United Bank v. Buckingham , 472 Md. 407 ( 2021 )


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  • United Bank v. Richard Buckingham, et al., Misc. No. 1, September Term, 2020. Opinion
    by Getty, J.
    COMMERCIAL             LAW      –     MARYLAND          UNIFORM        FRAUDULENT
    CONVEYANCE ACT – CHANGE IN LIFE INSURANCE BENEFICIARY
    CONSTITUTES CONVEYANCE – Court of Appeals held that a change in a life
    insurance beneficiary constitutes a “conveyance” under the Maryland Uniform Fraudulent
    Conveyance Act, Maryland Code, Commercial Law Article (“CL”) §§ 15-201 to 15-214
    (1975, 2013 Repl. Vol.). Court of Appeals concluded that a change in a life insurance
    beneficiary falls within the meaning of “conveyance” as defined in CL § 15-201(c).
    ESTATES & TRUSTS – GUARDIANSHIP – CHANGE IN LIFE INSURANCE
    BENEFICIARY– Court of Appeals held that a guardian of property does not have the
    authority to change a beneficiary of a life insurance policy of the ward under Maryland
    Code, Estates & Trusts Article (“ET”) § 15-102 (1974, 2017 Repl. Vol.).
    U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland
    Case No. 8:13-cv-03227-PX
    Argued: October 30, 2020
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    OF MARYLAND
    Misc. No. 1
    September Term, 2020
    UNITED BANK
    V.
    RICHARD BUCKINGHAM, ET AL.
    Barbera, C.J.,
    McDonald
    Watts
    Hotten
    Getty
    Booth
    Biran
    JJ.
    Opinion by Getty, J.
    Filed: March 9, 2021
    Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
    Materials Act
    (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.
    2021-03-09 10:09-05:00
    Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk
    Under the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act,1 this Court has
    the power to “answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the United States or by
    an appellate court of another state or of a tribe, if the answer may be determinative of an
    issue in pending litigation in the certifying court and there is no controlling appellate
    decision, constitutional provision, or statute of this State.” CJ § 12-603.
    Before us are two questions of law certified by the United States District Court for
    the District of Maryland (“District Court”) that arise in the context of a decade-long dispute
    between the adult children of the Buckingham family and United Bank (“the Bank”).
    Through the opportune formation of various trusts, the children successfully diverted
    hundreds of thousands of dollars in life insurance proceeds away from the declining family
    business and to their personal use. In an elaborate web of procedural history, federal and
    state courts both have attempted to conclusively determine whether this diversion of life
    insurance proceeds was an appropriate use of familial resources to assist ailing parents, or
    instead an act undertaken by the Buckingham children to intentionally defraud the Bank.
    The first question before us is whether a change of the beneficiary designation of a
    life insurance policy amounts to a “conveyance” under the Maryland Uniform Fraudulent
    1
    Maryland adopted the first version of the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act
    in 1972 as part of a uniform code promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission (also
    known as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) and codified
    the Act as Article 26, §§ 161 to 172. 1972 Md. Laws, ch. 427. The following year, Article
    26 was recodified as the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”). 1973 Md. Laws
    1st Spec. Sess., ch. 2. In 1995, the Uniform Law Commission issued a new model
    Certification of Questions of Law statute, which Maryland then adopted in 1996. 1996
    Md. Laws, ch. 344. The Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act is
    currently codified at CJ §§ 12-601 to 12-613, Maryland Code (1973, 2020 Repl. Vol.).
    Conveyance Act (“MUFCA”),2 particularly in light of § 16-111(d) of the Insurance Article3
    that provides for a protective exemption for the spouse and dependents of a life insurance
    policy holder. After conducting a plain language analysis of the definition of “conveyance”
    provided for in CL § 15-201(c) and reviewing the General Assembly’s intent in enacting
    MUFCA as evidenced by the Act’s legislative history, caselaw, and related statutory
    provisions, we hold that a change in life insurance beneficiary constitutes a conveyance
    under MUFCA.
    The second question is whether, under § 15-102(t) of the Estates and Trusts Article,4
    a guardian of property is granted the authority to change a life insurance beneficiary on a
    policy of the ward.       As a matter of first impression, this question relies upon an
    interpretation of the common law purpose of guardianship. Upon reviewing the legislative
    history of powers granted to guardians of property, and finding no changes to the common
    law, we hold that a guardian of property is not granted the authority to change a life
    insurance beneficiary on a policy of the ward under ET § 15-102(t).
    BACKGROUND
    In accordance with CJ § 12-605(a), “the court certifying a question of law” to this
    Court “shall issue a certification order.” Pursuant to CJ § 12-606(a)(2), the certification
    order must contain “[t]he facts relevant to the question, showing fully the nature of the
    2
    Md. Code (1975, 2013 Repl. Vol.), Commercial Law (“CL”) § 15-201(c) (defining
    “conveyance”).
    3
    Md. Code (1996, 2017 Repl. Vol.), Insurance (“IN”) § 16-111(d).
    4
    Md. Code (1974, 2017 Repl. Vol.), Estates & Trusts (“ET”) § 15-102(t).
    2
    controversy out of which the question arose[.]” Under these statutory mandates, this Court
    accepts the facts provided by the certifying court. See, e.g., Price v. Murdy, 
    462 Md. 145
    ,
    147 (2018). Thus, we adopt the following facts set forth in a memorandum opinion
    accompanying the certification order of the District Court:
    This clash between the Buckingham family and the creditors of the
    family’s deceased patriarch, John Buckingham, has now lasted more than a
    decade, and has played out in both state and federal court. The crux of the
    dispute before this Court concerns whether diversion of the proceeds from
    several life insurance policies, which are among the sole remaining assets of
    John Buckingham and the family company, Sun Control Systems (“SCS”),
    was done to defraud the Bank and other creditors. Although the background
    of this case has been repeated and reframed time and again, the Court
    summarizes the matter here to aid the Maryland Court of Appeals.
    John Buckingham founded SCS in 1979 and acted as President and as
    a Director on its board until 2009. John was married to Elizabeth “Betty”
    Buckingham, and together they had five children: David, Susan, Thomas,
    Daniel, and Richard Buckingham.
    In 2008, John was diagnosed with dementia and, in 2009, this
    diagnosis was confirmed to be both progressive and terminal. Around this
    time, Thomas Buckingham was designated to succeed John as President of
    SCS, although John stayed on as a Director and was never removed from the
    Board.
    By January 2010, John’s condition had worsened. He was sometimes
    found wandering his neighborhood or in his neighbors’ homes eating from
    their refrigerators. In August 2010, Betty Buckingham filed a petition for
    guardianship in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Betty was
    appointed guardian of John’s person, and David was appointed both
    temporary co-guardian of John’s person and sole guardian of John’s
    property. In December 2010, the guardianship order was amended to make
    David solely the guardian of the property and Betty the temporary guardian
    of John’s person. In January 2011, the Circuit Court issued a final
    guardianship order that announced David and Betty as the co-guardians of
    John’s person and maintained David’s status as sole guardian of the property.
    This order governing the guardianship of the property states that the guardian
    shall have “all powers and duties set forth in Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts
    § 13-214 and § 15-102.”
    As John’s mental health declined, so did SCS’s financial health.
    SCS’s revenues fell from $15.4 million in 2006 to $8.5 million in 2009. As
    of mid-2009, SCS had defaulted on loans it had secured with Virginia
    3
    Commerce Bank (“VCB”), the Bank’s predecessor, and owed over $5
    million to VCB. John and Betty were also personally indebted to VCB as
    they had on occasion guaranteed loans to SCS and had also taken out loans
    in their personal capacity through a home equity line of credit.
    In May of 2009, SCS entered into a forbearance agreement with VCB.
    In the forbearance agreement, VCB agreed to refrain from collection and to
    increase SCS’s line of credit by $750,000 in exchange for SCS’s
    commitment to meet a specified schedule of payments. SCS’s financial
    situation did not improve, however, and by 2010, SCS had defaulted on the
    forbearance agreement as well. VCB, now fearful it would lose millions of
    dollars through its loans to SCS, began looking to SCS’s remaining assets,
    among them the death benefits on eight life insurance policies in John’s name
    that are the subject of this litigation.
    These life insurance policies generally fall into three groups : (1) two
    policies from Northwestern Mutual (the “JDB policies”) that John had
    purchased and for which he paid the premiums; (2) four policies purchased
    by SCS from Northwestern Mutual (the “split dollar policies”) under a “split
    dollar” arrangement where John named the beneficiaries but SCS “owned”
    the policies, paid the premiums, and upon John’s death stood to recoup the
    premiums from the death benefits, with the remainder being paid to John’s
    designated beneficiary; and (3) two policies from John Hancock (the “John
    Hancock Policies”) purchased and owned by SCS and operated under a
    similar split dollar arrangement, with SCS recouping the premiums upon
    John’s death.
    In June 2010, as John’s health declined, VCB entered into a second
    forbearance agreement in which VCB obtained a secured interest in death
    benefits payable under the JDB and split dollar policies. The effect of this
    agreement was to give VCB a superior position to any SCS funds, including
    the life insurance benefits, upon John’s death.
    Prior to executing the second forbearance agreement, VCB had
    learned of John’s dementia. Outside counsel advised VCB that before
    entering into a second forbearance agreement, John should undergo a
    competency evaluation. VCB did not heed this advice. Instead, VCB entered
    into a fully executed second forbearance agreement. It eventually came to
    light that some of John’s signatures on this agreement were forged. VCB,
    for its part, denies having any knowledge about the forgeries.
    David contends he first learned of the second forbearance agreement
    in February 2011 when, after much back and forth, VCB provided to David
    the underlying documentation. David realized that the second forbearance
    agreement was executed when John was suffering acutely from dementia.
    David also recognized certain of the signatures as forgeries.
    The next month, in March 2011, David, in his capacity as guardian of
    the property, changed beneficiaries on the eight life insurance policies to the
    4
    newly-created John D. Buckingham Life Insurance Trust (“JDB Trust”) with
    David, Susan, and Richard as Co-Trustees. David contends that he created
    the JDB Trust to fund the care necessary for Betty once John died. David
    also made Betty the primary beneficiary and the Buckingham children
    contingent beneficiaries of the JDB Trust.
    David next took steps to obtain accelerated death benefits to be paid
    from the John Hancock policies into another new trust, the “Osprey Trust,”
    “to provide funds for [his] mother’s support and meet the extraordinary cost
    of [John’s] care.” However, SCS still was owed the amount it had paid in
    premiums under the split dollar arrangement, which at the time totaled
    $280,000. Thus, if David were to obtain accelerated benefits, they could be
    subject to SCS’s creditors such as VCB. David and Thomas knew as much;
    contemporaneous email correspondence between the brothers reflects their
    concern “[t]he bank or other creditors w[ould] end up with those funds.”
    SCS’s Directors at the time—Thomas, Betty and David—next agreed
    on behalf of SCS to sell the John Hancock policies to the newly-created
    Osprey Trust. They approved the sale of the policies for $110,000 payable
    to SCS. Then David, as Trustee of the Osprey Trust, promptly obtained
    accelerated death benefits on the John Hancock policies for roughly seven
    times the amount paid to the corporation, or $709,128.65.
    According to the Bank, the sale of the policies to the Osprey Trust for
    a fraction of the policies’ value amounted to a fraudulent ploy to shield the
    assets from John’s creditors. As evidence of the fraud, the Bank emphasizes
    the disparity between the $110,000 sale price and the $709,000 in valuable
    accelerated benefits obtained. David Buckingham, Susan Buckingham and
    Richard Buckingham (collectively “the Buckinghams”) maintain that this
    sale was simply designed to provide funds to care for John and Betty. And
    as to the disparity between the sale price and the value of the accelerated
    death benefits, the Buckinghams counter that because SCS had stopped
    paying the premiums, the policies had a negative surrender value and were
    in danger of lapsing. Thus, the Buckinghams claim, it was fair and
    appropriate to use a well-established U.S. Treasury Formula to arrive at the
    $110,000 sale price.
    On December 7, 2011, Betty passed away unexpectedly. The JDB
    Trust—which again was the beneficiary of all eight life insurance policies—
    was now at least partially obsolete as the vehicle to provide for Betty’s care
    upon John’s death. Thus, David, in his role as John’s guardian of the
    property, changed the beneficiary of the insurance policies, again naming
    another newly created trust, the Blue Heron Trust.
    Shortly after, in May 2012, David sued VCB in Montgomery County
    Circuit Court seeking to invalidate the assignment of the JDB and split dollar
    policies on the grounds that VCB entered into the second forbearance
    agreement knowing that John was incompetent. After a five-day bench trial
    5
    in May 2013, the Honorable [Joseph] Dugan invalidated the assignments,
    finding that John lacked the capacity to enter the second forbearance
    agreement and VCB, acting contrary to counsel’s advice, knew it. The court
    additionally found that certain of John’s signatures on the second forbearance
    agreement were forged. VCB’s priority interest in the JDB and the split
    dollar policies were thus voided.
    On October 17, 2012, John passed away and the remainder of death
    benefits on the policies were distributed. The John Hancock policies had
    already been paid down fully as accelerated death benefits. Northwestern
    paid the death benefits on the split dollar policies into the Blue Heron Trust,
    and the death benefits on the JDB policies into the registry of the Circuit
    Court in light of the pending action against VCB. In the end, no funds were
    available to satisfy any of VCB’s sizable, outstanding loans.
    (Citations omitted.)
    In the memorandum opinion accompanying the certification order, the District
    Court provided this summary of the procedural background:
    On October 30, 2013, the Bank brought suit in this Court against each
    of the Buckingham children individually, Susan and Richard in their
    capacities as representative for John’s estate, and David in his capacity as
    trustee for the Osprey and Blue Heron Trusts. The Bank sought to invalidate
    both the sale of the John Hancock polices from SCS to the Osprey Trust, and
    the change in beneficiaries on the JDB and split dollar policies to David as
    Trustee of the Osprey and Blue Heron Trusts.
    Counts I through III pertain to the sale of the John Hancock policies.
    Count I alleges that SCS, through its Directors and David as guardian of
    John’s property, fraudulently conveyed both its ownership and beneficiary
    interest in the Osprey Trust in violation of the Maryland Uniform Fraudulent
    Conveyance Act, Md. Code Ann., §§ 15-201, et seq. (“MUFCA”). In Count
    II, the Bank alleges that David fraudulently requested and received
    accelerated death benefits on the John Hancock policies and, as a result,
    caused those benefits to be paid into the Osprey Trust, also in violation of
    MUFCA. And in Count III, the Bank alleges that David’s change of the
    beneficiary of the John Hancock policies from Betty to the Osprey Trust
    constituted yet another violation of MUFCA.
    Counts IV through V concern changes of beneficiaries on the other
    two sets of policies also under MUFCA. In Count IV, the Bank alleges that
    David fraudulently changed the beneficiary status of the split dollar policies
    from SCS—to which the beneficiary status lapsed upon Betty’s death—to
    the Blue Heron Trust. In Count V, the Bank alleges that David fraudulently
    6
    changed the beneficiary status on the JDB policies from John’s estate to the
    Blue Heron Trust. Finally, in Count VI the Bank alleges David breached his
    fiduciary duty to SCS’s creditors, and in Counts VII and VIII the Bank sought
    a declaratory judgment that the Osprey and Blue Heron Trusts and the John
    Hancock policy transfers were void as beyond David’s authority as guardian
    of the property.
    The parties eventually filed cross motions for summary judgment.
    After a hearing on November 27, 2017 . . . [the Court] granted summary
    judgment in the Buckinghams’ favor on all counts. As to the MUFCA counts
    (Counts I-V), the Court concluded that the unclean hands doctrine barred the
    Bank from asserting any right to the proceeds of the insurance policies. The
    Court reasoned that because the Bank had already attempted through
    “grossly inequitable conduct” to secure priority interests in the insurance
    policies via the second forbearance agreement, the Bank was precluded from
    suit to recapture its interest in this Court.
    Alternatively, the Court concluded that even if the unclean hands
    doctrine did not apply, summary judgment in the Buckinghams’ favor was
    nonetheless warranted on the MUFCA counts. On Count I, the Court found
    that no reasonable trier of fact could view the sale of the JDB policies as
    fraudulent because the sale was “done for fair consideration and thus is not a
    fraudulent conveyance as a matter of law.” On Counts II through V, each as
    pertaining to a change of beneficiary status, the Court held that the alleged
    wrongful conduct fell outside the purview of MUFCA. The Court concluded
    that MUFCA, by its terms, only applied to “conveyances,” defined as
    “includ[ing] every payment of money, assignment, release, transfer, lease,
    mortgage, or pledge of tangible or intangible property, and also the creation
    of any lien or incumbrance.” Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 15-201(c)
    (emphasis added). Looking to the phrase “tangible or intangible property,”
    the Court reasoned that any “assignment, release, transfer, lease, [or]
    mortgage” must be a property interest to fall under this definition. Thus, and
    because Maryland common law suggested that a change in beneficiary status
    did not amount to a property interest, the Court held that the changes in
    beneficiary status here could not be a conveyance falling within the ambit of
    MUFCA. As to Counts VI through VIII, the Court held that the Bank lacked
    standing to either prosecute a breach of fiduciary duty action against David
    or seek a declaratory judgment that the transfer of the John Hancock policies,
    or creation of the Blue Heron and Osprey Trusts were void ab initio.
    The Bank appealed the Court’s decision to the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. On February 21, 2019, the Fourth Circuit
    reversed and remanded Counts I through V (the MUFCA counts) and
    affirmed the grant of summary judgment on Counts VI through VIII. As to
    Counts I through V, the Fourth Circuit rejected the District Court’s
    application of the unclean hands doctrine. The Fourth Circuit next concluded
    7
    that summary judgment was inappropriate as to the sale of the John Hancock
    policies forming the basis of the MUFCA claim in Count I because the
    disparity in sale price to the Trust versus the value of the accelerated death
    benefits created a genuine issue of disputed fact.
    As to Counts II through V, the Fourth Circuit directed that this Court
    on remand reconsider the propriety of summary judgment in light of
    “applicable Maryland estate and trust law and potentially applicable
    Maryland insurance law,” particularly whether David exceeded the scope of
    his power as guardian of John’s property under Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts
    § 15-102(t) (identifying the powers of a guardian of the property as to life
    insurance policies) and whether Md. Code Ann., Ins. § 16-111(d) (changing
    insurance beneficiary is “valid except for transfer with actual intent to hinder,
    delay, or defraud creditors”) should bear on the Court’s interpretation of
    MUFCA. As to the remaining counts, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Court’s
    grant of summary judgment on Count VI because the Bank waived appellate
    review on this claim and on Counts VII and VIII which sought unavailable
    declaratory relief.
    On remand, both parties renewed their cross motions for summary
    judgment and briefed the applicability of Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts §
    15-102(t) and Md. Code Ann., Ins. § 16-111(d). This briefing clearly
    demonstrated to this Court that little, if any, guidance exists as to the
    applicability of such provisions, and thus, for this Court to follow the Fourth
    Circuit’s directive would amount to writing on a clean slate as to questions
    involving the interpretation of Maryland statutory and common law.
    (Citations omitted.)
    The District Court, citing the absence of controlling authority and upon the
    agreement of both parties, certified the following questions of law to this Court:
    1) Whether the Maryland Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, see Md.
    Code Ann., Com. Law §§ 15-201 et seq., which generally applies to
    “conveyances” made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors,
    reaches a change in life insurance beneficiary particularly in light of Md.
    Code Ann., Ins. § 16-111(d)?
    2) Whether Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts § 15-102 grants a guardian of
    property the authority to change the beneficiaries of life insurance policies?
    8
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    This Court has the power to “answer a question of law certified to it by a court of
    the United States . . . if the answer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation
    in the certifying court and there is no controlling appellate decision, constitutional
    provision, or statute of this State.” CJ § 12-603. This Court may reformulate a certified
    question of law. CJ § 12-604. However, when answering a certified question of law, “this
    Court’s statutorily prescribed role is to determine only questions of Maryland law, not
    questions of fact . . . . [And], we confine our legal analysis and final determinations of
    Maryland law to the questions certified.” Fangman v. Genuine Title, LLC, 
    447 Md. 681
    ,
    690–91 (2016) (quoting Parler & Wobber v. Miles & Stockbridge, 
    359 Md. 671
    , 681
    (2000)). Indeed, this Court “may go no further than the question certified.” Price, 462
    Md. at 147 (quoting AGV Sports Grp., Inc. v. Protus IP Sols., Inc., 
    417 Md. 386
    , 389 n.1
    (2010)).
    DISCUSSION
    Under the facts presented, the District Court asked this Court to address two matters
    of first impression—whether a change in life insurance beneficiary constitutes a
    conveyance under MUFCA and whether a guardian of property has the authority to make
    a change of beneficiary for a life insurance policy of the ward. For the following reasons,
    we answer the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative.
    9
    A.     First Certified Question: A Change of Life Insurance Beneficiary Constitutes a
    Conveyance Under the Maryland Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act.
    1.     Parties’ Contentions.
    The appellant, the Bank, contends that a change in the beneficiary designation of a
    life insurance policy may constitute a fraudulent conveyance and therefore may support an
    action under MUFCA. The Bank draws this conclusion in reliance on its interpretation of
    the text of MUFCA, particularly CL § 15-201(c), that states, “‘[c]onveyance’ includes
    every payment of money, assignment, release, transfer, lease, mortgage, or pledge of
    tangible or intangible property, and also the creation of any lien or incumbrance.” The
    Bank further relies on the statutory relationship between MUFCA and Maryland’s
    insurance statute to reach this conclusion, specifically IN § 16-111(d), that states “[a]
    change of beneficiary, assignment, or other transfer is valid except for transfer with actual
    intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.”
    The appellees, the Buckinghams, contend that a change of the beneficiary
    designation of a life insurance policy does not amount to a conveyance and therefore cannot
    give rise to a claim under MUFCA. The Buckinghams assert that this Court’s precedent
    establishes that the status of a beneficiary is merely an expectancy instead of a property
    interest and thus cannot be reached by a narrower reading of CL § 15-201(c). The
    Buckinghams further argue that life insurance proceeds are exempt from the claims of
    creditors under Maryland law and that the language of IN § 16-111 does not imply a right
    of action under MUFCA.
    10
    The parties offer competing interpretations of the definition of “conveyance” found
    in CL § 15-201(c). First, the Buckinghams assert that the language of the statute presents
    three broad categories of conveyances consisting of: (1) a payment of money; (2) an
    assignment, release, transfer, lease, mortgage, or pledge of tangible or intangible property;
    and (3) the creation of a lien or incumbrance. The Bank rejects this reading of the statute
    and instead urges the Court to read the language disjunctively—i.e. a conveyance may
    consist of any of the following: (1) a payment of money; (2) an assignment of something;
    (3) a release of something; (4) a transfer of something; (5) a lease of something; (6) a
    mortgage; (7) a pledge of tangible or intangible property; or (8) the creation of a lien or
    incumbrance.     Thus, under the Bank’s interpretation, a change in beneficiary is
    encompassed by the term “transfer” in CL § 15-201(c) as a transfer of the right to receive
    insurance proceeds from one individual to another.
    Additionally, the Buckinghams argue that “includes,” particularly when followed
    by the word “every” as provided in the definition of “conveyance” in CL § 15-201(c), is a
    word of limitation indicating an inclusive list of all possible categories of conveyance. By
    contrast, the Bank urges us to read “includes” as a word of illustration indicating a list of
    potential examples without an “express outer limit.”
    2.      Plain Language Analysis of CL § 15-201.
    In engaging in statutory interpretation, “this Court’s primary goal is to ascertain the
    purpose and intention of the General Assembly when they enacted the statutory
    provisions.” Town of Forest Heights v. Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park and Planning
    Comm’n, 
    463 Md. 469
    , 478 (2019) (citing Washington Gas Light Co. v. Maryland Pub.
    11
    Serv. Comm’n, 
    460 Md. 667
    , 682 (2018)). In determining the General Assembly’s intent,
    we must first look to the natural and ordinary meaning of the language. Fangman, 447
    Md. at 691. We read the “statute as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or
    phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.” Town of Forest
    Heights, 463 Md. at 478 (quoting Brown v. State, 
    454 Md. 546
    , 551 (2017)). “If the words
    of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and
    unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written.”
    Fangman, 447 Md. at 691 (citations and brackets omitted in the original).                 Lastly,
    “statutory construction is approached from a ‘commonsensical’ perspective. Thus, we seek
    to avoid constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense.”
    Della Ratta v. Dyas, 
    414 Md. 556
    , 567 (2010).
    The following definitions for the statutory language in MUFCA are provided at CL
    § 15-201:
    (a) In this subtitle the following words have the meanings indicated.
    (b) (1) “Assets” means property of a debtor not exempt from liability for his
    debts.
    (2) “Assets” includes any property to the extent that the property is liable
    for any debts of a debtor.
    (c) “Conveyance” includes every payment of money, assignment,
    release, transfer, lease, mortgage, or pledge of tangible or intangible
    property, and also the creation of any lien or incumbrance.
    (d) “Creditor” means a person who has any claim, whether matured or
    unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed, or contingent.
    (e) “Debt” includes any legal liability, whether matured or unmatured,
    liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed, or contingent.
    (Emphasis added.)
    12
    We begin our plain language analysis by considering the parties’ alternative
    interpretations of the word “includes” in CL § 15-201(c). We note that “a provision is not
    interpreted in isolation. Rather, we analyze the statutory scheme as a whole and attempt to
    harmonize provisions dealing with the same subject so that each may be given effect.”
    Kushell v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 
    385 Md. 563
    , 577 (2005) (citing Deville v. State, 
    383 Md. 217
    , 223 (2004)).
    Here, we look to the entirety of CL § 15-201 to ascertain the intent of the General
    Assembly. Notably, “includes” appears in three provisions of this definitional subsection
    of MUFCA, and “means” appears twice. Specifically, in analyzing the definition of
    “assets” in CL § 15-201(b)(1) and (2), we determine that the two words—“includes” and
    “means”—cannot be used interchangeably as the Buckinghams assert. CL § 15-201(b)(1)
    states, “‘[a]ssets’ means property of the debtor not exempt from liability for his debts.”
    (Emphasis added.) By contrast, CL § 15-201(b)(2)—directly following—states, “‘[a]ssets’
    includes any property to the extent that the property is liable for any debts of a debtor.”
    (Emphasis added.) Reading these two provisions side by side, it is apparent to us that the
    General Assembly intended to use “means” as a limiting term and “includes” as a
    contrasting and, therefore, illustrative term.5   The General Assembly has provided
    meanings for certain words throughout the code and “includes” or “including” are within
    5
    We acknowledge that “includes” is only modified by “every” once in this subsection.
    However, we reject the argument that “includes every . . .” is synonymous with “means.”
    It is well established that the “General Assembly is presumed to have meant what it said
    and said what it meant.” Bellard v. State, 
    452 Md. 467
    , 481 (2017) (quoting Wagner v.
    State, 
    445 Md. 404
    , 418 (2015)). If the General Assembly desired to communicate an
    identical meaning in these instances, it would have utilized consistent terminology.
    13
    this list defined as: “‘[i]ncludes’ or ‘including’ means includes or including by way of
    illustration and not by way of limitation.” Md. Code (2014, 2019 Repl. Vol.), General
    Provisions § 1-110. Consequently, we find that in CL § 15-201(c) the word “includes” is
    used to indicate several examples of potential conveyances as opposed to signaling an
    inclusive list of all potential conveyances to follow.
    Our interpretation is reinforced by the language defining “conveyance” in CL §
    15-201(c). The Buckinghams urge us to read this provision as three separate categories of
    conveyances, the first pertaining to money, the second to property, and the third to liens or
    incumbrances.     To support this reading, the Buckinghams assert the qualifying
    phrase—“of tangible or intangible property”—modifies each term in the preceding list,
    including “assignment,” “release,” “transfer,” “lease,” “mortgage,” and “pledge.”
    However, we reject the Buckinghams’ reading of CL § 15-201(c) because it fails to
    give weight to the “generally recognized rule of statutory construction that a qualifying
    clause ordinarily is confined to the immediately preceding words or phrase—particularly
    in the absence of a comma before the qualifying phrase.” Md. Dep’t of the Env’t v.
    Underwood, 
    368 Md. 160
    , 175–76 (2002) (quoting Sullivan v. Dixon, 
    280 Md. 444
    , 451
    (1977)). Here, the qualifying phrase—“of tangible or intangible property”—is not set off
    by commas, and therefore it only modifies the immediately preceding term “pledge.”
    Next, we note the use of the conjunction “or” between “mortgage[]” and “pledge”
    and the absence of a conjunction between “money[]” and “assignment.” As written, the
    provision contains one long string of terms leading up to the disjunctive “or,” with no
    grammatical or structural indication given that a “payment of money” should be held apart
    14
    from the grouping of “assignment, release, transfer, lease, mortgage, or pledge.”
    Accordingly, it would be inconsistent to give one meaning to “payment of money” (i.e. it
    is a stand-alone term) and another meaning to the rest of the terms (i.e. each are subject to
    the qualifying phrase). Instead, we find the consistent use of commas here without the
    presence of a conjunction to mean each item in the string of terms is to be read
    disjunctively.
    Thus, after a detailed review of the plain language of CL § 15-201, we conclude that
    the use of the term “includes” and the disjunctive nature of the language in CL § 15-201(c)
    demonstrate the purpose of the General Assembly to provide illustrative examples of
    conveyances without any intent to limit the phrase “transfer” to “tangible or intangible
    property.” Therefore, the transfer of the right to receive insurance proceeds from one
    individual to another by altering the beneficiary designation on a life insurance policy falls
    within the definition of “conveyance” provided in CL § 15-201(c).
    3.        Legislative Intent of MUFCA.
    While this Court “begin[s] our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning
    of the language of the statute,” we sometimes “see fit to examine extrinsic sources of
    legislative intent merely as a check of our reading of a statute’s plain language.” Brown v.
    State, 
    454 Md. 546
    , 551 (2017) (quoting Phillips v. State, 
    451 Md. 180
    , 196–97 (2017)).
    More specifically, this Court may analyze “the context of a statute . . . and archival
    legislative history of relevant enactments.” Town of Forest Heights, 463 Md. at 478
    (quoting Brown, 454 Md. at 551). Here, we further clarify the General Assembly’s intent
    15
    in enacting MUFCA by reviewing the Act’s legislative history and considering the caselaw
    of this Court.
    A comprehensive review of MUFCA’s legislative history reveals Maryland first
    adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act in 1920 as part of the uniform laws
    promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission (also known as the National Conference of
    Commissioners on Uniform State Laws). 1920 Md. Laws, ch. 395. In 1924, the Uniform
    Fraudulent Conveyance Act was codified as Article 39B. The statutory language of Article
    39B § 1, which is the definitional provision of the Act, remained entirely unaltered
    throughout several later recodifications occurring in 1939, 1951, and 1957. Md. Code
    (1939), Art. 39B § 1; Md. Code (1951), Art. 39B § 1; Md. Code (1957), Art. 39B § 1.
    In 1975, as part of Maryland’s code revision,6 the General Assembly repealed
    Article 39B in its entirety and reenacted the provisions of MUFCA as §§ 15-201 to 15-214
    of the Commercial Law Article. 1975 Md. Laws, ch. 49. In addition to a bill containing
    the text of the statute to create the Commercial Law Article, the Commission to Revise the
    Annotated Code of Maryland also submitted a report to the General Assembly that included
    6
    As we have noted in the past, “[c]ode revision is a periodic process by which statutory
    law is re-organized and restated with the goal of making it more accessible and
    understandable to those who must abide by it.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shilling, 
    468 Md. 239
    , 251 n.9 (2020) (quoting Johnson v. State, 
    467 Md. 362
    , 381 n.8 (2020)).
    “Maryland Code Revision began in 1970 as a long-term project to create a modern
    comprehensive code when Governor Marvin Mandel appointed the Commission to Revise
    the Annotated Code. This formal revision of the statutory law for the General Assembly
    was coordinated by the Department of Legislative Services. Code Revision was completed
    in 2016 with the enactment by the General Assembly of the Alcoholic Beverages Article.”
    
    Id. 16
    section-by-section notes (known as “Revisor’s Notes”) documenting its work. The report
    expressed this overall goal for MUFCA: “[t]he Commission has refrained from making
    many changes to this Act, even of a purely stylistic nature, in accordance with its policy
    regarding Uniform Acts. Those few changes which have been made are, of course,
    explained in the revisor’s notes.” William S. James & Avery Aisenstark, Governor’s
    Commission to Revise the Annotated Code of Maryland, Commission Report No. 1975-1
    to the General Assembly of Maryland 40 (January 10, 1975).
    In addition, the 1975 Maryland Chapter Laws contain the Reviser’s Notes
    concerning the definitions provided in CL § 15-201 that we have analyzed above. The
    notes state, “[t]his section presently appears as Art. 39B, § 1. Subsection (b) of this section
    is divided into two paragraphs for the purpose of clarity. The only other changes are
    technical changes in style.” 1975 Md. Laws, ch. 49.
    In comparing Article 39B § 1 and CL § 15-201, we can confirm the accuracy of the
    Revisor’s Notes by identifying the few minor changes that were made by the commission.
    First, the wording of subsection (b) was rearranged and broken into two paragraphs.7
    7
    The original language of subsection (b) reads:
    In this article “assets” of a debtor means property not exempt from liability
    for his debts. To the extent that any property is liable for any debts of the
    debtor, such property shall be included in his assets.
    Md. Code (1957), Art. 39B § 1 (emphasis in original).
    The commission altered the language of subsection (b) to read:
    17
    Second, a comma was inserted immediately following “mortgage” in subsection (c). Third,
    the word “means” replaced the word “is” in subsection (d), and lastly a comma was inserted
    immediately following “fixed” in subsection (e).          However, as noted in both the
    commission’s report and the Revisor’s Notes, none of these changes were intended to be
    substantive. Therefore, these changes do not alter the original legislative intent of MUFCA
    dating back to its predecessor’s enactment in 1920.
    To discern the intent of the General Assembly in enacting the original Uniform
    Fraudulent Conveyance Act in 1920, we turn to caselaw for helpful context. This Court
    has long recognized that the purpose of fraudulent conveyance law is to preserve the rights
    of creditors. In 1939, this Court concluded that the Maryland fraudulent conveyance
    statutes “were designed to render null and void conveyances made for the purpose of
    hindering, delaying and defrauding creditors.” Kennard v. Elkton Banking & Trust Co.,
    
    176 Md. 499
    , 500 (1939). In 1973, this Court again reiterated that in enacting these
    statutes, the Legislature “was not restricting the legal or equitable remedies already
    available to the creditor,” and the “objective . . . [was] to enhance and not impair the
    remedies of the creditor.” Damazo v. Wahby, 
    269 Md. 252
    , 256–57 (1973).
    (1) “Assets” means property of a debtor not exempt from liability for his
    debts.
    (2) “Assets” includes any property to the extent that the property is liable for
    any debts of a debtor.
    Md. Code (1975, 2013 Repl. Vol.), CL § 15-201(b).
    18
    In light of this caselaw, we conclude that the Buckinghams’ interpretation of the
    term “conveyance” in CL § 15-201(c) conflicts with the General Assembly’s purpose in
    enacting MUFCA. If this Court were to find that a transfer of the right to receive life
    insurance proceeds does not constitute a conveyance under MUFCA, then it would be
    difficult for the creditors of policy holders to have any remedy for the fraudulent change
    of a life insurance beneficiary. Therefore, our reading of the term “conveyance” in CL §
    15-201(c) to include the transfer of the right to receive life insurance proceeds through a
    change in beneficiary is consistent with the General Assembly’s intent to enhance, rather
    than impair, the remedies of creditors.
    4.     Statutory Analysis of IN § 16-111(d).
    In the first certified question, the District Court also asks us to interpret
    IN § 16-111(d) as it relates to CL § 15-201(c). IN § 16-111 provides:
    (a) The proceeds of a policy of life insurance or under an annuity contract on
    the life of an individual made for the benefit of or assigned to the spouse,
    child, or dependent relative of the individual are exempt from all claims of
    the creditors of the individual arising out of or based on an obligation created
    after June 1, 1945, whether or not the right to change the named beneficiary
    is reserved or allowed to the individual.
    (b) For purposes of this section, proceeds include death benefits, cash
    surrender and loan values, premiums waived, and dividends, whether used to
    reduce the premiums or used or applied in any other manner, except if the
    debtor has, after issuance of the policy, elected to receive the dividends in
    cash.
    (c) This section does not prohibit a creditor from collecting a debt out of the
    proceeds of a life insurance policy pledged by the insured as security for the
    debt.
    (d) A change of beneficiary, assignment, or other transfer is valid except
    for transfer with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.
    (Emphasis added.)
    19
    Generally, IN § 16-111 provides an exemption to fraudulent conveyance law
    shielding the spouse, child or dependent relatives of a life insurance policy holder from
    creditors of the policy holder. However, subsection (d) is of import to the question at hand
    because it removes this protective exemption if a change of life insurance beneficiary is
    made fraudulently. While we agree with the Buckinghams’ assertion that perhaps no
    additional remedies are expressly created by this subsection, IN § 16-111(d) nonetheless
    underscores the General Assembly’s express rejection of the limitation on a creditor’s
    remedies in the event of a fraudulent transfer of life insurance beneficiary. Therefore, it
    follows that for IN § 16-111(d) to have any meaningful effect, a remedy for defrauded
    creditors must be available elsewhere under Maryland law. Based on our earlier plain
    language analysis of CL § 15-201(c), we conclude that one such remedy is available under
    MUFCA.
    Additionally, we find support for our statutory interpretation of CL § 15-201(c) in
    the parallel language contained within IN § 16-111(d) and CL § 15-207 of MUFCA.
    CL § 15-207 provides:
    Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred with actual intent, as
    distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud
    present or future creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and future
    creditors.
    Notably, identical language is used to describe both fraudulent conveyances in
    CL § 15-207 and fraudulent transfers of life insurance beneficiaries in IN § 16-111(d).
    Both discuss the “intent . . . to hinder, delay, or defraud . . . creditors.” At minimum, this
    language is indicative of overlapping core characteristics that support the assertion that a
    20
    fraudulent transfer of life insurance beneficiary may fairly be characterized as a fraudulent
    conveyance. Thus, in considering both the General Assembly’s purpose in enacting
    MUFCA and MUFCA’s textual parallels to IN § 16-111(d), we find strong support for our
    earlier plain language analysis of CL § 15-201(c). Accordingly, we determine that a change
    of life insurance beneficiary is a conveyance under MUFCA.
    B.     Second Certified Question: A Guardian of Property Does Not Have the Authority
    to Change the Beneficiary of a Life Insurance Policy of the Ward.
    1.     Parties’ Contentions.
    The Bank contends that a guardian of property does not have the power to change
    life insurance beneficiaries of a ward, especially if such change is for the benefit of
    someone other than the ward or the ward’s dependents.           The Bank points out that
    ET § 15-102 provides the powers of a court-appointed guardian of property in
    administering the fiduciary estate of a ward and the language of ET § 15-102(t), which lists
    powers pertaining to life insurance policies, meaningfully omits an express grant to change
    a policy beneficiary.
    Specifically, ET § 15-102(t) provides:
    A fiduciary may exercise options, rights and privileges contained in a life
    insurance policy, annuity, or endowment contract constituting property of the
    fiduciary estate, including the right to obtain the cash surrender value,
    convert a policy to another type of policy, revoke any mode of settlement,
    and pay any part or all of the premiums on the policy or contract.
    The Bank emphasizes that none of the powers listed in ET § 15-102(t) involve dispersing
    property from the estate without consideration of property in return, such as, for example,
    21
    changing a life insurance beneficiary designation to someone other than the ward’s
    dependents.
    Instead, a guardian’s powers to distribute or disperse the property of a ward without
    court authorization are provided for in ET § 13-214. The Bank maintains the power to
    change a life insurance beneficiary, particularly when diverting funds away from the estate,
    is notably absent. However, the Bank contends that the court may exercise the power to
    change a life insurance beneficiary on a policy of an incompetent ward under
    ET § 13-203(c)(1) which reads:
    Except for the limitations contained in § 13-106 of this title, after
    appointment of the guardian, the court has all the powers over the property
    of the minor or disabled person that the person could exercise if not disabled
    or a minor.
    As a result, the Bank argues the only proper course of action for a guardian seeking to
    change the beneficiary on a life insurance policy of the ward would be to seek permission
    of the court.
    On the other hand, the Buckinghams assert that ET § 15-102(t) grants a guardian
    the power to change the beneficiary designation on a life insurance policy of the ward
    because the statutory language clearly permits the guardian to do so. The Buckinghams
    construe the General Assembly’s use of the term “including” as illustrative rather than
    limiting, and therefore maintain that ET §15-102(t) grants a guardian the authority to
    exercise “options, rights and privileges contained in a life insurance policy” in addition to
    22
    those listed, including the option to change a beneficiary designation.8 Moreover, the
    Buckinghams argue that death benefits are only realized upon the death of the ward at
    which time they are distributed to a party other than the ward. With that in mind, they
    assert that the death benefits are not an asset of the guardianship estate.
    2.     Legislative History of Powers of Guardian of Property.
    For centuries, the common law purpose of guardianship has remained unaltered. A
    guardian of an incompetent ward has a fiduciary duty to guard and protect the estate of the
    ward. As the legislative history outlines below, a guardian of the property does not have
    the ability to change the beneficiary designations of a ward’s life insurance policy without
    court approval because the guardian did not have such powers under common law and the
    General Assembly has not conferred such powers in subsequent statutes addressing the
    powers of a guardian. “It is a generally accepted rule of law that statutes are not presumed
    to repeal the common law ‘further than is expressly declared . . . .’” Robinson v. State, 
    353 Md. 683
    , 693 (1999) (quoting Lutz v. State, 
    167 Md. 12
    , 15 (1934)).
    To comprehensively analyze the role of a guardian of property we must begin with
    Maryland’s adoption of English common law under Article 3 of the Declaration of Rights
    in the Maryland Constitution in 1776. Nickens v. Mount Vernon Realty Grp., LLC, 
    429 Md. 53
    , 65 n.11 (2012) (abrogated on other grounds). In 1867, the language of Article 3
    was reconstituted as Article 5. 
    Id.
     Article 5(a) of the Declaration of Rights now provides:
    8
    Regardless of whether the term “including” in ET § 15-102(t) was intended by the General
    Assembly as a term of illustration, we conclude that the power to change a life insurance
    beneficiary on a policy of a ward is not an option, right, or privilege granted to a guardian
    of property for reasons fully explained in this opinion.
    23
    That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of
    England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that Law, and to
    the benefit of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July,
    seventeen hundred and seventy-six; and which, by experience, have been
    found applicable to their local and other circumstances, and have been
    introduced, used and practiced by the Courts of Law or Equity; and also of
    all Acts of Assembly in force on the first day of June, eighteen hundred and
    sixty-seven; except such as may have since expired, or may be inconsistent
    with the provisions of this Constitution; subject, nevertheless, to the
    revision of, and amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of this State.
    And the Inhabitants of Maryland are also entitled to all property derived to
    them from, or under the Charter granted by His Majesty Charles the First to
    Caecilius Calvert, Baron of Baltimore.
    Md. Const. Declaration of Rights Art. 5(a) (emphasis added). As we have stated in the
    past, “Article 5(a) enumerates three bodies of law to which the people of Maryland are
    entitled[,]” the first of which is the English common law. Davis v. Slater, 
    383 Md. 599
    ,
    612 (2004). In 1821, we noted that the term “Common Law of England” referred to “the
    common law in mass, as it existed here, either potentially or practically, and as it prevailed
    in England at the time, except such portions of it as are inconsistent with the spirit of that
    instrument [the Declaration of Rights], and the nature of our new political institutions.” 
    Id.
    (quoting State v. Buchanan, 
    5 H. & J. 317
    , 358 (1821)). Thus, with the 1776 adoption of
    the language of Article 5(a), Maryland adopted the then-existing English common law
    principles of guardianship which were not inconsistent with the Maryland Declaration of
    Rights or the new political institutions, and such principles remain law so far as the
    Maryland legislature has not revised, amended or repealed them. See 
    id. at 614
     (quoting
    Balt. Sun Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 
    359 Md. 653
    , 662 (2000)) (“This Court
    has continually observed that ‘[a]though the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the
    24
    common law, that law is subject to modification by legislative acts or by decisions of this
    Court.’”).
    Pertinent to our assessment of English common law principles of guardianship and
    within the context of surveying the historical role of the King as a guardian of property,
    this Court has explained:
    The statute of Edward II, De Praerogativa Regis, was one of the statutes
    adopted in Maryland under Art. 5 of the Declaration of Rights. It provided,
    in effect, that under the King’s custodianship, the lands and tenements of
    lunatics should be ‘safely kept without Waste and Destruction, and that they
    and their Household shall live and be maintained competently with the
    Profits of the same.’ The declared purposes of the statute were to prevent
    alienation of the property, and to insure [sic] its return to the incompetent if
    he should recover, or to his heirs if he should die insane.
    Kelly v. Scott, 
    215 Md. 530
    , 535 (1958) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). This
    reference reveals the long-established English common law principle underlying the
    concept of guardianship—specifically, that the purpose of guardianship is to ensure the
    estate of the ward is preserved and not diminished. We now consider any legislative
    alterations to this principle following its adoption under the Declaration of Rights in 1776.
    For many decades, Maryland lawyers and judges operated without an organized or
    regularly published code. The first official code compiling Maryland state laws was not
    published until 1860. See Hoang v. Lowery, 
    469 Md. 95
    , 108 (2020). However, regular
    efforts to update the 1860 code quickly ceased, rendering it outdated within a few years.
    See Alan M. Wilner, Blame it All On Nero: Code Creation and Revision in Maryland
    (1994), https://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/html/history.html
    [https://perma.cc/F32A-M4A7]. Thus, prior to the publication of the first complete,
    25
    annotated Maryland Code in 1924, lawyers and courts relied on treatises authored by
    individual legal scholars to ascertain the current state of law. 
    Id.
     As a result, scholarly
    treatises provide pertinent historical insight on the development of law prior to 1924.
    Of particular relevance to the question at hand, Edward Otis Hinkley wrote a treatise
    in 1878 entitled The Testamentary Law and the Law of Inheritance and Apprentices in
    Maryland, that comprehensively surveyed Maryland statutes and caselaw, often quoting
    this Court. Edward Otis Hinkley, The Testamentary Law and the Law of Inheritance and
    Apprentices in Maryland (John Murphy & Co., 1878). We find part six—"Guardians and
    Wards”—and specifically chapter fifty-seven, which closely considers the duties and
    powers of guardians, to be instructive. At the beginning of this chapter, Hinkley provided
    a detailed index, similar to modern headnotes, containing twelve references to the 1860
    code and twenty-six references to caselaw. 
    Id. at 536
    –37. Citing both code and caselaw,
    Hinkley wrote:
    As it is the unquestionable province of a guardian, under our laws, to take
    care of the person of his ward, so it peculiarly belongs to his office to keep
    together and preserve the property of every kind and description.
    
    Id. at 541
    . Thus, Hinkley’s synthesis of the law evidences that the English common law
    purpose of guardianship, while derived originally from the role of the King, was fully
    embraced by both the Maryland legislature and this Court as of 1878.
    The Buckinghams argue that later provisions provided through guardianship reform
    gave broad powers to guardians. The Bank counters that these broad powers were granted
    under the doctrine of substituted judgment, which does not extend to the change of a life
    insurance beneficiary. This Court addressed the doctrine of substituted judgment in
    26
    Kelly v. Scott, a 1958 opinion written by Judge William L. Henderson, which relied on
    English common law principles to interpret the role of a guardian under Maryland law.
    
    215 Md. 530
    . As a matter of first impression, the Kelly Court rejected the legal doctrine
    of substituted judgment—a rule that emerged under an 1816 English case and broadened
    the role of a guardian by allowing the distribution of an incompetent ward’s estate for the
    benefit of someone other than the ward. See 
    id. at 533
    . The Court found that the 1816
    English case was irrelevant because it was not in force at the time of Maryland’s adoption
    of English common law in 1776. 
    Id. at 535
    –36. Noting the English common law duty of
    a guardian to preserve and maintain the estate of the ward, the Court held “the expenditure
    of surplus income for the benefit of persons other than the [ward] and his household” was
    not authorized under Maryland law. 
    Id. at 535
    . The Court also noted that the lack of legal
    authority for the doctrine of substituted judgment, if warranted, could only be remedied by
    the legislature. 
    Id. at 537
    .
    Immediately following the Kelly decision, the Maryland General Assembly passed
    legislation that codified the substituted judgment doctrine. Scott v. First Nat’l Bank, 
    224 Md. 462
    , 464 (1961); 1958 Md. Laws, ch. 93. The new statute authorized a court in equity
    to approve of the disbursement of a ward’s surplus income by a guardian of property in
    hardship cases. 1958 Md. Laws, ch. 93. These court-authorized additional payments of
    support and maintenance could be made to “such person, or persons as the incompetent
    [ward] would reasonably have been expected to make had he been in a sound state of mind
    and capable of managing his affairs.” 
    Id.
     While this statutory provision modified the effect
    of Kelly where facts supporting substituted judgment arise, it did not modify the purpose
    27
    of guardianship Kelly had so clearly defined from a historical review of English common
    law. While the General Assembly granted substituted judgment to guardians of property,
    it did so with limitations that did not extend to changing the beneficiary on a life insurance
    policy of a ward.
    In the years after the Kelly decision and the subsequent legislation adopting the
    substituted judgment doctrine, guardianship law underwent several phases of statutory and
    code revision by the Maryland General Assembly. In 1969, the General Assembly entirely
    overhauled Maryland’s testamentary law, revising Article 93 and adding Article 93A, in
    conformance with a report and recommendations produced by a gubernatorially appointed
    Commission chaired by Judge Henderson and thus known as the “Henderson
    Commission.”9 Piper Rudnick LLP v. Hartz, 
    386 Md. 201
    , 222 (2005). In its report, the
    Henderson Commission provided comments following Section 7-401 of Article 93, the
    statutory provision detailing the powers of guardians including those related to life
    insurance policies, stating that the commission relied on the 1969 Uniform Probate Code
    and “substantially adopt[ed] the assumption of the Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act that it is
    desirable to equip fiduciaries with the authority required for the prudent handling of
    assets.” Governor’s Commission to Review and Revise the Testamentary Law of
    Maryland, Second Commission Report on Article 93 Decedents’ Estate to the Governor
    9
    This 1969 reform included a “comprehensive revision of the Maryland law relating to
    guardianships . . . for the protection of the property” of incompetent or disabled wards and
    it collected “into one article all the diverse Maryland rules” pertaining to guardians of
    property. Shale D. Stiller and Roger D. Redden, Statutory Reform in the Administration of
    Estates of Maryland Decedents, Minors and Incompetents, 29 Md. L. Rev. 85, 116 (1969).
    28
    and   the     General   Assembly     of    Maryland    110–11      (December     5,    1968),
    http://mdlaw.ptfs.com/awweb/pdfopener?md=1&did=6570                [https://perma.cc/6CH3-
    H2CW]. This foundational assumption relied upon by the Henderson Commission aligned
    with the common law purpose of guardianship—preservation and maintenance of a ward’s
    estate—provided for in Kelly.
    In 1974, as part of Maryland’s code revision, the General Assembly repealed
    Articles 93 and 93A and reenacted them as the Estates and Trusts Article. 1974 Md. Laws,
    ch. 11. The Revisor’s Notes pertaining to ET § 15-102 indicate that no substantive changes
    were made to subsection (s) detailing a guardian’s powers relating to life insurance policies
    of the ward, which now exists as ET § 15-102(t). Id. Additionally, what is currently
    ET § 15-102 originated, in part, as Section 213 of Article 93A of the 1969 version of the
    Annotated Code of Maryland. Comments on Section 213 made by the Estate and Trusts
    Section of the State Bar Association record that the statute was “intended to give to
    guardians a broad catalogue of powers” in order to “permit the prompt and inexpensive
    administration of the estates of minors and disabled persons.”         Maryland State Bar
    Association, Report of the Section on Estates and Trusts of the Maryland State Bar
    Association    on   Guardianship     and    Other     Protective   Devices     for    Persons
    under Disability 7 (1968), http://mdlaw.ptfs.com/awweb/pdfopener?md=1&did=6805
    [https://perma.cc/7RN6-DBEY] The legislative history of ET § 15-102 indicates the
    General Assembly desired for management of guardianship estates to be more simplified
    and that assets were intended to be handled in a prudent manner for the benefit of the
    incompetent’s estate consistent with the traditional purpose of guardianship originating in
    29
    English common law. This fundamental purpose of guardianship was confirmed in the
    Edward Otis Hinkley treatise of 1878, reiterated in Kelly and then again restated as recently
    as 2000 by the Court of Special Appeals. Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Boney, 
    135 Md. App. 99
    ,
    112 (2000) (“[T]he fundamental duty of a guardian of property is to preserve the property
    in the guardianship estate for the benefit of the ward and other persons with an interest in
    that property.”).10
    10
    Despite several phases of guardianship reform in Maryland over a period of fifty
    years, the fundamental common law principle of preservation of the estate has remained
    unaltered. In 1994, the Maryland Office of Aging convened the Task Force on
    Guardianship to assess the current guardianship laws and develop legislation to achieve
    “comprehensive statutory reform.” Vicki Gottlich, The Role of the Attorney for the
    Defendant in Adult Guardianship Cases: An Advocate’s Perspective, 7 Md. J. Contemp.
    Legal Issues 191, 191 n.1 (1995–96). The Task Force on Guardianship was further divided
    into subcommittees, and the subcommittee for Reform of the Maryland Guardianship
    Statute made substantive recommendations for change. See 
    id. at 191
    . See also Joyce
    McConnell, Standby Guardianship: Sharing the Legal Responsibility for Children, 7 Md.
    J. Contemp. Legal Issues 249, 249 (1995–96). Then in 1996, another comprehensive
    reform of guardianship law took place with the adoption of Title 10 of the Maryland Rules,
    which reorganized existing rules and created new rules pertaining to guardianship. See
    23:14 Md. Reg. 1, 13–37 (July 5, 1996).
    More recently, in 2016 a judicial interdisciplinary workgroup called the
    Guardianship/Vulnerable Adults Workgroup of the Maryland Judicial Council’s Domestic
    Law Committee completed a report recommending twenty-five comprehensive changes to
    the practice of guardianship, which were all adopted as amendments to Title 10 of the
    Maryland Rules and became effective on January 1, 2018. See Maryland Judicial Council-
    Domestic Law Committee, Guardianship Work Group Report and Recommendations,
    https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/judicialcouncil/pdfs/workgroups/guardians
    hipreportrecommendations201605.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6ZS-4LYD];                 see also
    Maryland          Courts,       Guardianship           Information       for       Courts,
    https://www.courts.state.md.us/family/guardianship/guardianshipinformationforcourts
    [https://perma.cc/YG5S-MW4T].
    The workgroup was divided into three subgroups, one of which was devoted to the
    improvement of the law surrounding guardians of property, and the subgroups formulated
    recommendations for best practices in Maryland after careful review of other states’
    statutory provisions and general best practice literature. Maryland Judicial Workgroup
    30
    Looking to other statutory provisions contained in the Estates and Trusts Article,
    we note that ET § 13-214 provides the limited scope of a guardian’s powers to disperse
    property of the ward without court authorization. Markedly absent from these independent
    powers is the ability of a guardian to change the beneficiary designation of a life insurance
    policy of a ward. We agree with the Bank’s assertions and find that the authority to change
    a beneficiary designation on a life insurance policy of a ward following the appointment of
    a guardian belongs exclusively to the court. As previously referenced, ET § 13-203(c)(1)
    states, “[e]xcept for the limitations contained in § 13-106 of this title, after appointment of
    the guardian, the court has all the powers over the property of the minor or disabled person
    that the person could exercise if not disabled or a minor.” This provision demonstrates the
    General Assembly’s intent to safeguard the ward’s estate by the broad grant of authority to
    courts and the conversely limited grant of authority to guardians of property. Thus, we
    find further support for our conclusion that a guardian does not have the authority to change
    the beneficiary designation on a life insurance policy of the ward absent court
    authorization.
    Finally, we consider that the Uniform Probate Code, both as it existed in 1969 when
    the Henderson Commission relied upon it and the current version, expressly require court
    Spearheads      Guardianship      Reforms,    39      Bifocal    26,    27    (2018),
    https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/bifocal/final-
    bifocal_39_3.pdf. [https://perma.cc/5U77-5T2R]. This workgroup, like all previous
    reform efforts, did not propose providing authority to guardians to change beneficiary
    designations for wards.
    31
    authorization prior to a change in life insurance beneficiary on a policy of a ward. Unif.
    Probate Code § 5-408(4) (1969); Unif. Probate Code § 5-411 (last amended 2019) (2020).
    We note other states have recognized this approach. Wisconsin’s highest court has stated,
    “[i]n our opinion a guardian has no more authority to designate a beneficiary in a policy of
    insurance upon the life of a ward than he would have to change the will of his ward by
    executing a codicil thereto or by executing a wholly new will.” Kay v. Erickson, 
    244 N.W. 625
    , 626 (Wis. 1932). Likewise, although a state statute dictated an alternate outcome, a
    Texas intermediate appellate court nonetheless observed, “[i]t appears to be the generally
    accepted rule . . . that the guardian of an incompetent may exercise the right to change the
    beneficiary designated in a policy on the life of the incompetent if by the change the ward
    is benefited, and if the guardian is duly authorized to make such a change of beneficiary
    by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Salvato v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 
    424 S.W.2d 1
    , 4 (Tex. 1st. Ct. App. 1968). We agree with this rule and, as before noted, in
    accordance with ET § 13-203(c)(1), a guardian may apply to the court to change a
    beneficiary on a life insurance policy of the ward.
    In sum, the role of a guardian to maintain and preserve the estate of the ward
    originated with English common law and was incorporated into Maryland law under the
    Declaration of Rights. This purpose of guardianship has been consistently referenced in
    caselaw and has remained unaltered after five decades of guardianship law reform.
    Consequently, we find that ET § 15-102(t) does not provide a guardian with the power to
    change a beneficiary designation. Thus, we agree with the Bank and conclude that a
    32
    guardian of property does not have the authority to change the beneficiary on a life
    insurance policy of the ward.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we answer the first question certified to us by the District
    Court in the affirmative and hold that a change in life insurance beneficiary constitutes a
    conveyance under CL § 15-201(c) of MUFCA. Additionally, we answer in the negative to
    the second question certified to us by the District Court and hold that the guardian of
    property does not have the authority to change the beneficiary on a life insurance policy of
    a ward under ET § 15-102(t).
    CERTIFIED QUESTIONS OF LAW
    ANSWERED AS SET FORTH ABOVE.
    COSTS TO BE DIVIDED EQUALLY
    BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
    33
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1m-20

Citation Numbers: 472 Md. 407

Judges: Getty

Filed Date: 3/9/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/31/2021

Authorities (16)

Damazo v. Wahby , 269 Md. 252 ( 1973 )

Scott v. First Nat. Bank, Adm. , 224 Md. 462 ( 1961 )

Maryland Department of the Environment v. Underwood , 368 Md. 160 ( 2002 )

Lutz v. State , 167 Md. 12 ( 1934 )

Kelly v. Scott , 215 Md. 530 ( 1958 )

Sullivan v. William E. Dixon, P.A. , 280 Md. 444 ( 1977 )

Salvato v. Volunteer State Life Insurance Co. , 1968 Tex. App. LEXIS 3000 ( 1968 )

Davis v. Slater , 383 Md. 599 ( 2004 )

Kennard v. Elkton Banking & Trust Co. , 176 Md. 499 ( 1939 )

Piper Rudnick LLP v. Hartz , 386 Md. 201 ( 2005 )

Deville v. State , 383 Md. 217 ( 2004 )

AGV Sports Group, Inc. v. Protus IP Solutions, Inc. , 417 Md. 386 ( 2010 )

Della Ratta v. Dyas , 414 Md. 556 ( 2010 )

Parler & Wobber v. Miles & Stockbridge, P.C. , 359 Md. 671 ( 2000 )

Baltimore Sun Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore , 359 Md. 653 ( 2000 )

Kushell v. Department of Natural Resources , 385 Md. 563 ( 2005 )

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