Marcia REED, Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellee , 988 F.2d 812 ( 1993 )

HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

Marcia Reed appeals the order of the district court¹ granting summary judgment to the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary). The district court found that substantial evidence on the record as a whole supported the Secretary’s decision to deny her supplemental security income (SSI) benefits because of claimed disability. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Reed is a 5'2" 293-pound woman who suffers from morbid obesity, medically-controlled diabetes, and other claimed physical ailments. At the time of the administrative hearing, she was 29 years old. Although she has been previously employed as a nurse’s assistant, counter helper, waitress, and chicken deboner, she has not worked regularly since 1982. She completed ten years of formal education. On September 21, 1987, at the age of twenty-seven, she was injured in an automobile accident. She was examined at a hospital and diagnosed as having a mild back strain. During the next several years, numerous doctors examined Reed regarding a variety of ailments.

Reed filed applications for SSI disability benefits in 1987 and again in 1988. The applications were denied and Reed never appealed the decisions. Reed then filed her third application for SSI disability benefits on January 10, 1990, claiming that she was disabled due to diabetes and obesity. The application was denied initially and again on reconsideration. Reed then requested an administrative hearing.

Following the hearing, the administrative law judge (AU) denied benefits on July 2, 1990, by concluding that Reed was not disabled. The AU found that although she was unable to perform her past relevant work, Reed was capable of making vocational adjustments and performing other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy.

Reed then requested review by the Secretary’s Appeals Council. On March 21, 1991, the Appeals Council denied the request for review and affirmed the Secretary’s denial of disability benefits.

Reed sought judicial review of the Secretary’s adverse decision. In response to the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment on the administrative record, the district court granted summary judgment to the Secretary. Reed appeals this decision.

II. DISCUSSION

Our review of the Secretary’s decision to deny disability benefits is limited to determining whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Groeper v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir.1991). “Substantial evidence 'means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' ” Britton v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 328, 330 (8th Cir.1990).

Reed first argues that the AU did not properly consider her subjective complaints of pain as required by Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.1984). The AU found that her subjective complaints of pain were not credible. Reed contends, however, that there is not substantial evidence to support this finding by the AU.

When determining the credibility of a claimant’s allegations of subjective pain, Polaski requires the AU to consider the claimant’s prior work record, observations by third parties, and diagnoses by treating and examining physicians relating to such matters as (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) any precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of" medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. 739 F.2d at 1322.

In the written hearing decision, the AU thoroughly described Reed’s subjective complaints. Based on her testimony, Reed suffers from back pain, diabetes, excruciating bone spurs on her feet, and headaches lasting from one hour to seven hours occurring five to seven times a week, and is unable to walk more than one-half block, stand for more than 10 minutes, or sit for more than 45 minutes at a time. See ALJ decision at 2. In sharp contrast to her testimony, however, the ALJ observed that the objective medical evidence does not support Reed’s subjective complaints of pain. Although aware that an ALJ cannot disregard a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them, the ALJ correctly stated that subjective complaints may be discounted if there are inconsistencies in the evidence as a whole. See Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.

After reviewing the record, we agree that the evidence as a whole is inconsistent. Reed has not regularly worked for ten years. She testified at the hearing that she cleans her house and cares for her children, albeit with help from her family members. Hearing Transcript (Tr.) at 61-62. She also does the family shopping and cooking, again, with help from her family. Tr. at 62. While the medical records reveal some complaint about migraine headaches, no evidence exists that she complained to physicians of debilitating headaches lasting from one hour to seven hours a day five times a week and of her inability to concentrate. Reed’s treating physician testified that her diabetes is well controlled with oral medication. Tr. at 30. Conditions that can be reasonably regulated cannot constitute a basis of disability. Brown v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 451, 452 (8th Cir.1985); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1530(b) (1992). Physicians also advised her of the benefits of losing weight and even attempted to assist her in a weight loss program, but she nevertheless continued to gain weight. Although she complains of poor eyesight, no medical evidence exists that documents any significant vision impairment. Reed’s complaint of back pain is unsubstantiated as well. X-rays of her lumbar and cervical spine were negative and physicians stated that she had full range of motion of her spine. Tr. at 224, 249. Reed also alleges that she suffers from carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS). Dr. Lin, who examined Reed in January 1990, however, ruled out CTS and stated that he thought she needed vocational rehabilitation. Tr. at 278. Dr. Lu-zecky, who examined her in May 1990, recognized that her complaints suggested CTS but that the results of her nerve examination only indicated a possibility of borderline CTS. Tr. at 308-09.

Because “ ‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s findings from being supported by substantial evidence,’ ” see Browning v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817, 821 (8th Cir.1992) (quoting Cruse v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1184 (8th Cir.1989)), we conclude that there was substantial evidence in the hearing record to support the ALJ’s decision to disregard Reed’s subjective complaints of pain. We will not disturb the decision of an ALJ who seriously considers, but for good reasons explicitly discredits, a claimant’s testimony of disabling pain. Browning, 958 F.2d at 821 (citing Dixon v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 237, 238 (8th Cir.1990)).

Reed next contends that the ALJ erred by failing to consider the combined effects of her impairments. She also argues that the AU failed to utilize vocational expert testimony in making the determination as to her disability status.

In order to establish a disability claim, the initial burden of proof is on the claimant to show that she is unable to perform her past relevant work. Sykes v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 284, 286 (8th Cir.1988). If the claimant can meet her burden, the burden of proof shifts to the Secretary to prove that the claimant is capable of performing other jobs in the national economy that are consistent with her medically determinable impairments, age, education and work experience. Id. (citing McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1147 (8th Cir.1982) (en banc)). “At this stage, the AU must determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC), that is, what [s]he can still do physically even with [her] impairments, and also the claimant’s age, education, and relevant work experience— the latter three findings being referred to as vocational factors, as opposed to RFC, which is a medical factor.” McCoy, 683 F.2d at 1142. “If the AU’s findings as to RFC, age, education, and work experience fit any of the combinations of those criteria contained in the Tables in Appendix 2 to Part 404, then the AU must reach the conclusion (either ‘disabled’ or ‘not disabled’) directed by the relevant Rule or line of the applicable Table.” Id. The question Reed poses is whether the AU can rely exclusively on the guidelines in making this disability determination or whether the AU was required to also consider vocational expert testimony.

Generally, if the claimant suffers from nonexertional impairments that limit her ability to perform the full range of work described in one of the specific categories set forth in the guidelines, the AU is required to utilize testimony of a vocational expert. Groeper v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1234, 1235 n. 1 (8th Cir.1991). In those instances, the AU cannot rely exclusively on the guidelines to direct a conclusion of whether the claimant is “disabled” or “not disabled.” Thompson v. Bowen, 850 F.2d 346, 349 (8th Cir.1988). Instead, testimony of a vocational expert must be taken. Groeper, 932 F.2d at 1235. The exception to this general rule is that the AU may exclusively rely on the guidelines even though there are nonexertional impairments if the AU finds, and the record supports the finding, that the nonexertional impairments do not significantly diminish the claimant’s RFC to perform the full range of activities listed in the guidelines. Thompson, 850 F.2d at 349-350 (emphasis added) (“If Thompson’s nonexertional impairments significantly affect her residual functional capacity then the Guidelines are not controlling and may not be used to direct a conclusion of disabled or not disabled.”). In other words, the AU may rely on the guidelines to direct a conclusion of either disabled or riot disabled without resorting to vocational expert testimony if the AU determines that a claimant’s non-exertional limitations do not significantly affect the claimant’s RFC. Id. at 349.

In this case, Reed proved that she was unable to perform her past relevant work. See AU’s decision at 5. The burden then shifted to the Secretary to prove that Reed could perform other jobs that exist in a significant number in the national economy.² In deciding whether Reed was disabled, the AU found that Reed’s subjective assessment of the limitations of her functional capacity, including her pain, was not credible. As we previously stated, it is proper for the AU to make credibility determinations. Thompson, 850 F.2d at 349. The AU should state the reasons on the record for the credibility determinations. Id. In this case, the AU adequately stated his reasons. Thé AU specifically found that no credible nonexertional factors existed that would reduce Reed’s RFC. See AU’s decision at 5. Because the AU specifically found, and the record supports the finding, that the nonexertional impairments do not significantly diminish Reed’s RFC to perform a full range of activities listed in the guidelines, the AU was correct to rely exclusively on the guidelines in order to determine Reed’s disability status. See Groeper, 932 F.2d at 1235 n. 1 (citing Thompson, 850 F.2d at 349-50). Therefore, the testimony of a vocational expert was not required in this determination.

According to the guidelines, a claimant within the age range from 18 to 44 years old, who has a tenth grade education and is át least literate and able to communicate in English, who previously worked at an unskilled job and is unable to return to her prior job, and who can perform only sedentary work is deemed to be not disabled. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, Rule 201.24 (1992). Because these characteristics describe Reed, the AU properly denied her disability benefits.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court.

1 . The Honorable Russell G. Clark, Senior United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

2 . The dissent proceeds on the assumption that during oral argument the Secretary "implicitly conceded” that Reed cannot presently engage in substantial gainful activity as a sedentary employee or, in other words, that Reed cannot perform other sedentary jobs that exist in a significant number in the national economy. We respectfully disagree.