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Wilton Chatman-Bey v. Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General of the United States , 864 F.2d 804 ( 1988 )


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  • Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge STARR.

    Concurrence in the judgment filed by Circuit Judge SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, with whom Circuit Judge MIKVA joins.

    STARR, Circuit Judge:

    We agreed to hear this case en banc to consider a recurring issue in the administration of justice in this district, namely whether a federal prisoner, incarcerated outside the jurisdictional limits of the District of Columbia, can properly maintain an action in this district challenging his or her parole eligibility date as determined by federal prison and parole officials. The issue was initially presented to us in In re United States Parole Comm’n, 793 F.2d 338, reh’g granted, 798 F.2d 1532 (D.C.Cir.1986), which was eventually dismissed as moot upon the prisoner’s release on parole. Following supplemental briefing, the present case, involving a federal prisoner who had been sentenced both in federal court in Maryland and in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, was heard en banc.

    I

    The history of this litigation is described in our two earlier opinions. Chatman-Bey v. Meese, 797 F.2d 987 (D.C.Cir.1986) (Chatman-Bey II); In re Chatman-Bey, 718 F.2d 484 (D.C.Cir.1983) (Chatman-Bey I). To recap (and update) briefly, Chatman-Bey is currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institute in Petersburg, Virginia, following a transfer from the FCI at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, where the pertinent events for our purposes transpired. Shortly after his arrival at Lewisburg, Chatman-Bey was informed of his parole eligibility date by federal prison authorities. By virtue of Chatman-Bey’s two convictions, prison authorities calculated his parole eligibility date to be October 1999. Chatman-Bey objected to this determination, appealing to his prison case worker at Lewisburg, the warden at Lewisburg, the Bureau of Prisons Federal Regional Director in Philadelphia, and finally the BOP General Counsel in Washington. The gravamen of Chatman-Bey’s objection was that federal authorities had improperly failed to aggregate his federal and D.C. sentences for purposes of determining his parole eligibility date. Under Chatman-Bey’s analysis, his eligibility date would be June 3, 1991. Unsuccessful in his administrative efforts, Chatman-Bey filed a pro se complaint in federal court in the District of Columbia. The complaint was styled as a petition for habeas corpus or mandamus.

    Prior to service of the petition, the District Court transferred the case, sua sponte, to the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the district (at the time) of petitioner’s incarceration. Petitioner thereupon challenged the sua sponte transfer order in this court. In Chatman-Bey I, we vacated the order and remanded the case to the District Court. Our decision was specifically predicated on the view that petitioner’s action need not be brought in habeas corpus. Chatman-Bey I, 718 F.2d at 487 n. 7.

    On remand, the District Court held that Chatman-Bey’s claim was cognizable in either habeas or mandamus and that venue was also proper in this District. Chatman-Bey v. Smith, 594 F.Supp. 718, 721 (D.D.C.1984). The District Court went on, however, to reject petitioner’s substantive claim that his parole eligibility date had been incorrectly calculated. Id. at 722-24. The case then came to us again. In Chatman-Bey II, we reversed and held that *806petitioner’s parole eligibility date had been incorrectly determined. Chatman-Bey II, 797 F.2d at 993-94. In so concluding, the Chatman-Bey II panel followed the position stated and developed in In re United States Parole Comm’n, supra, that petitioner was not required to resort to habeas corpus and that venue was proper in this district. Chatman-Bey II, 797 F.2d at 990-91. Although Chatman-Bey II’s merits determination was approved by the court en banc, Chatman-Bey II, 797 F.2d at 994 n. 10, see Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265, 268 n. 11 (D.C.Cir.1981), the procedural issue whether Chatman-Bey’s petition sounds in habeas and, if it does, whether jurisdiction and venue appropriately lie in the District of Columbia rather than in the district of incarceration (the Middle District of Pennsylvania)1 was placed before the full court. This case thus presents the recurring question whether federal parole eligibility cases can properly be litigated in this jurisdiction when the federal prisoner is incarcerated at one of the approximately 40 federal prisons situated across the country, and none of which is located in the District of Columbia. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Chatman-Bey’s complaint sounds in habeas corpus and must be maintained as such. We further conclude that, because the government waived the defenses of venue and personal jurisdiction, this case was appropriately before the District Court of the District of Columbia.

    II

    Chatman-Bey styled his pro se complaint as a habeas petition or, in the alternative, a petition for mandamus. Because (for reasons that follow) habeas is an available and potentially efficacious remedy, it is clear beyond reasonable dispute that mandamus will not appropriately lie.2 We turn, then, to an explanation of why habeas is the Congressionally ordained remedy for parole eligibility cases.

    A

    The modern history of habeas corpus is a story of steady expansion of the Great Writ beyond the more limited office that it served at common law. Justice Blackmun aptly captured the point in his concurring opinion in Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973), a case that will loom large in the latter part of our analysis: “[W]e have come a long way from the traditional notions of the Great Writ. The common-law scholars of the past hardly would recognize what the [Supreme] Court has developed. . . .” 410 U.S. at 501, 93 S.Ct. at 1133.

    The essence of modern habeas corpus is to safeguard the individual against unlawful custody. As Justice Brennan put it for the Court in the watershed case of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438, 83 S.Ct. 822, 848, 96 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963), habeas’ role is to serve “as an effective and imperative remedy for detentions contrary to fundamental law_” Habeas gets at custody or detention of an individual. Its function is to test the power of the state to deprive an individual of liberty in the most elemental sense. This ancient role is evident in the language of the habeas statute itself, deriving from the venerable Judiciary Act of 1789. The statute provides for issuance of writs on behalf of persons who are “in custody.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1982).

    *807In construing the federal statutes that, over the years, have codified the Great Writ, the Supreme Court has steadily eliminated many of the traditional limitations on the availability of habeas corpus. Especially germane for our purposes is the Court’s emphatic rejection, in Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 88 S.Ct. 1549, 20 L.Ed.2d 426 (1968), of the proposition that habe-as would not lie if the relief granted would not result in the prisoner’s immediate release. Habeas is broad, the Peyton Court emphasized; “the statute does not deny the federal courts power to fashion appropriate relief other than immediate release.” Id. at 66, 88 S.Ct. at 1556. Looking to history, the Court went on: “Since 1874, the habeas corpus statute has directed the courts to determine the facts and dispose of the case summarily, ‘as law and justice require.’ ” Id. at 66-67, 88 S.Ct. at 1556. Thus it was that in Peyton the habeas petitioner was permitted to maintain a challenge to a state criminal conviction even though he was serving a lengthy sentence for another, separate conviction. Habeas relief obviously would have done the prisoner no good in terms of securing his release from confinement either immediately or in the near future. Indeed, the first sentence (which the prisoner was serving and did not challenge) was enormously long (30 years). Id. at 55, 88 S.Ct. at 1550. Yet, the Supreme Court permitted the challenge to the second conviction and in the process overruled one of its prior decisions, McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 55 S.Ct. 24, 79 L.Ed. 238 (1934), which had held that the habeas statute did not authorize attacks upon future consecutive sentences. In doing so, the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brennan, vindicated then-Chief Judge Haynsworth’s opinion for the Fourth Circuit which had predicted High Court overruling of McNally:

    Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Judge Haynsworth reasoned that this Court would no longer follow McNally, which in his view represented a “doctrinaire approach” based on an “old jurisdictional concept” which had been “thoroughly rejected by the Supreme Court in recent cases.”

    Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. at 57, 88 S.Ct. at 1551.

    Like such seminal habeas cases as Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953), and Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963), Peyton signaled strong High Court disapproval of formalistic analysis in the context of habeas corpus. Anti-formalism in modern habeas interpretation was first heralded by Justice Holmes in his frequently cited dissent in Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 35 S.Ct. 582, 59 L.Ed. 969 (1915) (habe-as corpus should be available to petitioner who alleges that state court fact-finding was tainted by mob influence). There, the Great Dissenter observed that “habeas corpus cuts through all forms and goes to the very tissue of the structure.” Id. at 346, 35 S.Ct. at 594. A reading of the cases that have followed in the wake of Justice Holmes’ memorable dissent abundantly demonstrates that modern habeas jurisprudence emphasizes the breadth and flexibility of the Great Writ in vindicating the fundamental concern in a democratic society of checking the powers of the state vis-a-vis an individual in custody. Habeas is, in the words of Justice Harlan in dissent in Fay v. Noia, “a fundamental safeguard against unlawful custody.” 372 U.S. at 449, 83 S.Ct. at 854.

    B

    Consistent with its broad vision of habe-as corpus, the Supreme Court has expressly sanctioned the invocation of habeas where the injury in question is, among other things, a prejudicing of one’s right to be considered for parole. In Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973), which we shall presently discuss at greater length, the Court observed that the existence of an outstanding indictment (in Kentucky) which the habeas prisoner (incarcerated in Alabama) was seeking to challenge “adversely affected his condition of [present] confinement [in Alabama] ... by prejudicing his opportunity for parole.” Braden, 410 U.S. at 487, 93 S.Ct. at 1125. It will be readily apparent that Chatman-*808Bey’s claim is strikingly similar to that advanced by the habeas petitioner in Bra-den; indeed, it is more graphic in that Chatman-Bey is flatly being denied consideration for parole for eight years. There is a “here-and-now” effect on Chatman-Bey that was not so evident in Braden.

    It thus seems beyond reasonable dispute that, in framing his complaint, Chatman-Bey proceeded appropriately in invoking the federal habeas statute. As a federal prisoner, Chatman-Bey obviously is “in custody” within the meaning of the statute; in addition, he has mounted an attack on the terms of that custody. That is, Chat-man-Bey contends that, under the parole structure as erected by Congress and implemented by the Parole Commission, he should become eligible for consideration for parole in 1991, rather than 1999. If this claim (which our court en banc has already sustained) has merit (as it obviously does), then Chatman-Bey is being subjected to an unlawful term or condition of custody,3 namely the deprivation of the opportunity to be considered for release from confinement until eight years after he is in fact entitled to such consideration. That claim, mounted by an individual “in custody,” falls comfortably within the broad reach of habeas corpus.

    C

    Before turning to the question of the appropriate forum for resolution of Chatman-Bey’s claim, we pause to address the distinct issue whether a federal prisoner challenging the determination of a parole eligibility date is required to bring his claim in habeas, or whether another form of action (say, mandamus or a declaratory-judgment action) will also lie.4 As to this question, we turn to the Supreme Court’s decision in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). The issue in Preiser was whether state prisoners could invoke the familiar federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to challenge the deprivation of good-time credits effected by state prison officials. The Preiser majority, speaking through Justice Stewart, concluded that the prisoners’ action was required to be brought in habeas. Otherwise, the Court reasoned, Congress’ carefully crafted habeas structure, requiring as it did exhaustion of state remedies by state prisoners, would be undermined by permitting state prisoners to invoke a (non-habeas) federal remedy (§ 1983) which did not mandate exhaustion. Analyzing the two statutes, the Court concluded that Congress intended the more specific federal habeas statute, “explicitly and historically designed to provide the *809means for a state prisoner to attack the validity of his confinement,” 411 U.S. at 489, 93 S.Ct. at 1836, to be utilized, as opposed to the more generic civil rights remedy embodied in § 1983. Inasmuch as Congress had amended the habeas statute in 1948 to require exhaustion of state remedies, the Preiser majority concluded that “[i]t would wholly frustrate explicit congressional intent to hold that the [challengers] could evade this requirement by the simple expedient of putting a different label on their pleadings.” Id. at 489-90, 93 S.Ct. at 1836.

    Preiser thus makes clear that, as a matter of Congressional intent, prisoners mounting a challenge to the lawfulness of their custody are to proceed by means of habeas. That intent is evidenced by the Article I branch’s employment of the pivotal terms, “a person in custody,” in the statute itself. Unless he or she is “in custody,” an individual with a constitutional (or other federal question-based) grievance simply would not be heard in the context of habeas. To be sure, the pivotal term, “custody,” has been broadly defined by the modern habeas cases, all of a piece with the Twentieth Century thrust, which we have previously adumbrated, of expanding habeas beyond its limited common-law boundaries. But “custody” must exist if habeas is to lie; and, concomitantly, where the individual is in custody, Congress’ provision of an express remedy for unlawful detentions means, as Preiser teaches, that habeas is the remedy intended by the Article I branch to be employed. This is all of a piece with the well-settled principle that a specific statute displaces (or, as is frequently said, preempts) more general remedies. See Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 834-35, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976) (and cases cited therein).

    This interpretive conclusion should give no cause for concern, much less alarm, over potential dangers to other values in our constitutional system. That is, Chat-man-Bey’s claim does not trigger the “Preiser dilemma” of relegating an individual advancing a federal claim to a state forum (and thus denying immediate access to a federal forum for adjudication of a federal claim). Id. 411 U.S. at 501, 93 S.Ct. at 1842 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In stark contrast to the factual setting in Preiser, where as we just saw state prisoners were seeking to mount a § 1983 challenge to the actions of state officials in denying them “good time” credits, Chatman-Bey’s status as a federal prisoner means that his challenge to his federal parole eligibility determination will be resolved in a federal, not state, court. This fundamental distinction between federal parole-eligibility cases and Preiser-type cases (involving state prisoners mounting federal claims) means that the elemental concern that animated the Preiser dissenters is fully accommodated, namely the prompt resolution of federal claims in federal court. That is, the “Preiser dilemma” is avoided when the ha-beas petitioner comes, as does Chatman-Bey, from the federal (rather than a state) prison system.

    Moreover, Preiser cannot, in conscience, be limited to the specific facts of that case, namely the elimination of good-time credits which, if overturned, would result in immediate release or a definite reduction in the actual amount of time to be spent in prison. As previously suggested, the modern habe-as cases teach, broadly, that habeas is designed to test the lawfulness of the government’s asserted right to detain an individual. That, as we have seen, is the essence of Chatman-Bey’s complaint. Like various successful habeas petitioners before him (e.g., Mr. Rowe in Peyton v. Rowe), Chat-man-Bey is not laying claim to immediate release or release in the near future. He is, however, maintaining that he is being deprived of the chance to secure his release (for the very substantial period of eight years) by unlawfully being declared ineligible for parole consideration. This opportunity, Chatman-Bey maintains, is secured to him by federal law, if the aggregation policies underlying federal criminal statutes and the parole system are to prevail. Congress has therefore designated habeas as the appropriate vehicle for individuals who, like Chatman-Bey, challenge the lawful*810ness of their custody.5

    What is more, Congress’ intent can be vindicated without sacrificing the value of securing a prompt adjudication of federal claims in federal court. To the contrary, that is precisely what federal habeas corpus accomplishes for federal prisoners. Thus, the desideratum of having federal claims adjudicated in a federal forum, emphasized so strongly by the dissenters in Preiser, is fully achieved by interpreting federal law to oblige federal prisoners to avail themselves of federal habeas procedures.6

    Ill

    That being so, we turn next in our analysis to the question of the proper defendant in habeas cases and specifically to this court’s holding in Guerra v. Meese, 786 F.2d 414 (D.C.Cir.1986). Although, for reasons already set forth, the key habeas concept of “custody” (and thus “custodian”) has been expanded significantly in recent years, the law of this circuit is clear that “[a] district court may not entertain a habe-as corpus action unless it has personal jurisdiction over the custodian of the prisoner.” Guerra, 786 F.2d at 415. We reaffirm that holding today. It is also well settled that the appropriate defendant in a habeas action is the custodian of the prisoner. See Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341, 92 5.Ct. 1693, 32 L.Ed.2d 141 (1972); Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 91 S.Ct. 995, 28 L.Ed.2d 251 (1971).

    The issue, then, is who is the habeas petitioner’s “custodian?” Not surprisingly, the answer is not “everyone.” Indeed, not any federal official who has some direct relationship to the federal prisoner will do service as a “custodian” within the meaning of the federal habeas statute. Guerra makes this point clearly, in holding that the United States Parole Commission (although responsible for making parole determinations) is not the “custodian” of federal prisoners seeking release (and, a fortiorari, eligibility) on parole. As the Guerra panel put it: “Were the Parole Commission to decide to change the prisoners’ parole eligibility dates today, they might be freed. But this power does not make the Commis*811sion the prisoners’ custodian in the sense of the habeas corpus statute.” Guerra, 786 F.2d at 416.

    Not only did Guerra reject the “Parole Commission as custodian” contention, but it also rearticulated settled circuit law that the Attorney General is not the custodian for purposes of the habeas statute. Id. (citing Sanders v. Bennett, 148 F.2d 19, 20 (D.C.Cir.1945)). Thus, it should be abundantly clear that habeas petitioners, such as Chatman-Bey, cannot properly bring suit against such officials as the Attorney General and such entities as the Parole Commission. Rather, the proper defendant in federal habeas cases is the warden. In this instance, of course, that is the warden of the FCI in Lewisburg, see n. 1 supra, whom Chatman-Bey in fact named in the original complaint. Under these circumstances, Guerra’s, holding is quite clear: “We ... hold that, for purposes of challenging a Parole Commission action on the sentence a prisoner is currently serving in a federal penal facility, the warden of that facility is the prisoner’s custodian within the meaning of [the federal habeas statute].” Guerra, 786 F.2d at 416.

    This fact should give no cause for concern. The limitation on the category of “custodian” in no wise circumscribes the types of claims that can properly be maintained in the specific context of habeas litigation. Quite apart from the breadth of modern habeas corpus, the Supreme Court has specifically stated that claims directed against federal officials in Washington can be litigated in the jurisdiction where the habeas action appropriately lies. That statement is contained in our already familiar friend, the Braden case, where the Court limited one of its earlier decisions (which had been informed by strict, formalistic notions about habeas jurisdiction) involving a lawsuit against then-Attorney General Clark brought by individuals detained at Ellis Island. The suit, eventuating in the case of Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 68 S.Ct. 1443, 92 L.Ed. 1898 (1948), was filed in United States District Court in Washington, D.C. But that was held to be the wrong forum. The Supreme Court in Ahrens upheld this court’s determination that a federal district court’s ha-beas jurisdiction extended only to cases where the prisoner seeking relief is confined within the district court’s territorial jurisdiction. Later, in Braden, the Court cut back substantially on Ahrens (and indeed overruled its territorially-based jurisdictional holding); but in so doing, the Bra-den Court stated flatly that the habeas petitioners in Ahrens, although challenging a policy promulgated by the Attorney General, “could have challenged their detentions by bringing an action in the Eastern District of New York against the federal officials who confined them in that district.” 410 U.S. at 500, 93 S.Ct. at 1132. That was so even though the Ellis Island custodian obviously had nothing to do with fashioning Attorney General Clark’s determinations under the Alien Enemy Act of 1798 (which was the purported statutory basis of the deportation order at issue in the case). Braden, then, stands as clear authority for the proposition that Chat-man-Bey (and other federal prisoners who are challenging some aspect of Parole Commission policy or action) can properly bring his complaint in his local federal district court and secure a resolution of his claim in the context of habeas corpus. In short, as Braden expressly states, lawsuits aimed at a policy fashioned in Washington, D.C. need not be brought in this district. Like the petitioners in Ahrens situated on Ellis Island, the federal court of the jurisdiction where the individual is incarcerated (or otherwise in “custody”) can properly entertain the action.

    IV

    This brings us, finally, to Braden’s teaching that habeas jurisdiction is not limited to the district where the individual is incarcerated. That is to say, by virtue of Braden’s holding, it can no longer be maintained that a federal court outside the district of incarceration lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a habeas claim.

    Here, at long last, are the facts of Bra-den. As we alluded to before, Braden was incarcerated in Alabama pursuant to a state conviction. There was outstanding *812against him, however, an indictment in Kentucky on state charges there. Kentucky authorities therefore lodged a detain-er against Braden with Alabama authorities. Braden had no quarrel with his Alabama conviction, nor with the detainer itself. What he did object to was the indictment in Kentucky which underlay the de-tainer. He therefore sought to challenge the validity of the Kentucky indictment by filing a habeas petition in federal district court in Kentucky. The Supreme Court held that he could.

    Not only did the Braden Court reaffirm its holding in Peyton v. Rowe, which as we saw before permits a challenge to a future indictment (or sentence), but it also held that venue considerations were to apply in the determination of the forum in which habeas should be brought. It made no sense, the Court stated, for Braden to bring his action in federal court in Alabama:

    It is in Kentucky, where all of the material events took place, that the records and witnesses pertinent to petitioner’s claim are likely to be found. And that forum is presumably no less convenient for the respondent and the Commonwealth of Kentucky, than for the petitioner. The expense and risk of transporting the petitioner to the Western District of Kentucky, should his presence at a hearing prove necessary, would in all likelihood be outweighed by the difficulties of transporting records and witnesses from Kentucky to the district where the petitioner is confined. Indeed, respondent makes clear that “on balance, it would appear simpler and less expensive for the State of Kentucky to litigate such questions ... in one of its own Federal judicial districts.”

    Braden, 410 U.S. at 493-94, 93 S.Ct. at 1128-29.

    Hence, both sides in the Braden litigation favored Kentucky as the forum for resolution of the prisoner’s challenge to his Kentucky indictment, even though Braden found himself incarcerated in Alabama. But the fly in the ointment, as the Kentucky authorities saw it, was the language of the federal habeas statute, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the Ahrens case. The statute in question, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (1982), provided (and still does) broadly that “[wjrits of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions.” It was the language, “within their respective jurisdictions,” that Kentucky authorities (and the Sixth Circuit) interpreted as requiring the prisoner to seek habeas relief within the jurisdiction where he was confined. The Braden Court disagreed:

    [Tjhat interpretation is not compelled either by the language of the statute or by the decision in Ahrens, and ... is fundamentally at odds with the purposes of the statutory scheme....

    Id. at 494, 93 S.Ct. at 1129.

    It was in this context that the Supreme Court set forth the bedrock principle that habeas “does not act upon the prisoner ... but the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Id. at 494-95, 93 S.Ct. at 1129. Quoting an ancient statement by the Court, the Braden Court emphasized the basic procedural fact of habeas practice — the writ is “directed to, and served upon, not the person confined, but the jailer.” Id. at 495, 93 S.Ct. at 1130 (quoting Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574, 5 S.Ct. 1050, 1055, 29 L.Ed. 277 (1885)). Thus, the Court stated, the statutory language required “nothing more than that the court issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian. So long as the custodian can be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ ‘within its jurisdiction’ requiring that the prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on his claim ... even if the prisoner himself is confined outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.” Braden, 410 U.S. at 495, 93 S.Ct. at 1130. Canvassing a number of its prior rulings, the Braden Court concluded with the observation that “we have held, if only implicitly, that the petitioner’s absence from the district does not present a jurisdictional obstacle to the consideration of the claim.” Id. at 498, 93 S.Ct. at 1131.

    *813In light of Braden’s teaching, the present case is thus not properly to be analyzed in terms of subject matter jurisdiction. That is, the physical presence of Chatman-Bey within this district is not required for the federal court of this district to have jurisdiction over his habeas claim. Braden holds as much. But Braden also makes clear that venue considerations may, and frequently will, argue in favor of adjudication of the habeas claim in the jurisdiction where the habeas petitioner is confined. Moreover, what seems clear beyond cavil, especially in light of Braden’s clear statement in this respect, is that the habeas court must have personal jurisdiction over the “custodian.” Id. at 495, 93 S.Ct. at 1130.

    In the case before us, it is evident that the District Court would not have personal jurisdiction over the warden at the Lewisburg FCI, who, again, is Chatman-Bey’s “custodian.”7 But this need not detain us, inasmuch as the government failed in its answer to interpose as defenses either improper venue or lack of personal jurisdiction over the warden. It is, of course, elementary that a defense of improper venue or lack of personal (as opposed to subject matter) jurisdiction is waived unless the defense is asserted by a pre-answer motion (i.e., Rule 12(b)) or in a responsive pleading, ie., the answer or a timely amendment thereto. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(1); C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1388 (1969).

    To canvass briefly the pertinent facts in this regard, the government filed its answer in February 1984 and asserted lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)) and failure to state a claim (12(b)(6)). The government did not, however, assert improper venue or lack of personal jurisdiction over the warden. Since, as Braden teaches, the jurisdictional flaw is not with respect to the subject matter of the suit, any other objection (or, more precisely, defense)8 should have been interposed in conformity with the applicable provisions of the Federal Rules.9

    The factual idiosyncracies of this case aside, however, it is now clear for reasons already stated that: (1) claims such as Chatman-Bey’s properly sound in habe-as and indeed must be brought in habeas; and (2) the “custodian” for habeas purposes is the warden of the FCI where the petitioner is incarcerated. That being so, it *814would not be inappropriate in this limited (but recurring) context for the District Court to transfer such cases sua sponte to the jurisdiction of confinement.10

    As to the specific procedure to follow, we are satisfied that issuance of an order to show cause is the most appropriate step prior to sua sponte transfer. This procedure will provide the habeas petitioner with both notice of the District Court’s anticipated action and an opportunity to set forth reasons why the case can (and should) properly be heard in this jurisdiction. We are reluctant, however, to erect further procedural devices which would tend to turn the question of the most appropriate (or indeed correct) habeas forum into a mini-litigation of its own, with the inevitable consequence of delay. Delay is undesirable in all aspects of our justice system, but it is especially to be avoided in the sensitive context of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court has said, time and again, that prompt resolution of prisoners’ claims is a principal function of habeas. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1204, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1981); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973). The erection of elaborate procedural devices to resolve venue-type questions would exact an unacceptably heavy toll on the core habeas value of speed. Federal prisoners deserve a prompt and just answer to their claims, not a ticket of admission to the arcane world of forum-selection law. In short, where, as here, the federal prisoner has immediate access to a federal forum close at hand, preliminary skirmishing over the speculative benefits of possibly appropriate fora simply spawns unproductive delay and fails to further any substantial interest relevant to the core values enshrined in the Great Writ.

    We conclude, in sum, that habeas corpus provides the exclusive remedy for claims such as Chatman-Bey’s. We further conclude that, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, the prior merits disposition of the court en banc stands by virtue of the government’s failure to interpose its defenses in timely fashion. Henceforth, however, the elemental considerations of speedy resolution of habeas claims, fairness to the parties, and the orderly administration of justice are more appropriately balanced where district courts are authorized to transfer such cases sua sponte, after the habeas petitioner has been afforded notice and an opportunity to respond.

    JUDGMENT ACCORDINGLY.

    . Notwithstanding Chatman-Bey’s transfer during the course of this litigation to the FCI at Petersburg, which is in the Eastern District of Virginia, habeas jurisdiction as a general matter continues to be in the district where the prisoner was incarcerated at the time the habeas petition was filed. See, e.g., Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 65 S.Ct. 208, 89 L.Ed. 243 (1944); Bishop v. Medical Superintendent, 377 F.2d 467 (6th Cir.1967).

    . Since it is established that mandamus is a drastic remedy to be invoked only in extraordinary situations, see, e.g., Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34-35, 101 S.Ct. 188, 190, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980) (per curiam), mandamus would potentially lie in the present case only if the complaint fell outside the reach of habeas (or if habeas was inefficacious). Since, as we shall now show, Chatman-Bey’s complaint falls comfortably within the broad confines of habeas corpus, mandamus would be inappropriate in this case even if habeas were simply an available, rather than exclusive, remedy. See also infra n. 4.

    . It should be noted that such parole issues have been prospectively eliminated by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub.L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (Supp. IV 1986)). The Act eliminates parole for persons convicted after November 1, 1987 and establishes a system of determinate sentencing.

    . Our concurring colleague suggests that our approach "plots a decisional course in the wrong direction.” Concurring Op. at 815. Ha-beas is itself an extraordinary remedy, the concurrence indicates, and thus the courts should not "indulge unlimited range to either habeas or mandamus.” Id. at 815. But it is a commonplace that mandamus is extraordinary in the sense that, as our colleague recognizes, "a writ of mandamus will ordinarily be denied when another avenue to the relief he desired is open.” Id. And that is precisely the point. Here, as we indicate at length in the text, Chatman-Bey sought either habeas or mandamus relief; the efficacy of habeas in this setting, which the concurrence fully recognizes, simply precludes resort to mandamus under settled principles.

    Thus, upon reflection, we have not steered in the wrong direction at all, even under our colleague’s mode of analysis. The concurrence’s real quarrel, rather, is the determination that habeas provides the exclusive remedy under the circumstances of this case. That is a fair point of debate. But in beginning the debate, the concurrence intimates that Chatman-Bey’s claim "does not implicate either the fact or the duration of his detention.” That surely cannot be. Chatman-Bey’s claim indeed does so, as a fair reading of the complaint demonstrates. True enough, as we recognize in the text, Chat-man-Bey’s success in establishing a 1991 (rather than 1999) eligibility date does not assure his release, but it surely "implicates the duration” of his detention in the most elemental way. Chat-man-Bey will not be released prior to expiration of his sentence (minus good time and assuming no act of clemency or pardon) unless he is released on parole. By definition, he will not be released on parole until he has attained eligibility for consideration for parole. Surely then, in the most practical sense, parole eligibility "implicates” the duration of confinement.

    . In In re United States Parole Comm’n, 793 F.2d 338, reh’g granted, 798 F.2d 1532 (D.C.Cir.1986), a panel of this court held that a prisoner’s challenge to new parole guidelines that postponed his eligibility for parole did not attack the “fact or duration” of confinement because even if successful, the challenge would not have entitled him to speedier release. Therefore, the court held, the prisoner was not limited to habe-as relief, but could bring an action for declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 344-46. The panel in Chatman-Bey II, relying on In re United States Parole Comm’n, similarly held that Chat-man-Bey’s challenge to the BOP's calculation of his parole eligibility date did not attack the "fact or duration" of confinement, and so could be brought as a request for declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Chatman-Bey II, 797 F.2d at 990-91. Having previously vacated both decisions, we now hold that a prisoner’s challenge to the determination of his eligibility for parole does indeed attack the "fact or duration” of confinement within the meaning of Preiser; therefore, habeas is the sole remedy available to such a prisoner, for the reasons set forth above.

    Our concurring colleague discusses several post-Preiser cases in evaluating the exclusivity of habeas relief. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), involved an action by state prisoners seeking to challenge the procedures by which disciplinary proceedings at the state prison were conducted. Wolff thus raised squarely the “Preiser dilemma,” which we discuss in the text that follows, of state prisoners seeking (and potentially being denied) access to a federal court. Here, of course, Chatman-Bey is being assured the prompt adjudication of his claims in federal court; the sole question is which federal court (that of the district where the individual is incarcerated or a court remote from that location) will adjudicate the case. In addition, Wolff involved a claim for money damages by state prisoners, which sounds squarely within 42 U.S. C. § 1983 and which raises questions that we do not address, much less resolve, in this case. See infra n. 6. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), likewise involved a "Preiser dilemma” action by state prisoners seeking access to federal court; so too with Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979).

    . It should be evident that what has been said thus far has no bearing on prisoners’ claims for money damages for alleged violations of federal rights. Our analysis goes solely to situations where the federal prisoner is seeking non-monetary redress for alleged violations of federally secured rights going to the lawfulness of his or her custody. We therefore are in accord with our concurring colleague’s discussion in this particular. See Concurring Op. at 816-817.

    . Although 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) generally provides for nationwide service on officers of the United States, this basis of personal jurisdiction is unavailable in habeas. Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 490 n. 4, 91 S.Ct. 995, 998 n. 4, 28 L.Ed.2d 251 (1971).

    . This includes the defense of lack of service of process, which is waived if not asserted in a timely manner. Rule 12(h)(1) F.R.C.P. The record indicates that the warden was never served. Yet, lack of service was likewise never asserted by the government.

    . The government’s failure to assert the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction cannot be excused on the ground that this defense was somehow not "available” at the time of defendant’s answer. Rule 12(g), Fed.R.Civ.P., provides, sensibly, that a defense may be waived only if "available” at the time of the answer or pre-an-swer motion. The decisional law indicates that a defense is unavailable if its legal basis did not exist at the time of the answer or pre-answer motion, Holzager v. Valley Hospital, 646 F.2d 792, 796 (2d Cir.1981) (law of the circuit subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court) or the complaint does not contain facts sufficient to indicate that a defense was possible. Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 712 F.2d 735, 738-39 (1st Cir.1983) (defendant unaware of plaintiffs residence). In those cases, it was for all practical purposes impossible for the defendants to interpose their respective defenses at the time of the answer. The situation here, however, is quite different. For one thing, in Chatman-Bey 1 the panel did not foreclose the possibility that the case could proceed in habeas. Chatman-Bey I, 718 F.2d at 487-88. On remand, the District Court set forth its conclusion that it indeed had habeas jurisdiction and treated mandamus as an alternative basis for relief. Chatman-Bey v. Smith, 594 F.Supp. 718, 721 (D.D.C.1984). Then, following Chatman-Bey I, the government expressly argued that mandamus would not lie and that the action could proceed only in habe-as. Chatman-Bey v. Meese, 797 F.2d 987, 990 (D.C.Cir.1986). Under the particular circumstances of this case, the government was thus by no means unaware that the action could proceed in habeas. Such defenses as lack of personal jurisdiction or improper venue that appeared to be relevant only in habeas were thus "available” and, consequently, waived by the government when not asserted in its answer.

    . This is not say that sua sponte dismissal is authorized. To the contrary, we have held that a civil action in forma pauperis may not be dismissed sua sponte as "frivolous” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) solely because the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Anger v. Revco Drug Co., 791 F.2d 956 (D.C.Cir.1986). Nor are we suggesting that sua sponte transfer is appropriate outside the unique context of habeas. See In re Scott, 709 F.2d 717 (D.C.Cir.1983) (sua sponte transfer inappropriate in FOIA context). For reasons that follow in the text, transfer (but not dismissal) sua sponte is uniquely appropriate in habeas cases by virtue of the clear limitations as to personal jurisdiction over the various wardens in the Bureau of Prisons system.

Document Info

Docket Number: 84-5901

Citation Numbers: 864 F.2d 804, 274 U.S. App. D.C. 398, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 17522

Judges: III, Wald, Robinson, Mikva, Edwards, Ginsburg, Starr, Silberman, Buckley, Williams, Sentelle

Filed Date: 12/23/1988

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/4/2024