James Allen, Sharon Allen v. Verson Allsteel Press ( 1992 )

ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs, James and Sharon Allen, appeal from the district court’s order granting summary judgment to defendant, Ver-son Allsteel Press. Plaintiffs contended that James Allen was injured by a defectively designed power press which had been manufactured by Verson.

On September 18, 1987, James Allen, while an employee at Lobdell-Emery Manufacturing Co., volunteered to fill in for an absent worker whose duties included the lubrication of presses. Allen had operated some presses at the plant, but had never before oiled them. He was injured while filling the oil reservoir on the press manufactured by Verson. He had climbed onto a rail that was about two feet above floor level in order to fill the reservoir, a cylindrical tank located on the side of the press. To steady himself, he held on to the edge of an opening in the press where a counterbalance piston operated. This unguarded “pinch point” opening was located ninety-seven inches above floor level. Unaware of Allen’s presence, the operators of the press activated it, with the result that the piston crushed three fingers of his left hand.

The press was manufactured by Verson in late 1965 and delivered to Lobdell-Em-ery shortly thereafter. The pinch point where Allen’s hand was injured was unguarded, but access to it was obstructed from below by a large electrical box that protruded from the face of the press. As manufactured and installed, the oil reservoir was filled through a pump mechanism located at the bottom of the reservoir, six feet above the floor, about two feet from the pinch point. However, by the time of the accident, the original reservoir had been replaced with one that had to be filled from above, eight and one-half feet above floor level, next to the pinch point. The rail onto which Allen climbed was not part of the original design.

Verson filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the Allens were unable to make out a prima facie case of design defect because the conditions under which Mr. Allen was injured were not foreseeable.

Plaintiffs argued that the press was inherently dangerous and lacked safety features established by industry standards. They further contended that the modifications to the press were known or foreseeable by Verson, which breached a duty to warn.

In its opinion granting summary judgment, the district court noted that, under Michigan case law, the issue raised by a cause of action based upon defective design of a product is whether the manufacturer took reasonable care in light of any reasonably foreseeable use of the product which might cause injury. See, e.g., Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 414 Mich. 413, 326 N.W.2d 372 (1982). As evidence that the press was defectively designed, plaintiffs relied upon industry standards promulgated in 1972, calling for moving parts less than 108 inches from the ground to be guarded. The district court pointed out that the sale of the press occurred prior to the promulgation of those standards, and that the ones in effect at that time called for guarding areas less than eighty-four inches from the ground, a standard surpassed by Verson’s press.

The district court concluded that Verson must prevail as a matter of law on the element of foreseeability, since the evidence on summary judgment did not present sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury, and gave three reasons for that conclusion. First, plaintiffs presented no evidence that the press was not in compliance with industry standards in effect at the time of manufacture and delivery. Second, the injury occurred in a location where it was not foreseeable that anyone would be injured, since that location was too far removed from the ground to present any danger to those working around the press. Finally, no reasonable jury could conclude that the alteration of the lubrication system, from one which was to be filled and maintained from the ground level to one which was to be filled from above, was foreseeable by Verson at the time of manufacture. The court noted that there was no evidence adequate to indicate that Verson had participated in the modifications.

We are unable to say that the district court erred, since it is apparent from our review of the record that plaintiffs failed to satisfy their burden of making a showing that they were in possession of evidence of specific facts that would establish the existence of an element essential to their case, on which they bore the burden of proof at trial, as required by the Celotex trilogy of cases and its progeny. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Electric Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed upon the reasoning set out by that court in its order of January 9, 1991.