Litvak Packing Company v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local Union No. 7 ( 1989 )

LOGAN, Circuit Judge.

The United Food and Commercial Workers, Local Union No. 7 (U.F.C.W.) filed a grievance protesting Litvak Packing Company’s (Litvak) discharge of Loyal P. Bar-stow. The matter was referred to arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, which resulted in an award rescinding the discharge. Litvak sued in federal district court to vacate the award. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted U.F.C.W.’s motion and enforced the award. This appeal followed.

Barstow was a production employee at Litvak’s slaughterhouse, meat packing, and processing plant in Denver, Colorado. He was discharged on November 14, 1986, for failing on the previous day to draw and store blood from cattle fetuses, a part of his job in the condemn room of the plant.

The collective bargaining agreement in effect at the time of the discharge provides in relevant part:

“6.01 No employee covered by this Agreement shall be suspended, demoted, or dismissed without just and sufficient cause. Sufficient cause for discharge shall include, among other reasons, persistent tardiness or absence, dishonesty, negligence, incompetence, insubordination, intoxication while on duty, refusal to perform any reasonable work, service or labor when required to do so by the Employer....”

The parties stipulated the following issue to be decided by the arbitrator: “Did the Company have just and sufficient cause to discharge the Grievant, Loyal P. Barstow, on November 14, 1986?” I R. Tab 1 at 3 (Arbitrator’s Award). Litvak argues, however, that the arbitrator “essentially required Litvak to prove that Barstow was insubordinate or refused to perform a reasonable work order.” Brief of Appellant at 13. The arbitrator did focus on these factors, finding that Barstow was fired “for insubordination and refusal to save the blood of the [cattle fetuses] as he had been told to do by his supervisors,” I R. Tab 1 at 7, and deeming “[t]he real question in this case [to be] whether the Griev-ant’s failure in job performance can be properly labeled as ‘insubordination’ and/or ‘the refusal to perform any reasonable work required by the Employer’ so as to constitute just and sufficient cause for discharge under the terms of § 6.01 of the contract,” id. at 11.

The arbitrator concluded that even though there was no reason for Barstow’s “failure to save blood on November 13th other than carelessness, laziness, and/or neglect,” and that Barstow “was derelict in carrying out his duties, ... he was not insubordinate and he did not refuse to perform work when required to do so by his Employer.” Id. at 12. The arbitrator then stated that “[djereliction of duty involving extreme carelessness and neglect and which results in serious economic damage to the employer may itself be grounds for discharge. But that was not the grounds stated by the Company in this case and, furthermore, all of the circumstances of this case do not add up to just and sufficient cause for discharging the Grievant.” Id.

Our review of arbitral awards is among the narrowest known to the law. We must enforce an award which “draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.” United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). This standard is not an invitation to a court to substitute its judgment for that of an arbitrator. The parties have contracted for an arbitrator to resolve their disputes, not a court. United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Miseo, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 108 S.Ct. 364, 370, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 764, 103 S.Ct. 2177, 2182, 76 L.Ed.2d 298 (1983). They have agreed to be bound by the arbitrator’s factfinding and contract interpretation whether his findings and conclusions are correct or not. Misco, 108 S.Ct. at 370-71; W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 765, 103 S.Ct. at 2183. Thus, “as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.” Misco, 108 S.Ct. at 371 (emphasis added). If the parties disagree with the arbitrator’s interpretation, their remedy is to modify their contract or select a new arbitrator.

Litvak argues that because the arbitrator “specifically found that Barstow was negligent,” he had no alternative to upholding the discharge. Brief of Appellant at 15. We agree that the arbitrator cannot ignore the express terms of § 6.01. The arbitrator, however, neither found this to be a negligence case nor that Barstow was negligent within the meaning of § 6.01. On the contrary, the arbitrator interpreted the contract and concluded that Barstow’s carelessness, laziness, and neglect, none of which are mentioned specifically in § 6.01, did not constitute just and sufficient cause to fire this 23-year employee. Although we might well have reached a contrary conclusion on the merits, the arbitrator’s award was certainly “rooted in the agreement,” International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Professional Hole Drilling, Inc., 574 F.2d 497, 503 (10th Cir.1978), and we cannot substitute our interpretation of the contract for his. Misco, 108 S.Ct. at 371.

Accordingly, the order of the district court enforcing the arbitration award is AFFIRMED.