, 
    13 Ill. 2d 481
    , 487 (1958). Whether a
    statute is mandatory or directory is a question of statutory construction, which we review
    de novo. People v. Delvillar, 
    235 Ill. 2d 507
    , 517 (2009).
    ¶ 12       The plaintiff alleged that four precincts failed to complete a Form 80 as required by section
    18-14 of the Election Code and that a new election should be held in those precincts. Section
    18-14 states the following:
    “At the nonpartisan and consolidated elections, the judges of election shall make a
    tally sheet and [Form 80] for each political subdivision as to which candidates or public
    questions are on the ballot at such election ***. The judges shall sign, seal in a marked
    envelope and deliver them to the county clerk with the other certificates of results
    herein required. ***
    Within 2 days of delivery of complete returns of the consolidated and nonpartisan
    elections, the board of election commissioners shall transmit an original, sealed tally
    sheet and [Form 80] from each precinct in its jurisdiction in which candidates or public
    questions of a political subdivision were on the ballot to the local election official of
    such political subdivision where a local canvassing board is designated to canvass such
    votes. Each local election official, within 24 hours of receipt of all of the tally sheets
    and [Form 80s] for all precincts in which candidates or public questions of his political
    subdivision were on the ballot, shall transmit such sealed tally sheets and [Form 80s]
    to the canvassing board for that political subdivision.” 10 ILCS 5/18-14 (West 2018).
    ¶ 13       According to the plaintiff, the plain language of section 18-14 makes it mandatory for
    election judges to fill out a Form 80 on election day, as evidenced by the General Assembly’s
    use of the word “shall” in combination with a specific requirement regarding the timing for
    when the Form 80 is to be transmitted to local election officials and the canvassing board
    (“within 2 days of delivery” and “within 24 hours of receipt,” respectively). The plaintiff
    further argues that, because completion of a Form 80 ensures the validity and integrity of the
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    election results, the proper remedy for a precinct’s failure to complete one is a new election in
    those precincts.
    ¶ 14       The defendants do not dispute that four precincts in the fifth ward either filed an incomplete
    Form 80 or failed to complete one at all. Rather, the defendants contend that completion of a
    Form 80 on election night is directory, not mandatory, because the General Assembly did not
    expressly provide for a penalty for noncompliance. The defendants also maintain that the
    plaintiff misunderstands the purpose behind the election Form 80 and how it relates to other
    relevant provisions of the Election Code. Specifically, the defendants contend that the
    plaintiff’s reliance on section 18-14 is misplaced, as sections 24B-15 and 24C-15 of the
    Election Code are the relevant provisions because they provide the procedures to be followed
    when, as here, votes are cast using optical scan paper ballot equipment or touch screen
    equipment. See 
    id.
     §§ 24B-15, 24C-15.
    ¶ 15       Section 24B-15 states that
    “[t]he precinct return printed by the automatic Precinct Tabulation Optical Scan
    Technology tabulating equipment shall include the number of ballots cast and votes
    cast for each candidate and proposition and shall constitute the official return of each
    precinct. In addition to the precinct return, the election authority shall provide the
    number of applications for ballots in each precinct, the write-in votes, the total number
    of ballots counted in each precinct for each political subdivision and district and the
    number of registered voters in each precinct. However, the election authority shall
    check the totals shown by the precinct return and, if there is an obvious discrepancy
    regarding the total number of votes cast in any precinct, shall have the ballots for that
    precinct retabulated to correct the return. *** In those election jurisdictions that use in-
    precinct counting equipment, the [Form 80], which has been prepared by the judges of
    election after the ballots have been tabulated, shall be the document used for the
    canvass of votes for such precinct. Whenever a discrepancy exists during the canvass
    of votes between the unofficial results and the [Form 80], or whenever a discrepancy
    exists during the canvass of votes between the [Form 80] and the set of totals which
    has been affixed to the [Form 80], the ballots for that precinct shall be retabulated to
    correct the return.” Id. § 24B-15.
    ¶ 16       Similarly, section 24C-15 states that
    “[t]he precinct return printed by the Direct Recording Electronic Voting System
    tabulating equipment shall include the number of ballots cast and votes cast for each
    candidate and public question and shall constitute the official return of each precinct.
    In addition to the precinct return, the election authority shall provide the number of
    applications for ballots in each precinct, the total number of ballots and vote by mail
    ballots counted in each precinct for each political subdivision and district and the
    number of registered voters in each precinct. However, the election authority shall
    check the totals shown by the precinct return and, if there is an obvious discrepancy
    regarding the total number of votes cast in any precinct, shall have the ballots for that
    precinct audited to correct the return. *** The certificate of results, which has been
    prepared and signed by the judges of election after the ballots have been tabulated, shall
    be the document used for the canvass of votes for such precinct. Whenever a
    discrepancy exists during the canvass of votes between the unofficial results and the
    certificate of results, or whenever a discrepancy exists during the canvass of votes
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    between the certificate of results and the set of totals reflected on the certificate of
    results, the ballots for that precinct shall be audited to correct the return.” Id. § 24C-15.
    ¶ 17        The defendants argue that, although these provisions still instruct election judges to
    complete a Form 80, the General Assembly expressly provided a statutory process whereby
    the BOE, prior to the proclamation of the final certified election results, is to correct any
    discrepancy discovered regarding a Form 80 during the postelection canvass by retabulating
    the ballots and correcting the Form 80. Defendants, therefore, maintain that there is no statutory
    basis for ordering a new election based on an incomplete or missing election night Form 80.
    ¶ 18        “There is no universal formula for distinguishing between mandatory and directory
    provisions.” Pullen, 
    138 Ill. 2d at 46
    . Whether a particular statutory provision is mandatory or
    directory is determined by the legislature’s intent, “which is ascertained by examining the
    nature and object of the statute and the consequences which would result from any given
    construction.” 
    Id.
     (citing Carr v. Board of Education of Homewood-Flossmoor Community
    High School District No. 233, 
    14 Ill. 2d 40
    , 44 (1958)). “The use of the word ‘shall’ is generally
    regarded as mandatory when used in a statutory provision but can be construed as directory
    depending on the legislative intent.” Brennan v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 
    336 Ill. App. 3d 749
    , 759 (2002). As our supreme court explained, a statute in the Election Code may
    generally be given a mandatory construction if it “expressly states that failure to act in the
    manner set out in the statute will void the ballot,” whereas a statute may generally be construed
    as directory if it “simply prescribes the performance of certain acts in a specific manner, and
    does not expressly state that compliance is essential to the validity of the ballot.” Pullen, 
    138 Ill. 2d at 46
    . As such, “[i]n construing statutory provisions regulating elections the courts
    generally have tended to hold directory those requirements as to which the legislature has not
    clearly indicated a contrary intention, particularly where such requirements do not contribute
    substantially to the integrity of the election process.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id. at 47
    .
    ¶ 19        Here, we conclude that the completion of a Form 80 by election judges on election day is
    directory rather than mandatory. Although section 18-14 states that the election judges “shall”
    complete a Form 80, the General Assembly failed to provide for a consequence in the event of
    noncompliance, which is generally required for a provision to be deemed mandatory. See
    Brennan, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 759-60 (finding an election provision that stated the BOE “shall
    render its final judgment within 60 days of the date the complaint is filed” directory because
    the provision did not expressly provide for a penalty if the BOE failed to comply with the 60-
    day provision (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, we agree with the defendants
    that the procedures outlined in sections 24B-15 and 24C-15 of the Election Code are further
    evidence that the General Assembly did not intend for an incomplete or missing Form 80 to
    result in a new election. Put simply, the General Assembly could have stated that completing
    a Form 80 is mandatory and failure to do so would void the impacted ballots; instead, it
    empowered the BOE to retabulate the actual ballots cast to resolve any discrepancies prior to
    the official proclamation. Therefore, the solution for when a precinct files an incomplete Form
    80, or fails to complete one entirely, is for the BOE to follow the “obvious discrepancies”
    procedures outlined in sections 24B-15 and 24C-15 and retabulate the ballots.
    ¶ 20        The plaintiff nevertheless argues that, even though the statute does not provide for a penalty
    for noncompliance, the completion of a Form 80 by election judges on election day is
    mandatory because it ensures the validity and integrity of the election. See Pullen, 138 Ill. 2d
    -6-
    at 47 (“[I]n construing statutory provisions regulating elections the courts generally have
    tended to hold directory those requirements as to which the legislature has not clearly indicated
    a contrary intention, particularly where such requirements do not contribute substantially to
    the integrity of the election process.” (Emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted.)).
    The thrust of the plaintiff’s argument in this regard is that, without a completed Form 80, “there
    is an obvious opportunity for an unauthorized person to tamper with the election results” and
    “a nefarious actor could choose not to count a ballot because of the candidate being voted for
    on that ballot.” The defendants counter that the absence of a Form 80 does not create an
    opportunity for tampering or nefarious conduct in an election with modern voting systems that
    store results electronically in memory packs and where the BOE is empowered to audit,
    correct, and retabulate results. We agree with the defendants.
    ¶ 21        “Invalidating an election is *** an extremely drastic measure, and we must distinguish
    between garden-variety election irregularities and those errors that are so pervasive as to
    undermine the integrity of the vote.” Andrews v. Powell, 
    365 Ill. App. 3d 513
    , 522-23 (2006)
    (citing Graham v. Reid, 
    334 Ill. App. 3d 1017
    , 1024 (2002)). Here, the plaintiff has not alleged
    sufficient facts to demonstrate how a lack of a Form 80 could allow for such “nefarious”
    conduct, and the plaintiff certainly does not allege that such conduct occurred here. Though
    we accept all well-pled facts when reviewing a section 2-615 motion to dismiss, a complaint
    will not survive this analysis if it consists only of conclusory or speculative allegations. Time
    Savers, Inc. v. La Salle Bank, N.A., 
    371 Ill. App. 3d 759
    , 767 (2007). We, therefore, conclude
    that the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to establish how completing a Form 80 on
    election night ensures the validity and integrity of the election and, consequently, the circuit
    court did not err in dismissing his complaint because the completion of a Form 80 is not
    mandatory. See Foster v. Chicago Board of Election Commissioners, 
    176 Ill. App. 3d 776
    , 779
    (1988) (“[P]leadings in an election contest charging violations of directory rather than
    mandatory provisions of the [Election] Code, without sufficient allegations of fraud, are
    subject to dismissal.”).
    ¶ 22        In sum, we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s amended complaint
    pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code because the plaintiff failed to sufficiently state a claim
    contesting the April 2, 2019, election for the office of alderman of the fifth ward. As a result
    of our disposition of this case, we need not address the arguments for dismissal pursuant to
    section 2-619 of the Code.
    ¶ 23      Affirmed.
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