State v. D.S. , 2021 Ohio 1725 ( 2021 )


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  • [Cite as State v. D.S., 
    2021-Ohio-1725
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    STATE OF OHIO,                                   :
    Plaintiff-Appellee,             :
    No. 109346
    v.                              :
    D.S.,                                            :
    Defendant-Appellant.            :
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 20, 2021
    Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-19-638997-A
    Appearances:
    Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
    Attorney, and Kelly N. Mason, Assistant Prosecuting
    Attorney, for appellee.
    Allison S. Breneman, for appellant.
    EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:
    Defendant-appellant, D.S.,1 appeals his convictions and claims the
    following three errors:
    1 Pursuant to Loc.App.R. 13.2(B)(1), we refer to the appellant and the victims by
    initials and generic terms to protect the victims’ privacy.
    1. The jury found, against the manifest weight of the evidence, that the
    appellant committed the acts charged in the indictment.
    2. The evidence was not legally sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict.
    3. Appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of
    Amendments VI and XIV of the United States Constitution and Article
    I, Section 10, of the Ohio Constitution.
    We find some merit to the appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment
    in part, and we vacate Counts 15 and 25 due to insufficient evidence.
    I. Facts and Procedural History
    D.S. was charged with 13 counts of rape in violation of R.C.
    2907.02(A)(1)(b), three counts of gross sexual imposition (“GSI”) in violation of R.C.
    2907.05(A)(4), ten counts of illegal use of a minor in nude material or performance
    in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(2), three counts of child endangering in violation
    of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1), three counts of having weapons while under disability in
    violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), three counts of attempted rape in violation of R.C.
    2907.02(A)(1)(b), one count of kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(4), and
    two counts of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1). The indictment
    alleged that D.S. sexually abused his three daughters: Victim 1, Victim 2, and Victim
    3 over a period of years.
    Detective Terry Lowther, of the Cleveland Police Department, testified
    at a jury trial that on April 10, 2019, D.S.’s wife, who is also the victims’ mother
    (“Mother”), came to the Fifth District police station to report that D.S. had sexually
    abused their children. (Tr. 734.) Lowther observed that Mother was “emotionally
    distraught” in describing the abuse. (Tr. 735.) Lowther arranged for the children to
    be taken by EMS to Rainbow Babies and Children’s Hospital for sexual assault
    examinations and treatment. (Tr. 736.)
    Sally McHugh, a social worker with the Cuyahoga County Department
    of Child and Family Services (“CCDCFS”), testified that she was trained to
    investigate child sexual abuse cases. (Tr. 744.) McHugh met the children at the
    hospital but interviewed them the following day in a room where a detective could
    observe the interview. (Tr. 753.) McHugh interviewed each child separately, but
    they each described similar experiences. According to McHugh, two of the girls had
    previously told Mother about the about the abuse, and Mother told them to “keep it
    inside” because “she was going to figure it out.” (Tr. 757.) Mother failed to take
    action, and the abuse continued.      One of the victims told McHugh that D.S.
    threatened to kill her if she told Mother or anyone. (Tr. 759.)
    McHugh’s investigation revealed that there had been several prior
    referrals to CCDCFS due to reports of suspected abuse and domestic violence, but
    no action was taken because the allegations were “unsubstantiated.” (Tr. 757.)
    However, following the disclosure of sexual abuse in April 2019, the agency obtained
    custody of the children due to the fact that Mother knew of the abuse and did nothing
    to protect the children. The children were placed in foster care where they have been
    receiving regular counseling services. (Tr. 760.)
    McHugh testified that there are three possible dispositions following a
    sexual abuse investigation: (1) unsubstantiated, which means the allegations may be
    true but there is no corroborating evidence; (2) indicated, which is a determination
    that abuse likely happened based on a detailed disclosure from the child victim and
    evidence that the victim has consistently told other people; and (3) substantiated,
    which is a determination that the abuse happened based on an admission by the
    perpetrator, medical evidence, witnesses who observed the abuse, or other
    corroborating evidence. (Tr. 749-750.)
    McHugh found the sexual abuse allegations in this case were
    substantiated based on the victims’ detailed disclosures to her, the victim’s
    disclosures to the sexual assault nurse examiner (“SANE”) at the hospital, the fact
    that the victims knew about each other’s experiences, and because some of the
    victims were together when the abuse occurred. (Tr. 764.) McHugh testified that
    she also believed the children because they recounted “details about certain
    activities and devices that they shouldn’t have known at their age[s].” (Tr. 783.) For
    example, Victim 2 told her that D.S. used a pump to “pump his penis up.” (Tr. 784.)
    Victim 1 also testified that she observed D.S. use the penis pump. (Tr. 1223, 1237-
    1240.)
    Brandalyn Kemp, the children’s therapist, testified that she began
    counseling the victims in April 2019, shortly after they were taken into custody. (Tr.
    825.) Kemp testified that all three victims suffered from severe anxiety, flashbacks,
    and nightmares and that, based on their symptoms, she diagnosed all three of them
    with posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). (Tr. 835.)
    All three victims provided similar testimony. The victims explained
    that the abuse episodes usually began when D.S. ordered one of them
    to go upstairs to his bedroom and remove her clothes. The girls
    testified that D.S. “greased” his penis with vegetable oil or Vaseline
    before inserting it into their vaginas. (Tr. 866-867, 894.) They also
    separately told Hackett that he regularly used Vaseline before sex. (Tr.
    1101, 1105, 1125.) Detective Timothy Clark, a special investigator with
    the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office, authenticated several nude
    pictures of one of the victims and testified that an open jar of Vaseline
    was depicted in several of the pictures.
    (Tr. 1348, 1496-1497.)
    Victim 2, who was 13 years old at the time of trial, testified that D.S.
    sometimes used a penis pump before raping her. She explained that he would “put
    it on his private part and he’d have to hold the knob and press on it, and then it
    would do something to his private part.” (Tr. 853.) According to Victim 2, D.S. kept
    the pump in a bag under clothes in his dresser. (Tr. 855.) Victim 2 also identified
    “rubber bands” that he put on his penis to prevent her from getting pregnant. (Tr.
    855-856.)
    Victim 2 testified that sometimes D.S. “put his penis in [her] private
    part,” and sometimes he made her “suck his penis.” (Tr. 859, 860.) Victim 2
    explained that the term “private part” refers to either D.S.’s penis or her vagina. (Tr.
    853, 859.) When she sucked his penis, “white stuff came out.” (Tr. 860.) When
    asked how often D.S. made Victim 2 do these things, she replied that it “happened
    mainly every day” since she was seven years old. (Tr. 861.)
    Victim 2 described a time when D.S. raped her and her sister, Victim 1,
    simultaneously. She stated:
    We both had our clothes off and he put, first he had put his penis into
    my private part and then he was like, while he was doing that, he was
    putting his fingers into my big sister’s private part.
    (Tr. 862.) She further explained that D.S. “took turns” doing this: “first it was mine
    and then it was my big sister and then it would go back to me.” (Tr. 862.) D.S. told
    the girls he would kill them if they told their mother about the abuse. (Tr. 863.)
    According to Victim 2, D.S. also took pictures of her in a state of nudity. (Tr. 895.)
    Victim 3, who was 12 years old at the time of trial, testified that D.S.
    often choked her and told her that he hates her. (Tr. 987, 990.) She explained that
    she could not breathe when he choked her and sometimes the choking caused
    bruises. (Tr. 990-991.) D.S. beat Victim 3 and her sisters with a belt, and the belt
    left marks on her body. (Tr. 992-994.)
    Victim 3 testified that D.S. first started assaulting her when she was 11
    years old. First, he put his fingers in her vagina, but later put his penis “in [her]
    butt.” (Tr. 998-999.) Other times, D.S. put his penis in Victim 3’s mouth. (Tr. 1005,
    1050.) D.S. also used his phone to take several pictures of Victim 3 naked. (Tr.
    1009.) Victim 3 testified that D.S. put his fingers in her vagina “more than one time,”
    put his penis in her vagina “more than one time,” put his penis “in her butt * * *
    more than one time,” and put his mouth on her vagina “sometimes.” (Tr. 1018,
    1050.)
    Victim 1 testified that D.S. first started sexually abusing her when she
    was five years old and they lived in their old house as opposed to their current
    residence. During the first incident, D.S. woke Victim 1 up while she was sleeping
    and placed his penis in her mouth. (Tr. 1202.) Victim 1 testified that when she was
    seven years old, D.S. put his penis “in [her] butt.” (Tr. 1214-1215.) Victim 1
    explained that the abuse happened “every so often” when she was younger and more
    frequently as she got older. (Tr. 1204, 1242.)
    Most of the abuse occurred in the family’s current home. Victim 1
    testified that D.S. anally raped her twice when she was 12 years old. (Tr. 1242-1243.)
    She testified that on other occasions, “he stuck his private part in [her] private part,”
    and that he sometimes rubbed her breasts under her clothes and over her clothes.
    (Tr. 1206, 1244.) Victim 1 testified that the word “private” referred to his penis and
    her vagina. (Tr. 1201-1202, 1206.)
    According to Victim 1, D.S. also took pictures of Victim 1 with her
    clothes off “at least three times.” (Tr. 1251.) He told her to “do certain poses” when
    he took the pictures and showed them to her before deleting them. (Tr. 1252.) He
    told Victim 1 that he deleted the pictures so that Mother “wouldn’t find out.” (Tr.
    1253.) Victim 1 knew when her sisters were being abused and now suffers from
    flashbacks, nightmares, and trouble sleeping. (Tr. 1257, 1262.) Victim 1 testified
    that D.S. last raped her the night before Mother reported the abuse to the police in
    April 2019.
    Kathleen Hackett (“Hackett”), the SANE nurse at Rainbow Babies and
    Children’s Hospital, who examined the victims, testified that when a victim is
    regularly assaulted once a week or once every two weeks, it is difficult for the victim
    to remember every detail of the event because victims tend to disassociate from the
    experiences. (Tr. 1089.) There are also other issues that could impair a victim’s
    ability to remember the details of such a traumatic event. (Tr. 1089.)
    Hackett also explained that nonfatal strangulation often occurs
    during sexual assaults. (Tr. 1094.) A strangulation event prevents memories from
    being formed because the brain is deprived of oxygen. Hackett also explained that
    the loss of oxygen that occurs during strangulation can “cause long-term health
    consequences such as strokes, miscarriages and all of that.” (Tr. 1131.)
    According to Hackett, all three victims separately reported that the
    abuse occurred often, that D.S. threatened to kill them if they told anyone, that he
    choked them, and that he took pictures of the girls naked. (Tr. 1102, 1123, 1124.)
    Victim 3 told Hacket that “one time * * * [D.S.] stuck his finger up my vagina and
    made it bleed.” (Tr. 1131.)
    Clark testified that he extracted photographs from D.S.’s LG
    smartphone. Clark authenticated several photographs extracted from the phone
    that depicted the victims without any clothes. (Tr. 1344-1350.) Some of the
    photographs he identified were taken on April 7, 2019, three days before Mother
    reported the abuse to police.
    After the state rested, the defense called Mother to testify. Mother
    testified that the victims were born in 2004, 2006, and 2007. Thereafter, she
    asserted her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and refused to
    answer any other questions.
    D.S. testified on his own behalf and claimed that he has had difficulty
    maintaining an erection ever since he was injured in a bicycle accident in 2005. He
    claimed that he took Viagra and Cialis for erectile dysfunction, but they did not work.
    His doctor later prescribed a penis pump, and D.S. claimed the penis pump did not
    work either. (Tr. 1662-1663.) He denied he ever assaulted any of the victims and
    asserted that he was telling the truth and they were lying. (Tr. 1678, 1706.)
    However, on cross-examination, D.S. admitted that even though he
    suffered from erectile dysfunction since 2005, he fathered two children who were
    born in 2006 and 2007. He also admitted that he had vaginal sex with his wife until
    2009. When the prosecutor confronted D.S. with condoms seized by police during
    the search of his home, he admitted that he kept them so as not “to get anyone
    pregnant.” (Tr. 1713.) When asked why he would need condoms if he could not get
    an erection, he explained that he kept them “[f]or back up, just in case.” (Tr. 1713.)
    D.S. also admitted that he had three firearms even though he was prohibited from
    possessing firearms due to his prior aggravated robbery and felonious assault
    convictions. (Tr. 1716-1717.)
    D.S. acknowledged that he “spanked” the victims with a belt and that
    CCDCFS had previously investigated him after the children went to school with
    marks on their bodies. (Tr. 1718, 17211, 1724.) At first, he denied he hit the children,
    but later admitted that he left marks on their bodies, stating “Yes, I had a heavy
    hand.” (Tr. 1725.)
    The prosecutor confronted D.S. with photographs of the victims not
    wearing any clothes. He disclaimed the pictures, stating “I can’t look at my babies
    like this.” (Tr. 1727.) D.S. then denied knowing how the pictures got on his phone.
    (Tr. 1733.)
    Finally, D.S. admitted on cross-examination that he continued to take
    Viagra and Cialis though 2019 and never complained to his doctor of erectile
    dysfunction until July 2019, after he was arrested and charged with the offenses in
    this case. (Tr. 1751.)
    Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury found D.S. guilty of
    all counts in the indictment. The court further found him guilty of notice of prior
    conviction, repeat violent offender, and sexually violent predator specifications.
    D.S. was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. He now appeals
    his convictions.
    II. Law and Analysis
    A. Manifest Weight of the Evidence
    In the first assignment of error, D.S. argues his convictions are against
    the manifest weight of the evidence because the victims’ testimony was not credible.
    He contends the victims’ testimony was inconsistent, that they have a reputation for
    lying, and that they wanted to get rid of their father so that their mother could take
    his money.
    The criminal manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard addresses
    the evidence’s effect of inducing belief. State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 386,
    
    678 N.E.2d 541
     (1997). In a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence analysis, “a reviewing
    court asks whose evidence is more persuasive — the state’s or the defendant’s?”
    State v. Wilson, 
    113 Ohio St.3d 382
    , 
    2007-Ohio-2202
    , 
    865 N.E.2d 1264
    , ¶ 25. The
    reviewing court must consider all the evidence in the record, the reasonable
    inferences, and the credibility of the witnesses to determine “‘whether in resolving
    conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
    miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’”
    Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 
    20 Ohio App.3d 172
    , 
    485 N.E.2d 717
     (1st
    Dist.1983).
    In conducting such a review, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated that
    the appellate court “sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the factfinder’s
    resolution of conflicting testimony.” Id. at 546-547, quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 
    457 U.S. 31
    , 45, 
    102 S.Ct. 2211
    , 
    72 L.Ed.2d 652
     (1982).               The Supreme Court’s
    characterization of the appellate court as a “thirteenth juror” refers to the appellate
    court’s “‘discretionary power to grant a new trial.’” Id. at 547, quoting Martin at 175.
    As a “thirteenth juror,” the appellate court may disagree with the factfinder’s
    resolution of the conflicting evidence and, in effect, create a deadlocked jury, which
    requires a new trial.
    However, our status as a “thirteenth juror” is not equal to that of the
    other twelve jurors, who are uniquely positioned to view the witnesses’ demeanor,
    gestures, facial expressions, and voice inflections. These outward behaviors are not
    evident in a written transcript. Demeanor is not what the witness says, but the
    manner in which he or she says it. Demeanor evidence is invaluable in assessing a
    witness’s credibility, yet it is totally lost in transmission to the court of appeals. It is
    for this reason that “the weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the
    witnesses are primarily for the trier of facts.” State v. DeHass, 
    10 Ohio St.2d 230
    ,
    
    227 N.E.2d 212
     (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus.
    As previously stated, D.S. contends the victims’ testimony was
    inconsistent and that they have a reputation for lying. However, D.S. does not
    identify any evidence to support his assertion that the victims had a reputation for
    lying. Although Victim 3 told McHugh that D.S. choked her while he raped her and
    stated at trial that he did not choke her while raping her, she testified that D.S.
    frequently choked her and raped her. (Tr. 988, 996, 998, 999, 1005, 1006-1007.)
    Her sisters separately corroborated the fact that D.S. physically beat and choked
    Victim 3 more than the other two victims. (Tr. 871, 1195.)
    Moreover, the victims separately and independently described D.S.’s
    abusive behavior and each victim’s separate description was consistent with the
    others’ descriptions. D.S. regularly ordered each victim to go upstairs into his
    bedroom, told her to take her own clothes off, and then raped them. They all three
    reported that D.S. “greased” his penis with Vaseline or vegetable oil before inserting
    his penis into their vaginas. (Tr. 866-867, 1101, 1105, 1125.) Some of photographs
    extracted from D.S.’s phone depicting the victims in a state of nudity also showed an
    open jar of Vaseline on the bed, which further corroborated the victims’ testimony.
    Two of the victims testified that D.S. used a penis pump before he had
    sex. (Tr. 853-854, 1220.) The victims had identical descriptions of the pump, the
    bag D.S. stored it in, and the drawer he kept it in. (Tr.853, 1218.) When shown the
    pump seized from D.S.’s drawer during the search of the house, both victims
    identified the pump as the one they were describing. The victims also reported D.S.’s
    use of the penis pump to McHugh. (Tr. 783.) McHugh testified that the victims
    would not normally have knowledge of penis pumps at their age. (Tr. 816.) Indeed,
    D.S., himself, acknowledged that the penis pump belonged to him. (Tr. 1662, 1708,
    1711-1712.)
    The three victims were each diagnosed with PTSD as a result of
    trauma they experienced. Kemp testified that she diagnosed them with PTSD based
    on their symptoms, which invariably included “severe anxiety, flashbacks, and
    nightmares.” (Tr. 834.) The victims themselves also testified that they suffered
    from these symptoms. (Tr. 890, 1017, 1262.)
    D.S. nevertheless argues that his illegal use of a minor in nude material
    or performance convictions are not supported by the weight of the evidence because
    someone else could have taken the pictures. However, all three victims testified that
    D.S. took nude photographs of them on his phone. (Tr. 895, 957, 960, 1009, 1251.)
    They also consistently stated that after taking the pictures, D.S. deleted them
    because he did not want Mother to see them. (Tr. 896, 1047, 1253.) When shown
    the cell phone that Clark extracted the photographs from, all three victims identified
    the phone as the phone D.S. used to take naked photographs of them. (Tr. 897, 1010,
    1254.)
    D.S. contends the victims lied about the abuse in order to get rid of
    him and take his money. However, two of the victims testified that despite the
    abuse, they still love D.S. (Tr. 920, 1019.) And, other than the fact that D.S. had
    some money saved in the bank, there is no evidence that the children were motivated
    to lie in order to get his money.
    The jury listened to the witnesses; observed their demeanor, gestures,
    and voice inflections; and used these observations to assess their credibility and
    determined the victims were credible. Although there were a few discrepancies
    between what Victim 3 reported to investigators and her testimony at trial, we find
    nothing in the record to suggest that the jury lost its way and created such a manifest
    miscarriage of justice that D.S.’s convictions must be reversed and a new trial
    ordered.
    The first assignment of error is overruled.
    B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    In the second assignment of error, D.S. argues the evidence was not
    legally sufficient to sustain his convictions. D.S. does not dispute that evidence was
    presented to support each of his convictions. He argues that the victims’ testimony
    is not enough to support his convictions because they lacked credibility and offered
    “varying accounts.” (Appellant’s brief p. 16.)
    However, credibility is not a factor in the sufficiency analysis. “[T]he
    test for sufficiency requires a determination of whether the prosecution met its
    burden of production at trial.” State v. Bowden, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92266,
    
    2009-Ohio-3598
    , ¶ 13. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence
    in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
    found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State
    v. Jenks, 
    61 Ohio St.3d 259
    , 
    574 N.E.2d 492
     (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
    1. Rape
    D.S. was convicted of 13 counts of rape in violation of R.C.
    2907.02(A)(1)(b), which states that “[n]o person shall engage in sexual conduct with
    another who is not the spouse of the offender * * * when * * * [t]he other person is
    less than thirteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of the
    other person.” R.C. 2907.01(A)(1) defines “sexual conduct” as
    vaginal intercourse between a male and female; anal intercourse,
    fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex; and,
    without privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of any part of
    the body * * * into the vaginal or anal opening of another. Penetration,
    however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal or anal intercourse.
    Victim 2 turned 13 years old in May 2006, and D.S. was arrested in
    April 2019. Therefore, because D.S. was arrested before Victim 2’s 13th birthday
    and no further abuse occurred after his arrest, all of the abuse she described at trial
    occurred when she was under the age of 13.
    Although Victim 2 testified that D.S. raped her “mainly every day,” she
    also described several specific incidents of rape. On one occasion, D.S. forced her to
    suck his penis. Victim 2 explained that on this particular occasion, “[t]here was
    white stuff coming out and that [she] had to swallow it.” (Tr. 860.) Another time,
    D.S. simultaneously raped Victim 2 and Victim 1 She explained that while D.S. was
    vaginally raping her, he digitally penetrated Victim 1’s vagina. He then switched and
    vaginally raped Victim 1 while digitally penetrating Victim 2. (Tr. 862.)
    Victim 2 testified that one day, after raking leaves, she went into the
    house to use the bathroom. D.S. followed her into the bathroom, rubbed her breasts
    and forced her to suck his penis. (Tr. 865.) According to Victim 2, D.S. did not
    ejaculate this time. (Tr. 866.) On a different day, D.S. told Victim 2 to go to his
    bedroom where he “greased” his penis and vaginally raped her on the bed. While
    they were having sex, Mother pulled into the driveway and D.S. quickly put his
    clothes back on and sprayed air freshener in the room. (Tr. 868.)
    Victim 2 testified that D.S. vaginally raped her and put his fingers in
    her vagina during another incident in D.S.’s bedroom. She explained that while she
    was cleaning, D.S. told her to go to his room and take off her clothes. After he raped
    her, Victim 2 stated that her mother was home, and D.S. slapped her across the face
    so hard that he left red marks on her face. (Tr. 869.) One time, D.S. handcuffed her
    to the bed and raped her. (Tr. 875.) And another time, he raped her on the table in
    the living room. (Tr. 895.) Thus, Victim 2 testified that D.S. raped her at least seven
    times while she was under 13 years of age.
    Victim 3 was 12 years old at the time of trial and was, therefore, also
    under 13 years of age when D.S. abused her. Like Victim 2, Victim 3 testified that
    D.S. raped her numerous times since she was eight or nine years old. (Tr. 987.) She
    stated that D.S. raped her vaginally, anally, and with his fingers. (Tr. 996, 998, 999.)
    She explained that he raped her in her bedroom, her sister’s bedroom, and in his
    bedroom. (Tr. 998.) She also stated that D.S. put his penis in her mouth “more than
    one time.” (Tr. 1007.) Therefore, according to Victim 3’s testimony, D.S. raped
    Victim 3 at least five times.
    Victim 1 testified that D.S. also repeatedly raped her over the period
    of several years. She stated that she was five years old and living in their old house
    when the abuse began. (Tr. 1198.) She explained that she was sleeping and her
    mother was at work when D.S. entered her bedroom and put his penis in her mouth.
    (Tr. 1202.) Victim 1 further stated that D.S. anally raped her once when she was
    seven years old and twice when she was 12 years old. (Tr. 1242-1243.) According to
    Victim 1, D.S. anally raped her “more than five times.” (Tr. 1215.) Thus, Victim 1
    described at least four different incidents of rape that occurred when she was under
    13 years of age. However, he also vaginally raped her after she reached 13 years of
    age. (Tr. 1205-1206, 1214-1215.)
    Victim 2 provided sufficient evidence that D.S. raped her at least seven
    times when she was under 13 years of age. Victim 3 provided sufficient evidence
    that D.S. raped her at least five times while she was under 13 years of age. And
    Victim 1 provided sufficient evidence that D.S. raped her at least four times while
    she was under the age of 13. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support a
    finding that D.S. committed 13 counts of rape of a child under 13 years of age.
    2. GSI
    D.S. was convicted of three counts of gross sexual imposition in
    violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4). To prove gross sexual imposition in violation of
    R.C. 2907.05(A)(1), the state had to prove that D.S. had sexual contact with a child
    under the age of 13. R.C. 2907.01(B) defines “sexual contact” as “any touching of an
    erogenous zone of another, including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock,
    pubic region, or, if the person is a female, a breast, for the purpose of sexually
    arousing or gratifying either person.” R.C. 2907.01(B).
    Victim 2 testified that during at least two incidents of rape, D.S.
    rubbed her breasts either before or during the actual rape. (Tr. 865, 894-985.)
    Victim 3 testified that D.S. “sometimes” put his mouth on her vagina. (Tr. 1050.)
    Victim 1 testified that D.S. often touched her naked buttock and rubbed his penis on
    her naked buttock. (Tr. 1212.) Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support
    three GSI convictions.
    3. Minor in Nude Material or Performance
    D.S. was convicted of ten counts of illegal use of a minor in nude
    material or performance in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(2), which states, “[n]o
    person shall * * * photograph the person’s child * * * who is a minor * * *, in a state
    of nudity * * * .”
    All three victims testified that D.S. routinely took pictures of them in
    a state of nudity. (Tr. 895-896, 1009, 1133.) Clark testified that he used a program
    called Cellebrite to extract data from D.S.’s LG smart phone. He identified over ten
    photographs that were extracted from D.S.’s phone and testified that two naked girls
    were depicted in them. (Tr. 1340-1341, 1351, 1360.) D.S., himself, verified naked
    pictures of his daughters, exclaiming “I can’t look at my babies like this.” (Tr. 1727.)
    After identifying that Victim 2 and Victim 1 were depicted in the photographs, D.S.
    complained: “I don’t want to look at the photograph. I don’t want to look at my
    daughter.” (Tr. 1732.) Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support ten counts
    of illegal use of a minor in nude material or performance.
    4. Child Endangering
    D.S. was convicted of three counts of child endangering in violation of
    R.C. 2919.22(B)(1), which states that no person shall “torture or cruelly abuse” a
    child under 18 years of age.
    The rape of a child is a form of child-sexual abuse. See, e.g., State v.
    Butts, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108381, 
    2020-Ohio-1498
    . And since we have already
    determined that there was sufficient evidence to support at least 13 counts of rape
    against three children under the age of 13, there is sufficient evidence that he cruelly
    abused three children under the age of 18. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence
    to support D.S.’s three child endangering convictions.
    5. Having Weapons While Under Disability
    D.S. was charged with three counts of having weapons while under
    disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) states, in relevant
    part, that “no person shall knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use any firearm * * * if
    * * * [t]he person * * * has been convicted of any felony offense of violence[.]”
    D.S. admitted on cross-examination that he possessed three firearms
    even though he had previously been convicted of violent offenses. (Tr. 1717.)
    Indeed, D.S. admitted that he possessed the guns illegally. (Tr. 1717.) Therefore,
    there was sufficient evidence to support D.S.’s three having weapons while under
    disability convictions.
    6. Attempted Rape
    D.S. was convicted of three counts of attempted rape in violation of
    R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b). Two counts were allegedly committed against Victim 2 and
    one count was allegedly committed against Victim 3
    As previously stated, R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) prohibits one from
    engaging in sexual conduct with a child under the age of 13. R.C. 2907.01(A) defines
    “sexual conduct” as:
    vaginal intercourse between a male and female; anal intercourse,
    fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex; and,
    without privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of any part of
    the body or any instrument, apparatus, or other object into the vaginal
    or anal opening of another. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to
    complete vaginal or anal intercourse.
    In Counts 14 and 15, the indictment alleges that D.S. attempted to
    rape Victim 2 by way of fellatio and vaginal intercourse. In Count 25, the indictment
    alleges that D.S. attempted to rape Victim 3 by way of fellatio. Apart from the
    successful attempts where rape actually occurred, we find no evidence of
    unsuccessful attempts to rape Victim 3       We also find no evidence that D.S.
    attempted, but failed to vaginally rape Victim 2
    However, Victim 2 described at least one instance where D.S.
    attempted to have her perform fellatio, but the attempt was not successful. Victim
    2 was sleeping in her sister’s room when she was awakened by the sound of D.S.
    entering the bedroom. Victim 2 explained that D.S. “was turning to suck my private
    part while I was trying to do his.” (Tr. 891.) Victim 2 described attempts to “suck”
    D.S.’s penis, but she never stated that his penis actually entered her mouth. (Tr.
    891-893.) Therefore, her testimony supports one count of attempted rape as alleged
    in Count 14 of the indictment.
    7. Kidnapping
    D.S. was convicted of kidnapping Victim 2 in violation of R.C.
    2905.01(A)(4). R.C. 2905.01(A)(4) as alleged in Count 12 of the indictment. The
    indictment included a furthermore clause alleging that Victim 2 was under 18 years
    of age at the time of the offense.
    R.C. 2905.01(A)(4) provides, in relevant part:
    No person, by force, threat, or deception, or, in the case of a victim
    under the age of thirteen or mentally incompetent, by any means, shall
    remove another from the place where the other person is found or
    restrain the liberty of the other person, for any of the following
    purposes:
    * * *
    (4) To engage in sexual activity, as defined in section 2907.01 of the
    Revised Code, with the victim against the victim’s will[.]
    R.C. 2907.01(C) defines “sexual activity” as “sexual conduct or sexual
    contact, or both.” As previously stated, “sexual conduct” means
    vaginal intercourse between a male and female; anal intercourse,
    fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex; and,
    without privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of any part of
    the body or any instrument, apparatus, or other object into the vaginal
    or anal opening of another. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to
    complete vaginal or anal intercourse.
    R.C. 2907.01(A). The term “sexual contact” means “any touching of an erogenous
    zone of another, including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic
    region, or, if the person is a female, a breast, for the purpose of sexually arousing
    or gratifying either person.” R.C. 2907.01(B).
    The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “implicit within every
    forcible rape * * * is a kidnapping” because the victim’s liberty is restrained during
    the act of forcible rape. State v. Logan, 
    60 Ohio St.2d 126
    , 130, 
    397 N.E.2d 1345
    (1979). To establish the element of force in a rape case of a minor child, neither
    express threat of harm nor evidence of significant physical restraint need be proven
    if the defendant holds a position of authority over the child. State v. Dye, 
    82 Ohio St.3d 323
    , 
    695 N.E.2d 763
     (1998), paragraph one of the syllabus. The adult’s
    position of authority and power in relation to the child’s vulnerability creates a
    unique situation of dominance and control in which explicit threats and displays of
    force are unnecessary. State v. Eskridge, 
    38 Ohio St.3d 56
    , 
    526 N.E.2d 304
     (1988),
    paragraph one of the syllabus.
    As Victim 2’s father, D.S. held a position of authority over Victim 2,
    particularly in light of her young age. And since there was sufficient evidence to
    establish that D.S. raped Victim 2 at least seven times, there was sufficient evidence
    to support at least one count of kidnapping.
    8. Felonious Assault
    D.S. was convicted of two counts of felonious assault in violation of
    R.C. 2903.11(A)(1). R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) states that “[n]o person shall knowingly * * *
    [c]ause serious physical harm to another.” The term “serious physical harm” is
    defined as:
    (a) Any mental illness or condition of such gravity as would normally
    require hospitalization or prolonged psychiatric treatment;
    (b) Any physical harm that carries a substantial risk of death;
    (c) Any physical harm that involves some permanent incapacity,
    whether partial or total, or that involves some temporary, substantial
    incapacity;
    (d) Any physical harm that involves some permanent disfigurement or
    that involves some temporary, serious disfigurement;
    (e) Any physical harm that involves acute pain of such duration as to
    result in substantial suffering or that involves any degree of prolonged
    or intractable pain.
    R.C. 2901.01(A)(5)(a)-(e).
    The state maintained that D.S. committed felonious assault by
    choking Victim 3 on multiple occasions. Indeed, Victim 3 testified that D.S. choked
    her “sometimes.” (Tr. 987.) However, in order for choking to constitute felonious
    assault, the victim must sustain “serious physical harm.” In cases where choking
    constituted felonious assault, the victim lost consciousness and the loss of
    consciousness met the serious physical harm element of felonious assault. See State
    v. Revere, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108386, 
    2020-Ohio-572
    , ¶ 22, citing State v.
    Chambers, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99864, 
    2014-Ohio-390
    , ¶ 23 (Temporary loss of
    consciousness constitutes a temporary substantial incapacity, and, therefore,
    serious physical harm.); see also State v. Redwine, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2006-
    08-011, 
    2007-Ohio-6413
    , ¶ 32 (concluding that “[l]osing consciousness as a result
    of an assault constitutes serious physical harm”); State v. Booker, 2d Dist.
    Montgomery No. 22990, 
    2009-Ohio-1039
    , ¶ 16 (concluding that “[t]emporary
    unconsciousness constitutes a temporary substantial incapacity, and therefore
    serious physical harm”); State v. Waugaman, 5th Dist. Richland No. 18CA18, 2019-
    Ohio-1102, ¶ 29 (A loss of consciousness due to choking would support a finding of
    serious physical harm. A loss of consciousness, irrespective of its duration, satisfies
    the definition of “temporary, substantial incapacity.”); State v. Wimpey, 6th Dist.
    Lucas No. L-18-1262, 
    2019-Ohio-4823
    , ¶ 23 (“Being rendered unconscious, no
    matter how brief, qualifie[s] as a ‘temporary substantial incapacity,’ which satisfie[s]
    the serious physical harm requirement.”); State v. McSwain, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    83394, 
    2004-Ohio-3292
    , ¶ 29 (“Unconsciousness is a state of temporary,
    substantial incapacity sufficient to constitute serious physical harm.”).
    Since there is no evidence that Victim 3 ever lost consciousness when
    D.S. choked her, these acts of choking, by themselves, do not constitute felonious
    assault.
    However, as previously stated, “serious physical harm” includes “[a]ny
    mental illness or condition of such gravity as would normally require hospitalization
    or prolonged psychiatric treatment.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(5)(a). In State v. Cooper, 
    139 Ohio App.3d 149
    , 
    743 N.E.2d 427
     (12th Dist.2000), the defendant was convicted of
    four counts of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1). Each of the four
    counts was based on the defendant’s abusive treatment of her four children over a
    period of time that resulted in each child developing a mental illness. Id. at 158. The
    defense argued the trial court should have dismissed all four of the felonious assault
    charges because a single felonious assault charge could not be based upon numerous
    acts occurring over the course of many years. The court in Cooper rejected that
    argument, explaining that “R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) does not mandate that a defendant
    perform a single act in order to commit the crime of felonious assault by causing a
    single injury in the form of mental illness.” Id. at 160.
    In this case, all three victims were diagnosed with PTSD and required
    ongoing psychiatric treatment as a result of D.S.’s abusive conduct. Therefore, there
    was sufficient evidence to support at least two counts of felonious assault.
    Having determined that there was insufficient evidence to support two
    attempted rape convictions but that there was sufficient evidence to support the
    remaining convictions, we sustain the second assignment of error in part and
    overrule it in part.
    C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    In the third assignment of error, D.S. contends his convictions should
    be reversed because his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel
    was violated.
    D.S.’s trial counsel stated on the record at the end of trial that he
    thought his performance was ineffective because he had trouble hearing. D.S. now
    contends his trial counsel was ineffective and that his right to a fair trial was
    prejudiced because his trial counsel could not hear.
    To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must
    demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
    reasonable representation and that he or she was prejudiced by that deficient
    performance. Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687-688, 
    104 S.Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L.Ed.2d 674
     (1984). Prejudice is established when the defendant demonstrates “a
    reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
    proceeding would have been different.” 
    Id. at 694
    .
    Although counsel stated on the record that he thought his
    performance was deficient, we find no evidence of deficient performance. D.S.
    asserts his trial counsel could not hear the witnesses, but this assertion is not
    supported by the record. The trial court allowed counsel to sit closer to the witnesses
    so he could hear them, and the record reflects that he was wearing his hearing aids.
    D.S. does not identify anywhere in the record establishing that counsel could not
    hear, nor does he identify any specific places in the record where counsel’s
    performance was deficient as a result of poor hearing. Counsel thoroughly cross-
    examined the state’s witnesses and objected appropriately throughout the trial,
    which indicates that counsel could hear. We, therefore, cannot say that D.S. was
    prejudiced because his counsel was hearing impaired and could not hear.
    The third assignment of error is overruled.
    The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in part. Counts 15 and 25,
    alleging attempted rape, are vacated due to insufficient evidence.
    It is ordered that appellant and appellee share costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
    common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
    of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
    LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J., and
    MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR