Yori v. Helms , 307 Neb. 375 ( 2020 )


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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    307 Nebraska Reports
    YORI v. HELMS
    Cite as 
    307 Neb. 375
    Connie S. Yori, appellee, v.
    Kirk P. Helms, appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed October 2, 2020.   Nos. S-19-520, S-19-840.
    1. Contempt: Appeal and Error. In a civil contempt proceeding where
    a party seeks remedial relief for an alleged violation of a court order,
    an appellate court employs a three-part standard of review in which (1)
    the trial court’s resolution of issues of law is reviewed de novo, (2) the
    trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and (3) the trial
    court’s determinations of whether a party is in contempt and of the sanc­
    tion to be imposed are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
    2. Parental Rights: Appeal and Error. Whether relief entered in a pro-
    ceeding to enforce a parent’s rights is reasonably necessary to enforce
    such rights is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
    3. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question which does
    not involve a fac­tual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a
    matter of law.
    4. Contempt. Contempt proceedings may both compel obedience to orders
    and administer the remedies to which the court has found the parties to
    be entitled.
    5. ____. In a civil contempt proceeding, for the sanction to retain its civil
    character, the contemnor must, at the time the sanction is imposed, have
    the ability to purge the contempt by compliance and either avert punish-
    ment or, at any time, bring it to an end.
    6. Courts: Jurisdiction: Divorce: Contempt. A court’s continuing juris-
    diction over a dissolution decree includes the power to provide equitable
    relief in a contempt proceeding.
    7. Courts: Equity. Where a situation exists that is contrary to the prin-
    ciples of equity and which can be redressed within the scope of judicial
    action, a court of equity will devise a remedy to meet the situation.
    8. Evidence: Appeal and Error. Where credible evidence is in conflict
    on a material issue of fact, the appellate court considers, and may give
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    weight to, the fact that the trial court heard and observed the witnesses
    and accepted one version of the facts rather than another.
    9.   Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Before reaching the legal issues
    presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine
    whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it.
    10.   ____: ____. Generally, once an appeal has been perfected, the trial court
    no longer has jurisdiction.
    11.   ____: ____. A trial court’s jurisdiction under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-351(2)
    (Reissue 2016) during the pendency of an appeal is properly character-
    ized as jurisdiction in aid of the appeal process.
    12.   Jurisdiction: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. For an appellate court
    to acquire jurisdiction of an appeal, the party must be appealing from a
    final order or a judgment.
    13.   Judgments: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. While all judgments not
    incorrectly designated as such are appealable, an order may be appealed
    only if a statute expressly makes the order appealable or the order falls
    within the statutory definition of a final order.
    14.   Final Orders: Appeal and Error. To be a final order subject to appel-
    late review, the lower court’s order must (1) affect a substantial right
    and determine the action and prevent a judgment, (2) affect a substantial
    right and be made during a special proceeding, (3) affect a substantial
    right and be made on summary application in an action after a judg-
    ment is rendered, or (4) deny a motion for summary judgment which
    was based on the assertion of sovereign immunity or the immunity of a
    government official.
    15.   Final Orders. The inquiry of whether a substantial right is affected
    focuses on whether the right at issue is substantial and whether the
    court’s order has a substantial impact on that right.
    16.   ____. Whether an order affects a substantial right depends on whether it
    affects with finality the rights of the parties in the subject matter.
    17.   Final Orders: Time. The duration of an order is relevant to whether it
    affects a substantial right.
    Appeals from the District Court for Lancaster County: John
    A. Colborn, Judge. Judgment in No. S-19-520 affirmed.
    Appeal in No. S-19-840 dismissed.
    Gregory D. Barton, of Barton Law, P.C., L.L.O., for
    appellant.
    Amie C. Martinez and Megan M. Zobel, of Anderson,
    Creager & Wittstruck, P.C., L.L.O., for appellee.
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    YORI v. HELMS
    Cite as 
    307 Neb. 375
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Cassel, J.
    INTRODUCTION
    The district court found Kirk P. Helms in contempt of court
    for violating parenting provisions of a dissolution decree,
    imposed a suspended jail sentence, and modified terms of the
    parenting plan. Helms appealed, arguing that the modifications
    were punitive and not reasonably necessary (first appeal). While
    that appeal was pending, the district court entered an order of
    commitment and a purge order which contained a reduction
    in Helms’ parenting time but set the matter for a review hear-
    ing in 41⁄2 months. Helms appealed that order (second appeal).
    Because the modifications involved in the first appeal were
    part of the equitable relief that the court was authorized to pro-
    vide, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm. We dismiss the
    second appeal for lack of a final order.
    BACKGROUND
    Marriage and Dissolution
    Helms married Connie S. Yori in 1996, and a child was
    born to the marriage in July 2004. The parties subsequently
    sought to dissolve their marriage and entered into a mediated
    agreement.
    On March 1, 2017, the district court entered a decree of
    dissolution. The decree awarded the parties joint legal and
    physical custody of the child. The parenting plan attached to
    the decree contained the terms of the parties’ mediated agree-
    ment and addressed topics such as day-to-day decisionmaking,
    alcohol consumption and testing, and parental responsibility
    and cooperation.
    Contempt Proceedings
    Yori claimed that Helms violated provisions of the parent-
    ing plan and mediated agreement. She filed an application for
    an order to show cause in October 2017 and thereafter filed
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    several amended applications. The operative pleading, filed in
    September 2018, alleged over 60 violations by Helms of the
    mediated agreement and decree of dissolution. In particular,
    Yori alleged that Helms violated the provisions regarding pay-
    ment of expenses for the child, medical appointments for the
    child, cooperation between the parents, and Helms’ consump-
    tion of alcohol and compliance with alcohol testing.
    Trial began in October 2018 but needed to be continued to
    December. In November, Helms moved to continue the hear-
    ing. The court sustained the motion, subject to provisions con-
    tained in a temporary order. Trial resumed in March 2019.
    The December 2018 temporary order addressed transpor-
    tation of the child and also gave Yori “final say on matters
    relating to the minor child’s sports and athletics.” It ordered
    that during the pendency of the proceedings, Yori or her
    designated representative be allowed to provide the child’s
    transportation to and from all religious confirmation or youth
    group activities, educational meetings or events relating to an
    educational action plan, athletic practices, and athletic tourna-
    ments or games.
    During a February 2019 hearing, the court clarified its intent
    with respect to the December 2018 temporary order. The court
    explained that its intent was for Yori to transport the child to
    the various activities, even if the activities occurred during
    Helms’ parenting time. The court stated that Yori “either is
    to return the child or, if . . . Helms is present at that activity,
    I don’t think there was any objection to him taking the child
    home from that activity, at least, from an email here it says
    you can take him home afterwards.” The court repeated, “The
    purpose and intent of this is to make sure the child makes it to
    all the activities . . . .”
    During the hearings on Yori’s application for an order to
    show cause, a number of witnesses testified on Yori’s behalf.
    Tim McGovern, who coached the child’s basketball team with
    Yori, testified that during a meeting with the players’ parents,
    Helms said that Yori was bullying the children and should
    not be trusted to be in charge of their sons. It appeared to
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    YORI v. HELMS
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    McGovern that “trying to make [Yori] look bad was the goal.”
    McGovern testified that he observed Helms at the child’s bas-
    ketball tournaments and had concerns that Helms was under
    the influence of alcohol.
    Other witnesses echoed McGovern’s testimony. Jennifer
    Cramer, who attended the meeting mentioned by McGovern,
    testified that Helms told the parents that Yori was abusive to
    the players and to him during their marriage. Cramer com-
    plained to Helms at that meeting about his failure to bring the
    child to practices or games. At a May 2018 basketball tourna-
    ment, Cramer observed Helms exhibiting abnormal behavior,
    including “flip[ping her] off” in the presence of parents and
    children. Another parent testified about her concerns that
    Helms was under the influence of alcohol at the child’s bas-
    ketball tournaments. She testified that she smelled alcohol on
    him and that she observed him “walk across the court, flip-
    ping off . . . towards our area.” Helms denied standing in the
    middle of a basketball court and flipping off the crowd. He
    also denied attending any of the child’s basketball games or
    events while under the influence of alcohol. But in February
    2019, Helms was arrested for driving under the influence on
    his way home from attending the child’s basketball event. At
    the time of the hearing, Helms did not have a driver’s license
    and relied on transportation by bicycle or bus or as provided
    by his family.
    Yori testified about difficulties in obtaining reimbursement
    from Helms for the child’s medical expenses. She sent numer-
    ous emails to Helms, requesting reimbursement and including
    itemizations of expenses and copies of each billing statement.
    Helms did not reimburse Yori because she did not send him the
    insurer’s explanation of benefits and instead sent handwritten
    information and amounts. He also asked Yori to sign a release
    so that he could talk with the healthcare provider, but she did
    not do so.
    The parties testified regarding issues with alcohol monitor-
    ing through Soberlink. The decree required Helms to keep
    Soberlink in place and to test during his parenting time at
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    YORI v. HELMS
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    307 Neb. 375
    8 a.m., 2 p.m., and 10 p.m. Six weeks after entry of the decree,
    Helms submitted a change request form to Soberlink, direct-
    ing that Yori not be listed as a concerned party. Although a
    Soberlink form showed a change in the concerned party name
    to Helms’ sister, Helms testified that he just intended to add
    his sister as a contact. The same page of the form identified
    Yori as someone who is to receive test results. Helms testified
    that Yori never informed him that she was not timely receiving
    Soberlink reports and that he did not recall her complaining
    about not being listed as a concerned party.
    Helms also reduced the Soberlink monitoring from “Level
    2” to “Level 1” monitoring. With Level 1 monitoring, in con-
    trast with Level 2 monitoring, Yori does not receive missed
    tests alerts and Helms does not have scheduled testing. Helms
    testified that he switched from Level 2 to Level 1 because it
    was his understanding that dates and times for testing could not
    be changed on Level 2. He felt that Level 1 would work better
    under the parenting agreement, because dates when the child
    would be with him would not stay the same all year long.
    Yori testified that through the summers of 2017 and 2018,
    Helms routinely missed Soberlink testing at 2 p.m. on Fridays.
    According to Helms, he tested at all required times when
    the child was with him. But if his parenting time ended at 3
    p.m., he would not take the 2 p.m. test unless he had to pick
    the child up for some reason. He admitted there was no lan-
    guage in the decree excusing him from taking a test at 2 p.m.
    on Fridays.
    The decree gave Yori “final say” regarding educational
    and religious issues. Yori informed Helms that she wanted
    the child to participate in religious confirmation preparation,
    but she testified that Helms expressed unwillingness to allow
    the child to participate. Yori testified that because the child
    was struggling in school, his counselor and teacher devised a
    plan to help him which included arriving at school 30 minutes
    early. But of the 11 sessions during Helms’ parenting time, the
    child attended only 3. Yori testified that in April 2018, during
    Helms’ parenting time, the child was suspended from school
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    YORI v. HELMS
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    and Helms did not inform her of a meeting with the principal
    and vice principal. Helms did not respond to Yori’s request
    inquiring of the consequences for the child.
    Yori had concerns about the child’s attendance at athletic
    events. She testified that in the summer of 2017, Helms took
    the child to only 3 of 18 practices. She felt that Helms acted
    in a retaliatory fashion when he removed the child from an
    athletic team. Even after the court entered the temporary order
    allowing Yori to transport the child to and from events, Helms
    attempted to transport the child.
    Order of Contempt
    On May 1, 2019, the court entered an order of contempt.
    The court found that Helms willfully, intentionally, and contu-
    maciously violated multiple provisions of the decree, includ-
    ing the obligation to not consume alcohol, to continue with
    Soberlink as ordered, and to comply with the parenting respon-
    sibilities and cooperation language. It also found that it had the
    authority to modify the decree as it related to the child in order
    to remedy the contempt. The court committed Helms to jail for
    21 days, but suspended execution of the sentence as long as
    Helms complied with several terms of the order. Among others,
    the terms included:
    •  refraining from consuming alcohol through December 31,
    2022;
    •  refraining from attending any practices for the child;
    •  allowing Yori or her designee to pick the child up from
    Helms’ house for various specified reasons and return the
    child following the event; and
    •  giving Yori “final say” on “all athletic issues and sports
    participation, religious activities, school activities, medical
    issues, and all other issues regarding the minor child’s partici-
    pation, education and development.”
    The court ordered that Helms comply with the purge plan for
    36 months.
    On May 29, 2019, Helms filed a notice of appeal. The first
    appeal is docketed as case No. S-19-520.
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    YORI v. HELMS
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    307 Neb. 375
    Motion for Commitment
    In July 2019, while the first appeal was pending, Yori moved
    for Helms’ commitment pursuant to the order of contempt. An
    amended motion additionally requested attorney fees and “such
    further and equitable relief as this Court deems just and equi-
    table including, but not limited to, a modification of [Helms’]
    parenting time.”
    Yori alleged that Helms violated the decree of dissolution in
    numerous ways. She alleged Helms failed to timely reimburse
    her for the child’s health care expenses, disparaged her in the
    child’s presence, failed to promptly notify her of orthodontic
    appointments scheduled for the child, scheduled the child’s
    orthodontic appointments during times that conflict with the
    child’s other activities, and scheduled an appointment for the
    child regarding an ankle injury without informing Yori of
    the time.
    Yori also alleged that Helms failed to abide by multiple pro-
    visions of the order of contempt. Specifically, she alleged that
    Helms refused to allow Yori to transport the child to and from
    athletic events, refused to commence counseling to address the
    family dynamic, refused to allow Yori to speak with the child
    on the telephone, and failed to reimburse Yori for half of the
    cost of the child’s athletic activities.
    During a hearing, Yori testified that it was important that she
    transport the child after events because Helms had removed the
    child from events early. Yori testified that a recurring problem
    was Helms’ demanding to transport the child. On one occa-
    sion, Yori arrived at Helms’ residence to pick the child up for
    a weightlifting session, but the child was still sleeping even
    though Yori communicated with Helms about the session ear-
    lier that morning.
    Yori also presented evidence concerning Helms’ failure to
    pay his share of expenses. Despite Yori’s sending Helms a
    request for payment with attachments, including the explana-
    tion of benefits, Helms had not paid. Helms testified that he
    notified Yori that the explanation of benefits was not attached,
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    but that she did not respond. He said he would pay his share
    if he received those documents. Yori also requested payment
    for athletic expenses, including hotel charges for out-of-state
    tournaments. But she had not received payment for anything
    sent in a July 8, 2019, email. Helms did not have any evidence
    that he paid Yori for any expenses she had incurred since May
    1, 2019.
    On May 14, 2019, Yori sent Helms a copy of the court’s
    order requiring him to immediately commence counseling with
    a mutually agreed-upon provider and included the names of
    three counselors. On May 28, she sent another email stating
    that she had not received any communication regarding which
    counselor Helms had selected. Helms testified that he made an
    appointment but had not seen a counselor yet.
    Yori claimed that Helms refused to allow her to speak to the
    child on May 1 and 12, 2019. According to Helms, Yori called
    to say that the child did not answer and to ask Helms to have
    the child call her. Helms was not home at the time, so he sent
    the child a text, told him to call Yori, and “left it at that.” On
    one occasion, Helms spoke with the child on the telephone for
    38 minutes, exceeding his 20-minute telephone call limit, but
    he did not realize he had done so because he “usually do[es]n’t
    keep track” when speaking to the child.
    Order of Commitment
    On August 1, 2019, the court entered an order of commit-
    ment. It committed Helms to the Lancaster County Department
    of Corrections for 21 days.
    The next day, the court entered a purge order. It ordered
    Helms to serve his 21-day commitment, but stated that he shall
    be released from custody so long as he met the following terms:
    paid $513.74 for past-due athletic expenses, paid $537.34 for
    past-due medical expenses, and paid $5,000 in attorney fees.
    The purge order contained additional terms. The court
    ordered that Helms immediately commence counseling per the
    May 1, 2019, order of contempt. It declared that Yori “shall
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    have initial and final say on all medical, dental and ortho­
    dontic appointments for the minor child.” The order stated
    that Helms
    is allowed to attend such appointments but shall not
    schedule such appointments nor transport the minor child
    to or from such appointments. [Yori] shall be contacted in
    the event [Helms] believes any medical, dental or ortho­
    dontic issue has arisen. [Yori] will be responsible for
    making any decision as to whether an appointment is nec-
    essary. [Helms] is granted authority only to take the minor
    child for emergent situations to the emergency room or
    Urgent Care during his parenting time. In the event he
    does so, he shall immediately notify [Yori] of the same
    including the reason for the emergent visit, and the loca-
    tion to which he will be taking the minor child.
    The court reduced Helms’ parenting time from a “7/7” sched-
    ule to a “10/4” schedule, which it stated it was doing “[t]empo-
    rarily” until December 19 or until further order of the court.
    The court ordered Helms to not denigrate Yori in the child’s
    presence, to direct the child to do as Yori has decided, to sup-
    port Yori’s decisions related to the child, and to “not sit silently
    with regard to those decisions.”
    The court set the matter for a review hearing on December
    19, 2019. The court explained that the purpose of the review
    hearing would be to allow Helms to prove his compliance
    with the court’s orders and to “adduce evidence as to the best
    interest of the minor child to support [Helms’] request for rein-
    statement of the original parenting time schedule.” The court
    stated that it would then address whether changes should be
    made to the 10/4 parenting time schedule. During the hearing,
    the court stated that if Helms was in compliance, the parent-
    ing schedule would “likely” go back to the 7/7 schedule. The
    court ordered that all provisions of prior court orders, except
    those specifically modified, shall remain in full force and
    effect. The court ordered Helms to comply with the purge
    plan for 36 months and provided that if he failed to do so, “he
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    shall be immediately detained for a period of 21 days in the
    Lancaster County jail.”
    On September 3, 2019, Helms filed a notice of appeal, stat-
    ing his intent to appeal from the August 2 purge order. The
    second appeal is docketed as case No. S-19-840.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    In the first appeal, Helms assigns several errors to the dis-
    trict court’s parenting plan modifications which he claims went
    beyond what was reasonably necessary and were punitive and
    therefore contrary to the law and the evidence. Specifically, he
    challenges (1) the “transportation provisions” of the original
    mediated parenting plan, (2) the modifications banning him
    from attending the child’s athletic and piano practices, and
    (3) the “final say provisions” of the original mediated parent-
    ing plan.
    In the second appeal, Helms assigns that the court erred by
    (1) reducing his parenting time by 43 percent, (2) making par-
    enting plan modifications that were not reasonably necessary to
    enforce Yori’s rights, and (3) finding he was in arrears on his
    obligation to pay half of the child’s athletic expenses.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] In a civil contempt proceeding where a party seeks reme-
    dial relief for an alleged violation of a court order, an appellate
    court employs a three-part standard of review in which (1) the
    trial court’s resolution of issues of law is reviewed de novo, (2)
    the trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error,
    and (3) the trial court’s determinations of whether a party is in
    contempt and of the sanc­tion to be imposed are reviewed for
    abuse of discretion. 1
    [2] Whether relief entered in a proceeding to enforce a par-
    ent’s rights is reasonably necessary to enforce such rights is
    reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 2
    1
    Braun v. Braun, 
    306 Neb. 890
    , 
    947 N.W.2d 694
    (2020).
    2
    See Martin v. Martin, 
    294 Neb. 106
    , 
    881 N.W.2d 174
    (2016).
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    [3] A jurisdictional question which does not involve a fac-
    tual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter
    of law. 3
    ANALYSIS
    First Appeal
    The court modified the parenting plan after finding Helms
    to be in contempt. Helms does not contest the finding of con-
    tempt. Nor does he dispute the court’s authority to modify the
    decree and parenting plan. Rather, he challenges particular
    modifications included in the order of contempt and purge
    plan. He claims that those modifications were punitive and
    were not reasonably necessary.
    [4,5] Contempt proceedings may both compel obedience
    to orders and administer the remedies to which the court has
    found the parties to be entitled. 4 The sanction in a civil con-
    tempt proceeding is both remedial and coercive. 5 In a civil con-
    tempt proceeding, for the sanction to retain its civil character,
    the contemnor must, at the time the sanction is imposed, have
    the ability to purge the contempt by compliance and either
    avert punishment or, at any time, bring it to an end. 6
    [6] A court’s continuing jurisdiction over a dissolution decree
    includes the power to provide equitable relief in a contempt
    proceeding. 7 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-364.15(1) (Reissue 2016)
    explicitly authorizes a court to “enter such orders as are rea-
    sonably necessary to enforce rights of either parent including
    the modification of previous court orders relating to parenting
    time, visitation, or other access” and to “use contempt powers
    to enforce its court orders relating to parenting time, visitation,
    or other access.”
    3
    Picard v. P & C Group 1, 
    306 Neb. 292
    , 
    945 N.W.2d 183
    (2020).
    
    4 Mart. v
    . Martin, supra note 2.
    5
    See Braun v. Braun, supra note 1.
    6
    Id. 7
        Martin v. Martin, supra note 2.
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    Helms argues that certain modifications were punitive rather
    than coercive and that they were not reasonably necessary to
    protect Yori’s rights under the parenting plan. He challenges
    as punitive the transportation provisions, the ban on his attend­
    ance at athletic and piano practices, and the final say provi-
    sions. He argues that the transportation provisions were puni-
    tive because the purpose was to ensure that the child make it to
    all of his activities; thus, it was unnecessary to give Yori con-
    trol over transportation from the event. He also argues that they
    are punitive because there is nothing he can do to avoid them
    through his conduct—they are unconditional. Helms argues
    that there was no factual or remedial justification to ban him
    from attending the child’s athletic and musical practices or
    to deprive him of final say over the child’s participation in
    musical activities or any say regarding participation in athletic
    events. He contends that the alcohol and Soberlink testing pro-
    visions were not reasonably necessary to protect Yori’s rights
    under the parenting plan.
    In characterizing the modifications as punitive, Helms
    appears to be trying to impose a “least remedial measure” rule.
    But that is not consistent with statute. Section 42-364.15(1)
    empowers the court to solve the problem. Rather than a sanc-
    tion, the modifications here were remedial measures to gain
    compliance. While it is possible that a modification could be
    so extreme that it qualifies as a sanction, the modifications here
    do not rise to that level.
    [7] Where a situation exists that is contrary to the principles
    of equity and which can be redressed within the scope of judi-
    cial action, a court of equity will devise a remedy to meet the
    situation. 8 Here, the court had the equitable authority, within
    the contempt proceeding, to modify the decree and parenting
    plan to remedy issues that led to contempt.
    [8] The evidence showed that the remedial modifications
    were reasonably related to behavior prompting the contempt
    8
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    proceeding. Yori adduced evidence that Helms violated the
    parenting plan on numerous occasions and in numerous ways.
    Where credible evidence is in conflict on a material issue of
    fact, the appellate court considers, and may give weight to,
    the fact that the trial court heard and observed the witnesses
    and accepted one version of the facts rather than another. 9
    There was evidence that Helms expressed an unwillingness to
    allow the child to participate in some events, failed to trans-
    port him to educational meetings and practices, and had him
    depart early from other events. The court also heard testimony
    about Helms’ intoxication and inappropriate behavior at the
    child’s athletic games and practices. And Yori testified that
    he had been confrontational. We conclude the modifications
    about which Helms complains were part of the equitable relief
    that the court is authorized to provide. 10 We find no abuse
    of discretion.
    Second Appeal
    [9] Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it
    is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has
    jurisdiction over the matter before it. 11 This appeal presents
    two distinct jurisdictional issues: whether the district court pos-
    sessed jurisdiction to further modify aspects of the parenting
    plan and whether Helms has appealed from a final order.
    [10,11] Helms argues that the district court did not have
    jurisdiction to further modify the final say provisions of the
    parenting plan while an appeal concerning the final say provi-
    sions was pending. Generally, once an appeal has been per-
    fected, the trial court no longer has jurisdiction. 12 But under
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-351(2) (Reissue 2016), a trial court retains
    jurisdiction for certain matters. Section 42-351(2) provides:
    9
    Id. 10
         See
    id. 11
         Cullinane v. Beverly Enters. - Neb., 
    300 Neb. 210
    , 
    912 N.W.2d 774
         (2018).
    12
    Burns v. Burns, 
    293 Neb. 633
    , 
    879 N.W.2d 375
    (2016).
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    When final orders relating to proceedings governed by
    sections 42-347 to 42-381 are on appeal and such appeal
    is pending, the court that issued such orders shall retain
    jurisdiction to provide for such orders regarding support,
    custody, parenting time, visitation, or other access . . .
    or other appropriate orders in aid of the appeal process.
    Such orders shall not be construed to prejudice any party
    on appeal.
    A trial court’s jurisdiction under § 42-351(2) during the pend­
    ency of an appeal is properly characterized as jurisdiction in
    aid of the appeal process. 13
    A trial court’s jurisdiction to modify a decree regarding
    an issue which is pending appeal is not unlimited. Section
    42-351(2) does not grant a trial court authority to hear and
    determine anew the very issues then pending on appeal and
    to enter permanent orders addressing these issues during the
    appeal process. 14 In the first appeal, Helms opposed modifi-
    cations to provisions regarding transportation, the ban on his
    attendance at athletic and piano practices, the final say provi-
    sions, and his alcohol use and testing. Following the filing of
    the notice of appeal, the district court held further hearings,
    but it did not make new determinations about the identical
    issues being appealed. Rather, in the August 2019 purge order,
    the court set forth terms for Helms to comply with in order to
    be released from jail. This falls within the court’s continuing
    jurisdiction to provide for such orders regarding parenting time
    or other access.
    [12,13] Yori contends that the August 2019 order is not a
    final, appealable order. For an appellate court to acquire juris-
    diction of an appeal, the party must be appealing from a final
    order or a judgment. 15 A judgment is the final determination
    13
    See Brozek v. Brozek, 
    292 Neb. 681
    , 
    874 N.W.2d 17
    (2016).
    14
    Burns v. Burns, supra note 12.
    15
    State v. Fredrickson, 
    306 Neb. 81
    , 
    943 N.W.2d 701
    (2020).
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    of the rights of the parties in an action. 16 Every direction of the
    court made or entered in writing and not included in a judg-
    ment is an order. 17 While all judgments 18 not incorrectly desig-
    nated as such 19 are appealable, an order may be appealed only
    if a statute expressly makes the order appealable or the order
    falls within the statutory definition of a final order. 20
    [14] Under our final order statute, 21 to be a final order
    subject to appellate review, the lower court’s order must (1)
    affect a substantial right and determine the action and prevent
    a judgment, (2) affect a substantial right and be made during a
    special proceeding, (3) affect a substantial right and be made
    on summary application in an action after a judgment is ren-
    dered, or (4) deny a motion for summary judgment which was
    based on the assertion of sovereign immunity or the immunity
    of a government official. 22 Proceedings regarding modifica-
    tion of a marital dissolution are special proceedings. 23 And we
    have described a contempt order as one made upon a summary
    application in an action after judgment. 24 Here, our focus is
    not upon the procedural classification under § 25-1902, but,
    rather, whether the order affected a substantial right of one or
    more parties. 25
    [15,16] The inquiry of whether a substantial right is
    affected focuses on whether the right at issue is substantial
    and whether the court’s order has a substantial impact on that
    16
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1301(1) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
    17
    State v. Fredrickson, supra note 15.
    18
    See § 25-1301(1) (defining judgment).
    19
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315(1) (Reissue 2016).
    20
    See State v. Fredrickson, supra note 15.
    21
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Supp. 2019).
    22
    See State v. Fredrickson, supra note 15.
    23
    Tilson v. Tilson, 
    299 Neb. 64
    , 
    907 N.W.2d 31
    (2018).
    24
    See McCullough v. McCullough, 
    299 Neb. 719
    , 
    910 N.W.2d 515
    (2018).
    25
    See State v. Fredrickson, supra note 15.
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    right. 26 Whether an order affects a substantial right depends on
    whether it affects with finality the rights of the parties in the
    subject matter. 27 An order affects a substantial right when the
    right would be significantly undermined or irrevocably lost by
    postponing appellate review. 28
    [17] The duration of an order is relevant to whether it affects
    a substantial right. 29 In several cases, we have determined that
    orders temporarily affecting a parent’s custodial, visitation, or
    educational rights were not final. 30 With respect to a visitation
    order in a guardianship proceeding, we stated that where a
    final guardianship hearing was scheduled for 3 weeks later, an
    order that effectively denied visitation until that hearing did not
    affect a substantial right because “the length of time that [the
    mother’s] relationship with [the child] was to be disturbed was
    brief, and the order was not a permanent disposition.” 31
    Here, the court did not intend its order to be a permanent
    disposition. The order stated in part:
    IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter be set
    for review hearing on Thursday, December 19, 2019 at
    1:30 p.m. At such hearing, [Helms] shall be allowed 45
    minutes to present evidence. [Yori] shall be awarded a
    like amount of time. The purpose of the review hearing
    shall be to allow [Helms] to prove his compliance with
    the Court’s orders and adduce evidence as to the best
    interest of the minor child to support [Helms’] request
    for reinstatement of the original parenting time schedule.
    26
    See
    id. 27
         Id.
    28
    
         Id.
    29
    
         Tilson v. Tilson, supra note 23.
    30
    See, id.; In re Interest of Danaisha W. et al., 
    287 Neb. 27
    , 
    840 N.W.2d 533
         (2013); Steven S. v. Mary S., 
    277 Neb. 124
    , 
    760 N.W.2d 28
    (2009); Gerber
    v. Gerber, 
    218 Neb. 228
    , 
    353 N.W.2d 4
    (1984).
    31
    In re Guardianship of Sophia M., 
    271 Neb. 133
    , 139, 
    710 N.W.2d 312
    , 317
    (2006).
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    The Court notes it is specifically interested in [Helms’]
    compliance with the Court’s orders and the information
    from Dr. Williams. The Court will address what changes,
    if any, should be made to the 10/4 parenting time sched-
    ule as in the best interest of the minor child.
    And the court orally advised that it was changing Helms’ par-
    enting time “[t]emporarily” and that the “temporary order”
    would be in effect until December 19, 2019. The court antici-
    pated that the parenting schedule would “likely” revert to the
    7/7 schedule if Helms complied with the purge order.
    That the court planned to revisit the parenting time schedule
    in 41⁄2 months demonstrates the temporary nature of the order.
    We recognize that the length of time involved here is perhaps
    on the outer edge of what would be considered a temporary
    disturbance, but we cannot say the reduction in parenting time
    from a 7/7 schedule to a 10/4 schedule for 41⁄2 months affects
    a substantial right.
    Because the order did not affect a substantial right of Helms,
    it is not a final order that may be appealed under § 25-1902.
    We dismiss the second appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
    CONCLUSION
    In the first appeal, we conclude that the court’s modifica-
    tions were part of the equitable relief that it had the authority
    to provide to remedy issues that led to contempt. We find no
    abuse of discretion and affirm the district court’s judgment.
    Because the second appeal was not taken from a final order, we
    dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction.
    Judgment in No. S-19-520 affirmed.
    Appeal in No. S-19-840 dismissed.