State v. Jackson , 2021 Ohio 517 ( 2021 )


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  •         [Cite as State v. Jackson, 
    2021-Ohio-517
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
    HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
    STATE OF OHIO,                                       :   APPEAL NO. C-190676
    TRIAL NO. B-1901479
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                          :
    O P I N I O N.
    vs.                                                :
    JACKIE JACKSON,                                      :
    Defendant-Appellant.                             :
    Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
    Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
    Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: February 26, 2021
    Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and H. Keith
    Sauter, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
    Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Sarah E. Nelson,
    Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    W INKLER , Judge.
    {¶1}   Following no-contest pleas, defendant-appellant Jackie Jackson was
    convicted of one count of having weapons while under a disability under R.C.
    2923.13(A)(2), one count of carrying concealed weapons under R.C. 2923.12(A)(2),
    and one count of improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle under R.C.
    2923.16(B). He now appeals, and in his sole assignment of error, he contends that
    the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence found in his car.
    He argues that (1) the police did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion to
    stop his vehicle, (2) there was not reasonable suspicion or concern for officer safety
    to justify removing Jackson from his vehicle or searching his vehicle, and (3) the
    plain-view exception to the warrant requirement did not apply. We find no merit in
    his arguments, and we affirm his convictions.
    {¶2}   The only evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress
    was the video footage from three police officers’ body cameras. It shows that on
    March 19, 2019, Cincinnati police officers stopped Jackson’s car for a window-tint
    violation. Two officers approached the driver’s side of the vehicle. Jackson was the
    only occupant, and the driver’s side window was open. One of the officers asked
    Jackson to turn off his car so that he would not drive away. Jackson questioned the
    reason for the stop and protested that he would not drive away.           The officer
    explained that Jackson was pulled over for a window-tint violation, and Jackson
    seemed surprised. The windows were never tested because none of the officers had a
    window-tint meter.
    {¶3}   The officers asked Jackson for his identification. Jackson did not
    attempt to get his identification right away, but instead continued doing something
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    with his cell phone. He later said that he was turning on his camera so he could
    record his interactions with the police. He also questioned why so many officers had
    responded to a window-tint violation.
    {¶4}   The officer who first approached the car told Jackson that if he did not
    give them his identification, they would get him out of the car. The officer then
    opened Jackson’s door and demanded that he step out of the vehicle. When Jackson
    got out of the car, he had a can of Red Bull in his hand. The officer took it from him
    and set it on the windshield.
    {¶5}   Another officer tugged at Jackson’s clothing from behind to move him
    to the rear of his car. The officers instructed Jackson to put his hands on his head,
    and they patted him down for weapons. They explained to him why it was important
    for him to produce his identification immediately when asked. Jackson produced his
    identification and explained that his insurance information was on his cell phone.
    {¶6}   The officer who opened the driver’s side door did not close it after
    Jackson got out of the vehicle. He reached into the vehicle twice, first to remove the
    keys from the ignition, and second, to put the can of Red Bull into a cup holder.
    Nothing incriminating was visible at that time.
    {¶7}   When the first officer walked away from the car, another officer
    approached the driver’s side of the car while the door was still open, and began
    looking inside with a flashlight. The officer saw the marijuana cigarette sitting on the
    floor on the side of the driver’s seat.     The discovery of the marijuana cigarette
    prompted a full search of the vehicle. Police found a bin full of clothing in the back
    seat. Inside the bin, the police found a handgun, and they also found small amounts
    of marijuana in the pockets of the clothing.
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    {¶8}   Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of
    law and fact. We must accept the trial court’s findings of fact as true if competent,
    credible evidence supports them. But we must independently determine whether the
    facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. State v. Burnside, 
    100 Ohio St.3d 152
    ,
    
    2003-Ohio-5372
    , 
    797 N.E.2d 71
    , ¶ 8; State v. Houston, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
    190598, 
    2020-Ohio-5421
    , ¶ 56. Because the trial court made no findings of fact in
    this case, we directly examine the record to determine whether there was sufficient
    evidence to show that the trial court’s decision was supported by the record and
    legally justified. See State v. Shield, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-100362, 2011-Ohio-
    1912, ¶ 9.
    {¶9}   First, Jackson takes issue with the stop of his vehicle, but Jackson
    waived the issue at the hearing on the motion to suppress. Jackson’s counsel stated,
    “Mr. Jackson questioned why he was pulled over for the window tint, and it was
    interesting that there was a lot of conversation if anyone had a meter, whether it was
    probable cause. But I’m not questioning the stop. Officers are allowed to make, you
    know, reasonable mistakes.”
    {¶10} Waiver is the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
    right.” State v. Rogers, 
    143 Ohio St.3d 385
    , 
    2015-Ohio-2459
    , 
    38 N.E.3d 860
    , ¶ 20.
    Although Jackson raised the issue in his motion to suppress, he relinquished his
    right to challenge the stop in open court. See State v. Dotson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No.
    C-170214, 
    2018-Ohio-499
    , ¶ 10. Further, because he abandoned the issue, he is
    precluded from raising it now, even under a plain-error analysis. See State v. Ulmer,
    1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-190304, C-190305 and C-190306, 
    2020-Ohio-4689
    , ¶ 15.
    {¶11} Next, Jackson argues that the police officer’s order for him to get out of
    his vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights. In State v. Evans, 
    67 Ohio St.3d 4
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    405, 
    618 N.E.2d 162
     (1993), the Ohio Supreme Court followed Pennsylvania v.
    Mimms, 
    434 U.S. 106
    , 
    98 S.Ct. 330
    , 
    54 L.Ed.2d 331
     (1977), and held that a police
    officer may order a motorist to get out of a car that has been properly stopped for a
    traffic violation, even without a suspicion of criminal activity. The court referred to
    this type of order as a Mimms order. Evans at 407-408. “[T]he order to step out of
    the vehicle is not a stop separate and distinct from the original traffic stop. It is so
    minimal and insignificant an intrusion that the Mimms court refused to apply the
    requirements of an investigatory stop.” Id. at 408.
    {¶12} Though the Ohio Supreme Court modified Evans on other grounds in
    State v. Lozada, 
    92 Ohio St.3d 74
    , 
    748 N.E.2d 520
     (2001), it did not change that
    rule. Further, this court has held that where a police officer had lawfully stopped a
    driver for a window-tint violation, he could properly order the driver to get out of his
    van. See State v. Leonard, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-060595, 
    2007-Ohio-3312
    , ¶ 16.
    Consequently, Jackson’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when the
    officers ordered him to get out of the car. See Houston, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
    190598, 
    2020-Ohio-5421
    , at ¶ 64; State v. Emmons, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
    150636, 
    2016-Ohio-5384
    , ¶ 14.
    {¶13} Jackson contends that the pat-down search of his person was
    improper. We need not address that issue because no evidence was discovered as a
    result of that pat-down. Further, it was not part of the chain of events that led to the
    search of the car. See State v. Comp, 
    2014-Ohio-329
    , 
    24 N.E.3d 601
    , ¶ 17-21 (5th
    Dist.).
    {¶14} Finally, Jackson contends that the search of the car was not justified
    by the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement. The warrantless seizure by
    a law enforcement officer of an object in plain view does not violate the Fourth
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    Amendment if (1) the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the
    place from which the object could be plainly viewed, (2) the discovery of the evidence
    was inadvertent, and (3) its incriminating nature was immediately apparent. State v.
    Williams, 
    55 Ohio St.2d 82
    , 
    377 N.E.2d 1013
     (1978), paragraph one of the syllabus;
    State v. Mitchem, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-130351, 
    2014-Ohio-2366
    , ¶ 10.
    {¶15} The thrust of Jackson’s argument is that the police were not lawfully in
    a place they were permitted to be because they had improperly ordered Jackson out
    of his car. But, that argument is incorrect since the police officer’s order to Jackson
    to get out of the car did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights.
    {¶16} The video shows that the officer who found the marijuana cigarette
    just walked up to the car and looked in. The cigarette was plainly visible, and its
    incriminating nature was readily apparent. See State v. Wilson, 1st Dist. Hamilton
    No. C-170408, 
    2018-Ohio-2377
    , ¶ 12; Mitchem at ¶ 11-12.
    {¶17} Jackson contends the plain-view exception might apply if he had left
    his car door open upon voluntarily exiting from the vehicle. He argues that because
    the police ordered him out of the car and the police officers left the car door open,
    the marijuana cigarette was not in plain view. We find that to be a distinction
    without a difference. Because the police officers were legally in a place where they
    could see the marijuana cigarette in plain view, no Fourth Amendment violation
    occurred. See State v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23781, 
    2010-Ohio-5387
    , ¶
    8; State v. Clark, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83480, 
    2005-Ohio-1160
    , ¶ 14.
    {¶18} Once the police officers saw the marijuana cigarette, they had probable
    cause to believe that the car contained contraband, and they were justified in
    conducting a warrantless search of the car under the automobile exception to the
    warrant requirement. See Houston, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190598, 2020-Ohio-
    6
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    5421, at ¶ 66; Wilson at ¶ 11. They also had probable cause to believe the containers
    inside the car contained contraband, justifying the search of the bins in the back seat.
    See Wyoming v. Houghton, 
    526 U.S. 295
    , 302, 
    119 S.Ct. 1297
    , 
    143 L.Ed.2d 408
    (1999); In re L.S., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150526, 
    2016-Ohio-5582
    , ¶ 15.
    {¶19} Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not err in overruling
    Jackson’s motion to suppress. We overrule his sole assignment of error and we
    affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Judgment affirmed.
    B ERGERON , P.J., and C ROUSE , J., concur.
    Please note:
    The court has recorded its own entry this date.
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