In re K.R. , 2021 Ohio 4474 ( 2021 )

[Cite as In re K.R., 2021-Ohio-4474.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
SHELBY COUNTY
IN RE: CASE NO. 17-21-12
K.R.,
DEPENDENT CHILD. OPINION
[CRYSTAL R. - APPELLANT]
IN RE: CASE NO. 17-21-13
W.R.,
DEPENDENT CHILD. OPINION
[CRYSTAL R. - APPELLANT]
Appeals from Shelby County Common Pleas Court
Juvenile Division
Trial Court Nos. 2018 DEP 0023 and 2018 DEP 0024
Judgments Affirmed
Date of Decision: December 20, 2021
APPEARANCES:
Royce A. Link for Appellant
Madison S. Brinkman for Appellee
Case Nos. 17-21-12 and 17-21-13
WILLAMOWSKI, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant Crystal R. (“Crystal”) brings this appeal from the judgments
of the Court of Common Pleas of Shelby County, Juvenile Division, terminating her
parental rights and granting permanent custody of the children to the Shelby County
Department of Job and Family Services, Children Services Division (“the Agency”).
Crystal claims on appeal that the trial court violated her rights to due process and
that the judgments of the trial court were against the manifest weight of the
evidence. For the reasons set forth below, the judgments are affirmed.
{¶2} W.R. was born to Crystal and Mitchell R. (“Mitchell”) in 2008. ADoc.
1.1 K.R. was born to them in 2012. BDoc. 1. In 2018, the Agency opened a case
regarding the family due to concerns regarding Crystal’s mental health and
substance abuse issues. ADoc. and BDoc. 2. This case was closed in May of 2018
when the children were placed in the legal custody of their maternal uncle. ADoc.
and BDoc. 2. On September 7, 2018, the uncle notified the Agency that he could
no longer care for the children. ADoc. and BDoc. 2. Due to Crystal’s failure to
take the medication prescribed for her mental health issues, the Agency did not place
the children with Crystal. ADoc. and BDoc. 2. On November 27, 2018, the Agency
filed a complaint alleging that the children were dependent. ADoc. and BDoc. 2.
The initial hearing was held on December 13, 2018. ADoc. and BDoc. 33. At that
1
The docket for W.R. is identified as “ADoc.” The docket for K.R. is identified as “BDoc.”
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time, the magistrate ordered that the children be placed in the temporary custody of
the Agency. ADoc. and BDoc. 33. A case plan was filed requiring Crystal to 1)
obtain and maintain stable and safe housing, 2) only allow safe and appropriate
people in the home and around the children, 3) cooperate with the Agency assigned
coach, 4) complete a drug and alcohol and mental health assessment, 5) cooperate
with all requested drug screens, 6) obtain medical coverage, 7) sign all releases, 8)
follow the professional recommendations, and 9) attend all professional meetings.
ADoc. and BDoc. 34. Following an adjudicatory hearing on January 10, 2019, the
children were determined to be dependent and the temporary custody of the Agency
was continued. ADoc. and BDoc. 48.
{¶3} On January 24, 2019, Misty Shields (“Shields”), the guardian ad litem,
filed her report. ADoc. and BDoc. 49. Shields indicated that W.R. was very
interested in seeing Mitchell right away, but did not appear to be eager to see
Crystal. ADoc. and BDoc. 49. Shields was concerned that W.R. was “yelling a lot”
during her visit. ADoc. and BDoc. 49. As to K.R., Shields noted that he was very
quiet and did not want to interact. ADoc. and BDoc. 49. Although K.R. seemed
happy in the home, he was yelling and hitting another child in the home which
resulted in that child having a bloody lip and K.R. also hit the child’s head against
the wall. ADoc. and BDoc. 49. Because of this behavior, the foster parents were
asking that the boys be removed from their home for the protection of the other
children in the home. ADoc. and BDoc. 49. Shields noted that when she met with
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Crystal before the adjudicatory hearing, she was agitated and was yelling and
cursing at her attorney and the case worker. ADoc. and BDoc. 49. Crystal told
Shields that the Agency had “stolen” her children and that she did not want to work
the case plan. ADoc. and BDoc. 49. Shields had tried on two other occasions to
contact Crystal with no success. ADoc and BDoc 49. Though Crystal had been
given Shields’ contact information, she did not contact Shields. ADoc. and BDoc.
49. Shields also noted that security was required at visits due to threats made by
Crystal to kill everyone involved. ADoc. and BDoc. 49. Shields recommended that
the children stay in the temporary custody of the Agency. ADoc. and BDoc. 49.
{¶4} On January 28, 2019, the Agency filed a motion to have temporary
custody of K.R. be awarded to his paternal grandmother. BDoc. 54. This motion
was heard at the disposition hearing on January 31, 2019. BDoc. 67. The trial court
granted the motion and K.R. was placed in the temporary custody of his
grandmother under the protective supervision of the Agency. BDoc. 67. W.R.
remained in the temporary custody of the Agency. ADoc. 67.
{¶5} On March 15, 2019, the Agency removed Crystal from the case plan.
ADoc. and BDoc. 68. The basis for the removal was that Crystal had not scheduled
any appointments for her assessments, tested positive for drugs on three separate
screens, and had missed two consecutive visits. ADoc. and BDoc. 68. The Agency
noted that Crystal was unwilling to work with the Agency to be reunified with her
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children. ADoc. and BDoc. 68. The trial court approved this amendment to the
case plan on May 6, 2019. ADoc. and BDoc. 77.
{¶6} On April 12, 2019, Mitchell filed a motion to have custody of the
children returned to him. ADoc. and BDoc. 72. An administrative review was held
on May 21, 2019. ADoc. and BDoc. 79. The review indicated that Mitchell had
made significant progress in completing the case plan. ADoc. and BDoc. 79. The
Agency recommended that the trial court grant Mitchell’s motion for custody with
protective supervision. ADoc. and BDoc. 79. Shields also filed a report. ADoc.
and BDoc. 80. Shields noted that the children had not had contact with Crystal for
several weeks and both expressed interest in moving back home with Mitchell.
ADoc. and BDoc. 80. Shields recommended that the children be placed in the
custody of Mitchell. ADoc. and BDoc. 80. Temporary custody was granted to
Mitchell subject to protective supervision on June 5, 2019. ADoc. and BDoc. 87.
{¶7} The Agency filed a motion requesting temporary custody of the
children on September 6, 2019. ADoc. and BDoc. 96. The basis for the motion was
that Mitchell had tested positive for use of methamphetamines and failed to enroll
the children in school resulting in excessive absences. ADoc. and BDoc. 96. On
September 11, 2019, a hearing was held on the motion and the children were
returned to the custody of the Agency. ADoc. and BDoc. 101. A new case plan was
then filed by the Agency reinstating services for Crystal. ADoc. 103 and BDoc.
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102. The Agency set the same requirements as were previously ordered for Crystal.
ADoc. 103 and BDoc. 102.
{¶8} The next case review was completed on November 7, 2019. ADoc. 108
and BDoc. 109. The review indicated that Crystal was living with her brother and
an adult son, the home was clean and appropriate, and that Crystal had maintained
employment for ten months. ADoc. 108 and BDoc. 109. Crystal had also completed
the assessments on September 10, 2019, but had not scheduled any follow up
services. ADoc. 108 and BDoc. 109. Crystal was working cooperatively at the
visits as well. ADoc. 108 and BDoc. 109. However, the Agency determined that
the progress since September was insufficient. ADoc. 108 and BDoc. 109. The trial
court also found that as of November 7, 2019, Crystal was not in substantial
compliance with the case plan. ADoc. 110 and BDoc. 108.
{¶9} On February 20, 2020, a review hearing was held. ADoc. and BDoc.
116. At that hearing, evidence was presented that Crystal had been evicted from
her home and was temporarily living with one of her adult sons. ADoc. and BDoc.
116. The trial court noted that the Agency had offered mental health services for
Crystal through the Family Resource Center (“FRC”), but Crystal had refused.
ADoc. and BDoc. 116. The trial court also noted that Crystal had been testing
positive for THC in her drug screens after testing negative on November 17, 2019.
ADoc. and BDoc. 116. Following the hearing, the trial court concluded that Crystal
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was not in substantial compliance with the case plan at that time. ADoc. and BDoc.
116.
{¶10} At the May 14, 2020, review hearing, evidence was presented that
Crystal was still without an independent living arrangement and that she had
completed a new mental health assessment, but not had not enrolled in services.
ADoc. and BDoc. 119. Evidence was also presented that Crystal had one positive
test for THC and one negative drug test. ADoc. and BDoc. 119. Again the trial
court determined that Crystal was not substantially complying with the case plan.
ADoc. and BDoc. 119. These issues were all remedied by the August 6, 2020
review hearing. ADoc. and BDoc. 120. Testimony was presented at that hearing
indicating that Crystal was living independently, had a negative drug screen, was
attending counseling, and was attending virtual visits with the children. ADoc. and
BDoc. 120. The trial court then found that Crystal was substantially complying with
the case plan at that time. ADoc. and BDoc. 120
{¶11} The Agency conducted a case review on October 21, 2020. ADoc.
and BDoc. 132. The Agency recommended that the temporary custody be continued
because Crystal was inconsistent in complying with the professional
recommendations. ADoc. and BDoc. 132. The Agency noted in the review that
Crystal had been having in home visits since September 15, 2020, but they had to
be returned to the Agency after Crystal moved her second adult son and his family
into the two bedroom home and indicated that she was hearing voices. ADoc. and
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BDoc. 132. This was a concern because Crystal refused to elaborate on what the
voices were saying. ADoc. and BDoc. 132. The Agency also noted that Crystal
had again become inconsistent with attending sessions at FRC. ADoc. and BDoc.
132.
{¶12} On November 2, 2020, the Agency filed a motion for permanent
custody of the children. ADoc. and BDoc. 133. The basis for the motion was that
the children had spent 12 of the last 22 months in the temporary custody of the
Agency and that Crystal had failed to substantially comply with the case plan to
remedy the reasons that caused the removal of the children. ADoc. and BDoc. 133.
A hearing was held on this motion on March 4 and 5, 2021. ADoc. 184 and BDoc.
179. After the hearing, the trial court terminated the parental rights of Crystal and
Mitchell and awarded permanent custody of the children to the Agency. ADoc. 184
and BDoc. 179. Crystal appealed from these judgments. ADoc. 193 and BDoc.
180. On appeal, Crystal raises the following assignments of error.
First Assignment of Error
The trial court violated [Crystal’s] constitutional 14th
Amendment Right to due process and equal protection under the
law.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court’ decision was against the manifest weight of the
evidence in the determination that the children cannot be placed
with Crystal in a reasonable time, or should not be placed with
Crystal.
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Third Assignment of Error
The trial court’s decision was against the manifest weight of the
evidence, because the evidence did not support a finding that the
Agency made reasonable efforts to effect reunification.
Fourth Assignment of Error
The trial court’s decision was against the manifest weight of the
evidence because the evidence did not support a finding that the
termination of parental rights of [Crystal] was in the children’s
best interest.
Due Process
{¶13} In the first assignment of error, Crystal claims that she was denied due
process when COVID 19 restrictions prevented her from working the case plan. Her
argument is that the trial court should not have granted the Agency’s motion for
permanent custody because the Agency received temporary custody in September
of 2019 and a significant portion of the time was when services were limited due to
COVID 19 restrictions. According to Crystal, this impeded her ability to work the
services.
{¶14} There is no dispute that COVID 19 restrictions affected how case plans
could be approached. The ability to utilize in-person services, such as visitation,
was significantly restricted for a limited time. If the 12 out of 22 months time frame
had been primarily during the time the COVID 19 restrictions were in place, this
argument may be more persuasive. See In re A.L., 9th Dist Wayne Nos. 20AP0047,
20AP0048, 20AP0049, 20AP0050, 2021-Ohio-1982, ¶ 16, 173 N.E.3d 1260.
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However, the motion for permanent custody was filed on November 2, 2020, which
means that the time to be reviewed goes back to January 2, 2019. The record shows
that the children were placed in the temporary custody of the Agency before this
day. W.R. remained in the temporary custody of the Agency until June 5, 2019,
which is 154 days within the time frame in question. He then was returned to
Mitchell. On September 11, 2019, he was returned to the temporary custody of the
Agency. This accounted for another 418 days. Thus W.R. was in the temporary
custody of the Agency for a total of 572 days or approximately 19 of the 22 months
before the filing of the motion for permanent custody.
{¶15} K.R. was also placed in the temporary custody of the Agency before
January 2, 2019. He was placed with his paternal grandmother on January 31, 2019,
so had 29 days of countable time. Like W.R., K.R. was returned to the temporary
custody of the Agency on September 11, 2019, for an additional 418 days. K.R.
was therefore in the temporary case of the Agency for a total of 447 days or
approximately 15 of the 22 months before the filing of the motion for permanent
custody.
{¶16} The Agency originally opened a case involving the boys in the winter
of 2018. COVID 19 restrictions were not implemented until April of 2020. During
all of this time, the Agency had a requirement that Crystal seek mental health
services as part of the plan. This means that Crystal had approximately two years
prior to the implementation of the COVID 19 restrictions to make progress on the
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case plan, but chose not to do so. In March 2019, Crystal even asked to be removed
from the case plan because she did not wish to work it. She did not ask to be
reinstated to the case plan until September 2019. Although she was again offered
services, Crystal made no attempt to utilize them before 2020. In February of 2020,
she completed the assessment, but made no attempt to follow through with the
recommendations, instead telling her case worker that she did not believe she
needed help. Tr. 334-35. During the time services were restricted, Crystal
continued to refuse to utilize the mental health services when her case worker would
speak with her about beginning services. Tr. 334-338. The case worker spoke with
Crystal on March 13, April 9, May 14, and June 5, 2020. Tr. 336-37. On each of
those occasions, Crystal refused mental health services, claiming either she did not
need them or that she did not want people poking around in her mind. Tr. 336-37.
Crystal only agreed to begin services on July 17, 2020, which was after she had been
informed that visits would be returning to in person instead of via telephone. Tr.
340. For a short time, Crystal was in compliance, which caused the trial court to
determine that she was in compliance with the case plan at the August 6, 2020,
hearing. This led to her having the visits moved to an in-home setting. However,
this did not last long as by the end of September 2020, the visits were returned to
the Agency due to Crystal’s hearing voices and no longer attending all of the visits.
{¶17} Based upon the record before this Court, no evidence was presented
that would indicate that Crystal’s ability to work the case plan was impeded by the
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COVID 19 restrictions. The record clearly reflects that Crystal chose not to
substantially comply with the case plan, not that she was prevented from doing so.
Therefore, Crystal was not denied due process when the trial court considered
whether the children had been in the temporary custody of the Agency for 12 out of
the 22 months immediately preceding the motion for permanent custody. The first
assignment of error is overruled.
Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶18} In her second, third, and fourth assignments of error, Crystal claims
that the judgments of the trial court were not supported by the manifest weight of
the evidence. The right to parent one's own child is a basic and essential civil right.
In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 556 N.E.2d 1169 (1990). “Parents have a
‘fundamental liberty interest’ in the care, custody, and management of their
children.” In re Leveck, 3d Dist. No. 5–02–52, 5–02–53, 5–02–54, 2003–Ohio–
1269, ¶ 6. These rights may be terminated, however, under appropriate
circumstances and when all due process safeguards have been followed. Id. When
considering a motion to terminate parental rights, the trial court must comply with
the statutory requirements set forth in R.C. 2151.414. These requirements include,
in pertinent part, as follows.
(B)(1) Except as provided in division (B)(2) of this section, the
court may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the
court determines at the hearing held pursuant to division (A) of
this section, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best
interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the
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agency that filed the motion for permanent custody and that any
of the following apply:
(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the
temporary custody of one or more public children services
agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more
months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, * * * and the
child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents within a
reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents.
***
(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more
public children services agencies or private child placing agencies
for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month
period * * *.
***
For the purposes of division (B)(1) of this section, a child shall be
considered to have entered the temporary custody of an agency
on the earlier of the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to [R.C.
2151.28] or the date that is sixty days after the removal of the child
from the home.
***
(C) In making the determination required by this section * * *, a
court shall not consider the effect the granting of permanent
custody to the agency would have upon any parent of the child. A
written report of the guardian ad litem of the child shall be
submitted to the court prior to or at the time of the hearing held
pursuant to division (A) of this section * * * but shall not be
submitted under oath.
If the court grants permanent custody of a child to a movant
under this division, the court, upon the request of any party, shall
file a written opinion setting forth its findings of fact and
conclusions of law in relation to the proceeding. The court shall
not deny an agency’s motion for permanent custody solely
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because the agency failed to implement any particular aspect of
the child’s case plan.
R.C. 2151.414. A court’s decision to terminate parental rights will not be
overturned as against the manifest weight of the evidence if the record contains
competent, credible evidence by which a court can determine by clear and
convincing evidence that the essential statutory elements for a termination of
parental rights have been established. In re S.L., 3d Dist. Shelby Nos. 17-17-17,
17-17-18, 17-17-19, 2018-Ohio-900, ¶ 24.
{¶19} The determination whether to grant a motion for permanent custody
requires a two-step approach. In re L.W., 3d Dist. Marion Nos. 9-16-55, 9-16-56,
2017-Ohio-4352, ¶ 5. The first step is to determine whether any of the factors set
forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) apply. Id. If one of those circumstances applies, then
the trial court must consider whether granting the motion is in the best interest of
the child by considering the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D). Id.{¶20} Crystal claims in her second assignment of error that the trial court
erred in finding that the children could not or should not be placed with her within
a reasonable time. This Court notes that the motions for permanent custody alleged
that the children had been in the temporary custody of the Agency for more than 12
out of the immediately preceding 22 month period. This provision set forth in R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(d) does not require a finding that the children cannot or should not
be placed with the parent within a reasonable period of time. “[A]s long as a child
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meets the ‘12 of 22’ requirement, an agency is no longer required to prove that a
child cannot be returned to the parents within a reasonable time or should not
be returned to the parents.” In re E.B., 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2009-10-139,
2010-Ohio-1122, ¶ 20, citing In re C.W., 104 Ohio St.3d 163, 2004-Ohio-6411, ¶
21, 818 N.E.2d 1176. See In re B.R. 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 18AP-903, 18AP-904,
2019-Ohio-2178, ¶ 46. As discussed above, W.R. was in the temporary custody of
the Agency for approximately 19 months and K.R. for 15 months of the 22 months
immediately preceding the filing of the motion for permanent custody. The trial
court specifically found that the 12 out of 22 month provision of R.C.
2151.414(B)(1) applied. Since the trial court was not required to make a finding as
to whether the children could be returned to Crystal within a reasonable time, any
alleged error could not be prejudicial.
{¶21} Even if the trial court was required to make a finding that the children
could not or should not be returned to Crystal within a reasonable time, the record
shows that this is a reasonable conclusion. Emily Long (“Long”) testified that she
was Crystal’s mental health counselor at FRC. Tr. 10-12. Long diagnosed Crystal
with Bipolar I with psychotic features. Tr. 13. According to Long, Crystal was
inconsistent with her treatment and was unable to say whether Crystal would be able
to care for her children. Tr. 15-19, 36, 39, and 52. Long also indicated that Crystal
had poor insight in that she saw and heard things that weren’t real, accepting them
as true despite contradictory evidence. Tr. 44, 50.
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{¶22} Janice Geise (“Geise”) was the family coach for Crystal. Tr. 139.
Geise testified that Crystal did not take redirection well, responding defiantly when
given instructions. Tr. 143-145. Geise also testified that during the September 2020
visits, she was concerned because Crystal allowed extra, unapproved people to be
at the visits and Crystal told Geise that she was hearing voices. Tr. 149-153. Crystal
informed Geise that she was not attending therapy at that time because she “needed
a break”. Tr. 153. According to Geise, Crystal is more a friend to the children than
a parent and is inconsistent. Tr. 161-163.
{¶23} Wes Branscum (“Branscum”) testified that he was the ongoing case
worker for this family. Tr. 199. Bramscum indicated that Crystal lacked suitable
housing because she was living in a two bedroom, approximately 1,000 square foot
home with six other people. Tr. 216-218, 270. The home was not big enough to
add W.R. and K.R. to the total. Branscum then gave Crystal a choice of either 1)
moving all of them to a larger home or 2) moving the one son and his family out of
the home. Tr. 220. Branscum offered to help, but as of the hearing date, Crystal
had not taken any of the necessary steps to find new housing for anyone. Tr. 221-
23. Branscum also noted that Crystal had not attended the budgeting skills sessions
at FRC, worked on her parenting skills or consistently worked on her mental health
issues. Tr. 228-42. Additionally, Crystal was required to attend all professional
meetings, yet she only attended three out of thirteen and her participation was
minimal when she attended. Tr. 248.
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{¶24} Shields testified that she is the CASA assigned to the case. Tr. 379.
In her testimony and her submitted report, Shields noted that Crystal was
inconsistent with her counseling. Ex. I. Shields testified that Crystal was stressed
and overwhelmed. Tr. 386. Shields’ conclusion was that if the children were to be
returned to Crystal, she would not be able to handle it and the Agency would have
to remove the children again. Tr. 386 and Ex. I. Given all of the evidence and the
lack of progress Crystal had made in the years that her family was involved with the
Agency, the record supports the trial court’s determination that the children could
not or should not be returned to the home within a reasonable time. The second
assignment of error is overruled.
{¶25} In the third assignment of error, Crystal claims that the trial court erred
in finding that the Agency had made reasonable efforts at reunification. “When the
Agency intervenes to protect a child's health or safety, the efforts by the state to
permit the child to return home by removing the threat are called ‘reasonable
efforts’”. In re Da.R., 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-18-13, 2019-Ohio-2270, ¶ 17.
The Agency must make a reasonable effort to reunify the family prior to the
termination of parental rights. In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶
43, 862 N.E.2d 816. “Reasonable efforts” are only an issue at the permanent
custody hearing if the trial court has not previously determined that the agency used
reasonable efforts to reunify the family. In re J.H., 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 19AP-
517, 19AP-518, 2021-Ohio-807, ¶ 64.
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{¶26} Here, the Agency’s efforts were set out in numerous case plans. At
the case review conducted on October 21, 2020, the Agency set forth what was
required of Crystal to complete the case plan and the progress she had made. ADoc.
and BDoc. 132. The case plan required Crystal to 1) maintain appropriate housing
and employment, 2) only expose her children to appropriate persons, 3) visit with
the children and participate with in-home coaching, 4) participate in mental health
services, 5) submit to random drug screens, 6) obtain medical insurance, 7) sign
necessary releases, 8) follow professional recommendations, and 9) attend and
participate in professional meetings. ADoc. and BDoc. 132. According to the
review, Crystal had complied with maintaining employment, not exposing the
children to inappropriate people, obtaining medical insurance, and signing the
necessary releases. ADoc. and BDoc. 132. The remaining goals all had outstanding
issues. The review also identifies the steps taken by the Agency to help Crystal.
The [Agency] has worked to provide Crystal with mental health
and parenting education services to reduce the risk of
abuse/neglect if the children were to be returned to the home.
These services are provided through [FRC]. Crystal has chosen
to remain inconsistent in these services which prohibit the
[Agency] and professionals from determining if proper progress
is being made to reunify the children to the home. The [Agency]
conducts monthly visit [sic] to Crystal’s home to discuss case plan
goals and progress made to returning children to the home. The
[Agency] holds monthly team meetings for Crystal to participate
in and voice any concerns as well as discuss any progress being
made.
ADoc. and BDoc. 132 at 10-11.
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{¶27} Branscum testified that he attempted to assist Crystal in finding
suitable housing, but she did not take the steps necessary for the Agency to be able
to help. Tr. 221. According to Branscum, the Agency even spoke with FRC about
adjusting Crystal’s therapy to just mental health so that Crystal would not be
overwhelmed and could focus on the most important issue. Tr. 229. Branscum
testified that the Agency did all it could to help Crystal. Tr. 226.
{¶28} Shields indicated in her testimony and in her report that Crystal had
refused to begin working the case plan until the trial court mandated it even though
she was told that the sooner she started, the sooner the children could be returned
home. Ex. I at 6. Shields also indicated that she had several conversations with
Crystal requiring the need to find appropriate housing or move the extra family out
of her house, but Crystal still refused even after being told she could lose her
children. Ex. I at 6-7. According to Shields, Crystal stopped going to counseling
because she was mad and needed a break, though Crystal had told her she did not
agree with going. Ex. I at 7. Despite numerous attempts by Shields and Branscum
to persuade Crystal to continue counseling so that she could get her children back,
Crystal was still sporadic in her attendance of counseling. Ex. I at 9.
{¶29} In several judgment entries, the trial court made a finding that the
Agency was making reasonable efforts in its permanency plan and was complying
with the case plan. See ADoc. 48, 62, 66, 77, 86, 87, 101, 107, 110, 116, 119, 120,
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Case Nos. 17-21-12 and 17-21-13
126, 148 and BDoc. 47, 48, 66, 77, 86, 87, 91, 101, 107, 116, 119, 120, 126, 148.
The trial court in its judgment entry made the following statements.
Throughout this case, the [Agency] has been more than willing to
work with Crystal and provide her additional opportunities to
complete services. Crystal was encouraged to engage in mental
health counseling. The Agency was also willing to help Crystal
find new housing to accommodate the children and the family
currently residing in her two-bedroom house. Crystal chose not
to use the help offered by the [Agency] and did not remove anyone
from her home or find a new residence. In addition, Crystal
indicated that doing mental health counseling, parenting
education, and budgeting at once was too stressful. The [Agency]
agreed to work with Crystal to first allow her to work on her
mental health counseling. Regardless, after the twenty-nine (29)
months this case has been open Crystal has failed to satisfactorily
complete any significant portion of the case plan services. Any
general assertions by Crystal that she ‘could do’ the things
required of her under the case plan stand in stark contrast to the
evidence that she has simply not completed those goals or
satisfactorily evidenced an ability to do so – despite the significant
assistance of the case plan services and the Agency.
ADoc. 184 and BDoc. 179 at 8. The trial court went even further and made the
following conclusion.
The Court finds that the [Agency] has made reasonable efforts to
prevent the removal, to eliminate the continued removal, or make
it possible for W.R. and K.R. to return home safely to the home
of either parent. The Court further finds that the [Agency] has
made reasonable efforts to make a permanency plan for W.R. and
K.R. through foster placement and/or adoption services.
ADoc. 184 and BDoc. 179 at 13. All of the findings of the trial court are supported
by the record. Thus, the trial court’s determination that the Agency made reasonable
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Case Nos. 17-21-12 and 17-21-13
efforts to reunify the family is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The
third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶30} Crystal’s fourth assignment of error claims that the trial court’s
decision that granting the Agency’s motion was in the best interest of the children
is against the manifest weight of the evidence. “Once a trial court has determined
that one of the enumerated provisions in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) applies, it then must
determine by clear and convincing evidence whether granting the agency permanent
custody of the child is in the child's best interest.” In re A.N., 3d Dist. Marion No.
9-19-79, 2020-Ohio-3322, ¶ 5.
(D)(1) In determining the best interest of a child at a hearing held
pursuant to division (A) of this section * * * the court shall
consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the
following.
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the
child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-
home providers, and any other person who may significantly
affect the child;
(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or
through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the
maturity of the child;
(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child
has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children
services agencies * * * for twelve or more months of a consecutive
twenty-two month period * * *.
(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and
whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant
of permanent custody to the agency.
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Case Nos. 17-21-12 and 17-21-13
(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this
section apply in relation to the parents and child.
R.C. 2151.414. A trial court must either specifically address each of the required
factors or otherwise provide some affirmative indication that it considered the listed
factors. A.N. supra.{¶31} In this case, the trial court specifically addressed the factors set forth
in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). ADoc. 184 and BDoc. 179 at 3-4, 6-7, 12-13. The findings
of the trial court were supported by the evidence. Specifically, Shields made the
following recommendations as to the best interest of the children in her report,
which were used by the trial court in reaching its conclusions.
Since my appointment as CASA I have diligently followed this
case and seen [W.R. and K.R.] in multiple settings. It is my
opinion that both children should remain in the custody of [the
Agency] and parental rights be terminated. Crystal began
reengaging in services in 11/2019. She has had more than enough
time to complete mental health services at FRC. She will go to a
few appointments, and then get upset when a court hearing does
not go her way and stop attending; and then restart, and then
stop. Myself and her case worker have had multiple
conversations with her explaining the importance of going to each
and every appointment consistently, and if she does not, she may
lose custody of her children. Crystal continues to be inconsistent
and sporadic with counseling. I believe it is critical that Crystal
attend her counseling appointments consistently to continue to
work on and minimize her psychosis episodes, since she is
unwilling to take the recommended medication. I have witnessed
several of these episodes, and they are very disturbing, especially
for her children. Crystal has told me she is stressed, overwhelmed
and just needs a break. I believe if the children were to move
home, the added stress would be too much for her to handle. In
my opinion, it would only be a matter of time before the Agency
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Case Nos. 17-21-12 and 17-21-13
would need to become involved again considering the family’s
past history and Crystal’s unwillingness to deal with her mental
health.
***
After the boys were removed from their Father’s custody on
9/11/19, I witnessed the devastating and lasting affects it has had
on the children. Both have needed, and continue to need,
counseling to deal with their anger issues, sadness, lashing out and
hitting others, bed-wetting & bathroom issues, blaming
themselves and more. They are both currently living in stable
placements for over a year, and I believe to put them through
another move that will most likely be unsuccessful would be
detrimental to them. These boys need permanence and this is
something neither parent can provide.
Ex. I at 9-10.
{¶32} In its findings, the trial court noted that Crystal was bonded with the
children and that they were bonded to her and each other. ADoc. 184 and BDoc.
179 at 12. When questioned about where the children wanted to be, they were
inconsistent with their answers sometimes wanting to be with Crystal and other time
wanting to stay in their present situations. Id. The trial court noted that most
recently, both boys indicated they wanted to stay where they were. Id. As to the
need for permanency, the trial court noted that continuing this case longer would be
detrimental to the children. Id. at 12-13. There is competent and credible evidence
in the record to support the findings of the trial court. Thus, the fourth assignment
of error is overruled.
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Case Nos. 17-21-12 and 17-21-13
{¶33} Having found no prejudicial errors in the particulars assigned and
argued, the judgments of the Court of Common Pleas of Shelby County, Juvenile
Division are affirmed.
Judgments Affirmed
MILLER and SHAW, J.J., concur.
/hls
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