DeepRock Disposal Solutions, L.L.C. v. Forté Prods., L.L.C. , 2021 Ohio 1436 ( 2021 )

[Cite as DeepRock Disposal Solutions, L.L.C. v. Forté Prods., L.L.C., 2021-Ohio-1436.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WASHINGTON COUNTY
DeepRock Disposal Solutions, LLC, : Case No. 20CA15
Appellant and Cross-Appellee, :
:
v. DECISION AND
: JUDGMENT ENTRY
Forté Productions, LLC, et al.,
:
Appellees and Cross-Appellants.
: RELEASED 4/21/2021
APPEARANCES:
Rick L. Ashton, James A. Coutinho, and Jeffrey R. Corcoran, Allen Stovall Neuman
Fisher & Ashton LLP, Columbus, Ohio for Appellant and Cross-Appellee.
Craig E. Sweeney, Aaron M. Bruggeman, and Zachary Eddy, Bricker & Eckler LLP,
Marietta, Ohio for Appellees and Cross-Appellants.
Hess, J.
{¶1} This appeal involves a pipeline and whether the pipeline owner trespasses
across two properties along the pipeline’s route. The original pipeline owner constructed
the pipeline but was placed into a receivership and its pipeline was sold to the current
pipeline owner. The parties agree that there are no recorded written easements allowing
the pipeline owner to cross through these two properties. Generally, when a pipeline
crosses another’s property without written permission to do so, it constitutes trespass.
Here, the pipeline owner contends that there are defenses to the trespass claims.
{¶2} The current pipeline owner is Appellant and Cross-Appellee DeepRock
Disposal Solutions, LLC (“DeepRock”). DeepRock purchased the pipeline from the
Washington App. No. 20CA15 2
original owner, Water Energy Services, LLC (“WES”), through the WES receivership in
January 2017. DeepRock appeals the trial court’s partial grant of summary judgment to
appellees and cross-appellants, which dismissed DeepRock’s claims for: (1) easement
by estoppel, (2) a declaratory judgment on the validity of the Forté easements, (3) tortious
interference with business relationship, (4) tortious interference with contract, and (5) civil
conspiracy, and granted Forté and the Landowners’ counterclaims against DeepRock for
trespass. The appellees and cross-appellants in this matter are Forté Productions, LLC
(“Forté”), Derow Enterprises, LLC (“Derow”), Ronald Deem (”Deem”), Bailey Homestead,
LLC (“Bailey Homestead”), and Terry R. Johnson (“Johnson”) (Bailey Homestead and
Johnson are collectively “Landowners” and the properties they own that are relevant to
this lawsuit are “Properties”).
{¶3} Deem is a landman who, through his company, Derow, was retained by
WES in early 2015 to obtain easements and rights-of-way for the construction of the
pipeline. Deem approached property owners along the proposed construction route to
obtain written easements for the pipeline to cross through. Bailey Homestead is an LLC
for the Bailey family members who own property through which the pipeline crosses.
Johnson owns property through which the pipeline crosses. Bailey Homestead and
Johnson did not give written easements to allow DeepRock’s pipeline to cross their
Properties and they alleged that DeepRock is trespassing. However, Bailey Homestead
and Johnson did eventually grant written easements to Forté. Forté is a business that, in
November and December 2016, obtained and recorded written easements (the “Forté
Easements”) to place a pipeline on the subject Properties, but it does not own a pipeline.
Washington App. No. 20CA15 3
In other words, DeepRock owns the pipeline, but no written easements for the Properties,
and Forté has written easements for the Properties, but no pipeline.
{¶4} Appellees/Cross-appellants appeal the trial court’s partial grant of summary
judgment to DeepRock on DeepRock’s claim for a declaratory judgment “that any claim
of the Defendants as against the WES Assets1 * * * were released upon the sale of the
WES Assets * * *.” The trial court also granted summary judgment to DeepRock when it
dismissed Derow and Deem’s counterclaims for breach of contract/quantum meruit and
frivolous conduct, but these rulings are not challenged on appeal.
{¶5} DeepRock also appeals the trial court’s order denying as moot its Civ.R.
56(G) motions to strike certain affidavits and a court-ordered as-built survey of the
pipeline on the ground that the survey was not properly authenticated and that the
testimony in the affidavits conflicted with the affiant’s deposition testimony or that the
affidavits were submitted as new evidence in a reply memorandum. The trial court issued
its decision on the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment, and then determined
that this rendered moot DeepRock’s motions to strike the survey and affidavits.
{¶6} DeepRock raises two assignments of error for our review. First, DeepRock
contends that the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment to appellees
because: (1) it refused to apply the doctrine of easement by estoppel; (2) it granted
appellees summary judgment on their trespass claims; (3) it declined to find Forté’s
easements invalid; and (4) it dismissed DeepRock’s claims for tortious interference with
business relationships, tortious interference with contracts and civil conspiracy. Second,
1 In its amended complaint, DeepRock defined “WES Assets” as those assets acquired pursuant to and
defined in section 1.1 of the Asset Purchase Agreement. The Asset Purchase Agreement was assigned
to and assumed by DeepRock.
Washington App. No. 20CA15 4
DeepRock contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion to strike the survey and
certain affidavits under Civ.R. 56(G).
{¶7} Because it may affect our review of DeepRock’s first assignment of error
challenging the trial court’s decision on the parties’ summary judgment motions, we
review DeepRock’s second assignment of error first. We find that the trial court erred
when it denied as moot DeepRock’s motions to strike. The trial court should have
determined whether the evidence and affidavits appellees submitted to support their
summary judgment motions would be considered by it before ruling on those summary
judgment motions. However, we find that the error was harmless because we find that
the motions to strike were properly denied on substantive grounds. We overrule
DeepRock’s second assignment of error.
{¶8} As to DeepRock’s first assignment of error, we find that the trial court did
not err when it granted summary judgment to appellees on DeepRock’s easement by
estoppel claim (Count 5 of the First Amended Complaint). DeepRock failed to present
any evidence to contradict the testimony of the Landowners and WES’s own landman,
Deem, all who testified that the Landowners did not make misrepresentations to WES
about a pipeline easement. DeepRock also failed to present evidence to contradict the
Landowners’ and Deem’s testimony that the Landowners voiced objections to WES when
they discovered that the pipeline crossed their Properties.
{¶9} The trial court also ruled properly on appellees’ trespass claims (Count 1 of
Amended Counterclaims) because in DeepRock’s reply to the amended counterclaims,
DeepRock admitted its pipeline crossed the Properties. And, DeepRock failed to present
any expert testimony or an alternative as-built survey of the pipeline to contradict the court
Washington App. No. 20CA15 5
ordered as-built survey prepared by the expert surveyor the parties agreed to jointly retain
to perform the survey.
{¶10} The trial court did not err when it dismissed DeepRock’s claim that the Forté
Easements were invalid (Count 2 of First Amended Complaint). Forté did not obtain the
easements in violation of the doctrines of champerty and maintenance; the easements
were obtained before DeepRock purchased the pipeline and well before DeepRock filed
its action against the Landowners. Additionally, DeepRock named Forté as a defendant
in the action. Therefore, Forté had both a bona fide interest in the case and was a party
to it. Although WES was in a receivership, Forté did not violate the receivership stay order
when it acquired the easements because the Landowners’ Properties were not assets of
the receivership estate. The Landowners were free to do as they wished with their
Properties.
{¶11} Finally, we find that the trial court properly dismissed DeepRock’s tortious
interference with business relationships/contracts and civil conspiracy claims against
Forté, Derow, and Deem (Counts 6, 7, and 8 of First Amended Complaint). DeepRock
alleged that these three interfered with DeepRock’s business relationships and contracts
with the Landowners in late 2016 when Forté obtained its easements. Construing the
evidence most strongly in DeepRock’s favor we find that business relationships existed
between WES and Bailey Homestead and Johnson. However, those relationships ended
in late 2015 when WES constructed the pipeline on the Properties and failed to provide
an appropriate and acceptable response when the Landowners objected. As for its
tortious interference with contract claim, DeepRock failed to produce any evidence of any
contractual agreement between WES and the Landowners. Because DeepRock failed to
Washington App. No. 20CA15 6
provide any evidence that a business relationship between WES and the Landowners
existed in late 2016, and no evidence of any contracts, its tortious interference claims
were properly dismissed. And, without evidence of an underlying tort, the civil conspiracy
claim fails.
{¶12} Appellees/Cross-Appellants raise one assignment of error challenging the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment in DeepRock’s favor finding that DeepRock
purchased the WES assets free and clear of all liens, claims, and encumbrances arising
prior to or on the date of the confirmation of the receivership sale (Count 3 of First
Amended Complaint).
{¶13} We acknowledge that a great deal of confusion exists among the parties
concerning this claim. To the extent that the trial court’s order might be read to dismiss
all of the Landowners’ and Forté’s trespass claims, we agree it was in error. However, we
find that the trial court correctly determined that WES’s assets were sold free and clear
of any lien, claim or encumbrances against the assets arising prior to the pipeline’s sale
– those liens attached to the pipeline sale proceeds and were handled in the receivership.
This finding has little relevance in this litigation because none of the cross-appellants’
counterclaims asserted any interest in WES’s assets. We also find that the trial court
properly found that the Landowners’ and Forté’s trespass claims against WES, which
arose when the pipeline was constructed without permission on the Properties and ended
when WES was no longer the pipeline owner, could not be brought against DeepRock.
And, Deem and Derow’s breach of contract/quantum meruit claims against WES could
not be brought against DeepRock. DeepRock was not a successor of WES and had no
successor liability for any of WES’s obligations. However, the Landowners and Forté
Washington App. No. 20CA15 7
could bring trespass claims against DeepRock for DeepRock’s own trespass on the
Properties, which commenced when DeepRock became owner of the pipeline and failed
to remove the pipeline from the Properties, and continues until DeepRock either removes
the pipeline or obtains the Landowners’ permission to cross the Properties. The trial court
allowed cross-appellants’ trespass claims against DeepRock and will let a jury determine
the merits of any defense DeepRock might have that has not already been rejected on
summary judgment (i.e., the rejected defenses that the pipeline does not cross the
Properties or that there are easements by estoppel). Due to the broad, somewhat
ambiguous language used in the trial court’s order, we sustain in part the cross-
appellants’ sole assignment of error.
{¶14} We affirm, in part, the trial court’s judgment and modify it only to the extent
that it barred cross-appellants’ trespass claims against DeepRock that arose when
DeepRock acquired the pipeline. Those claims are allowed to proceed.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{¶15} DeepRock filed a complaint against Forté, Derow, Deem, Bailey
Homestead, and Johnson in July 2017 concerning whether DeepRock’s wastewater
disposal pipeline was trespassing upon Johnson’s and Bailey Homestead’s Properties
and interfering with easements Johnson and Bailey Homestead had given to Forté.
Appellees answered and asserted counterclaims for trespass, among other claims.
{¶16} In January 2018, at DeepRock’s request, the trial court ordered an “as built”
survey “to determine the precise location of the subject pipeline as it related to the Bailey
Homestead Property and the Johnson Property.” The trial court ordered: (1) Smith Land
Surveying, Inc. to perform the survey, (2) Johnson and Bailey Homestead to allow Smith
Washington App. No. 20CA15 8
Land Surveying access to their Properties to complete the survey, and (3) the costs of
the survey to be split equally by the parties. The order stated that the parties agreed to
its terms. After Smith Land Surveying completed the survey, appellees filed a motion for
partial summary judgment in March 2018, but the motion was later withdrawn after
DeepRock filed a first amended complaint and appellees filed answers and amended
counterclaims.
{¶17} In its First Amended Complaint filed August 2018, DeepRock alleged that
it had acquired the wastewater pipeline, along with easements and other assets from
Water Energy Services, LLC (“WES”) in a receivership case in January 2017. WES was
a company that built and operated a wastewater disposal operation in Marietta, Ohio in
2015 but was placed under a receivership in July 2016. DeepRock alleged that in 2015,
WES hired Deem and his company, Derow, to serve as the landman to acquire right-of-
way easements for the construction of the wastewater pipeline. DeepRock alleged that
WES disputed certain invoices Deem and Derow submitted for over $10,000 in services
and that Deem never delivered any documentation of any easements from Bailey
Homestead or Johnson2 even though WES paid Bailey Homestead $6,000 for a right-of-
way easement over its Property.
{¶18} DeepRock alleged that Bailey Homestead and Johnson conveyed
easements to Forté in late 2016, which were recorded on November 30 and December
2, 2016, that conflicted with WES’s right to maintain a pipeline through the Properties.
The sale of WES assets occurred on December 6, 2016 and DeepRock contends that it
was the successful bidder but did not discover the recorded Forté Easements until after
2 It is undisputed that Johnson executed two options and rights-of-way with WES for properties that adjoin
the Johnson Property at issue in this case. Those properties are not the subject of this litigation.
Washington App. No. 20CA15 9
the sale. After DeepRock became owner of the pipeline, Forté, Johnson, and Bailey
Homestead informed DeepRock that its pipeline was trespassing and demanded that it
stop transporting liquids through the Properties, or alternatively, pay a total of $2.00 per
barrel to Forté. DeepRock alleged that it asked to survey the Properties to determine the
location of the pipeline but Forté, Johnson, and Bailey Homestead refused. DeepRock
allegedly made repeated requests for documentation of the location of its pipeline, but its
requests were denied.
{¶19} DeepRock contended that no post-installation survey was made of the
pipeline and although it believed the pipeline did not travel through Bailey Homestead
and Johnson’s Properties, DeepRock claimed to have valid easements to do so.
DeepRock sought: a declaratory judgment that the pipeline is not located on those
Properties or on the Forté Easements (Count 1); a declaratory judgment that the Forté
Easements were invalid (Count 2); a declaratory judgment as to whether any of the
defendants’ claims against WES assets, including trespass claims, survived the
receivership sale (Count 3); damages under the doctrine of promissory estoppel because
DeepRock contends that Bailey Homestead and Johnson made promises to provide right-
of-way easements to WES for the pipeline (Count 4); easement by estoppel because
DeepRock contends that Bailey Homestead and Johnson consented to the pipeline
construction and allowed it to be constructed without objection (Count 5); tortious
interference with WES’s business relationship with Bailey Homestead and Johnson
against Deem, Derow, and Forté based on Forté’s acquisition of easements (Count 6);
tortious interference with WES’s contract with Johnson and Bailey Homestead by Deem,
Derow, and Forté based on Forté’s acquisition of easements (Count 7); civil conspiracy
Washington App. No. 20CA15 10
against Deem, Derow, and Forté for the same allegedly tortious conduct (Count 8);
breach of contract against Johnson and Bailey Homestead for failing to provide an
easement for the pipeline (Count 9); breach of contract against Deem and Derow for
failing to deliver the easements for the Bailey Homestead and Johnson Properties (Count
10).
{¶20} The defendants each filed amended counterclaims. Johnson, Bailey
Homestead and Forté sought a declaratory judgment that the pipeline is trespassing on
their Properties, claims for trespass and willful trespass-related damages against
DeepRock, injunctive relief to prevent DeepRock’s continued use of the pipeline, and a
claim for frivolous conduct based on the fact that the court-ordered as-built survey
prepared by Smith Land Surveying shows that DeepRock’s pipeline encumbers 197 linear
feet of the Johnson property and 1,103 feet of the Bailey Homestead property, yet
DeepRock’s First Amended Complaint still includes a claim for declaratory judgment that
the pipeline does not trespass on the Properties.
{¶21} Deem and Derow brought breach of contract counterclaims alleging that
DeepRock claimed to be the successor in interest to WES and claimed an interest in
WES’s contract rights with Deem and Derow and therefore Deem and Derow are entitled
to counter with a claim for unpaid invoices against DeepRock. Deem and Derow also
sought a declaratory judgment that their contract with WES terminated in April 2016
based on the disengagement letter and they owed no duty to WES or DeepRock. Deem
and Derow also asserted a frivolous conduct claim on the same grounds as the other
defendants.
Washington App. No. 20CA15 11
{¶22} In its reply to Johnson and Bailey Homestead’s counterclaim for trespass,
DeepRock denied “that it is a successor-in-interest to WES” because that term was
undefined.3 However, DeepRock repeatedly admitted that its pipeline crossed the
Johnson and Bailey Homestead Properties and that it transported brine through the
pipeline. DeepRock contended that it lacked sufficient knowledge about the respective
lengths of the pipeline on the Properties. DeepRock also admitted that it purchased the
WES assets after the Forté Easements were publicly recorded.
{¶23} The parties then filed various motions for summary judgment or partial
summary judgment. DeepRock filed two motions to strike evidence appellees’ submitted
in support of their summary judgment motions. In its first motion to strike, DeepRock
sought to have the affidavits of Deem, Johnson, and Michael Bailey stricken because they
allegedly contained false statements. DeepRock also asked to have the court-ordered as-
built survey stricken because it lacked proper authentication and foundation under Evid.R.
702, governing testimony by experts. In its second motion to strike, DeepRock asked to
have Deem’s supplemental affidavit stricken because it was “ambush evidence.”
{¶24} The trial court ruled on the various summary judgment motions. As to
DeepRock’s First Amended Complaint, the trial court dismissed the following: validity of
Forté Easements (Count 2); easement by estoppel (Count 5); tortious interference with
business relationships (Count 6); tortious interference with contracts (Count 7); and civil
conspiracy (Count 8). The trial court allowed the following DeepRock claims to proceed
forward: declaratory judgment of the pipeline location (Count 1); breach of contract claims
3 In paragraph 1 of DeepRock’s First Amended Complaint, it alleged “DeepRock is the successor in interest
to all assets of [WES],” in its promissory estoppel count, DeepRock alleged that it was “successor-in-interest
to the WES assets and claims,” and in its tort claims DeepRock more broadly alleged it was WES’s
“successor.”
Washington App. No. 20CA15 12
against Forté, Johnson, and Bailey Homestead (Count 9); and breach of contract claims
against Deem and Derow (Count 10).
{¶25} As to DeepRock’s request for a declaration that it purchased the WES
assets free and clear of any and all claims, liens and encumbrances of the appellees
(Count 3 of First Amended Complaint) – the trial court granted judgment to DeepRock.
The trial court’s decision states:
Johnson, Bailey and Forté’s trespass claims ended at least as of the confirmation
date of the sale. Their claims may have begun the day after the confirmation of the
sale and continue to the present.
However, the jury may find that these three defendants’ claims should be denied
until the date of this entry or another date because of defendants’ inaction in filing
proofs of claim or plaintiff incurring no successor liability for WES’ debts. Johnson
and Bailey could have submitted claims to the receiver prior to the sale, followed
Confirmation Order, paragraph 10 procedures, or filed a lawsuit about their
trespass claim instead of conveying easements to Forté.
In sum, plaintiff’s count against Bailey[,] Johnson and Forté is granted as of the
date of the confirmation of the sale. However, it is an issue for the jury if Forté,
Bailey and Johnson’s claims continues to a date beyond the sale confirmation
date.
The Court denies defendants’ motion and grants plaintiff’s motion on Count III of
the First Amended Complaint.
The trial court’s analysis is ambiguous and the last sentence appears to broadly grant
DeepRock’s motion. However, when read in context, we construe it as follows: The
Johnson, Bailey Homestead and Forté’s trespass claims and trespass-related damages
that existed up through the WES asset sale were barred. However, trespass claims
brought against DeepRock that began when DeepRock acquired the pipeline could be
pursued. DeepRock was not entitled to a declaration that DeepRock was not liable in
trespass.
Washington App. No. 20CA15 13
{¶26} On Forté, Johnson, and Bailey Homestead’s claims, the trial court granted
their claim for a declaratory judgment that DeepRock’s pipeline is on their Properties
(Count 1 of Amended Counterclaims) and allowed trespass and willful trespass claims to
proceed forward (Counts 2 and 3 of Amended Counterclaims). The trial court also allowed
Count 4 to proceed forward, which alleged frivolous conduct by DeepRock for asserting
a claim that the pipeline is not on the Landowners’ Properties after the court-ordered as-
built survey shows that it is, and allowed Landowners and Forté’s claim for an injunction
against DeepRock’s continued use of the pipeline.
{¶27} The trial court dismissed Deem and Derow’s claim for unpaid invoices
(Count 1) and claim for frivolous conduct (Count 3). The trial court determined that the
claim for declaratory judgment that Deem and Derow owed no duty to DeepRock was not
part of the summary judgment motion and did not address it (Count 2). Thus, Deem and
Derow’s declaratory judgment claim remains pending.
{¶28} The parties appealed various aspects of the trial court’s decision.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶29} DeepRock designates two assignments of error for review:
I. The Trial Court erred in entering the May 1, 2020 Entry: Motions for Summary
Judgment. [Summary Judgment Entry at pp. 637-647.] (Brackets sic.)
II. The Trial Court erred in entering the May 1, 2020 Entry Dismissing Two Motions
as Moot. [ Entry on Motions to Strike at p. 636.] (Brackets sic.)
{¶30} Cross-appellants designate one assignment of error for review:
I. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff as to Count
III of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
Washington App. No. 20CA15 14
III. Jurisdictional Issue
{¶31} Before addressing the merits of the errors assigned for our review, we must
first consider a threshold jurisdictional issue. Ohio law provides that courts of appeals in
this state have jurisdiction to review the final orders or judgments of inferior courts within
their district. Section 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution; R.C. 2501.02. In the event
that a jurisdictional issue is not raised by the parties, then we must raise it sua sponte.
Whitaker–Merrell Co. v. Geupel Constr. Co., 29 Ohio St.2d 184, 186, 280 N.E.2d 922(1972); In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 159-160, 556 N.E.2d 1169, fn. 2 (1990); Kouns
v. Pemberton, 84 Ohio App.3d 499, 501, 617 N.E.2d 701 (4th Dist.1992).
{¶32} Here the trial court’s judgment disposed of several, but not all, of Deeprock’s
claims and several of the appellees’ counterclaims. In such instances under Civ.R. 54(B)
the trial court may enter final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims
or parties upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. Here the
trial court’s judgment includes the “no just reason for delay” language.
{¶33} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “ ‘[f]or an order to determine the
action and prevent a judgment for the party appealing, it must dispose of the whole merits
of the cause or some separate and distinct branch thereof and leave nothing for the
determination of the court.’ ” Natl. City Commercial Capital Corp. v. AAAA at Your Serv.,
Inc., 114 Ohio St.3d 82, 2007-Ohio-2942, 868 N.E.2d 663, ¶ 7, quoting Hamilton Cty. Bd.
of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities v. Professionals Guild of Ohio, 46 Ohio St.3d
147, 153, 545 N.E.2d 1260 (1989). A decision dismissing some causes of action, while
leaving some remaining does this:
R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) provides that an order “that affects a substantial right in
an action that in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment” is
Washington App. No. 20CA15 15
final and appealable. The portions of the trial court's order
that granted summary judgment to several defendants on entire claims
against them “determine[d] the action” as to those parties, and thus was a
final order pursuant to R.C. 2505.02. Summary judgment precluded any
recovery on those claims. Together with the appropriate “no just cause for
delay” Civ. R. 54(B) language that the trial court added on June 3, 2005,
those aspects of the order were final and appealable, even though other
portions of the order were not immediately appealable. Therefore, the [order
on appeal], with the later addition of the Civ.R. 54(B) language, is final and
appealable, but only to the extent that it granted summary judgment on entire
claims. (Citations omitted.)
Stuck v. Miami Valley Hosp., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28233, 2020-Ohio-305, ¶ 8,
quoting Interstate Properties v. Prasanna, Inc., 9th Dist. Summit No. 22734, 2006-Ohio-
2686, ¶ 14.
{¶34} Therefore, the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment on some of
the claims in the case and dismissing them, and appending a Civ.R. 54(B) certification, is
a final appealable order as to the claims that were granted and/or dismissed. The portion
of the trial court’s order that denies summary judgment on DeepRock’s declaratory
judgment claim (Count 1), promissory estoppel claim (Count 4), and breach of contract
claims (Counts 9 and 10) and the portion that denies summary judgment on Forté and
the Landowner’s counterclaims for willful trespass and frivolous action (Counts 2, 3, and
4) are not final or reviewable.
{¶35} Additionally, as DeepRock concedes, a trial court’s order denying a motion
to strike an affidavit or other evidence supporting a summary judgment motion would not
be a final appealable order. However, in the context of our review of the trial court’s
decision granting summary judgment on some of the claims, the trial court’s denial of
DeepRock’s motions to strike is directly related and reviewable. See Ceasor v. City of
East Cleveland, 2018-Ohio-2741, 112 N.E.3d 496 (8th Dist.) (finding that an order
Washington App. No. 20CA15 16
denying summary judgment on city’s claim of governmental immunity was a final
appealable order and the related order denying city’s motion to strike plaintiff’s expert
report filed in opposition to city’s summary judgment motion was reviewable on appeal).
IV. DeepRock’s Motions to Strike
{¶36} We will address DeepRock’s second assignment of error first because the
court-ordered as-built survey and affidavits it sought to have stricken supports the
appellees’ summary judgment motion. If the trial court erred in denying the motions to
strike, it may substantively impact our review of DeepRock’s first assignment of error and
the cross-appellants’ sole assignment of error, both which challenge the trial court’s
decision on the summary judgment motions.
{¶37} After DeepRock filed its complaint and the appellees filed their
counterclaims, the appellees filed a combined motion for partial summary judgment
accompanied by affidavits from Deem, Michael Bailey as the managing member of Bailey
Homestead, and Johnson as well as the court-ordered as-built survey of the pipeline.
Appellees eventually withdrew this summary judgment motion because, while it was
pending, DeepRock filed a First Amended Complaint and the appellees filed Amended
Counterclaims. Appellees then filed new summary judgment motions with new supporting
affidavits, DeepRock filed a motion for partial summary judgment, and the parties filed
their respective oppositions and replies.
{¶38} DeepRock filed two separate motions to strike. One pursuant to Civ.R.
56(G) that sought to: (1) strike the affidavits of Deem, Johnson, and Bailey on the ground
that these affidavits conflicted with the affiant’s deposition testimony, contained
speculative statements, and mischaracterized documents; (2) strike the court-ordered as-
Washington App. No. 20CA15 17
built survey of the pipeline because it lacked proper authentication and foundation; and
(3) impose sanctions on the appellees. The second motion to strike argued that a
supplemental Deem affidavit and accompanying exhibits should be stricken because it
was submitted in support of a reply memorandum as speculative ambush evidence, and
it contained testimony about lost or destroyed documents in violation of Evid.R. 1002 and
1004. Appellees opposed the motions to strike.
{¶39} The trial court did not rule on DeepRock’s motions to strike until after it
decided the parties’ summary judgment motions and then it denied them as moot. We
find that the trial court erred in denying the motions as moot because it should have first
determined whether it would consider this evidence before rendering its decision on the
summary judgment motions. However, we find this error harmless because, for alternative
reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny DeepRock’s motions to strike.
A. Standard of Review
{¶40} DeepRock’s motions to strike were based on two different legal theories.
First, it argued that the survey should be stricken because it lacked proper authentication
and foundation and that Deem’s supplemental affidavit should be stricken because it was
included with the reply memorandum and should be excluded under Evid.R. 1002, which
are all evidentiary challenges. “Decisions involving the admissibility of evidence are
reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard of review.” Estate of Johnson v. Randall
Smith, Inc., 135 Ohio St.3d 440, 2013-Ohio-1507, 989 N.E.2d 35, ¶ 22, citing State v.
Hancock, 108 Ohio St.3d 57, 2006-Ohio-160, 840 N.E.2d 1032; State v. Morris, 132 Ohio
St.3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, 972 N.E.2d 528, ¶ 19 (“It is well established that a trial court's
decision to admit evidence is an evidentiary determination within the broad discretion of
Washington App. No. 20CA15 18
the trial court and subject to review on an abuse-of-discretion standard.”). Thus, an
appellate court will not disturb a trial court's ruling regarding the admissibility of evidence
absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion with attendant material prejudice to the
complaining party. State v. Green, 184 Ohio App.3d 406, 2009-Ohio-5199, 921 N.E.2d
276, ¶ 14 (4th Dist.).
{¶41} When, however, an appellant alleges that a trial court's evidentiary ruling
was “ ‘based on an erroneous standard or a misconstruction of the law,’ ” an appellate
court reviews the trial court's evidentiary ruling using a de novo standard of review. Wray
v. Wessell, 4th Dist. Scioto Nos. 15CA3724 and 15CA3725, 2016-Ohio-8584, ¶ 13, citing
Morris at ¶ 16, quoting Castlebrook, Ltd. v. Dayton Properties Ltd. Partnership, 78 Ohio
App.3d 340, 346, 604 N.E.2d 808 (2d Dist.1992); accord Estate of Johnson at ¶ 22
(reviewing admissibility of evidence by first examining whether, as a matter of law, statute
applied, and then once threshold question concerning applicability of statute resolved,
reviewing whether trial court abused its discretion); Med. Mut. of Ohio v. Schlotterer, 122
Ohio St.3d 181, 2009-Ohio-2496, 909 N.E.2d 1237, ¶ 13 (stating that “[w]hen a court's
judgment is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, an abuse-of-discretion
standard is not appropriate”); Painter and Pollis, Ohio Appellate Practice, Appendix G
(2015) (stating that although trial court decisions involving the admission of evidence are
generally reviewed as a discretionary matter, but they are subject to de novo review if a
clear legal rule applies. “For example, a trial court does not have discretion to admit
hearsay into evidence”). State v. Wright, 2017-Ohio-9041, 101 N.E.3d 496, ¶ 24-25 (4th
Dist.).
Washington App. No. 20CA15 19
{¶42} Second, DeepRock argued that the Deem, Johnson, and Bailey affidavits
should be stricken as made in bad faith under Civ.R. 56(G). In reviewing the denial of a
Civ.R. 56(G) motion, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. Residential Funding Co.
v. Thorne, 2012-Ohio-2552, 973 N.E.2d 294, ¶ 41 (6th Dist.). “ ‘[A]buse of discretion’
[means] an ‘unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable use of discretion, or * * * a view
or action that no conscientious judge could honestly have taken.’ ” “An abuse of discretion
includes a situation in which a trial court did not engage in a ‘ “sound reasoning process.”
’ ” “The abuse-of-discretion standard is deferential and does not permit an appellate court
to simply substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.” (Citations omitted.)
Gulbrandsen v. Summit Acres, Inc., 2016-Ohio-1550, 63 N.E.3d 566, ¶ 31 (4th Dist.).
B. Review of Court Ordered As-Built Survey
{¶43} DeepRock argued that the court-ordered as-built survey should be stricken
because it was not properly authenticated and the appellees failed to lay the proper
foundation. The trial court decided that this issue was made moot by its decision on the
summary judgment motions and denied the motion to strike. However, we find that the
trial court should have determined the admissibility of the survey prior to ruling on the
summary judgment motions and its failure to do so was an error of law subject to de novo
review. Nevertheless, we find the error harmless and affirm the trial court’s denial on
substantive grounds because the survey was properly authenticated and did not lack
proper foundation.
{¶44} At DeepRock’s request and with the parties’ agreement, the trial court
ordered Smith Land Surveying, Inc. to prepare an as-built survey of the pipeline. Smith
Land Surveying completed the survey and DeepRock’s attorney provided a copy of it to
Washington App. No. 20CA15 20
appellees’ attorneys via email. Appellees attached a copy of this email communication to
its memorandum opposing the motion to strike showing that they obtained the survey
from DeepRock’s attorney. Appellees’ attorney tried to obtain an affidavit from Smith Land
Surveying to authenticate the survey as a true and accurate copy, but Smith Land
Surveying responded that the project manager involved was no longer employed there.4
Instead, Mr. Smith sent an email to appellees’ attorney that contained a transmittal letter,
a memo, and a copy of the as-built survey. In the memo, Mr. Smith stated, “We prepared
an As-Built Brine Line Location Exhibit as requested by DeepRock Disposal Solutions,
LLC on the 26th of January 2018.” The as-built survey included the notation that it was
prepared on January 26, 2018 for DeepRock by Smith Land Surveying as Job No. 8780.
The transmittal letter was addressed to appellees’ counsel, stated that it was from Smith
Land Surveying for Job No. 8780, and stated, “We are sending you attached * * * 1 copy
As-Built Brine Line Location Exhibit” and “1 copy Memo.” The transmittal letter, memo,
and as-built survey were attached to appellees’ memorandum opposing the motion to
strike.
{¶45} Appellees argued that these documents provided ample proof to establish
that the as-built survey is what they claim it is under Evid.R. 901. We agree.
{¶46} Evid.R. 901(A) governs authentication, “The requirement of authentication
or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Subpart (B)
provides, “By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are
4The project manager was not the only person who could have authenticated the survey. It could have
been authenticated by a person at Smith Land Surveying with the ability to compare the version of the
survey appellees submitted with their summary judgment motion to the version Smith Land Surveying
prepared and verify that it was a true and accurate copy.
Washington App. No. 20CA15 21
examples of authentication or identification * * *.” “The threshold standard for
authenticating evidence is low.” Stumpff v. Harris, 2015-Ohio-1329, 31 N.E.3d 164 (2d
Dist.).
Evid.R. 901 does not provide an exhaustive list of the means of
authentication. Indeed, Evid.R. 901(B) expressly states, “By way of
illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of
authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this rule
[.]” In our view, testimony regarding the production of a document during
discovery may provide sufficient indicia of authenticity to satisfy Evid.R. 901.
***
Numerous courts, both state and federal, have held that items produced in
discovery are implicitly authenticated by the act of production by the
opposing party. See, e.g., Welch v. Bissell, N.D.Ohio No. 1:12CV3108,
2013 WL 6504679, *4 (Dec. 11, 2013) (video was properly authenticated by
affidavit from counsel that the video was produced by the opposing party
during discovery); Churches of Christ in Christian Union v. Evangelical Ben.
Trust, S.D.Ohio No. C2:07CV1186, 2009 WL 2146095, *5 (July 15, 2009)
(“Where a document is produced in discovery, ‘there [is] sufficient
circumstantial evidence to support its authenticity’ at trial.”); Hampton v.
Bruno's, Inc., 646 So.2d 597, 600 (Ala.1994) (“when a document is
produced by a party during discovery, that party waives the right to object
to the admission of the document on the basis of its genuineness or
authenticity”) (interpreting Alabama Power Co. v. Tatum, 293 Ala. 500, 306
So.2d 251 (1975)); Denison v. Swaco Geolograph Co., 941 F.2d 1416, 1423
(10th Cir.1991); McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 928
(3d Cir.1985) (fact that documents were produced in discovery was
probative of authenticity); United States v. Brown, 688 F.2d 1112 (7th
Cir.1982) (“Brown produced the documents voluntarily and, as an officer of
the corporation, he was in a position to vouch for their authenticity. Just as
he could have identified the records by oral testimony, his very act of
production was implicit authentication.”).
***
This is not to say that everything produced in discovery should automatically
be deemed authenticated. See, e.g., Cramer v. NEC Corp. of America, 5th
Cir. No. 12–10236, 2012 WL 5489395, *2 (Nov. 13, 2012) (document
purporting to be job description was not authenticated by production in
discovery where the discovery request was too broad to provide evidence
of authenticity, the document itself bore no indication of authenticity, and
deposition testimony regarding the document was noncommittal). As
explained by the Supreme Court of Kentucky:
Washington App. No. 20CA15 22
Other courts have applied this notion of implied authentication
in the context of civil discovery, sometimes stating the rule
quite broadly. See, e.g., South Central Bank and Trust
Company v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., 863 F.Supp. 635,
645 (N.D.Ill.1994) (“[P]roduction of a document amounts to an
implicit authentication of the document.”) (citing United States
v. Brown, 688 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir.1982)); In re Greenwood Air
Crash, 924 F.Supp. 1511, 1514 (S.D.Ind.1995). (“Production
of a document by a party constitutes an implicit authentication
of that document.”) (also citing Brown ). In most of these
cases, however, the person producing the document is
competent to authenticate it—a private individual producing
his own papers, say, or a business's records custodian
producing the business's documents—and in those cases
production can indeed be said to imply the document's
authenticity. * * * [H]owever, parties may have in their
possession or control documents from other sources and
even documents of unknown origin, which they would not be
competent to authenticate directly. It is hard to see in those
circumstances how the mere production of the document—in
response, say, to a very broad request for “everything in your
possession or control having to do with X”—implies anything
about the extraneous document's authenticity.
Thrasher v. Durham, 313 S.W.3d 545, 548 (Ky.2010). The Supreme Court
of Kentucky thus held that “the fact that the document was produced in
discovery may give rise to an inference of authenticity where production
was made by someone competent to provide authentication, but the mere
fact of production does not suffice where that competence is lacking.”
Thrasher at 549.
Stumpff at ¶ 33-38; Nau v. Stonebridge Operation Co., 7th Dist. Noble No. 19NO0466,
2019-Ohio-3647, ¶ 39 (“Ohio courts have held that items produced in discovery are
implicitly authenticated by the act of production by the opposing party.”); Diller v. Miami
Valley Hospital, 2017-Ohio-9051, 102 N.E.3d 520 (2d Dist.). The Supreme Court of Ohio
recently discussed the holdings in Stumpff and Nau and acknowledged that testimony of
a witness with knowledge is not the only method by which documents may be
authenticated. Under Evid.R. 901(B)(4), trial courts may take into consideration the
distinctive characteristics of the document and the circumstances of the case. Columbus
Washington App. No. 20CA15 23
City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 159 Ohio St.3d 283, 2020-Ohio-
353, 150 N.E.3d 877, ¶ 20-22 (“Indeed, ‘implied authentication by production in discovery’
has been recognized as satisfying the requirement of Evid.R. 901” and finding that a
purchase and sale agreement and a settlement statement were authenticated under
Evid.R. 901(B)(4)).
{¶47} DeepRock does not challenge the authenticity of the survey on substantive
grounds – it does not argue that the survey attached to the summary judgment motion
differs in any material respect from the copy provided by DeepRock’s counsel to
appellees’ counsel. Rather DeepRock contends that the trial court should strike the
survey because it was not authenticated by the method set out in Evid.R. 901(B)(1)
(testimony of witness with knowledge). Here, considering the totality of the circumstances,
we find that the survey was authentic. The survey was performed pursuant to the trial
court’s order, the expert surveyor was agreed upon by the parties, a copy of the survey
was produced by DeepRock’s attorney during the course of the litigation and was
responsive to document production requests, the survey was produced and identified in
subsequent communications from the surveying company that prepared it, and the job
number identified on the survey matches the one on the transmittal letter. These
circumstances provide strong evidence that the survey was authentic and were sufficient
to show that the survey is what appellees claimed it to be under Evid.R. 901(B)(4).5
{¶48} DeepRock also argued that the survey should have been stricken as
inadmissible expert testimony under Evid.R. 702, which outlines the foundation for expert
5 Given the circumstances, the parties could have readily stipulated to the survey’s authenticity but this
professional courtesy was not extended. Additionally, the trial court could order the surveyor to file a
certified copy of the as-built survey with the court.
Washington App. No. 20CA15 24
witness testimony, i.e., the expert’s qualifications and methods. However, here the parties
agreed to retain this expert surveyor. The trial court found the expert acceptable and
ordered the parties to jointly share the costs. Any objection by DeepRock to Smith Land
Surveying’s expertise was waived when it agreed to use them as the expert – any error
was invited.
{¶49} Although the trial court’s rationale for denying DeepRock’s motion to strike
the court-ordered as-built survey was incorrect, the decision to deny it was not. Thus, the
error was harmless. We will consider the survey in our review of the parties’ assignments
or error.
C. Review of Civ.R. 56(G) Sanctions
{¶50} “ ‘Unless a motion to strike has been properly granted pursuant to Civ.R.
56(G), all evidence presented is to be evaluated by the trial court pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C)
before ruling.’ ” Pettiford v. Aggarwal, 126 Ohio St.3d 413, 2010-Ohio-3237, 934 N.E.2d
913, ¶ 24, quoting Byrd v. Smith, 110 Ohio St.3d 24, 2006-Ohio-3455, 850 N.E.2d 47, ¶
26. Civ.R. 56(G) provides:
(G) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
the other party to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
{¶51} DeepRock must show that the affidavits were made in “bad faith.” “Bad faith”
means “a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, conscious wrongdoing, breach of a known
duty through some ulterior motive or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud. It also
embraces actual intent to mislead or deceive another.” Slater v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co.,
Washington App. No. 20CA15 25
174 Ohio St. 148, 151, 187 N.E.2d 45, 48 (1962), overruled on other grounds by Zoppo
v. Homestead Ins. Co., 71 Ohio St.3d 552, 1994-Ohio-461, 644 N.E.2d 397 (1994). In
Deutsche Bank Trust Co. v. Fox, 5th Dist. No. 11CA0065, 2012-Ohio-2855, the appellate
court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Civ.R. 56(G) sanctions where the appellant argued
that the affiant “robo-signed” his affidavit without reading every paragraph or inspecting
the exhibits attached to it. The appellate court noted that there was “a dearth of Ohio case
law” interpreting “bad faith” as used in Civ.R. 56(G), so the court relied on case law from
Ohio federal district courts and held that “bad faith” is “where affidavits contained
perjurious or blatantly false allegations or omitted facts concerning central issues to the
resolution of the case.” Id at ¶ 30-31 (internal quotations omitted). “Sanctions under Rule
56 are ‘rare’ and the conduct involved must be ‘egregious.’ ” TCF Inventory Finance, Inc.
v. Northshore Outdoor, Inc., N.D. Ohio No. 1:11CV85, 2012 WL 2576367 (July 3, 2012);
Abdelkhaleq v. Precision Door of Akron, 653 F.Supp.2d 773, 787 (N.D. Ohio 2009).
“Additionally, courts have not awarded sanctions under Rule 56(g) ‘where a litigant’s
actions, even though wrongful, did not affect the disposition of the summary judgment
motion.’ ” Abdelkhaleq at 787.
{¶52} DeepRock’s motions focus exclusively on the “bad faith” component of
Civ.R. 56(G); there is no evidence in the record of “purposeful delay.” DeepRock argued
that Deem’s affidavit should be stricken because Deem’s affidavit states that Johnson
refused to execute a written easement for the pipeline on his Property but in his deposition
Deem testified that Johnson agreed to allow the pipeline to be built on his Property.
However, our review of the deposition shows that Deem testified that it was his
understanding that Johnson may have been in negotiations over a two-foot section of his
Washington App. No. 20CA15 26
Property. We find no inconsistency between Deem’s deposition testimony and his
affidavit. Johnson could have engaged in preliminary negotiations about a possible
easement across a small section of his Property and ultimately refused to execute a
written easement for the pipeline to cross a larger or different section of his Property.
{¶53} DeepRock also argued that Deem’s affidavit conflicted with Forté’s
deposition testimony concerning the level of Deem’s involvement in the Forté easement
transaction. In his affidavit, Deem testified that after he introduced Forté to Johnson and
Bailey Homestead, he had no further involvement. However, DeepRock contends that
this conflicts with Robin Forté’s deposition, who testified that funding for the easement
came from Deem and that an employee of Derow6 notarized the easement. Without
specific dates, this testimony is vague and imprecise concerning when Deem’s
involvement ended. Regardless, it cannot constitute bad faith by Deem. That Deem and
Forté – two different witnesses – may have conflicting testimony is not a basis to strike
Deem’s affidavit on bad faith grounds. DeepRock points to no evidence that Deem was
lying or intentionally deceptive. If a witness’s deposition testimony actually conflicts with
another witness’s affidavit about a material fact, then it may be grounds to deny summary
judgment. But it does not rise to the level of bad faith, which requires perjurious or
blatantly false facts concerning central issues to the resolution of the case.
{¶54} DeepRock argued that Johnson’s first affidavit contained false statements
and that Johnson admitted to “scanning over” the affidavit. However, the first affidavit
was submitted in support of the first summary judgment motion, which was withdrawn and
not considered by the trial court. There is no evidence the trial court considered evidence
6
Deem testified that Derow had no employees and instead used independent contractors to perform
services.
Washington App. No. 20CA15 27
supporting the withdrawn motion. Thus, there is no evidence that those affidavits affected
the disposition of the second summary judgment motion, which had separate, different
affidavits supporting it. Abdelkhaleq at 787 (courts have not awarded sanctions under
Rule 56(g) “where a litigant’s actions, even though wrongful, did not affect the disposition
of the summary judgment motion”). And, “scanning over” an affidavit is not the same as
providing perjurious and blatant false statements in it. See Deutsche Bank Trust Co.,
supra (robo-signing affidavit does not constitute bad faith).
{¶55} DeepRock argued that Johnson’s second affidavit falsely states that he
never agreed to the installation of the pipeline across the length of his property. It
contends that this statement conflicts with Johnson and, as previously discussed, Deem’s
deposition testimony. However, Johnson’s deposition testimony was that he had
preliminary discussions about the possibility of the pipeline cutting across a 15-foot corner
– not an installation across of the full length of his Property. We find no inconsistency in
his affidavit and his deposition testimony.
{¶56} Finally, DeepRock argued that Michael Bailey’s affidavit contained blatantly
false and perjurious statements concerning if and when Bailey had written notice of the
WES receivership. DeepRock contends that Bailey’s affidavit stated that he had no
knowledge of the WES receivership until after DeepRock filed its lawsuit in July 2017.
However, in his deposition Bailey testified that Johnson told him about the WES
receivership in December 2016, seven months earlier. In his deposition, Bailey testified
that Johnson told him there was a receivership, but did not explain what a receivership
was or what happens in one. Bailey testified that he did not do any research on his own
to figure out what a receivership was or what happens in one. Thus, reading Bailey’s
Washington App. No. 20CA15 28
affidavit and deposition testimony together, it appears that Bailey knew of the existence
of the WES receivership in December 2016, but did not have an understanding of the
WES receivership until seven months later when DeepRock filed its lawsuit. Thus,
Bailey’s affidavit statement “I had no knowledge of any receivership action in association
with WES until after the filing of the subject litigation” is inaccurate. A more accurate
statement would be that Bailey had knowledge of the existence of the WES receivership,
but no knowledge or understanding of the implications of the WES receivership until after
DeepRock filed its lawsuit. Regardless, DeepRock provided no evidence that Bailey’s
inaccurate statement was made with the requisite bad faith intent or an ulterior motive to
commit fraud, or that the timing of when Bailey learned of the WES receivership is a
central issue in the case.
{¶57} DeepRock also argued that Bailey made blatant bad faith falsehoods when
he testified that checks he received from WES in the sum of $6,000 and $300 were
reimbursement for attorney fees in connection with the establishment of a limited liability
company and the transfer of property to the limited liability company. DeepRock
speculates that the $6000 and $300 payments could not have been for setting up a limited
liability company and transferring the property because DeepRock contends that the
attorney fees for this work was $2,253.50 plus $1,496 for total fees of $3,749.50.
{¶58} We have reviewed Bailey’s deposition testimony and related exhibits and
do not find any inconsistency in his testimony about the $6,000 and $300 payments.
Bailey incurred expenses and attorney fees for two different legal services: (1) those
associated with setting up the Bailey Homestead LLC and related property transfers to
the Bailey Homestead –which appear to exceed $11,000 and (2) those associated with
Washington App. No. 20CA15 29
probating his mother’s estate – which may not have exceeded $2,253.50. In his affidavit,
Bailey testified that “WES * * * issued checks in the amount of $6,000 and $300 to Bailey
Homestead, which I understood to be reimbursement for attorney’s fees incurred * * * in
connection with the establishment of the limited liability company and the transfer of the
Property to that limited liability company.” In his deposition, Bailey testified that the $6,000
check was “paid for the LLC to get established and it reimbursed what was taken out that
was supposed to be transferred in.” DeepRock’s counsel showed Bailey a letter from
attorneys who were handling the probate estate of his mother, Hattie Grace Bailey, which
stated that the probate court had approved their attorney fees and the total amount due
is $2,253.50. The letter also discussed the final steps needed to finalize the estate.
Bailey testified that he did not know if $2,253.50 was the total amount of attorney fees or
if there were additional bills associated with handling her probate estate. Regardless, from
the face of the letter, which is marked “RE: Estate of Hattie Grace Bailey” the $2,253.50
were fees associated with the probate of the Hattie Bailey estate. Bailey also testified
that attorney fees in the sum of $1,496 were incurred to set up the Bailey Homestead LLC
and that an additional $10,000 in expenses were incurred to purchase and transfer a
sibling’s interest in the Property, making these total costs in excess of $11,000.
{¶59} DeepRock argued that because the $2,253.50 in probate estate attorney
fees and the $1,496 in the initial attorney fees associated with setting up the LLC did not
add up to $6,000, then the $6,000 payment could not possibly have been for attorney
fees. And because, in his deposition, Bailey agreed that mathematically the two attorney
fee figures did not add up to $6,000, DeepRock claims he is blatantly lying about the
purpose of the $6,000 payment. However, Bailey’s affidavit states that the $6,300 was
Washington App. No. 20CA15 30
reimbursement for attorney’s fees to set up the limited liability company and also
reimbursement for the transfer of the Property to the limited liability company, which
appears to include a $10,000 expense associated with a sibling buyout.7 And, in his
deposition, he qualified his responses, stating that he did not know the total amount of
attorney fees associated with his mother’s estate or the total attorney fees associated
with the Bailey Homestead LLC.
{¶60} Again, as with the others, we find Bailey’s affidavit does not contain material
inconsistencies; certainly not any inaccuracies that would constitute blatant falsehoods
intended to perpetuate a fraud under Civ.R. 56(G). We have reviewed all the arguments
DeepRock made in its first motion to strike, even those we have not discussed here in
detail, and we find nothing that constitutes bad faith. We affirm the trial court’s decision
denying DeepRock’s motion to strike the affidavits of Deem, Johnson, and Bailey.
However, we do so on alterative substantive grounds, not for mootness. As with the as-
built survey, we will consider the affidavits of Deem, Johnson and Bailey in determining
the merits of the appeal and cross-appeal.
D. Deem’s Supplemental Affidavit in Reply
{¶61} DeepRock’s second motion to strike addressed Deem’s supplemental
affidavit submitted with appellees’ reply brief. DeepRock argued that Civ.R. 56 does not
permit a party to obtain summary judgment by “ambush” by introducing new arguments
or evidence for the first time in a reply brief. DeepRock also argued that the affidavit
7 Bailey’s affidavit can be read two ways grammatically: (1) The $6,300 was to reimburse legal fees
associated with setting up the LLC and legal fees associated with the transfer of Property to the LLC or (2)
The $6,300 was to reimburse for legal fees associated with setting up the LLC and to reimburse for the
transfer of the Property to the LLC. In light of his deposition testimony it would appear that the latter reading
is the one intended.
Washington App. No. 20CA15 31
should be stricken under Evid. R. 1002 and 1004 because Deem destroyed documents
in bad faith. Appellees responded that Deem’s supplemental affidavit did not raise any
new grounds and was submitted to rebut arguments DeepRock raised in its memorandum
in opposition and that there was no evidence Deem destroyed documents.
{¶62} In its appellate brief, DeepRock focuses its argument on its motion to strike
affidavits on bad faith grounds under Civ.R. 56(G) and did not specifically address the
supplemental Deem affidavit submitted with the reply memorandum. However, because
its assignment of error broadly addressed both motions to strike, we will address it.
{¶63} Where the affidavit does not raise new grounds and is submitted to counter
evidence in a memorandum in opposition, there “is no general prohibition against
affidavits being timely submitted with reply briefs, but instead, is a practice that has been
utilized in other cases.” Cashlink, L.L.C. v. Mosin, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-395,
2012-Ohio-5906, ¶ 11. Here Deem’s supplemental affidavit addresses issues that were
previously raised in the case. The parties had knowledge that Deem had recorded some
right-of-way easements and retained 11 others after WES failed to pay some of Deem’s
invoices. The parties were also aware that Johnson and Bailey Homestead refused to
execute easements on the Properties. Deem gave deposition testimony concerning the
11 rights-of-way and testified that none of them were from Johnson or Bailey Homestead.
Deem also testified that he recorded memoranda of options with at the recorder’s office.
He submitted copies of those with his affidavit. These were public records directly related
to DeepRock’s pipeline, not “ambush evidence.”
{¶64} Additionally, there is no evidence that Deem lost or destroyed documents
in bad faith. Deem testified that he had turned them over to his attorney several years
Washington App. No. 20CA15 32
earlier and had not seen them since that time. Therefore, under Evid.R. 1004(1), the
original 11 rights-of-way are not required because they have been lost or destroyed
without evidence of bad faith.
{¶65} Again, we find that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it waited to
rule on, then denied as moot, DeepRock’s motion to strike Deem’s supplemental affidavit.
However, we find the error harmless because the motion to strike was properly denied.
The affidavit did not raise new grounds, was rebuttal evidence, and was not barred under
Evid.R. 1004(1).
{¶66} In sum, we find that the trial court erred when it denied as moot DeepRock’s
motions to strike. However, it was harmless error because the motions were properly
denied on substantive grounds. When reviewing the parties’ remaining assignments of
error, we will consider, as the trial court did, the court-ordered as-built survey, both Deem
affidavits, and the Johnson and Bailey affidavits. See Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio
St.3d 356, 604 N.E.2d 138 (1992). We overrule DeepRock’s second assignment of error.
V. DeepRock’s Appeal of Summary Judgment
A. Standard of Review
{¶67} We review the trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment de
novo. Smith v. McBride, 130 Ohio St.3d 51, 2011-Ohio-4674, 955 N.E.2d 954, ¶ 12.
Accordingly, we afford no deference to the trial court's decision and independently review
the record and the inferences that can be drawn from it to determine whether summary
judgment is appropriate. Harter v. Chillicothe Long–Term Care, Inc., 4th Dist. Ross No.
11CA3277, 2012-Ohio-2464, ¶ 12; Grimes v. Grimes, 4th Dist. Washington No. 08CA35,
2009-Ohio-3126, ¶ 16.
Washington App. No. 20CA15 33
{¶68} Summary judgment is appropriate only when the following have been
established: (1) that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) that reasonable minds can come
to only one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party. Civ.R.
56(C); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Levin, 128 Ohio St.3d 68, 2010-Ohio-6279, 941 N.E.2d 1187, ¶
15. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the record and
all inferences therefrom in the nonmoving party's favor. Civ.R. 56(C). The party moving
for summary judgment bears the initial burden to demonstrate that no genuine issues of
material fact exist and that they are entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law.
Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292–293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). To meet its burden,
the moving party must specifically refer to “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written
stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action,” that affirmatively demonstrate that the
nonmoving party has no evidence to support the nonmoving party's claims. Civ.R. 56(C);
Dresher at 293, 662 N.E.2d 264. Moreover, the trial court may consider evidence not
expressly mentioned in Civ.R. 56(C) if such evidence is incorporated by reference in a
properly framed affidavit pursuant to Civ.R. 56(E). Discover Bank v. Combs, 4th Dist.
Pickaway No. 11CA25, 2012-Ohio-3150, ¶ 17; Wagner v. Young, 4th Dist. Athens No.
CA1435, 1990 WL 119247, *4 (Aug. 8, 1990). Once that burden is met, the nonmoving
party then has a reciprocal burden to set forth specific facts to show that there is a genuine
issue for trial. Dresher at 293, 662 N.E.2d 264; Civ.R. 56(E). Am. Express Bank, FSB v.
Olsman, 2018-Ohio-481, 105 N.E.3d 369, ¶ 10-11 (4th Dist.).
Washington App. No. 20CA15 34
{¶69} For its first assignment of error, DeepRock contends that the trial court erred
in issuing its decision on the summary judgment motions. DeepRock identified four
issues: (1) the dismissal of its easement by estoppel claim; (2) the granting of appellees’
trespass claims; (3) the dismissal of its claim against the Forté Easements; and (4) the
dismissal of its tortious interference with business relationships, tortious interference with
contracts, and civil conspiracy claims.
B. Easement by Estoppel
{¶70} DeepRock alleged that Johnson and Bailey Homestead, the Landowners,
were aware of WES’s efforts to build a pipeline, consented to its location and construction
on their Properties, and never objected. Therefore, DeepRock contended that it has an
easement by estoppel. DeepRock did not seek summary judgment on its easement by
estoppel claim; the Landowners and Forté sought summary judgment that this claim be
dismissed.
{¶71} As an initial matter, DeepRock brought an easement by estoppel claim
because of two important undisputed facts: (1) DeepRock’s pipeline crosses the
Landowners’ Properties and (2) DeepRock (and the pipeline’s prior owner, WES) did not
have recorded written easements from the Landowners allowing the pipeline to cross the
Properties.
{¶72} The Supreme Court of Ohio recognizes only three ways to create an
easement: by deed, by prescription, or by implication. We recently discussed the
existence of the equitable remedy of estoppel to create an easement:
This court and other Ohio appellate courts have recognized
easements by estoppel. See Pinkerton, 2015-Ohio-377, at ¶ 32-33; Northwest
Ohio Properties, Ltd. v. County of Lucas, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-17-1190, 2018-
Ohio-4239, 2018 WL 5116596, ¶ 37-42; Von Stein v. Phenicie, 3d Dist. Crawford
Washington App. No. 20CA15 35
No. 3-13-18, 2014-Ohio-4872, 2014 WL 5510473, ¶ 74-77
(recognizing easements by estoppel but declining to find one under the
circumstances); Byham v. Pierce, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 13206, 1992 WL
127714, *2-3 (June 9, 1992). We have stated: “A landowner cannot remain silent
and permit another to spend money in reliance on a purported easement, when in
justice and equity the landowner should have asserted his conflicting rights. If he
fails to object, under these circumstances the landowner is estopped to deny
the easement.” (Emphasis added.) Pinkerton at ¶ 32. This standard is consistent
with Yeager, Kallner, and the purpose of equitable estoppel “ ‘to prevent actual or
constructive fraud and to promote the ends of justice.’ ” Doe, 116 Ohio St.3d 538,
2008-Ohio-67, 880 N.E.2d 892, at ¶ 7, quoting Ohio State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Frantz, 51 Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 555 N.E.2d 630 (1990).
Fling v. Daniel, 2019-Ohio-1723, 130 N.E.3d 319, ¶ 23 (4th Dist.) (“our research has not
revealed any cases in which the Supreme Court of Ohio has explicitly or implicitly
recognized easements by estoppel, it has also not revealed any cases in which that court
declined to recognize such an easement despite the presence of actual or constructive
fraud”). “The party seeking to establish an equitable easement must show (1) a
misrepresentation or fraudulent failure to speak, and (2) reasonable detrimental reliance.
Courts are generally reluctant, however, to find an easement by estoppel on the basis of
passive acquiescence.” (Citations omitted.) Arkes v. Gregg, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-
202, 2005-Ohio-6369, ¶ 27-28.
{¶73} The court in Maloney, infra, explained the challenges a claimant faces in
proving easement by estoppel:
Claimants alleging misrepresentation not only must prove that the alleged
statements were made but also must establish that those statements were
actually misrepresentations. Showing reliance presents additional
problems. An easement by estoppel claimant cannot rely on an assertion
that may be checked easily in the public records or that is contrary to
information in the claimant's possession. Moreover, the claimant must
change position personally; proof of reliance by third parties does not
suffice. Finally, what constitutes reliance depends on the facts and the
circumstances of the particular case. Locating improvements on the
dominant estate in order to take advantage of the represented easement
has been held to satisfy the reliance requirement. Expending money to
repair or improve a servient estate also evinces reliance.
Washington App. No. 20CA15 36
“Courts are reluctant to find an easement by estoppel on the basis of ‘mere
passive acquiescence.’ Nonetheless, under certain circumstances, equity
imposes an obligation to disclose information regarding the existence or
location of an easement. Such a duty may be found when the servient
estate owner observes the claimant improving the servient estate, but not
usually when the servient estate owner stands by while the claimant
improves his own property, the alleged dominant estate. Furthermore, there
is authority that an obligation to speak does not arise when a claimant is
already in possession of the relevant information.”
Maloney v. Patterson, 63 Ohio App.3d 405, 410, 579 N.E.2d 230, 233 (9th Dist.1989),
quoting Bruce & Ely, The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land (1988), Section 6.01.
{¶74} Johnson and Bailey Homestead argued that they were entitled to a
dismissal of DeepRock’s easement by estoppel claim because it was undisputed that they
never actively misled DeepRock’s predecessor that easements existed or fraudulently
failed to rebut WES’s belief in the existence of easements. Michael Bailey, the managing
member of Bailey Homestead, provided affidavit testimony that: (1) he did not agree
verbally or in writing to the installation of the pipeline on the Property, (2) there was no
written document between Bailey Homestead and WES that grants an easement to WES,
and (3) he informed both Deem, WES’s landman, and John Jack, WES’s chief executive
officer, that the pipeline’s presence on his Property constituted a trespass. John Jack
never returned Bailey’s telephone calls.
{¶75} Johnson also provided affidavit testimony that, although he gave two right-
of-way options to WES on two of his other properties, he never gave any verbal or written
authorization to WES for the construction or installation of the pipeline on the subject
Property. Johnson explained that his daughter lived on the Property and, due to the size
of the Property, he did not want the pipeline to negatively interfere with her enjoyment of
it. Johnson also testified that he notified Deem and John Jack that the pipeline
Washington App. No. 20CA15 37
construction constituted a trespass and that John Jack did not return his calls. Johnson’s
daughter also provided affidavit testimony and photographic evidence that she witnessed
and photographed the unauthorized pipeline construction in the fall of 2015 on her father’s
Property and telephoned her father and notified him of the activity.
{¶76} DeepRock argued in its memorandum in opposition that a genuine issue of
material fact existed as to whether it was entitled to an easement by estoppel because,
“aside from their self-serving testimony,” “there is no evidence that Landowners [Johnson
and Bailey Homestead] ever raised objections to the Pipeline” until a year after the
pipeline was installed. DeepRock argued that the construction workers WES hired to
clear, excavate and install the pipeline were not told by the Landowners that they were
trespassing. DeepRock included affidavit testimony from three people who worked on the
pipeline construction that stated that no landowner ever accused them of trespassing or
otherwise told them that they had no authority to be on the lands during the pipeline
construction.
{¶77} DeepRock also included an affidavit from Christyann Chavez, who testified
that she was familiar with the books and records of DeepRock and the WES records
DeepRock obtained through the receivership sale. Chavez testified that WES’s landman,
Deem, did not send any written correspondence to WES informing it that the landman
had not obtained easements from Bailey Homestead or Johnson. DeepRock also argued
that WES sent Bailey Homestead several checks that Bailey did not adequately explain,
and that Johnson admitted to agreeing to allow the pipeline to cross a corner of his
Property. Finally, DeepRock argued that statements or omissions made by WES’s
Washington App. No. 20CA15 38
landman, Deem, prevented the Landowners from denying the existence of easements on
their Properties.
{¶78} In reply, as rebuttal to DeepRock’s argument that statements or omissions
by WES’s own landman Deem estopped the Landowners from denying the existence of
an easement, Bailey Homestead and Johnson submitted the affidavit testimony of Deem.
Deem testified that he was contacted by John Jack of WES to serve as the professional
landman to obtain easements for the pipeline project. However, WES stopped paying his
invoices and Deem terminated his contract with WES for nonpayment. Deem testified that
Johnson refused to negotiate an easement on his Property and Bailey Homestead never
agreed to negotiate an easement on the Property. As a result, Deem did not have or
provide documentation to WES for easements on either the Bailey Homestead or
Johnson Properties.
{¶79} The trial court reviewed the evidence submitted by the parties in support of
and against the dismissal of the easement by estoppel claim and found, “plaintiff does not
have an easement by estoppel.” “The court dismisses Count V [easement by estoppel] of
the First Amended Complaint * * *.” Though it is not clear from the decision the rationale
for the trial court’s determination, our review of the evidence supports the trial court’s
decision to dismiss DeepRock’s easement by estoppel claim.
{¶80} The Landowners submitted evidence that they did not agree verbally or in
writing to provide an easement to WES for the pipeline to cross their Properties. They
also testified that they made timely objections to the pipeline construction by contacting
WES’s landman, Deem, and WES’s Chief Executive Officer, John Jacks. DeepRock did
not provide any evidence that Bailey Homestead or Johnson made a misrepresentation
Washington App. No. 20CA15 39
to WES or its agents concerning a pipeline easement. To the contrary, Deem submitted
an affidavit in which he affirmatively stated that he did not obtain easements from Bailey
Homestead and Johnson. Deem also testified that he repeatedly told WES that the
pipeline trespassed across the Bailey Homestead and Johnson Properties and Deem also
informed the WES receiver of the trespass prior to the receivership sale.8 DeepRock
provided no testimony from either Deem or John Jack denying that they were contacted
by Bailey Homestead or Johnson with objections or concerns about the pipeline
construction on their Properties. The affidavit testimony DeepRock provided from the
three construction workers does not conflict with Bailey or Johnson’s testimony. The law
does not require that Bailey Homestead and Johnson voice their objections to the
construction workers. It is sufficient that they voiced them directly to WES’s landman and
CEO.
{¶81} DeepRock’s affidavit from Chavez also fails to establish any
misrepresentation by the Landowners. Chavez testified that Deem did not send a written
correspondence that he had not obtained easements from the Landowners. First, Deem
was WES’s agent, not Bailey Homestead or Johnson’s agent. Deem’s statements or lack
thereof do not constitute misrepresentations by the Landowners. That WES’s files contain
no letter from Deem about easements from Bailey Homestead and Johnson simply
means Deem made no written representations upon which WES could reasonably rely –
a fact which could only hurt, not help, DeepRock’s estoppel claim.
8 The receivership order confirming the sale of WES assets, which DeepRock submitted in support of its
summary judgment motion, shows that the parties to the receivership were aware of the easement dispute
on the Bailey Homestead and Johnson Properties. Immediately after acquiring the pipeline, DeepRock was
given an opportunity to conduct discovery on issues related to the easement dispute, i.e., issue a subpoena
to Derow asking to inspect the 11 rights-of-way purportedly retained by Derow and/or request permission
to perform an as-built survey. There is no evidence in the record that DeepRock undertook any such efforts
at that time.
Washington App. No. 20CA15 40
{¶82} Finally, as we addressed in reviewing DeepRock’s second assignment of
error, Michael Bailey explained in his deposition and in his affidavit that he understood
that the payments he received from WES were reimbursements for fees and expenses
associated with setting up and transferring land to the Bailey Homestead LLC. DeepRock
speculates that these payments were actually for an easement, but DeepRock provided
no affidavit or deposition testimony from anyone to support its speculation. “Mere
speculation and unsupported conclusory assertions are not sufficient to meet the
nonmovant's reciprocal burden under Civ.R. 56(E) to withstand summary judgment.”
Bank of New York Mellon v. Bobo, 2015-Ohio-4601, 50 N.E.3d 229, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.).
{¶83} Similarly, we addressed DeepRock’s contention that Johnson gave
inconsistent deposition testimony that he had verbal discussions about the pipeline
possibly cutting across a 15-foot corner of his Property. This is neither an inconsistent
statement nor a misrepresentation and cannot form the basis for DeepRock’s estoppel
defense. Even if we assume arguendo that Johnson’s preliminary discussion was an
actual misrepresentation, it strains reason to believe that a business entity engaged in
wastewater disposal operations would rely on casual verbal discussions and word-of-
mouth promises instead of properly executed easements to commence a multi-million-
dollar pipeline project. The reliance must be “reasonable.” “An easement by estoppel
claimant cannot rely on an assertion that may be checked easily in the public records or
that is contrary to information in the claimant’s possession.” (Emphasis added.) Maloney,
63 Ohio App.3d at 410. WES had no written easements from Bailey Homestead or
Johnson in its possession before constructing the pipeline across the Properties. If WES
believed these Landowners had promised to grant easements, it could have checked its
Washington App. No. 20CA15 41
own records and confirmed whether it had written easements from them prior to
commencing pipeline construction across their Properties.
{¶84} We find that the trial court properly ruled in appellees’ favor and against
DeepRock on DeepRock’s easement by estoppel claim. We affirm the dismissal of Count
V (Easement by Estoppel) of DeepRock’s First Amended Complaint.
C. Bailey Homestead & Johnson’s Trespass Claims
{¶85} DeepRock contends that the trial court erred in granting Bailey Homestead
and Johnson summary judgment in their favor on their counterclaim for trespass (Count
1, Amended Counterclaims). Bailey Homestead and Johnson’s counterclaims seek a
declaratory judgment that the pipeline trespasses on the Bailey Homestead Property and
the Johnson Property. Forté sought a declaratory judgment that the pipeline “is located
on real property whereby Forté owns a general, exclusive easement.” We will address
the trial court’s ruling on the Forté Easement separately in subpart D.
{¶86} DeepRock argues that the trial court’s declaratory judgment that the pipeline
trespasses on the Properties is erroneous because the trial court relied on the as-built
survey, which was not properly authenticated. DeepRock also argues that it has an
easement by estoppel and therefore is authorized to have its pipeline on the Properties.
{¶87} “The essential elements necessary to state a cause of action
in trespass are: (1) an unauthorized intentional act, and (2) entry upon land in the
possession of another.” Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 716,
622 N.E.2d 1153, 1161 (4th Dist.1993). The parties do not contest that Bailey Homestead
and Johnson are the landowners of the Properties at issue. The material issue is whether
DeepRock’s pipeline crosses the Properties without permission.
Washington App. No. 20CA15 42
{¶88} We have already determined that the trial court properly denied DeepRock’s
motion to strike the court-ordered as-built survey. The survey was properly authenticated
and was considered by the trial court in reviewing the parties’ summary judgment
motions.9 The survey shows that the pipeline crosses Bailey Homestead Property and
crosses 1013 linear feet of that parcel and the pipeline crosses Johnson’s Property and
crosses 197 linear feet of that parcel. The survey also contains notes concerning the
survey methods used.
{¶89} DeepRock submitted an affidavit from Mr. Smith, the owner of the court-
ordered surveying company, that included a letter he sent explaining that he was not the
person who performed the survey and he had only limited involvement in the project.
Thus, he contended that the initial “authentication” affidavit sent by appellees’ counsel,
which named Mr. Smith as the surveyor, was false and misstated. Most importantly, Mr.
Smith’s affidavit testimony does not dispute the authenticity or accuracy of the survey,
dispute the survey’s findings, or criticize the methods set out in the survey notes. Thus,
DeepRock provided no alternate survey or expert witness testimony that conflicted with,
disputed, or provided alternative boundary lines to those set out in the survey. See Viars
v. Ironton, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 16CA8, 2016-Ohio-4912, ¶ 34 (summary judgment was
appropriate where opponent “argued that there were genuine issues of material fact about
his northern property line” but “did not hire a professional surveyor to survey his property
and presented no alternative northern boundary line for the trial court's consideration”).
9The trial court found that the appellees did not present sufficient “verification of the accuracy of the survey.”
However, as we discussed in addressing the denial of the motion to strike the survey, the survey was
properly authenticated and shows that the pipeline crosses the Properties. DeepRock produced no
evidence to contradict the accuracy of the survey, nor did it propose alternate boundaries. Crucially,
DeepRock admitted in its reply to the counterclaims that the pipeline crosses the Properties. Any dispute
over the linear footage findings in the survey goes to the amount of trespass damages to which the
Landowners might be entitled as requested in Count 2 of Amended Counterclaims.
Washington App. No. 20CA15 43
{¶90} Moreover, DeepRock admitted in its reply to Bailey Homestead and
Johnson’s counterclaims that the pipeline crossed these properties: “Plaintiff admits that
the Pipeline crosses into the Johnson Property * * * Plaintiff admits that the Pipeline
crosses into the Bailey Homestead Property and that Plaintiff owns and operates the
Pipeline * * *.”
{¶91} DeepRock argues on appeal that Forté and the Landowners’ trespass
claims are “incompatible” because if DeepRock is trespassing and the Forté Easements
are valid, “then the trespass claim belongs to Forté,” not the Landowners. DeepRock
cites no case law to support this novel argument that a property owner that has granted
an easement loses its right to enforce trespass claims against other, unauthorized
intruders. We reject it.
{¶92} The trial court properly issued a declaratory judgment that DeepRock, as
the current owner of the pipeline, is trespassing on the Bailey Homestead and Johnson
Properties (Count 1, Amended Counterclaim).
D. Forté Easements
{¶93} DeepRock brought a declaratory judgment claim to have the Forté
Easements declared “null and void as a result of them being established in contravention
of the Stay Order and Sales Procedure Injunction” (Count 2, First Amended Complaint).
Forté brought a declaratory judgment claim that “the subject Pipeline is located on real
property whereby Forté owns a general, exclusive easement (Count 1, Amended
Counterclaim).
{¶94} DeepRock argued that it was entitled to summary judgment that the Forté
Easements were invalid for three reasons: (1) the doctrines of champerty and/or
Washington App. No. 20CA15 44
maintenance; (2) they violated the WES receivership stay order; and (3) they do not define
with sufficient accuracy the location of the right-of-way.
{¶95} The trial court granted Forté’s declaratory judgment and dismissed
DeepRock’s. The trial court rejected DeepRock’s arguments that the Forté Easements
were invalid: (1) as “champerty and maintenance” or (2) for violating the stay order issued
in WES’s receivership case. The trial court also rejected DeepRock’s contention that the
easements were invalid because they were not specifically described.
{¶96} The Supreme Court of Ohio defines champerty and maintenance as follows:
“Maintenance” is assistance to a litigant in pursuing or defending a lawsuit
provided by someone who does not have a bona fide interest in the case.
“Champerty” is a form of maintenance in which a nonparty undertakes to
further another's interest in a suit in exchange for a part of the litigated
matter if a favorable result ensues. “The doctrines of champerty and
maintenance were developed at common law to prevent officious
intermeddlers from stirring up strife and contention by vexatious and
speculative litigation which would disturb the peace of society, lead to
corrupt practices, and prevent the remedial process of the law.”
The ancient practices of champerty and maintenance have been vilified in
Ohio since the early years of our statehood. We stated in Key that
maintenance “is an offense against public justice, as it keeps alive strife and
contention, and perverts the remedial process of the law into an engine of
oppression.” We have held the assignment of rights to a lawsuit to be void
as champerty We have also said “that the law of Ohio will tolerate no lien in
or out of the [legal] profession, as a general rule, which will prevent litigants
from compromising, or settling their controversies, or which, in its
tendencies, encourages, promotes, or extends litigation.” (Citations
omitted.)
Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 99 Ohio St.3d 121, 2003-Ohio-2721, 789
N.E.2d 217, ¶ 10-11.
{¶97} DeepRock argues that Forté is “an officious intermeddler with no bona fide
interest in this dispute,” is “funding the litigation,” will “share recovery” with the
Washington App. No. 20CA15 45
Landowners, and “is stirring up the type of strife that the doctrines of champerty and
maintenance are designed to avoid.”
{¶98} Yet, Forté obtained pipeline easements from Johnson and Bailey
Homestead in late 2016 and publicly recorded them in 2016, before DeepRock purchased
the pipeline in January 2017. Then in July 2017, DeepRock – not Forté – brought an
action naming Forté as a defendant. Because Forté has valid easements on the relevant
Properties, it has a bona fide interest in the case and because it was sued by DeepRock,
it is a party to the litigation. The trial court’s review of the applicable caselaw was correct
and it soundly rejected this argument.
{¶99} Next DeepRock argued that the Forté Easements violated the WES
receivership stay order because Forté acquired the easements “to advance potential
claims against WES” and “diminish the value of WES’ assets through a threat of litigation.”
DeepRock provided no evidence that any party filed a contempt motion against Bailey
Homestead, Johnson, or Forté in the receivership case and no evidence that the
receivership court issued any orders holding these parties in contempt for any stay
violations. Moreover, according to DeepRock, the stay order was designed to protect
WES assets. WES did not own the Bailey Homestead or Johnson Properties – those
Properties were not WES’s assets. WES did not have recorded easements across the
Bailey Homestead and Johnson Properties. Bailey Homestead and Johnson were free to
do as they wished with their properties and could sell them, lease them, or grant
easements to Forté. In essence, DeepRock’s argument is that because WES’s pipeline
crossed their Properties, the Landowners could not give valid easements to anyone else
Washington App. No. 20CA15 46
as that might result in trespass litigation and a devaluation of the pipeline. The trial court
properly rejected this argument.
{¶100} Last, DeepRock argues that the easements were invalid because
they violated the statute of frauds for failing to identify the location of the rights-of-way.
DeepRock is not a party to the Forté Easements and lacks standing to raise the statute
of frauds. “As a matter of common law contract, ‘a defense under the statute of frauds is
personal to the parties to the transaction and cannot be availed of by third parties.’ ”
Blain's Folding Serv., Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 2018-Ohio-959, 109 N.E.3d 177, ¶ 4-5
(8th Dist.), quoting Texeramics v. United States, 239 F.2d 762, 764 (5th Cir.1957); Legros
v. Tarr, 44 Ohio St.3d 1, 8, 540 N.E.2d 257 (1989), quoting Bradkin v. Leverton, 26 N.Y.2d
192, 199, 309 N.Y.S.2d 192, 257 N.E.2d 643 (1970) (“ ‘where a third party is concerned,
the Statute of Frauds provides no defense to him’ ”); Edwards Mfg. Co. v. Bradford Co.,
294 F. 176, 181 (2d Cir.1923) (“the defense of the statute of frauds is personal to the
contracting parties”); see also Delaware Golf Club, LLC v. Dornoch Estates Homeowners
Assn., Inc., 5th Dist. Delaware No. 19 CAE 04 0027, 2020-Ohio-880, ¶ 43 (“If there is no
specific delineation of the easement, or if the document is ambiguous, the court must then
look to the circumstances surrounding the transaction in order to determine the intent of
the parties” – the court does not declare the easement invalid). The trial court properly
rejected this argument.
{¶101} The trial court properly dismissed DeepRock’s declaratory judgment
claim that the Forté Easements were invalid (Count 2, First Amended Complaint) and
granted Forté’s declaratory judgment that DeepRock’s pipeline is located on the Bailey
Washington App. No. 20CA15 47
Homestead and Johnson Properties whereby Forté owns a general, exclusive easement
(Count 1 – Amended Counterclaim).
E. Tortious Interference with Business Relationships,
Tortious Interference with Contracts, and Civil Conspiracy
{¶102} DeepRock brought claims against Derow, Deem, and Forté alleging
that WES, and DeepRock as its successor, held ongoing business relationships and
contracts with Bailey Homestead and Johnson for easements through the Properties.
DeepRock alleged that Deem, Derow and Forté contacted Bailey Homestead and
Johnson and induced them to discontinue their relationships and contracts with
DeepRock and, instead, provide easements to Forté. DeepRock alleged that this behavior
constituted tortious interference with business relationships, tortious interference with
contracts and a civil conspiracy (Counts 6, 7, and 8, First Amended Complaint).
{¶103} Deem, Derow, and Forté moved for summary judgment and sought
the dismissal of these claims on the ground that there was no contract and/or business
relationship between WES and the Landowners and the civil conspiracy claim requires
the existence of an unlawful act independent from the actual conspiracy, which does not
exist. DeepRock opposed the motion, arguing that the payments that WES made to the
Landowners established the existence of a business relationship and there remained
genuine issues concerning whether written easements existed between WES and the
Landowners. DeepRock also argued that Forté engaged in extortion when it asked
DeepRock to either move the pipeline or provide monetary compensation to Forté and
the Landowners for the use of their Properties.
{¶104} The trial court found that the Landowners granted Forté easements
on their Property in late 2016, a year after the pipeline construction was complete. During
Washington App. No. 20CA15 48
that time WES did not have a business relationship with the Landowners, the parties did
not have a contract at any time, and WES was a trespasser. For these reasons the trial
court dismissed DeepRock’s tortious interference with business relationships/contracts
claims and the civil conspiracy claim.
{¶105} “The elements of the tort of tortious interference with contract are (1)
the existence of a contract, (2) the wrongdoer's knowledge of the contract, (3) the
wrongdoer's intentional procurement of the contract's breach, (4) lack of justification, and
(5) resulting damages.” Fred Siegel Co., L.P.A. v. Arter & Hadden, 85 Ohio St.3d 171,
1999-Ohio-260, 707 N.E.2d 853, paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶106} DeepRock’s claim for tortious interference with contract fails
because it is undisputed that the Landowners did not grant easements to WES. Both
Bailey Homestead and Johnson testified that they did not grant easements to WES. Deem
testified that he did not obtain written easements from the Landowners for the WES
pipeline. DeepRock has provided no written easements or testimony that written
easements existed between the Landowners and WES. Because DeepRock has failed to
prove the existence of a contract, the trial court properly dismissed its tortious interference
with contract claim (Count 7) on the ground that the parties never had a contract at any
time.
{¶107} “The elements of tortious interference with a business relationship
are: (1) a business relationship; (2) the tortfeasor's knowledge thereof; (3) an intentional
interference causing a breach or termination of the relationship; and (4) damages
resulting therefrom.” Martin v. Jones, 2015-Ohio-3168, 41 N.E.3d 123, ¶ 63 (4th Dist.).
Washington App. No. 20CA15 49
{¶108} Johnson testified that he agreed to allow WES to cross two other
properties (not the subject of this lawsuit) and he received payments from WES. Johnson
also testified that he allowed WES to park equipment on the disputed Property and in
exchange received a $500 payment. However, Johnson testified that he discovered that
WES constructed the pipeline on his Property without his permission. He contacted
WES’s landman, Deem, and objected. Johnson also testified that he had several
conversations about WES’s trespass with WES’s CEO John Jack. Johnson testified that
he became increasingly frustrated with WES as he could not get the situation resolved.
He described his final discussion with WES, which occurred in late 2015 or early 2016:
Johnson: * * * The last conversation that I had with Jack was one day he
decided to answer the phone; and when he decided to answer the phone, I
told him, I said, ‘You trespassed on me. You need to do something about
this.’ And he said, ‘It’s my pipeline.’ And I said, ‘Stay the F off. You’re
trespassing.’ From then on, I never talked to John Jack again.
{¶109} Construing the evidence most strongly in DeepRock’s favor, we find
that Johnson had a business relationship with WES during the construction of the pipeline
beginning in May 2015 and through the fall of 2015, which ended in November or
December 2015 when Johnson discovered the pipeline had been built on his Property,
expressed his objections, and was unable to get a meaningful response from WES.
{¶110} Likewise, Bailey Homestead appeared to have a business
relationship with WES in the summer and fall of 2015 as reflected by the testimony of
Michael Bailey about WES giving him financial assistance with the estate, the
establishment of the LLC, and related property transfer expenses. However, like the
Johnson business relationship, WES’s business relationship with Bailey Homestead
Washington App. No. 20CA15 50
disintegrated after WES constructed the pipeline on the Property without permission and
Bailey objected but could not get a satisfactory response from WES.
{¶111} Bailey testified that he was not contacted by Forté until December
2016, a year after their business relationship with WES ended and Johnson testified that
he was first introduced to Forté sometime after WES was placed in receivership, which
occurred in July 2016. Therefore, by the time both Johnson and Bailey Homestead were
introduced to Forté, WES no longer had a business relationship with either of them.
Because there was no business relationship at the time Forté became involved in late
2016, the trial court properly granted summary judgment dismissing DeepRock’s tortious
interference with business relationship claim (Count 6, First Amended Complaint).
{¶112} To prove a civil conspiracy claim, DeepRock must show: (1) a
malicious combination, (2) involving two or more persons, (3) causing injury to person or
property, and (4) the existence of an unlawful act independent from the conspiracy itself.
A civil conspiracy claim is derivative and cannot be maintained absent an underlying tort
that is actionable without the conspiracy. Mender v. Chauncey, 2015-Ohio-4105, 41
N.E.3d 1289, ¶ 29 (4th Dist.).
{¶113} DeepRock alleged that the underlying tortious interference claims
constituted the unlawful acts independent from the conspiracy itself and provide the fourth
element of its civil conspiracy claim. However, we affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of
the tortious interference with business relationship/contracts claims. Because those
claims were properly dismissed, we find that the trial court did not err in granting summary
judgment and dismissing DeepRock’s dependent claim of civil conspiracy (Count 8). A
civil action for civil conspiracy requires a viable claim distinct from the conspiracy in order
Washington App. No. 20CA15 51
for the conspiracy claim to survive. Because the tortious interference claims were properly
dismissed, there can be no surviving civil conspiracy claim.
{¶114} Additionally, we reject DeepRock’s contention that its civil conspiracy
claim is based on an alleged extortion by Forté. In our previous determinations, we found
that: (1) the pipeline crosses the Properties; (2) DeepRock is a trespasser because it has
no written easements and no easements by estoppel; and (3) the Forté Easements are
not invalid. Forté and the Landowners asked DeepRock to either move the pipeline or
provide monetary compensation for the use of their Properties. This is not extortion, but
the lawful protection of their property rights and interests. See R.C. 2905.11 (Extortion).
{¶115} Construing the record and all inferences from it in DeepRock’s favor,
we find that no genuine issues of material fact exist and appellees are entitled to summary
judgment in their favor and against DeepRock for the dismissal of DeepRock’s easement
by estoppel, tortious interference with business relationships, tortious interference with
contract, and civil conspiracy claims – Counts 5, 6, 7, and 8 of First Amended Complaint.
Appellees are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on their counterclaim for a
declaratory judgment that DeepRock is a trespasser because its pipeline crosses the
Properties on which Forté owns a general exclusive easement – Count 1 of the First
Amended Counterclaims. And, appellees are entitled to summary judgment in their favor
dismissing DeepRock’s declaratory judgment claim seeking to invalidate the Forté
Easements – Count 2 of First Amended Complaint. We affirm the trial court’s judgment
on these claims. DeepRock’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Washington App. No. 20CA15 52
VI. Cross-appellants’ Appeal of Summary Judgment
{¶116} For their sole assignment of error, cross-appellants contend that the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment to DeepRock on DeepRock’s request for
a declaratory judgment that WES assets were sold free and clear of any claims the cross-
appellants had against WES assets, “including any claim for trespass and the Forté
Easements” (Count 3, First Amended Complaint).
A. Standard of Review
{¶117} The de novo standard of review applicable to our review of
DeepRock’s first assignment of error set out in Part V, A, is also applicable to our review
of the cross-appellants’ sole assignment of error.
B. Declaratory Judgment that WES Assets were Sold Free and Clear
of Liens, Claims and Encumbrances
{¶118} In its motion for partial summary judgment, DeepRock argued that it
was entitled to summary judgment on its request for a declaratory judgment that it
acquired WES’s assets free and clear of any claims, liens or encumbrances because: (1)
the Forté Easements are invalid (a claim we find was properly rejected and dismissed,
the Forté Easements are not invalid) and (2) Deem, Derow and the Landowners “have
asserted claims that are barred by * * * sales-related orders in the receivership
proceeding.” DeepRock argued that “the only manner for recovery by unsecured
creditors of WES was through the receivership claims process that they [the cross-
appellants] did not participate in.”
{¶119} DeepRock submitted the affidavit of WES’s receiver’s attorney,
Myron Terlecky, who explained the receivership claims approval process. According to
Mr. Terlecky’s testimony and documents and orders entered in the receivership case, the
Washington App. No. 20CA15 53
receivership court approved a claim approval process so that creditors who had claims
against WES could file them. Deem, Derow, Bailey Homestead, and Johnson did not file
a claim in the WES receivership. Also, as part of the receivership case, the sale of WES
assets occurred on December 6, 2106 to DeepRock.10 Shortly after the sale, the
receivership court issued an order confirming that WES assets “will be transferred to
Buyer free and clear of all liens, claims and encumbrances arising either before or after
the appointment of the Receiver. Any such liens shall attach to the proceeds of sale, in
their respective amounts and priority.” The order also provided that DeepRock “shall not
be deemed a successor of [WES] and shall incur no successor liability for any obligation
of [WES] as a result of the sale of the Acquired Assets to [DeepRock], other than those
related to the Assumed Liabilities.”
{¶120} DeepRock argued that the sale of the WES assets to it cut off all
claims of WES’s creditors against the assets. DeepRock cited Park Natl. Bank v. Cattani,
187 Ohio App.3d 186, 189, 2010-Ohio-1291, 931 N.E.2d 623 (12th Dist.). In Cattani, Park
National Bank filed a complaint to foreclose on a mortgage on real property consisting of
a gas station, convenience store and fast-food restaurant. A junior lienholder, Lykins Oil
Company, filed an answer and cross-claim in the foreclosure action asserting an interest
in the real property via its junior lien. A receiver was appointed and the trial court entered
an order authorizing the receiver to sell the real property and personal property “ ‘free and
clear of all liens and encumbrances,’ whereby any claims by those with an interest in the
property would be subsequently attached to the net proceeds in order of priority.” Id. at ¶
10 A company known as Funds Protection Investment, LLC was the successful bidder that eventually
assigned its bid to DeepRock. This transaction is not relevant to this litigation and, for simplicity, we refer
to DeepRock as the successful bidder and buyer.
Washington App. No. 20CA15 54
6. Lykins Oil Company appealed arguing that the order to sell the real property free and
clear of its lien was contrary to law. The appellate court disagreed:
The Supreme Court of Ohio has interpreted R.C. 2735.04 “ ‘as enabling the
trial court to exercise its sound judicial discretion to limit or expand a
receiver's powers as it deems appropriate.’ ” Norris v. Dudley, Franklin App.
No. 07AP–425, 2007-Ohio-6646, 2007 WL 4340263, ¶ 21, quoting State ex
rel. Celebrezze v. Gibbs (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 69, 74, 573 N.E.2d 62. As a
result, because R.C. Chapter 2735 “does not contain any restrictions on
what the court may authorize when it issues orders regarding receivership
property,” we find that this includes the power to authorize a receiver, under
certain circumstances, to sell property at a private sale free and clear of all
liens and encumbrances. Quill v. Troutman Ents., Inc., Montgomery App.
No. 20536, 2005-Ohio-2020, 2005 WL 994676, ¶ 34; see also Ohio Director
of Transp. v. Eastlake Land Dev. Co., 177 Ohio App.3d 379, 2008-Ohio-
3013, 894 N.E.2d 1255, ¶ 49–51 (Gallagher, P.J., dissenting); see,
e.g., Regions Bank v. Egyptian Concrete Co. (E.D.Mo.2009), No. 4:09–CV–
1260 CAS, 2009 WL 4431133 (stating that “it has long been recognized that
under appropriate circumstances, a federal court presiding over a
receivership may authorize the assets of the receivership to be sold free
and clear of liens and related claims”); John T. Callahan & Sons Inc. v.
Dykeman Elec. Co. Inc. (D.Mass.2003), 266 F.Supp.2d 208, 222 (noting
that “notwithstanding the absence of an express power to sell assets free
and clear of claims,” the court had the implied power to sell assets free and
clear of creditors' claims in a private sale); but see Au v. Au Rustproofing
Ctr., Inc. (July 3, 1984), Richland App. No. CA–2227, 1984 WL 4959.
Cattani at ¶ 13 (footnote omitted). Like the receiver in Cattani, the WES receiver was
authorized to sell the WES assets free and clear of all liens, claims, and encumbrances
arising before or after the appointment of the receiver. Like Cattani, any claim by those
with an interest in the assets would attach to the net proceeds in order of priority.
{¶121} Thus, if Deem, Derow, Bailey Homestead, or Johnson had any liens,
claims or encumbrances against WES assets, those would have been removed from the
assets and attached to the net proceeds from the sale. However, there was no evidence
presented in this action by any of these parties that they had any lien, claim, or
encumbrance against WES’s assets. Deem, Derow, and the Landowners presented no
Washington App. No. 20CA15 55
evidence of any security agreements, mechanic’s liens, mortgages, judicial liens, or other
claims to WES’s assets. A lien is “a charge or security or encumbrance upon property. A
claim or charge on property for payment of some debt, obligation or duty. Qualified right
of property which a creditor has in or over specific property of the debtor, as security for
the debt or charge or for performance of some act. * * *The word ‘lien’ is a generic term
and, standing alone, includes liens acquired by contract or by operation of law.” (Citations
omitted.) Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed.1979). A claim against an asset is an action in
rem, i.e., an action against the property. Guernsey Bank v. Milano Sports Ents. L.L.C.,
177 Ohio App.3d 314, 2008-Ohio-2420, 894 N.E.2d 715, ¶ 68 (10th Dist.) (claim to
enforce mechanic’s lien is a claim against property). An encumbrance is “ ‘a claim, lien,
charge, or liability attached to and binding real property; e.g. a mortgage * * *.’ ” Griffin v.
First Natl. Acceptance Co., 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2012-T-0075, 2013-Ohio-4302, ¶ 25,
quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed.1991).
{¶122} We find that although WES’s assets were sold free and clear of liens,
claims and encumbrances, this finding has no relevance to this action. Deem, Derow, and
the Landowners are not asserting any liens, claims or encumbrances against the WES
assets.
{¶123} However, Deem and Derow are seeking to recover monies owed
them by WES for unpaid invoices in the sum of $10,716.85. We agree that those claims
could have been filed in the receivership proceeding. The claims process described in
Mr. Terlecky’s affidavit testimony and related exhibits stated that the purpose of the
receivership was to liquidate WES’s assets in an attempt to maximize returns to creditors.
Deem and Derow could have submitted a claim and attached the invoices as
Washington App. No. 20CA15 56
documentation of the claim to be considered in any distribution of funds at the conclusion
of the receivership case.
{¶124} DeepRock is not liable to Deem and Derow for the unpaid invoices,
either as a successor-in-interest to WES or via the contract between WES and Derow.
Derow and Deem alleged that they terminated the contract with WES in April/May 2016,
after WES failed to pay the invoices within the 15-day time period set out in a demand
letter by Derow’s attorney. In the Asset Purchase Agreement attached to DeepRock’s
First Amended Complaint, DeepRock specifically identified the ongoing contractual
obligations of WES, as well as the liabilities it was assuming under Schedule 1.1(a) and
Schedule 1.1(b). Derow, Deem and WES’s contract for services rendered during the
pipeline’s planning and construction phase was not identified as an Assumed Contract
under Schedule1.1(a). And, the unpaid invoices were not listed as an Assumed Liability
under Schedule 1.1(b). Therefore, DeepRock has no rights or obligations in the contract
between Deem, Derow and WES.
{¶125} We also find that Bailey Homestead and Johnson had claims against
WES for trespass that arose when WES constructed the pipeline across the Properties.
WES continued to trespass until the pipeline was sold in the receivership and WES no
longer owned it. Those claims for trespass and related damages caused by WES’s
clearing the land and constructing and maintaining the pipeline on the Properties up
through the receivership sale of the pipeline cannot be brought against DeepRock as a
successor to WES. The order confirming the sale specifically provided that DeepRock is
not a successor of WES and shall incur no successor liability for any of WES’s obligations.
DeepRock argued that these pre-sale trespass claims against WES are barred in its
Washington App. No. 20CA15 57
motion for partial summary judgment: “The Landowners claims for trespass by WES are
also without merit, as such claims accrued prior to the sale of WES’ assets to DeepRock.”
{¶126} However, after DeepRock purchased the pipeline, DeepRock took
no steps to remove the pipeline off the Bailey Homestead and Johnson Properties.
DeepRock’s trespass began when it acquired the pipeline and continues for as long as
the pipeline crosses the Properties without permission. Bailey Homestead and Johnson
have the right to bring trespass claims for damages against DeepRock commencing on
the date DeepRock acquired the pipeline and up to the time that either DeepRock obtains
permission for the pipeline to cross the Properties or removes the pipeline off the
Properties.
{¶127} There is a great deal of confusion among the parties about the
meaning of the trial court’s decision on DeepRock’s declaratory judgment claim that the
assets were sold free and clear (Count 3, First Amended Complaint). The Landowners
argue that the effect was to condemn and take possession of their Properties because
they interpret it as barring all trespass claims against DeepRock. We understand the
confusion because, after the somewhat confusing discussion of this claim, the trial court
broadly states, “The Court denies defendants’ motion and grants plaintiff’s motion on
Count III of the First Amended Complaint.” This could be interpreted as barring all
trespass claims against DeepRock – both pre-receivership sale and post-receivership
sale of the pipeline. However, we believe the trial court intended to reach the same result
that we have reached here. The trial court stated that Bailey Homestead, Johnson and
Forté’s pre-sale claims against WES cannot be asserted against DeepRock: “In sum,
plaintiff’s count against Bailey, Johnson and Forté is granted as of the date of the
Washington App. No. 20CA15 58
confirmation of sale.” The trial court allowed Bailey Homestead, Johnson and Forté to
bring post-sale trespass claims against DeepRock and will allow the jury to decide
whether DeepRock’s continuing trespass is willful and the amount of trespass-related
damages: “However, it is an issue for the jury if Forté, Bailey and Johnson’s claims
continues to a date beyond the sale confirmation date.” Therefore, we affirm the portion
of the trial court’s judgment that is in accordance with our decision, and reverse the portion
that might be read as a dismissal of the cross-appellants’ post-sale trespass claims
against DeepRock. We sustain, in part, the cross-appellants’ sole assignment of error.
VII. CONCLUSION
{¶128} The trial court erred as a matter of law when it dismissed as moot
DeepRock’s motions to strike. However, we find the error harmless because the motions
were properly denied on alternative grounds. We affirm the trial court’s decision granting
summary judgment to appellees/cross-appellants and dismissing appellant’s/cross-
appellee’s claims for invalidity of the Forté Easements, easements by estoppel, tortious
interference with business relationships, tortious interference with contracts, and civil
conspiracy (Counts 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the First Amended Complaint) and granting
appellees/cross-appellants summary judgment in their favor on their declaratory
judgment claim for trespass (Count 1, Amended Counterclaims). We affirm, with
modification, the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment to appellant/cross-
appellee on its claim for declaratory judgment that it purchased WES assets free and
clear of liens, claims, and encumbrances against the assets (Count 3, First Amended
Complaint). The modification clarifies that the appellees/cross-appellants’ trespass claims
Washington App. No. 20CA15 59
against appellant/cross-appellee that arose after the receivership sale of the pipeline are
allowed to proceed. We affirm, with modification, the judgment of the trial court.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, AS MODIFIED.
Washington App. No. 20CA15 60
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED, AS MODIFIED and that Appellant
shall pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Washington
County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of
this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. & Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY: ________________________________
Michael D. Hess, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with
the clerk.