State v. Majid , 2022 Ohio 189 ( 2022 )

[Cite as State v. Majid, 2022-Ohio-189.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 110560
v. :
ARIF MAJID, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 27, 2022
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-05-474447-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Anthony T. Miranda, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Arif Majid, pro se.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, A.J.:
Appellant Arif Majid (“Majid”) appeals the trial court’s denial of his
motion to correct sentence unauthorized by law. Upon review, we affirm the
decision of the trial court.
Background
In May 2011, following a retrial, Majid was convicted on one count of
murder and two counts of attempted murder, each with firearm specifications, and
one count of having weapons while under disability. Majid was sentenced to 18
years to life on Count 1 (consisting of 3 years on the firearm specification run prior
to and consecutive with 15 years to life on the base count), 10 years on each of Counts
2 and 3, and 5 years on Count 4, with all counts run consecutive to each other for a
total aggregate term of 43 years to life. In March 2012, on appeal, this court affirmed
in part but reversed in part because the trial court “neglected to impose sentences
on each of the firearm specifications for which [Majid] was convicted.” State v.
Majid, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96855, 2012-Ohio-1192, ¶ 104-108. The case was
remanded to the trial court “for the limited purpose of resentencing [Majid] as to
each of the firearm specifications.” Id. at ¶ 107.
In December 2012, the trial court resentenced Majid. Majid was
present with counsel. The trial court imposed the same sentence on each count for
a total aggregate prison term of 43 years to life, which included the three-year prison
term on the firearm specification in Count 1 to run prior to and consecutive with the
underlying prison term of 15 years to life on that count. The resentencing was
limited to merging all firearm specifications into the single three-year firearm
specification on Count 1. Majid did not appeal his resentencing.
After filing several unsuccessful postconviction motions, on
February 26, 2021, Majid filed a motion to correct sentence unauthorized by law.
The trial court denied the motion on May 4, 2021, and this appeal followed.
Assignments of Error
On appeal, Majid raises five assignments of error challenging his
sentence. Under his assignments of error, Majid argues his constitutional rights
were violated because (1) he was sentenced outside the statutory range; (2) the court
failed to provide a de novo sentencing hearing in his presence; (3) he was sentenced
to prison terms already served; (4) the trial court sentenced him to consecutive
terms without strictly complying with Ohio sentencing statutes; and (5) the trial
court applied no legal analysis in considering whether his convictions merge as
allied offenses of similar import.
Law and Analysis
Majid’s motion to correct sentence unauthorized by law is a petition
for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21(A)(1) because it (1) was filed subsequent
to a direct appeal; (2) claimed a denial of constitutional rights; (3) sought to render
the judgment void; and (4) asked for a vacation of the judgment and sentence. State
v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 160-161, 1997-Ohio 304, 679 N.E.2d 1131; see also
State v. Ali, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110624, 2021-Ohio-4303, ¶ 10. Whether the
trial court possessed subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain an untimely petition
for postconviction relief is a question of law, which we review de novo. Ali at ¶ 11,
citing State v. Apanovitch, 155 Ohio St.3d 358, 2018-Ohio-4744, 121 N.E.3d 351,
¶ 24.
In this appeal, Majid raises various constitutional challenges to his
sentence and claims the trial court disregarded statutory mandates and imposed a
sentence that is unlawful, contrary to law, and statutorily void. Majid’s claims were
not timely raised in a direct appeal.
In State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d
248, and State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776,
the Supreme Court of Ohio realigned its precedent with the traditional
understanding of what constitutes a void judgment. Harper at ¶ 4; Henderson at
¶ 34. The court did so to “restore predictability and finality to trial-court judgments
and criminal sentences.” Henderson at ¶ 33. As explained in Henderson, “[a] void
judgment is rendered by a court without jurisdiction. * * * A voidable judgment is
one pronounced by a court with jurisdiction.” Id. at ¶ 17. If a judgment is void, “[i]t
is a mere nullity and can be disregarded” and “[i]t can be attacked in collateral
proceedings.” Id., citing Tari v. State, 117 Ohio St. 481, 494, 159 N.E. 594 (1927).
In Harper, the Supreme Court of Ohio returned to the traditional
view and held that “[w]hen a case is within a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and
the accused is properly before the court, any error in the exercise of that jurisdiction
in imposing postrelease control renders the court’s judgment voidable, permitting
the sentence to be set aside if the error has been successfully challenged on direct
appeal.” Id. at ¶ 4. In Henderson, the court recognized Harper involved the
imposition of postrelease control and did not involve a case in which a trial court
deviated from a statutory mandate. Id. at ¶ 27. The court made clear “that sentences
based on an error are voidable, if the court imposing the sentence has jurisdiction
over the case and the defendant, including sentences in which a trial court fails to
impose a statutorily mandated term” and that “[a] sentence is void only if the
sentencing court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case or personal
jurisdiction over the accused.” Henderson at ¶ 27.
Recently, in State ex rel. Ogle v. Hocking Cty. Common Pleas Court,
Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-4453, the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized its
clarification of what constitutes a void sentence in Henderson, but adhered to the
Supreme Court of the United States decision in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58
S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), which declared a Sixth Amendment right-to-
counsel violation results in the court’s loss of jurisdiction and renders an associated
conviction void. Ogle at ¶ 12-13.
In Zerbst, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized that
“[s]ince the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to
the assistance of counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an
essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court’s authority to deprive an
accused of his life or liberty.” Id. at 467. Therefore, if the accused is not represented
by counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right,
then “the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and
sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty.” Id. at 468. When the Sixth
Amendment requirement is not complied with, “the court no longer has jurisdiction
to proceed” and “[t]he judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without
jurisdiction is void * * *.” (Emphasis added.) Id. The Supreme Court of the United
States has limited collateral attacks on prior convictions to the “unique
constitutional defect” presented in Zerbst that rose “to the level of a jurisdictional
defect resulting from the failure to appoint counsel at all.” Custis v. United States,
511 U.S. 485, 496, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994) (holding a violation of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the sole exception to the general rule against
collateral attacks upon state convictions).
Here, Majid was represented by counsel and the trial court had
jurisdiction to proceed with resentencing Majid on the firearm specifications.
Henderson and Harper remain controlling authority. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d
285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776; Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-
2913, 159 N.E.3d 248.
Accordingly, because the sentencing court had subject-matter
jurisdiction over the case and personal jurisdiction over Majid, any sentencing error
would render the sentence voidable, not void. See State v. Stansell, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 109023, 2021-Ohio-2036, ¶ 7. Moreover, any error in the imposition
of sentence rendered the sentence voidable and not subject to collateral attack in a
postconviction proceeding. See State v. Sailor, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109459,
2021-Ohio-2277, ¶ 23; see also State v. Stewart, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109498,
2020-Ohio-6743, ¶ 5, citing Henderson at ¶ 43.
Therefore, Majid was limited to challenging his sentence via a direct
appeal and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider his untimely petition for
postconviction relief. See Ali, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110624, 2021-Ohio-4303, at
¶ 13. The trial court did not err by summarily denying Majid’s motion to correct
sentence. The assignments of error are overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
____________________________________
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR