State v. Lee , 2021 Ohio 2925 ( 2021 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Lee, 
    2021-Ohio-2925
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    STATE OF OHIO,                                  :
    Plaintiff-Appellee,            :
    No. 109215
    v.                             :
    ANDRE LEE,                                     :
    Defendant-Appellant.           :
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    JUDGMENT: APPLICATION DENIED
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 20, 2021
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-19-643978-A
    Application for Reopening
    Motion No. 545002
    Appearances:
    Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
    Attorney, and Callista Plemel, Assistant Prosecuting
    Attorney, for appellee.
    Patituce & Associates, LLC, Joseph C. Patituce and
    Megan M. Patituce, for appellant.
    ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:
    Andre Lee has filed a timely App.R. 26(B) application for reopening.
    Lee is attempting to reopen the appellate judgment, rendered in State v. Lee, 8th
    Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109215, 
    2020-Ohio-6738
    , that affirmed his conviction and
    sentence for the offenses of murder (R.C. 2903.22(B)), felonious assault (R.C.
    2903.11(A)(1)), carrying a concealed weapon (R.C. 2923.12(A)(2)), drug possession
    (R.C. 2925.11), and possessing criminal tools (R.C. 2923.24). We decline to reopen
    Lee’s appeal for the following reasons.
    I.     Standard of Review Applicable to App.R. 26(B) Application for
    Reopening
    In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate
    counsel, Lee is required to establish that the performance of his appellate counsel
    was deficient, and the deficiency resulted in prejudice. Strickland v. Washington,
    
    466 U.S. 688
    , 
    104 S.Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L.Ed.2d 674
     (1984); State v. Bradley, 
    42 Ohio St.3d 136
    , 
    538 N.E.2d 373
     (1989), cert. denied, 
    497 U.S. 1011
    , 
    110 S.Ct. 3258
    , 
    111 L.Ed.2d 767
     (1990).
    In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court held that a court’s
    scrutiny of an attorney’s work must be highly deferential. The court further stated
    that it is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess his attorney after
    conviction and that it would be too easy for a court to conclude that a specific act or
    omission was deficient, especially when examining the matter in hindsight. Thus, a
    court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the
    wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must
    overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action
    might be considered sound trial strategy. Strickland.
    Moreover, even if Lee establishes that an error by his appellate
    counsel was professionally unreasonable, Lee must further establish that he was
    prejudiced; but for the unreasonable error there exists a reasonable probability that
    the results of his appeal would have been different. Reasonable probability, with
    regard to an application for reopening, is defined as a probability sufficient to
    undermine confidence in the outcome of the appeal. State v. May, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 97354, 
    2012-Ohio-5504
    .
    II.    First Proposed Assignment of Error
    Lee’s first proposed assignment of error is that:
    The failure to inquire into the conflict in the attorney-client
    relationship before denying Mr. Lee’s motion to discharge counsel is
    structural error.
    Lee, through his first proposed assignment of error, argues that the
    trial court erred by denying his request for new counsel. Specifically, Lee argues that
    the trial court’s denial of the request for new counsel resulted in structural error.
    Substitution of trial counsel is required if a defendant can demonstrate good cause,
    conflict of interest, breakdown in communications, or irreversible conflict.
    In order to warrant a substitution of counsel during trial, the defendant
    must show good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete
    breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads
    to an apparently unjust verdict. * * * If a court refuses to inquire into a
    seemingly substantial complaint about counsel when he has no reason
    to suspect the bona fides of the defendant, or if on discovering
    justifiable dissatisfaction a court refuses to replace the attorney, the
    defendant may then properly claim denial of his Sixth Amendment
    right. * * * In the absence of a conflict which presents such a Sixth
    Amendment problem, the trial court has discretion to decide whether
    to grant a continuance during the course of trial for the substitution of
    counsel, and that decision will be reversed only if the court has abused
    its discretion. * * *
    (Citations omitted.) United States v. Calabro, 
    467 F.2d 973
    , 986 (2d Cir.1972).
    Herein, a review of the trial court transcript clearly demonstrates that
    Lee failed to establish good cause for the discharge of court-appointed trial counsel
    and the need for the appointment of new trial counsel. Lee failed to demonstrate a
    conflict of interest with counsel, a breakdown in communication with counsel, or
    any irreconcilable conflict. See tr. 9-12; State v. Pruitt, 
    18 Ohio App.3d 50
    , 
    480 N.E.2d 499
     (8th Dist.1984); State v. Patterson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100086,
    
    2014-Ohio-1621
    .
    In addition, we find no structural error based upon the trial court’s
    denial of Lee’s request for new trial counsel. Structural errors are those errors that
    are so intrinsically harmful as to require automatic reversal without consideration
    of their effect on the outcome of the trial. State v. Hill, 
    92 Ohio St.3d 191
    , 2001-
    Ohio-141, 
    749 N.E.2d 274
    ; State v. Webster, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102833, 2016-
    Ohio-2624. We find no structural error based upon the trial court’s denial of a
    request for new trial.   Lee has failed to establish any prejudice through his first
    proposed assignment of error.
    III.   Second Proposed Assignment of Error
    Lee’s second proposed assignment of error is that:
    Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to sever irrelevant and
    prejudicial counts.
    Lee, through his second proposed assignment of error, argues that
    trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request the severance of counts for trial.
    Specifically, Lee argues that he was prejudiced by the simultaneous trial of the
    offenses of murder and drug possession.
    Lee has failed to establish how he was prejudiced by the failure of trial
    counsel to request severance for trial of the offenses for murder and drug possession.
    To the contrary, the charged offenses of murder and drug possession were directly
    related to each other and were simple and direct. State v. Lott, 
    51 Ohio St.3d 160
    ,
    
    555 N.E.2d 293
     (1990).
    In addition, Crim.R. 8(A), provides that two or more offenses may be
    charged together if the offenses are of the same or similar character, or are based on
    the same act or transaction, or are part of a course of criminal conduct. State v.
    Dean, 
    146 Ohio St.3d 106
    , 
    2015-Ohio-4347
    , 
    54 N.E.3d 80
    ; State v. Williams, 
    73 Ohio St.3d 153
    , 
    652 N.E.2d 721
     (1995); State v. Ferrell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    100659, 
    2014-Ohio-4377
    . Ohio law clearly favors joining multiple offenses in a
    single trial if the requirements for joinder under Crim.R. 8(A) are met. Joinder is
    liberally permitted to conserve judicial resources, reduce the chance of incongruous
    results in successive trials, and diminish inconvenience to the witnesses. State v.
    Nitsche, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103174, 
    2016-Ohio-3170
    ; State v. Dantzler, 10th
    Dist. Franklin Nos. 14AP-907 and 14AP-908, 
    2015-Ohio-3641
    ; State v. Morales,
    10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 03AP-318 and 03AP-319, 
    2004-Ohio-3391
    . Lee has failed
    to establish any prejudice through his second proposed assignment of error.
    IV.    Third Proposed Assignment of Error
    Lee’s third proposed assignment of error is that:
    Appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel where trial counsel
    failed to move for the exclusion of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence.
    Lee, through his third proposed assignment of error, argues that he
    was prejudiced by the failure of trial counsel to request the exclusion of “irrelevant,
    inconclusive, and prejudicial evidence.” Specifically, Lee argues that testimony from
    a Forensic Scientist, concerning a Trace Metal Detection Test and a Griess Test,
    should have been excluded pursuant to a Daubert challenge.
    Lee has failed to establish any prejudicial effect by the admission of
    testimony regarding a Trace Metal Detection Test and a Griess Test. To the contrary,
    the testimony adduced at trial provided negative results that favored Lee. State v.
    Alexander, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104281, 
    2017-Ohio-9011
    . Lee has failed to
    establish any prejudice through his third proposed assignment of error.
    V.     Fourth Proposed Assignment of Error
    Lee’s fourth proposed assignment of error is that:
    The admission of opinion testimony over objection, denial of motion
    for mistrial, and failure to provide a narrowly tailored limiting
    instruction resulted in a denial of Appellant’s right to due process.
    Lee, through his fourth proposed assignment of error, argues that he
    was prejudiced by the testimony of a police officer. Specifically, Lee argues that the
    statement of the police office, concerning Lee’s credibility, was improper and should
    have resulted in a new trial.
    The testimony of the police officer was not directed toward the
    credibility of Lee as a witness.
    PROSECUTOR: And did anyone else come forward to provide you with
    any information with respect to the death of victim?
    POLICE OFFICER: Outside of the anonymous calls that I testified
    about earlier, no.
    PROSECUTOR: The vehicles, the Tahoe and the Blazer, are those still
    in the custody of the Cleveland Police Department?
    POLICE OFFICER: No.
    PROSECUTOR: What happened to them?
    POLICE OFFICER: The TrailBlazer that [victim] was driving was
    returned to [owner].
    PROSECUTOR: Okay.
    POLICE OFFICER: And the vehicle that the defendant was driving was
    returned to a friend of his.
    PROSECUTOR: Okay. The keys that were found with [victim’s]
    belongings on the scene where he was shot, did those go with the
    TrailBlazer?
    POLICE OFFICER: Yes.
    PROSECUTOR: And were those turned over to the owner of the Blazer
    when they came to the police department to get it?
    POLICE OFFICER: Yes.
    PROSECUTOR: I have nothing further.
    THE COURT: Mr. [Defense Counsel].
    DEFENSE COUNSEL: Thank you, Judge
    ***
    DEFENSE COUNSEL: So in response to the prosecutor’s question of
    [Police Officer], I asked to approach the bench, and my argument was
    that any answers elicited were going to be opinion testimony on the
    credibility of my client, whose statement we just heard during the
    course of the last several days. And I objected at that point, and then
    the prosecutor asked another question with reference to that, and the
    detective actually answered in response to the prosecutor’s question
    about my client’s credibility or lack thereof.
    So, Judge, at this time, as a result of the Ohio Supreme Court in State
    v. Boston and the fact that there was direct opinion testimony of, one
    fact witness of the defendant that I’m going to make a motion for
    mistrial.
    PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, the State of Ohio objects to that motion.
    The questioning of [Police Officer] was not regarding his opinion with
    respect to the defendant’s credibility in his unsworn statement that
    we’ve listened to for the last three hours, but rather directly based upon
    his own investigation in attempts to verify the information provided by
    the defendant. So it wasn’t his, you know, he’s not ─ I don’t find him
    to be credible. That wasn’t the testimony of [Police Officer]. It was,
    rather, I was unable to verify the information that he provided with
    respect to his credibility.
    So we’d ask that the motion be denied.
    THE COURT: The motion is denied.
    DEFENSE COUNSEL: Thank you, Judge.
    Tr. 522-528.
    The testimony of the police officer was related to statements made by
    Lee to the police and did not impeach the credibility of Lee. State v. Eastham, 
    39 Ohio St.3d 307
    , 
    530 N.E.2d 409
     (1988). We further find that the trial court properly
    denied the motion for mistrial, because the testimony of the police officer did not
    attack Lee’s credibility. State v. Pawlak, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99555, 2014-Ohio-
    2175.    Lee has failed to establish any prejudice through his fourth proposed
    assignment of error.
    VI. Fifth Proposed Assignment of Error
    Lee’s fifth proposed assignment of error is that:
    The trial court erred in admitting gruesome, irrelevant photographs
    over defense objection.
    Lee, through his fifth proposed assignment of error, argues that the
    trial court erred by allowing the admission of two autopsy photographs. Specifically,
    Lee argues that the cause of death was not in dispute, thus limiting any probative
    value of the photographs.
    A trial court may reject a photograph due to its inflammatory nature
    if on balance the prejudice outweighs the relevant probative value. However, the
    mere fact that a photograph is gruesome or horrendous is not sufficient to render it
    per se inadmissible. State v. Woodards, 
    6 Ohio St.2d 14
    , 
    215 N.E.2d 568
     (1966).
    The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence and unless it has
    clearly abused its discretion and the defendant has been materially prejudiced by
    the admission of any photograph, this court may not interfere with the trial court’s
    judgment. State v. Hymore, 
    9 Ohio St.2d 122
    , 
    224 N.E.2d 126
     (1967).
    The fact that Lee stipulated to the cause of death does not
    automatically render the photographs inadmissible. The two photos, state’s exhibits
    199 and 120, corroborated and illustrated the testimony of the deputy medical
    examiner who performed the autopsy of the victim. He testified as to the location,
    extent, and cause of the wounds sustained by the victim. The state did not use the
    two photographs to appeal to the jurors’ emotions and to prejudice them against
    Lee. State v. Thompson, 
    33 Ohio St.3d 1
    , 
    514 N.E.2d 407
     (1987); State v. Keenan,
    
    66 Ohio St.3d 402
    , 
    613 N.E.2d 203
     (1983). The state employed the photos at the
    trial to corroborate and illustrate the cause of the victim’s death and to carry the
    state’s ultimate burden of proof that Lee was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We
    cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the admission of the
    two photographs. State v. Maurer, 
    15 Ohio St.3d 239
    , 
    473 N.E.2d 768
     (1984). Lee
    has failed to establish that he was prejudiced through his fifth proposed assignment
    of error.
    VI.   Sixth Proposed Assignment of Error
    Lee’s sixth proposed assignment of error is that:
    The inclusion of the flight instruction over objection of defense counsel
    was reversible, prejudicial error.
    Lee, through his sixth proposed assignment of error, argues that the
    trial court erred by providing the jury with a flight instruction. Specifically, Lee
    argues that there existed no basis to allow the trial court to instruct the jury
    regarding flight.
    We conclude that the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury
    regarding Lee’s flight from the scene of the victim’s murder.           The evidence
    established that Lee fled from the murder scene. It is significant that after he fled
    following the murder, Lee did not return to the scene of the murder but was arrested
    the next morning following a tip. The evidence adduced at trial warranted the flight
    instruction given by the trial court. State v. Wood, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2010-CA-42,
    
    2011-Ohio-2314
    ; State v. Frock, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2004-CA-76, 
    2006-Ohio-1254
    .
    Lee has failed to establish that he was prejudiced through his sixth proposed
    assignment of error.
    VII. Seventh Proposed Assignment of Error
    Lee’s seventh proposed assignment of error is that:
    Incomplete and inaccurate self-defense jury instructions, given over
    defense objection, constituted structural error and a denial of
    Appellant’s due process rights.
    Lee, through his seventh proposed assignment of error, argues that
    the trial court improperly instructed the jury with regard to the claim of self-defense
    which resulted in structural error. However, Lee fails to explain how he was
    prejudiced by the trial court’s jury instruction.
    App.R. 26(B) mandates that Lee not only set forth assignments of
    error, but Lee must also indicate the manner in which such deficiency prejudicially
    affected the outcome of his appeal. Relative to this assignment of error, appellant
    has failed to explain how he was prejudiced. The simple claim that the trial court’s
    refusal to “include language sought by the defense” does not establish any prejudice.
    State v. Simpson, Slip Opinion No. 
    2020-Ohio-6719
    ; State v. Marcum, 7th Dist.
    Columbiana No. 10-CO-17, 
    2012-Ohio-2721
    .
    In addition, the jury instructions delivered by the trial court were
    based upon the Ohio Jury Instructions that dealt with self-defense against danger of
    death or great bodily harm and the use of deadly force. “The instructions found in
    Ohio Jury Instructions are not mandatory.           Rather, they are recommended
    instructions based primarily upon case law and statutes, crafted by eminent jurists
    to assist trial judges with correctly and efficiently charging the jury as to the law
    applicable to a particular case.” State v. Settle, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2015-T-0119,
    
    2017-Ohio-703
    , ¶ 25.
    Herein, a review of the record indicates that the trial court employed
    Ohio Jury Instructions, CR Section 421.21 with regard to its instruction on self-
    defense. The jury instructions provided were identical to the language provided by
    the Ohio Jury Instructions and were complete. We find no prejudicial error
    associated with the trial court’s jury instructions that dealt with self-defense. State
    v. Chavez, 3rd Dist. Seneca Nos. 13-19-05, 13-19-06, and 13-19-07, 
    2020-Ohio-426
    ;
    State v. Everett, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-140275, 
    2015-Ohio-5273
    . Lee has failed
    to establish that he was prejudiced through his seventh proposed assignment of
    error.
    VIII. Eighth and Ninth Proposed Assignments of Error
    Lee’s eighth proposed assignment of error is that:
    Appellant’s conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
    Lee’s ninth proposed assignment of error is that:
    The State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove each and every
    element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Lee, through his eighth and ninth proposed assignments of error,
    argues that his convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence and not
    supported by sufficient evidence. Lee, however, has failed to present any cognizable
    argument with regard to the eighth and ninth proposed assignments of error. Thus,
    Lee has failed to demonstrate how appellate counsel’s performance was deficient
    and that he was prejudiced by appellate counsel’s claimed deficiencies.
    In State v. Kelly, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 74912, 
    2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2907
     (June 21, 2000), this court established that the mere recitation of
    assignments of error is not sufficient to meet the burden to prove that the applicant’s
    appellate counsel was deficient for failing to raise the issues he now presents, or that
    there was a reasonable probability that the applicant would have been successful if
    the presented issues had been considered in the original appeal. See also State v.
    Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99703, 
    2014-Ohio-4467
    ; State v. Hawkins, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 90704, 
    2009-Ohio-2246
    . The failure of Lee to present any cognizable
    argument with regard to manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence results in
    the failure to demonstrate that his appellate counsel was deficient and that he was
    prejudiced by the alleged deficiency. State v. Freeman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    95511, 
    2011-Ohio-5151
    .
    Notwithstanding the failure of Lee to present any cognizable
    argument in support of his eighth and ninth proposed assignments of error, a review
    of the record clearly demonstrates that the convictions for the offenses of murder,
    felonious assault, carrying a concealed weapon, drug possession, and possessing
    criminal tools were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In a manifest
    weight analysis, an appellate court reviews the entire record, weighs the evidence
    and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses, and resolves
    conflicts in the evidence. An appellate court may not substitute its view for that of
    the jury unless it finds that the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
    miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed, and a new trial ordered.
    We cannot say that the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
    miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed. State v. Wilson, 
    113 Ohio St.3d 382
    , 
    2007-Ohio-2202
    , 
    865 N.E.2d 1264
    ; State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 
    678 N.E.2d 541
     (1997); State v. Walker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109328, 2021-
    Ohio-2037.
    Finally, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
    criminal conviction, this court is required to examine the evidence admitted at trial
    to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind
    of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether,
    after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
    trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
    reasonable doubt. A review of the record demonstrates that sufficient evidence was
    adduced at trial to support Lee’s conviction for the offenses of murder, felonious
    assault, carrying a concealed weapon, and possessing criminal tools. State v. Jenks,
    
    61 Ohio St.3d 259
    , 
    574 N.E.2d 492
     (1991); State v. Matthews, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
    No. 97916, 
    2012-Ohio-5174
    ; State v. Hunter, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86048, 2006-
    Ohio-20. Lee has failed to establish that he was prejudiced through his eighth and
    ninth proposed assignments of error.
    Application denied.
    ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE
    MARY J. BOYLE, A.J., and
    MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR