State v. Purvis , 2021 Ohio 265 ( 2021 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Purvis, 
    2021-Ohio-265
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
    MARION COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO,
    CASE NO. 9-20-29
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
    v.
    ANTHONY PURVIS,                                            OPINION
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court
    Trial Court No. 19-CR-190
    Judgment Affirmed
    Date of Decision: February 1, 2021
    APPEARANCES:
    Edwin M. Bibler for Appellant
    Nathan Heiser for Appellee
    Case No. 9-20-29
    WILLAMOWKSI, P.J.
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant Anthony J. Purvis (“Purvis”) appeals the judgment
    of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas, alleging that the trial court erred by
    imposing the maximum prison term in this case. For the reasons set forth below,
    the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Facts and Procedural History
    {¶2} On June 10, 2018, Tara C. (“Tara”) caught Purvis, who was twenty
    years old at that time, in bed with her fourteen year old daughter, K.C. PSI. Tara
    ordered Purvis to leave the premises. PSI. Shortly thereafter, K.C. fled from the
    residence on foot. PSI. Tara then contacted the police. PSI. The police made
    contact with Purvis, who denied knowing the whereabouts of K.C. and having a
    sexual relationship with K.C. PSI. When the police located K.C., she denied having
    a sexual relationship with Purvis. PSI.
    {¶3} Tara agreed to have K.C. participate in a SANE examination at the
    hospital. PSI. During the SANE examination, K.C. admitted that she had sexual
    intercourse with Purvis. PSI. This examination also detected the presence of DNA
    from a male subject. PSI. Once the police located Purvis, they informed him that a
    male’s seminal fluid was found in K.C.’s vaginal area. PSI. Purvis eventually
    admitted that he had previously had sexual intercourse with K.C. PSI.
    {¶4} Tara also gave permission to the police to examine K.C.’s phone. PSI.
    The police located multiple photos that Purvis had sent to K.C. that captured a male
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    in a state of undress. PSI. Purvis stated that the pictures were not of him but were
    pictures of penises that he found online. PSI. K.C. stated that she would be able to
    identify whether a picture depicted Purvis or was a stock image. PSI. K.C. also
    admitted that they had exchanged a photo of her in a state of undress. PSI.
    {¶5} On May 8, 2019, Purvis was charged with one count of unlawful sexual
    conduct with a minor in violation of R.C. 2907.04(A), a felony of the fourth degree;
    and one count of disseminating matter harmful to juveniles in violation of R.C.
    2907.31(A)(1), a felony of the fifth degree. Doc. 1. On July 21, 2020, Purvis pled
    guilty to one count of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor in violation of R.C.
    2907.04(A). Doc. 20. The second count against Purvis was dismissed. Doc. 23.
    The parties jointly recommended that Purvis be sentenced to community control.
    Doc. 20.
    {¶6} At his sentencing hearing on August 24, 2020, the trial court considered
    the content of a presentence investigation report (“PSI”) and a series of emails that
    Purvis had sent to K.C. after the offense. Tr. 1, 4, 7. These emails indicated that
    Purvis wanted to continue to maintain his relationship with K.C. Tr. 6. After
    reviewing these materials, the trial court imposed the maximum prison term on
    Purvis. Tr. 6. Doc. 23.
    Assignment of Error
    {¶7} The appellant filed his notice of appeal on August 28, 2020. Doc. 27.
    On appeal, Purvis raises the following assignment of error:
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    Case No. 9-20-29
    The trial court erred by sentencing the Defendant to eighteen (18)
    months when the Appellant was a first time felon, there was a
    joint recommendation for Community Control, and had shown he
    was amenable to community control sanctions and the record
    does not support the trial court’s imposition of a maximum
    sentence.
    Purvis argues the minimum sentence necessary to protect the public and rehabilitate
    him was a community control sanction and not a term of imprisonment.
    Legal Standard
    {¶8} In rendering a sentence, “[t]he trial court has full discretion to impose
    any sentence within the authorized statutory range * * *.”1 State v. Dayton, 3d Dist.
    Union No. 14-16-05, 
    2016-Ohio-7178
    , ¶ 15, quoting State v. King, 2d Dist. Clark
    Nos. 2012-CA-25, 2012-CA-26, 
    2013-Ohio-2021
    , ¶ 45. However, in this process,
    trial courts are to sentence convicted felons in accordance with the overriding
    purposes of felony sentencing, which
    are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and
    others and to punish the offender using the minimum sanctions
    that the court determines accomplish those purposes without
    imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government
    resources. * * *
    R.C. 2929.11. “To effectuate compliance with these overriding purposes, the Ohio
    Revised Code requires the trial court to consider a number of factors listed in R.C.
    2929.12.” State v. Walton, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-17-55, 
    2018-Ohio-1680
    , ¶ 6. The
    1
    Trial courts are given discretion in applying the statutory factors in the process of determining an appropriate
    sentence. A misapplication of these factors in sentencing that rises to the level of an abuse of discretion is
    clearly and convincingly contrary to law. Thus, we examine the record to determine whether the trial court
    clearly and convincingly failed to act in accordance with the laws governing the imposition of sentences.
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    Case No. 9-20-29
    R.C. 2929.12 factors direct the trial court to evaluate the seriousness of the offense
    and the likelihood of recidivism. R.C. 2929.12.
    {¶9} “Appellate courts defer to the broad discretion of the trial court in
    matters of sentencing.” State v. Jones, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-19-08, 2019-Ohio-
    4938, ¶ 7. If the defendant establishes by clear and convincing evidence that his or
    her sentence is “(1) contrary to law and/or (2) unsupported by the record,” an
    appellate court has the authority, pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), “to increase,
    reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence * * *.” State v. McGowan, 
    147 Ohio St.3d 166
    , 
    2016-Ohio-2971
    , 
    62 N.E.3d 178
    , ¶ 1.
    {¶10} “Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court will reverse a sentence
    ‘only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not
    support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is
    otherwise contrary to law.’” State v. Nienberg, 3d Dist. Putnam Nos. 12-16-15 and
    12-16-16, 
    2017-Ohio-2920
    , ¶ 8, quoting State v. Marcum, 
    146 Ohio St.3d 516
    ,
    
    2016-Ohio-1002
    , 
    59 N.E.3d 1231
    , ¶ 1.
    Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof
    which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but
    not to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a
    reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the
    mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts
    sought to be established.
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    Case No. 9-20-29
    State v. Taflinger, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-17-20, 
    2018-Ohio-456
    , ¶ 12, quoting Cross
    v. Ledford, 
    161 Ohio St. 469
    , 
    120 N.E.2d 118
    , 
    53 O.O. 361
    , paragraph three of the
    syllabus (1954).
    Legal Analysis
    {¶11} In this case, Purvis pled guilty to a felony of the fourth degree. Doc.
    1, 23. See R.C. 2907.04(B)(1). For this reason, his eighteen-month prison term falls
    within the statutory range of six to eighteen months. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(4). Tr.
    6. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that it had considered the purposes
    and principles of felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.11. Tr. 5. Doc. 23. See R.C.
    2929.11(A). The trial court also stated that it considered the seriousness and
    recidivism factors. Tr. 5.
    {¶12} Regarding the factors listed in R.C. 2929.12, the trial court noted
    multiple times that the victim of this offense was a fourteen year old minor. Tr. 5-
    6. The trial court then determined “that amongst the seriousness factors, the injury
    to the victim, as worsened by her age and the relationship with the victim, facilitated
    the offense.” Tr. 6. See R.C. 2929.12(1), (6). The record indicates that Purvis
    admitted that he and K.C. “had been in a relationship for * * * 10 months” before
    the instant offense occurred. PSI.
    {¶13} As to the recidivism factors, the trial court also noted that Purvis “has
    prior adjudication of delinquency or criminal convictions * * *.” Tr. 5. See R.C.
    2929.12(D)(2). The trial court then found that Purvis “failed to respond favorably
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    to past sanctions imposed for criminal convictions * * *.” Tr. 5. See R.C.
    2929.12(D)(3).
    {¶14} Further, while Purvis verbally stated that he was remorseful, the trial
    court found that Purvis had “no actual remorse” because he was continuing to
    contact the minor who was the victim of this offense.              Tr. 6.    See R.C.
    2929.12(D)(5). At the sentencing hearing, the following exchange occurred:
    [Purvis]: I—I just want to say I know I did mess up by trying to
    contact her [K.C.] and everything.
    ***
    [Trial court]: Let’s just be clear. You’re acknowledging this is
    you emailing the victim in the case repeatedly. These white pages
    that I’ve referred to that are twice as thick as the rest of the PSI.
    It’s just numerous emails between you and this child.
    ***
    I’ll also indicate that the—that, in my view, while his words may
    express remorse, the fact that he continues to contact this minor
    child that he had sexual misconduct with is a clear indication to
    me that there is no actual remorse because it did not—if he was
    sorry, his behavior would have changed and he would realize that
    he should stay away from this child altogether.
    Tr. 6. The trial court stated that the “content of the emails” Purvis sent to the victim
    “mak[e] it clear that he intends to continue a relationship with her, despite her still
    minor status.” Tr. 6. For this reason, the trial court determined that the only way to
    protect the public was to keep Purvis away from the victim by incarcerating him.
    Tr. 6. See R.C. 2929.12(E)(4), (5); R.C. 2929.11(A). The trial court stated that:
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    I am gonna impose a prison sentence in this case. It will be the
    maximum prison sentence because that’s how long I can keep him
    away from this child.
    ***
    And that’s all this Court can do to keep him away from her
    because he has made it clear through his conduct, not just in
    this—the allegations of this case, but during his time in my jail
    that he is not going to do that on his own.
    Tr. 5-6. After reviewing the evidence in the record, Purvis has not carried the burden
    of establishing that his sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law nor has
    he shown by clear and convincing evidence that his sentence is unsupported by the
    record. Having reviewed the evidence in the record, we find no indication that the
    trial court erred by imposing this sentence. His sole assignment of error is overruled.
    Conclusion
    {¶15} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars
    assigned and argued, the judgment of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas
    is affirmed.
    Judgment Affirmed
    ZIMMERMAN and SHAW, J.J., concur.
    /hls
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