Martinez v. Ryan , 132 S. Ct. 1309 ( 2012 )


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  • (Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2011                                       1
    Syllabus
    NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
    being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
    The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
    prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
    See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 
    200 U. S. 321
    , 337.
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    Syllabus
    MARTINEZ v. RYAN, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPART-
    MENT OF CORRECTIONS
    CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
    THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    No. 10–1001. Argued October 4, 2011—Decided March 20, 2012
    Arizona prisoners may raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial
    counsel only in state collateral proceedings, not on direct review. In
    petitioner Martinez’s first state collateral proceeding, his counsel did
    not raise such a claim. On federal habeas review with new counsel,
    Martinez argued that he received ineffective assistance both at trial
    and in his first state collateral proceeding. He also claimed that he
    had a constitutional right to an effective attorney in the collateral
    proceeding because it was the first place to raise his claim of ineffec-
    tive assistance at trial. The District Court denied the petition, find-
    ing that Arizona’s preclusion rule was an adequate and independent
    state-law ground barring federal review, and that under Coleman v.
    Thompson, 
    501 U. S. 722
    , the attorney’s errors in the postconviction
    proceeding did not qualify as cause to excuse the procedural default.
    The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
    Held:
    1. Where, under state law, ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel
    claims must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a
    procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing
    those claims if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was
    no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective. Pp. 5–14.
    (a) Given that the precise question here is whether ineffective
    assistance in an initial-review collateral proceeding on an ineffective-
    assistance-at-trial claim may provide cause for a procedural default
    in a federal habeas proceeding, this is not the case to resolve the
    question left open in Coleman: whether a prisoner has a constitution-
    al right to effective counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings.
    However, to protect prisoners with potentially legitimate ineffective-
    2                           MARTINEZ v. RYAN
    Syllabus
    assistance claims, it is necessary to recognize a narrow exception to
    Coleman’s unqualified statement that an attorney’s ignorance or in-
    advertence in a postconviction proceeding does not qualify as cause to
    excuse a procedural default, namely, that inadequate assistance of
    counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause.
    Pp. 5–6.
    (b) A federal court can hear Martinez’s ineffective-assistance
    claim only if he can establish cause to excuse the procedural default
    and prejudice from a violation of federal law. Coleman held that a
    postconviction attorney’s negligence “does not qualify as ‘cause,’ ” be-
    cause “the attorney is the prisoner’s agent,” and “the principal bears
    the risk of ” his agent’s negligent conduct, Maples v. Thomas, ante, at
    12. However, in Coleman, counsel’s alleged error was on appeal from
    an initial-review collateral proceeding. Thus, his claims had been
    addressed by the state habeas trial court. This marks a key differ-
    ence between initial-review collateral proceedings and other collat-
    eral proceedings. Here, where the initial-review collateral proceeding
    is the first designated proceeding for a prisoner to raise the ineffec-
    tive-assistance claim, the collateral proceeding is the equivalent of a
    prisoner’s direct appeal as to that claim because the state habeas
    court decides the claim’s merits, no other court has addressed the
    claim, and defendants “are generally ill equipped to represent them-
    selves” where they have no brief from counsel and no court opinion
    addressing their claim. Halbert v. Michigan, 
    545 U. S. 605
    , 617. An
    attorney’s errors during an appeal on direct review may provide
    cause to excuse a procedural default; for if the attorney appointed by
    the State is ineffective, the prisoner has been denied fair process and
    the opportunity to comply with the State’s procedures and obtain an
    adjudication on the merits of his claim. Without adequate represen-
    tation in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a prisoner will have
    similar difficulties vindicating a substantial ineffective-assistance-at-
    trial claim. The same would be true if the State did not appoint an
    attorney for the initial-review collateral proceeding. A prisoner’s in-
    ability to present an ineffective-assistance claim is of particular con-
    cern because the right to effective trial counsel is a bedrock principle
    in this Nation’s justice system.
    Allowing a federal habeas court to hear a claim of ineffective assis-
    tance at trial when an attorney’s errors (or an attorney’s absence)
    caused a procedural default in an initial-review collateral proceeding
    acknowledges, as an equitable matter, that a collateral proceeding, if
    undertaken with no counsel or ineffective counsel, may not have been
    sufficient to ensure that proper consideration was given to a substan-
    tial claim. It thus follows that, when a State requires a prisoner to
    raise a i claim of ineffective assistance at trial in a collateral proceed-
    Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)                     3
    Syllabus
    ing, a prisoner may establish cause for a procedural default of such
    claim in two circumstances: where the state courts did not appoint
    counsel in the initial-review collateral proceeding for an ineffective-
    assistance-at-trial claim; and where appointed counsel in the initial-
    review collateral proceeding, where that claim should have been
    raised, was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U. S. 668
    . To overcome the default, a prisoner must also demonstrate that
    the underlying ineffective-assistance-at-trial claim is substantial.
    Most jurisdictions have procedures to ensure counsel is appointed for
    substantial ineffective-assistance claims. It is likely that such attor-
    neys are qualified to perform, and do perform, according to prevailing
    professional norms. And where that is so, States may enforce a pro-
    cedural default in federal habeas proceedings. Pp. 6–12.
    (c) This limited qualification to Coleman does not implicate stare
    decisis concerns. Coleman’s holding remains true except as to initial-
    review collateral proceedings for claims of ineffective assistance at
    trial. The holding in this case should not put a significant strain on
    state resources. A State facing the question of cause for an apparent
    default may answer that the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel
    claim is insubstantial. The limited circumstances recognized here al-
    so reflect the importance of the right to effective assistance at trial.
    Other claims may not implicate the same fundamentals of the adver-
    sary system. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
    1996 does not speak to the question presented here, and thus does
    not bar Martinez from asserting attorney error as cause for a proce-
    dural default. Pp. 12–14.
    2. Whether Martinez’s attorney in his first collateral proceeding
    was ineffective and whether his ineffective-assistance-at-trial claim
    is substantial, as well as the question of prejudice, are questions that
    remain open for a decision on remand. P. 15.
    
    623 F. 3d 731
    , reversed and remanded.
    KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
    C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.,
    joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J.,
    joined.
    Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)                              1
    Opinion of the Court
    NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
    preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
    notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­
    ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
    that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 10–1001
    _________________
    LUIS MARIANO MARTINEZ, PETITIONER v.
    CHARLES L. RYAN, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA
    DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
    APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    [March 20, 2012]
    JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
    The State of Arizona does not permit a convicted person
    alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel to raise that
    claim on direct review. Instead, the prisoner must bring
    the claim in state collateral proceedings. In the instant
    case, however, petitioner’s postconviction counsel did not
    raise the ineffective-assistance claim in the first collateral
    proceeding, and, indeed, filed a statement that, after
    reviewing the case, she found no meritorious claims help­
    ful to petitioner. On federal habeas review, and with new
    counsel, petitioner sought to argue he had received ineffec­
    tive assistance of counsel at trial and in the first phase of
    his state collateral proceeding. Because the state collat­
    eral proceeding was the first place to challenge his con-
    viction on grounds of ineffective assistance, petitioner
    maintained he had a constitutional right to an effective
    attorney in the collateral proceeding. While petitioner
    frames the question in this case as a constitutional one, a
    more narrow, but still dispositive, formulation is whether
    a federal habeas court may excuse a procedural default of
    2                    MARTINEZ v. RYAN
    Opinion of the Court
    an ineffective-assistance claim when the claim was not
    properly presented in state court due to an attorney’s
    errors in an initial-review collateral proceeding.
    I
    A jury convicted petitioner, Luis Mariano Martinez, of
    two counts of sexual conduct with a minor under the age
    of 15. The prosecution introduced a videotaped forensic
    interview with the victim, Martinez’s 11-year-old step­
    daughter. It also put in evidence the victim’s nightgown,
    with traces of Martinez’s DNA. As part of his defense,
    Martinez introduced evidence of the victim’s recantations,
    including testimony from the victim’s grandmother and
    mother and a second videotaped interview in which the
    victim denied any abuse. The victim also denied any
    abuse when she testified at trial. App. to Pet. for Cert.
    38a–39a. To explain the inconsistencies, a prosecution
    expert testified that recantations of child-abuse accusa­
    tions are caused often by reluctance on the part of the
    victim’s mother to lend support to the child’s claims. Pet.
    for Cert. 3. After considering the conflicting evidence, the
    jury convicted Martinez. He was sentenced to two consec­
    utive terms of life imprisonment with no possibility of
    parole for 35 years. App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a.
    The State appointed a new attorney to represent Mar­
    tinez in his direct appeal. Ibid.; Pet. for Cert. 4. She
    made numerous arguments on Martinez’s behalf, includ­
    ing a claim that the evidence was insufficient and that
    newly discovered evidence warranted a new trial. App. to
    Pet. for Cert. 39a. Arizona law, however, did not permit
    her to argue on direct appeal that trial counsel was inef­
    fective. State v. Spreitz, 
    202 Ariz. 1
    , 3, 
    39 P. 3d 525
    , 527
    (2002). Arizona instead requires claims of ineffective
    assistance at trial to be reserved for state collateral
    proceedings.
    While Martinez’s direct appeal was pending, the attor­
    Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)            3
    Opinion of the Court
    ney began a state collateral proceeding by filing a “Notice
    of Post-Conviction Relief.” Martinez v. Schriro, 
    623 F. 3d 731
    , 733–734 (CA9 2010); Ariz. Rule Crim. Proc. 32.4(a)
    (2011). Despite initiating this proceeding, counsel made
    no claim trial counsel was ineffective and later filed a
    statement asserting she could find no colorable claims at
    all. 
    623 F. 3d, at 734
    . Cf. State v. Smith, 
    184 Ariz. 456
    ,
    459, 
    910 P. 2d 1
    , 4 (1996).
    The state trial court hearing the collateral proceeding
    gave Martinez 45 days to file a pro se petition in support of
    postconviction relief and to raise any claims he believed
    his counsel overlooked. 
    623 F. 3d, at 734
    ; see Smith,
    
    supra, at 459
    , 
    910 P. 2d, at 4
    . Martinez did not respond.
    He later alleged that he was unaware of the ongoing col­
    lateral proceedings and that counsel failed to advise him
    of the need to file a pro se petition to preserve his rights.
    The state trial court dismissed the action for postconvic­
    tion relief, in effect affirming counsel’s determination that
    Martinez had no meritorious claims. 
    623 F. 3d, at 734
    .
    The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Martinez’s convic­
    tion, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. 
    Id., at 733
    .
    About a year and a half later, Martinez, now represent­
    ed by new counsel, filed a second notice of postconviction
    relief in the Arizona trial court. 
    Id., at 734
    . Martinez
    claimed his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to
    challenge the prosecution’s evidence. He argued, for ex­
    ample, that his trial counsel should have objected to the
    expert testimony explaining the victim’s recantations or
    should have called an expert witness in rebuttal. Mar­
    tinez also faulted trial counsel for not pursuing an excul­
    patory explanation for the DNA on the nightgown. App. to
    Brief in Opposition B–6 to B–12. Martinez’s petition was
    dismissed, in part in reliance on an Arizona Rule barring
    relief on a claim that could have been raised in a previous
    collateral proceeding. 
    Id.,
     at B–27; see Ariz. Rule Crim.
    4                    MARTINEZ v. RYAN
    Opinion of the Court
    Proc. 32.2(a)(3). Martinez, the theory went, should have
    asserted the claims of ineffective assistance of trial coun­
    sel in his first notice for postconviction relief. The Arizona
    Court of Appeals agreed. It denied Martinez relief be­
    cause he failed to raise his claims in the first collateral
    proceeding. 
    623 F. 3d, at 734
    . The Arizona Supreme
    Court declined to review Martinez’s appeal.
    Martinez then sought relief in United States District
    Court for the District of Arizona, where he filed a petition
    for a writ of habeas corpus, again raising the ineffective­
    assistance-of-trial-counsel claims. Martinez acknowledged
    the state courts denied his claims by relying on a well­
    established state procedural rule, which, under the doc­
    trine of procedural default, would prohibit a federal court
    from reaching the merits of the claims. See, e.g., Wain-
    wright v. Sykes, 
    433 U. S. 72
    , 84–85, 90–91 (1977). He
    could overcome this hurdle to federal review, Martinez
    argued, because he had cause for the default: His first
    postconviction counsel was ineffective in failing to raise
    any claims in the first notice of postconviction relief and in
    failing to notify Martinez of her actions. See 
    id.,
     at 84–85.
    On the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, the District
    Court denied the petition, ruling that Arizona’s preclusion
    rule was an adequate and independent state-law ground
    to bar federal review. App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a. Martinez
    had not shown cause to excuse the procedural default,
    the District Court reasoned, because under Coleman v.
    Thompson, 
    501 U. S. 722
    , 753–754 (1991), an attorney’s
    errors in a postconviction proceeding do not qualify as
    cause for a default. See 
    id.,
     at 754–755.
    The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
    The Court of Appeals relied on general statements in
    Coleman that, absent a right to counsel in a collateral
    proceeding, an attorney’s errors in the proceeding do not
    establish cause for a procedural default. Expanding on
    the District Court’s opinion, the Court of Appeals, citing
    Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)            5
    Opinion of the Court
    Coleman, noted the general rule that there is no constitu­
    tional right to counsel in collateral proceedings. 
    623 F. 3d, at 736
    . The Court of Appeals recognized that Coleman
    reserved ruling on whether there is “an exception” to this
    rule in those cases “where ‘state collateral review is the
    first place a prisoner can present a challenge to his convic­
    tion.’ ” 
    623 F. 3d, at 736
     (quoting Coleman, 
    supra, at 755
    ).
    It concluded, nevertheless, that the controlling cases
    established no basis for the exception. Certiorari was
    granted. 563 U. S. ___ (2011).
    II
    Coleman v. Thompson, 
    supra,
     left open, and the Court of
    Appeals in this case addressed, a question of constitution­
    al law: whether a prisoner has a right to effective counsel
    in collateral proceedings which provide the first occasion
    to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial. These
    proceedings can be called, for purposes of this opinion,
    “initial-review collateral proceedings.” Coleman had sug-
    gested, though without holding, that the Constitution
    may require States to provide counsel in initial-review
    collateral proceedings because “in [these] cases . . . state
    collateral review is the first place a prisoner can present a
    challenge to his conviction.” 
    Id., at 755
    . As Coleman
    noted, this makes the initial-review collateral proceeding a
    prisoner’s “one and only appeal” as to an ineffective­
    assistance claim, 
    id., at 756
     (emphasis deleted; internal
    quotation marks omitted), and this may justify an excep­
    tion to the constitutional rule that there is no right to
    counsel in collateral proceedings. See 
    id., at 755
    ; Douglas
    v. California, 
    372 U. S. 353
    , 357 (1963) (holding States
    must appoint counsel on a prisoner’s first appeal).
    This is not the case, however, to resolve whether that
    exception exists as a constitutional matter. The pre-
    cise question here is whether ineffective assistance in an
    initial-review collateral proceeding on a claim of ineffective
    6                    MARTINEZ v. RYAN
    Opinion of the Court
    assistance at trial may provide cause for a procedural
    default in a federal habeas proceeding. To protect prison­
    ers with a potentially legitimate claim of ineffective assis­
    tance of trial counsel, it is necessary to modify the unqual­
    ified statement in Coleman that an attorney’s ignorance
    or inadvertence in a postconviction proceeding does not
    qualify as cause to excuse a procedural default. This
    opinion qualifies Coleman by recognizing a narrow excep­
    tion: Inadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review
    collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner’s
    procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at
    trial.
    A
    Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality of
    a state prisoner’s conviction and sentence are guided by
    rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments are
    accorded the finality and respect necessary to preserve the
    integrity of legal proceedings within our system of federal­
    ism. These rules include the doctrine of procedural de­
    fault, under which a federal court will not review the
    merits of claims, including constitutional claims, that a
    state court declined to hear because the prisoner failed to
    abide by a state procedural rule. See, e.g., Coleman, su-
    pra, at 747–748; Sykes, 
    supra,
     at 84–85. A state court’s
    invocation of a procedural rule to deny a prisoner’s claims
    precludes federal review of the claims if, among other
    requisites, the state procedural rule is a nonfederal
    ground adequate to support the judgment and the rule is
    firmly established and consistently followed. See, e.g.,
    Walker v. Martin, 562 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 7–
    8); Beard v. Kindler, 558 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at
    7). The doctrine barring procedurally defaulted claims
    from being heard is not without exceptions. A prisoner
    may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim by showing
    cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of
    Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)            7
    Opinion of the Court
    federal law. See Coleman, 
    501 U. S., at 750
    . There is no
    dispute that Arizona’s procedural bar on successive peti­
    tions is an independent and adequate state ground. Thus,
    a federal court can hear Martinez’s ineffective-assistance
    claim only if he can establish cause to excuse the proce­
    dural default.
    Coleman held that “[n]egligence on the part of a prison­
    er’s postconviction attorney does not qualify as ‘cause.’ ”
    Maples v. Thomas, 565 U. S ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at
    12). Coleman reasoned that “because the attorney is the
    prisoner’s agent . . . under ‘well-settled principles of agen­
    cy law,’ the principal bears the risk of negligent conduct on
    the part of his agent.” Maples, supra, at ___ (slip op., at
    12).
    Coleman, however, did not present the occasion to apply
    this principle to determine whether attorney errors in
    initial-review collateral proceedings may qualify as cause
    for a procedural default. The alleged failure of counsel in
    Coleman was on appeal from an initial-review collateral
    proceeding, and in that proceeding the prisoner’s claims
    had been addressed by the state habeas trial court. See
    
    501 U. S., at 755
    .
    As Coleman recognized, this marks a key difference
    between initial-review collateral proceedings and other
    kinds of collateral proceedings. When an attorney errs in
    initial-review collateral proceedings, it is likely that no
    state court at any level will hear the prisoner’s claim.
    This Court on direct review of the state proceeding could
    not consider or adjudicate the claim. See, e.g., Fox Film
    Corp. v. Muller, 
    296 U. S. 207
     (1935); Murdock v. Mem-
    phis, 
    20 Wall. 590
     (1875); cf. Coleman, 
    supra,
     at 730–731.
    And if counsel’s errors in an initial-review collateral pro­
    ceeding do not establish cause to excuse the procedural
    default in a federal habeas proceeding, no court will re­
    view the prisoner’s claims.
    The same is not true when counsel errs in other kinds of
    8                    MARTINEZ v. RYAN
    Opinion of the Court
    postconviction proceedings. While counsel’s errors in
    these proceedings preclude any further review of the
    prisoner’s claim, the claim will have been addressed by
    one court, whether it be the trial court, the appellate court
    on direct review, or the trial court in an initial-review
    collateral proceeding. See, e.g., Coleman, 
    supra, at 756
    .
    Where, as here, the initial-review collateral proceeding
    is the first designated proceeding for a prisoner to raise a
    claim of ineffective assistance at trial, the collateral pro­
    ceeding is in many ways the equivalent of a prisoner’s
    direct appeal as to the ineffective-assistance claim. This
    is because the state habeas court “looks to the merits of
    the clai[m]” of ineffective assistance, no other court has
    addressed the claim, and “defendants pursuing first-tier
    review . . . are generally ill equipped to represent them­
    selves” because they do not have a brief from counsel or an
    opinion of the court addressing their claim of error. Hal-
    bert v. Michigan, 
    545 U. S. 605
    , 617 (2005); see Douglas,
    
    372 U. S., at
    357–358.
    As Coleman recognized, an attorney’s errors during an
    appeal on direct review may provide cause to excuse a
    procedural default; for if the attorney appointed by the
    State to pursue the direct appeal is ineffective, the prison­
    er has been denied fair process and the opportunity to
    comply with the State’s procedures and obtain an adjudi­
    cation on the merits of his claims. See 
    501 U. S., at 754
    ;
    Evitts v. Lucey, 
    469 U. S. 387
    , 396 (1985); Douglas, 
    supra,
    at 357–358. Without the help of an adequate attorney,
    a prisoner will have similar difficulties vindicating a
    substantial ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim.
    Claims of ineffective assistance at trial often require
    investigative work and an understanding of trial strategy.
    When the issue cannot be raised on direct review, more-
    over, a prisoner asserting an ineffective-assistance-of-trial­
    counsel claim in an initial-review collateral proceeding
    cannot rely on a court opinion or the prior work of an
    Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)            9
    Opinion of the Court
    attorney addressing that claim. Halbert, 
    545 U. S., at 619
    .
    To present a claim of ineffective assistance at trial in
    accordance with the State’s procedures, then, a prisoner
    likely needs an effective attorney.
    The same would be true if the State did not appoint an
    attorney to assist the prisoner in the initial-review collat­
    eral proceeding. The prisoner, unlearned in the law, may
    not comply with the State’s procedural rules or may mis­
    apprehend the substantive details of federal constitutional
    law. Cf., e.g., 
    id.,
     at 620–621 (describing the educational
    background of the prison population). While confined to
    prison, the prisoner is in no position to develop the eviden­
    tiary basis for a claim of ineffective assistance, which often
    turns on evidence outside the trial record.
    A prisoner’s inability to present a claim of trial error is
    of particular concern when the claim is one of ineffective
    assistance of counsel. The right to the effective assistance
    of counsel at trial is a bedrock principle in our justice
    system. It is deemed as an “obvious truth” the idea that
    “any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a
    lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
    provided for him.” Gideon v. Wainwright, 
    372 U. S. 335
    ,
    344 (1963). Indeed, the right to counsel is the foundation
    for our adversary system. Defense counsel tests the pros­
    ecution’s case to ensure that the proceedings serve the
    function of adjudicating guilt or innocence, while protect­
    ing the rights of the person charged. See, e.g., Powell v.
    Alabama, 
    287 U. S. 45
    , 68–69 (1932) (“[The defendant]
    requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
    proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not
    guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does
    not know how to establish his innocence”). Effective trial
    counsel preserves claims to be considered on appeal, see,
    e.g., Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(b), and in federal habeas
    proceedings, Edwards v. Carpenter, 
    529 U. S. 446
     (2000).
    This is not to imply the State acted with any impropri­
    10                   MARTINEZ v. RYAN
    Opinion of the Court
    ety by reserving the claim of ineffective assistance for a
    collateral proceeding. See Massaro v. United States, 
    538 U. S. 500
    , 505 (2003). Ineffective-assistance claims often
    depend on evidence outside the trial record. Direct ap­
    peals, without evidentiary hearings, may not be as effec­
    tive as other proceedings for developing the factual basis
    for the claim. 
    Ibid.
     Abbreviated deadlines to expand the
    record on direct appeal may not allow adequate time for
    an attorney to investigate the ineffective-assistance claim.
    See Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense, 
    92 Cornell L. Rev. 679
    , 689, and n. 57 (2004) (most rules give
    between 5 and 30 days from the time of conviction to file a
    request to expand the record on appeal). Thus, there are
    sound reasons for deferring consideration of ineffective­
    assistance-of-trial-counsel claims until the collateral­
    review stage, but this decision is not without consequences
    for the State’s ability to assert a procedural default in
    later proceedings. By deliberately choosing to move trial­
    ineffectiveness claims outside of the direct-appeal process,
    where counsel is constitutionally guaranteed, the State
    significantly diminishes prisoners’ ability to file such
    claims. It is within the context of this state procedural
    framework that counsel’s ineffectiveness in an initial­
    review collateral proceeding qualifies as cause for a proce­
    dural default.
    The rules for when a prisoner may establish cause to
    excuse a procedural default are elaborated in the exercise
    of the Court’s discretion. McCleskey v. Zant, 
    499 U. S. 467
    , 490 (1991); see also Coleman, 
    supra,
     at 730–731;
    Sykes, 
    433 U. S., at 83
    ; Reed v. Ross, 
    468 U. S. 1
    , 9 (1984);
    Fay v. Noia, 
    372 U. S. 391
    , 430 (1963), overruled in part
    by Sykes, 
    supra.
     These rules reflect an equitable judg­
    ment that only where a prisoner is impeded or obstructed
    in complying with the State’s established procedures will a
    federal habeas court excuse the prisoner from the usual
    sanction of default. See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U. S.
    Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)           11
    Opinion of the Court
    263, 289 (1999); Reed, 
    supra, at 16
    . Allowing a federal
    habeas court to hear a claim of ineffective assistance of
    trial counsel when an attorney’s errors (or the absence of
    an attorney) caused a procedural default in an initial­
    review collateral proceeding acknowledges, as an equitable
    matter, that the initial-review collateral proceeding, if
    undertaken without counsel or with ineffective counsel,
    may not have been sufficient to ensure that proper consid­
    eration was given to a substantial claim. From this it
    follows that, when a State requires a prisoner to raise an
    ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in a collateral
    proceeding, a prisoner may establish cause for a default of
    an ineffective-assistance claim in two circumstances. The
    first is where the state courts did not appoint counsel in
    the initial-review collateral proceeding for a claim of inef­
    fective assistance at trial. The second is where appointed
    counsel in the initial-review collateral proceeding, where
    the claim should have been raised, was ineffective under
    the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U. S. 668
    (1984). To overcome the default, a prisoner must also
    demonstrate that the underlying ineffective-assistance-of­
    trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say
    that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has
    some merit. Cf. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 
    537 U. S. 322
     (2003)
    (describing standards for certificates of appealability to
    issue).
    Most jurisdictions have in place procedures to ensure
    counsel is appointed for substantial ineffective-assistance
    claims. Some States, including Arizona, appoint counsel
    in every first collateral proceeding. See, e.g., Alaska Stat.
    18.85.100(c) (2010); Ariz. Rule Crim. Proc. 32.4(c)(2)
    (2011); 
    Conn. Gen. Stat. §51
    –296(a) (2011); Me. Rules
    Crim. Proc. 69, 70(c) (2010); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §7A–
    451(a)(2) (2009); N. J. Ct. Rule 3:22–6(b) (2012); R. I. Gen.
    Laws §10–9.1–5 (Lexis 1997); 
    Tenn. Code Ann. §8
    –14–205
    (2011). Some States appoint counsel if the claims require
    12                   MARTINEZ v. RYAN
    Opinion of the Court
    an evidentiary hearing, as claims of ineffective assistance
    often do. See, e.g., Ky. Rule Crim. Proc. 11.42(5) (2011);
    La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 930.7(C) (West 2008);
    Mich. Rule Crim. Proc. 6.505(A) (2011); S. C. Rule Civ.
    Proc. 71.1(d) (2011). Other States appoint counsel if the
    claims have some merit to them or the state habeas trial
    court deems the record worthy of further development.
    See, e.g., Ark. Rule Crim. Proc. 37.3(b) (2011); Colo. Rule
    Crim. Proc. 35(b) (2011); Del. Super. Ct. Rule Crim. Proc.
    61(e)(1) (2011); Indiana Rule Post-Conviction Remedies
    Proc. 1, §9(a) (rev. 2011); 
    Kan. Stat. Ann. §22
    –4506 (2007);
    N. M. Dist. Ct. Rule Crim. Proc. 5–802 (2011); Hust v.
    State, 
    147 Idaho 682
    , 683–684, 
    214 P. 3d 668
    , 669–670
    (2009); Hardin v. Arkansas, 
    350 Ark. 299
    , 301, 
    86 S. W. 3d 384
    , 385 (2007) (per curiam); Jensen v. State, 
    2004 ND 200
    , ¶13, 
    688 N. W. 2d 374
    , 378; Wu v. United States, 
    798 A. 2d 1083
    , 1089 (D. C. 2002); Kostal v. People, 
    167 Colo. 317
    , 
    447 P. 2d 536
     (1968). It is likely that most of the
    attorneys appointed by the courts are qualified to per-
    form, and do perform, according to prevailing professional
    norms; and, where that is so, the States may enforce a
    procedural default in federal habeas proceedings.
    B
    This limited qualification to Coleman does not implicate
    the usual concerns with upsetting reliance interests pro­
    tected by stare decisis principles. Cf., e.g., Montejo v.
    Louisiana, 
    556 U. S. 778
    , 792–793 (2009). Coleman held
    that an attorney’s negligence in a postconviction proceed­
    ing does not establish cause, and this remains true except
    as to initial-review collateral proceedings for claims of
    ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Coleman itself
    did not involve an occasion when an attorney erred in an
    initial-review collateral proceeding with respect to a claim
    of ineffective trial counsel; and in the 20 years since Cole-
    man was decided, we have not held Coleman applies in
    Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)           13
    Opinion of the Court
    circumstances like this one.
    The holding here ought not to put a significant strain on
    state resources. When faced with the question whether
    there is cause for an apparent default, a State may answer
    that the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is in­
    substantial, i.e., it does not have any merit or that it is
    wholly without factual support, or that the attorney in the
    initial-review collateral proceeding did not perform below
    constitutional standards.
    This is but one of the differences between a constitu­
    tional ruling and the equitable ruling of this case. A
    constitutional ruling would provide defendants a free­
    standing constitutional claim to raise; it would require the
    appointment of counsel in initial-review collateral proceed­
    ings; it would impose the same system of appointing coun­
    sel in every State; and it would require a reversal in all
    state collateral cases on direct review from state courts if
    the States’ system of appointing counsel did not conform to
    the constitutional rule. An equitable ruling, by contrast,
    permits States a variety of systems for appointing counsel
    in initial-review collateral proceedings. And it permits a
    State to elect between appointing counsel in initial-review
    collateral proceedings or not asserting a procedural de­
    fault and raising a defense on the merits in federal habeas
    proceedings. In addition, state collateral cases on direct
    review from state courts are unaffected by the ruling in
    this case.
    The rule of Coleman governs in all but the limited cir­
    cumstances recognized here. The holding in this case does
    not concern attorney errors in other kinds of proceedings,
    including appeals from initial-review collateral proceed­
    ings, second or successive collateral proceedings, and
    petitions for discretionary review in a State’s appellate
    courts. See 
    501 U. S., at 754
    ; Carrier, 477 U. S., at 488. It
    does not extend to attorney errors in any proceeding be­
    yond the first occasion the State allows a prisoner to raise
    14                    MARTINEZ v. RYAN
    Opinion of the Court
    a claim of ineffective assistance at trial, even though that
    initial-review collateral proceeding may be deficient for
    other reasons.
    In addition, the limited nature of the qualification to
    Coleman adopted here reflects the importance of the right
    to the effective assistance of trial counsel and Arizona’s
    decision to bar defendants from raising ineffective­
    assistance claims on direct appeal. Our holding here
    addresses only the constitutional claims presented in this
    case, where the State barred the defendant from raising
    the claims on direct appeal.
    Arizona contends that the Antiterrorism and Effective
    Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 
    28 U. S. C. §2254
    ,
    bars Martinez from asserting attorney error as cause for
    a procedural default. AEDPA refers to attorney error in
    collateral proceedings, but it does not speak to the ques­
    tion presented in this case. Section 2254(i) provides that
    “the ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during
    Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings
    shall not be a ground for relief.” “Cause,” however, is not
    synonymous with “a ground for relief.” A finding of cause
    and prejudice does not entitle the prisoner to habeas relief.
    It merely allows a federal court to consider the merits of
    a claim that otherwise would have been procedurally de­
    faulted. In this case, for example, Martinez’s “ground for
    relief ” is his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, a
    claim that AEDPA does not bar. Martinez relies on the
    ineffectiveness of his postconviction attorney to excuse his
    failure to comply with Arizona’s procedural rules, not as
    an independent basis for overturning his conviction. In
    short, while §2254(i) precludes Martinez from relying on
    the ineffectiveness of his postconviction attorney as a
    “ground for relief,” it does not stop Martinez from using it
    to establish “cause.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. ___, ___
    (2010) (slip op., at 18).
    Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)           15
    Opinion of the Court
    III
    Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance
    of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collat­
    eral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal
    habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffec­
    tive assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral
    proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that pro­
    ceeding was ineffective.
    In this case Martinez’s attorney in the initial-review
    collateral proceeding filed a notice akin to an Anders brief,
    in effect conceding that Martinez lacked any meritorious
    claim, including his claim of ineffective assistance at trial.
    See Anders v. California, 
    386 U. S. 738
     (1967). Martinez
    argued before the federal habeas court that filing the
    Anders brief constituted ineffective assistance. The Court
    of Appeals did not decide whether that was so. Rather, it
    held that because Martinez did not have a right to an
    attorney in the initial-review collateral proceeding, the
    attorney’s errors in the initial-review collateral proceeding
    could not establish cause for the failure to comply with the
    State’s rules. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not deter­
    mine whether Martinez’s attorney in his first collateral
    proceeding was ineffective or whether his claim of ineffec­
    tive assistance of trial counsel is substantial. And the
    court did not address the question of prejudice. These
    issues remain open for a decision on remand.
    *    *     *
    The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
    the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
    with this opinion.
    It is so ordered.
    Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)           1
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 10–1001
    _________________
    LUIS MARIANO MARTINEZ, PETITIONER v.
    CHARLES L. RYAN, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA
    DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
    APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    [March 20, 2012]
    JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins,
    dissenting.
    I
    A
    Let me get this straight: Out of concern for the values of
    federalism; to preserve the ability of our States to provide
    prompt justice; and in light of our longstanding juris-
    prudence holding that there is no constitutional right to
    counsel in state collateral review; the Court, in what it
    portrays as an admirable exercise of judicial restraint,
    abstains from holding that there is a constitutional right
    to counsel in initial-review state habeas. After all, that
    would have meant, in a case such as the one before us,
    that failing to provide assistance of counsel, or providing
    assistance of counsel that falls below the Strickland
    standard, would constitute cause for excusing procedural
    default. See Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U. S. 668
    (1984). Instead of taking that radical step, the Court
    holds that, for equitable reasons, in a case such as the one
    before us, failing to provide assistance of counsel, or
    providing assistance of counsel that falls below the Strick-
    land standard, constitutes cause for excusing procedural
    default. The result, of course, is precisely the same.
    2                        MARTINEZ v. RYAN
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    Ah, but perhaps the explanation of why the Court’s
    action today amounts to praiseworthy self-restraint is this:
    It pronounces this excuse from the usual rule of proce-
    dural default only in initial-review state habeas raising an
    ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. But it could
    have limited its invention of a new constitutional right to
    collateral-review counsel in precisely the same fashion—
    and with precisely the same consequences. Moreover, no
    one really believes that the newly announced “equitable”
    rule will remain limited to ineffective-assistance-of-trial-
    counsel cases. There is not a dime’s worth of difference
    in principle between those cases and many other cases in
    which initial state habeas will be the first opportunity for
    a particular claim to be raised: claims of “newly discov-
    ered” prosecutorial misconduct, for example, see Brady v.
    Maryland, 
    373 U. S. 83
     (1963), claims based on “newly
    discovered” exculpatory evidence or “newly discovered”
    impeachment of prosecutorial witnesses, and claims as-
    serting ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The
    Court’s soothing assertion, ante, at 14, that its holding
    “addresses only the constitutional claims presented in this
    case,” insults the reader’s intelligence.1
    ——————
    1 The Court also seeks to restrict its holding to cases in which the
    State has “deliberately cho[sen]” to move the asserted claim “outside of
    the direct-appeal process,” ante, at 10. That line lacks any principled
    basis, and will not last. Is there any relevant difference between cases
    in which the State says that certain claims can only be brought on
    collateral review and cases in which those claims by their nature can
    only be brought on collateral review, since they do not manifest them-
    selves until the appellate process is complete? Our cases establish that
    to constitute cause for failure to raise an issue on direct review, the
    excuse must be “an objective factor external to the defense.” See infra,
    at 7. That the factual basis for a claim was not available until the
    collateral-review stage is no less such a factor than a State’s requiring
    that a claim be brought on collateral review. See Murray v. Carrier,
    
    477 U. S. 478
    , 488 (1986). The Court’s asserted limitation makes sense
    only if the opinion means that a State has “deliberately chos[en]” to
    move newly-arisen claims “outside of the direct-appeal process” if it
    Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)                   3
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    Moreover, even if today’s holding could (against all
    logic) be restricted to ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel
    claims, it would have essentially the same practical conse-
    quences as a holding that collateral-review counsel is
    constitutionally required. Despite the Court’s suggestion
    to the contrary, see ante, at 13, the rule it adopts calls into
    question the common state practice of not appointing
    counsel in all first collateral proceedings, see ante, at 11–
    12. It does not, to be sure, call into question the lawful-
    ness of that practice; only its sanity. For if the prisoner
    goes through state collateral proceedings without counsel,
    and fails to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel
    claim which is, because of that failure, defaulted, the
    default will not preclude federal habeas review of the
    merits of that claim. And since ineffective assistance of
    trial counsel is a monotonously standard claim on federal
    habeas (has a duly convicted defendant ever been effective-
    ly represented?), whoever advises the State would himself
    be guilty of ineffective assistance if he did not counsel
    the appointment of state-collateral-review counsel in all
    cases—lest the failure to raise that claim in the state pro-
    ceedings be excused and the State be propelled into federal
    habeas review of the adequacy of trial-court representa-
    tion that occurred many years ago.2 Which is to say that
    ——————
    fails to reopen the direct-appeal process in order to entertain such
    claims. Such a radical change in what we require of the States surely
    ought to be prescribed by language clearer than what today’s opinion
    contains.
    2 The Court says that to establish cause a prisoner must demonstrate
    that the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is “substantial,”
    which apparently means the claim has at least some merit. See ante, at
    11. The Court does not explain where this substantiality standard
    comes from, and how it differs from the normal rule that a prisoner
    must demonstrate actual prejudice to avoid the enforcement of a
    procedural default, see Coleman v. Thompson, 
    501 U. S. 722
    , 750
    (1991). But whatever the standard, examination of the adequacy of
    4                          MARTINEZ v. RYAN
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    the Court’s pretended avoidance of requiring States to ap-
    point collateral-review counsel is a sham.3
    Of course even the appointment of state-collateral-
    review counsel will not guarantee that the State’s criminal
    proceeding can be concluded without years-long federal
    retrial. Appointment of counsel may, as I have said, avoid
    federal review of the adequacy of representation that
    occurred years ago, at the original trial. But since, under
    today’s opinion, the condition for exclusion of federal
    habeas is the very same condition that would apply if
    appointment of state-collateral-review counsel were con-
    stitutionally required, it will remain to be determined in
    federal habeas review whether the state-appointed counsel
    was effective. Thus, as a consequence of today’s decision
    the States will always be forced to litigate in federal habe-
    as, for all defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel
    claims (and who knows what other claims), either (1) the
    validity of the defaulted claim (where collateral-review
    counsel was not appointed), or (2) the effectiveness of
    collateral-review counsel (where collateral-review counsel
    was appointed). The Court notes that many States al-
    ready provide for the appointment of counsel in first col-
    ——————
    years-ago representation has been substituted for summary dismissal
    by reason of procedural default.
    3 The Court also claims, ante, at 13, that its “equitable” ruling, unlike
    a constitutional ruling, will not require “a reversal in all state collateral
    cases on direct review from state courts” where counsel has not been
    appointed. Surely the Court does not mean to suggest that an un-
    constitutional failure to appoint counsel on collateral review, like an
    unconstitutional failure to appoint counsel at trial, would require the
    entire conviction to be set aside. That is inconceivable. So either one of
    two things would happen: Either the reviewing state court would be
    able to inquire into prejudice (which is an improvement over having the
    federal habeas court make that inquiry, as the Court’s “equitable”
    solution requires); or else the appellate state court will remand for a
    collateral proceeding with counsel (which is, as we have said, just what
    the Court’s “equitable” ruling effectively requires anyway). So the
    Court’s “equitable” ruling is no boon to the States.
    Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)                      5
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    lateral challenges—as though this proves that what the
    Court forces the States to do today is eminently reasona-
    ble. But what the Court fails to point out is that current-
    ly, when state-appointed counsel does not raise an ineffec-
    tive-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, that is the end of the
    matter: The issue has been procedurally defaulted. By
    virtue of today’s opinion, however, all those cases can (and
    where capital punishment is at issue assuredly will) pro-
    ceed to federal habeas on the issue of whether state-
    appointed counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the
    ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel issue. That is the
    meaning of the Court’s (supposedly comforting) statement:
    “It is likely that most of the attorneys appointed by
    the courts are qualified to perform, and do perform,
    according to prevailing professional norms; and, where
    that is so, the States may enforce a procedural default
    in federal habeas proceedings.” Ante, at 12 (emphasis
    added).
    To be more precise, the Court should have said “where
    that is so, and where federal habeas courts have finally
    rejected claims that it is not so, the States may enforce a
    procedural default in federal habeas proceedings.”
    I cannot possibly imagine the basis for the Court’s confi-
    dence, ante, at 12–13, that all this will not put a signifi-
    cant strain on state resources. The principal escape route
    from federal habeas—existence of an “adequate and in-
    dependent state ground”—has been closed.4 Whether
    ——————
    4 See N. King, F. Cheesman, & B. Ostrom, Final Technical Report:
    Habeas Litigation in U. S. District Courts 45–49 (2007) (documenting
    the percentage of habeas petitions that included claims dismissed for
    various procedural reasons); Administrative Office of the United States
    Courts, Habeas Corpus Petitions Disposed of Procedurally During the
    12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2011 (reporting that for ap-
    peals in noncapital state-prisoner habeas cases, procedural default
    accounted for the largest percentage of procedural dispositions, with
    the exception of the denial of a certificate of appealability) (available in
    6                           MARTINEZ v. RYAN
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    counsel appointed for state collateral review raises the
    ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim or not, federal
    habeas review will proceed. In practical effect, that may
    not make much difference in noncapital cases (except for
    the squandering of state taxpayers’ money): The defendant
    will stay in prison, continuing to serve his sentence, while
    federal habeas review grinds on. But in capital cases, it will
    effectively reduce the sentence, giving the defendant as
    many more years to live, beyond the lives of the innocent
    victims whose life he snuffed out, as the process of federal
    habeas may consume. I guarantee that an assertion of
    ineffective assistance of trial counsel will be made in all
    capital cases from this date on, causing (because of today’s
    holding) execution of the sentence to be deferred until
    either that claim, or the claim that appointed counsel was
    ineffective in failing to make that claim, has worked its
    way through the federal system.
    B
    The Court would have us believe that today’s holding
    is no more than a “limited qualification” to Coleman v.
    Thompson, 
    501 U. S. 722
     (1991). Ante, at 12. It is much
    more than that: a repudiation of the longstanding princi-
    ple governing procedural default, which Coleman and
    other cases consistently applied. Coleman itself involved a
    habeas petitioner’s contention that his attorney’s failure to
    file a timely notice of appeal in his state habeas proceed-
    ing, which resulted in procedural default of the claims
    raised in that proceeding, was cause to excuse that default
    in federal habeas. 
    501 U. S., at 752
    . The petitioner in
    that case contended that whether a violation of his consti-
    tutional right to effective counsel had occurred was of no
    consequence, so long as the attorney’s conduct fell short of
    the effectiveness standard set forth in Strickland. See 501
    ——————
    Clerk of Court’s case file).
    Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)            7
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    U. S., at 753. Whereas Coleman flatly repudiated that
    claim as being inconsistent with our precedent, see ibid.,
    today’s majority wholeheartedly embraces it, ante, at 11.
    Rejection of the argument in Coleman was compelled by
    our jurisprudence pertaining to cause for excusing proce-
    dural default, and in particular Murray v. Carrier, 
    477 U. S. 478
     (1986). See Coleman, 
    supra,
     at 752–753. Car-
    rier involved the failure of a defendant’s attorney to raise a
    claim on direct appeal. 
    477 U. S., at 482
    . This failure did
    not constitute cause, we explained, because it was not an
    “objective factor external to the defense.” 
    Id., at 488
     (em-
    phasis added). This external-factor requirement reflects
    the judgment that States should not be forced to undergo
    federal habeas review of a defaulted claim unless a factor
    not attributable to the prisoner obstructed his compliance
    with state procedures. See 
    id.,
     at 487–488.
    Although this externality requirement has been the
    North Star of our excuse-for-cause jurisprudence, today’s
    opinion does not whisper its name—no doubt because it is
    impossible to say that Martinez’s procedural default was
    caused by a factor external to his defense. Coleman and
    Carrier set forth in clear terms when it is that attorney
    error constitutes an external factor: Attorney error by it-
    self does not, because when an attorney acts (or fails to
    act) in furtherance of the litigation, he is acting as the
    petitioner’s agent. Coleman, supra, at 753; Carrier, 
    supra, at 492
    . Any other rule would be inconsistent with our
    system of representative litigation, under which “each
    party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent.”
    Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 
    498 U. S. 89
    , 92
    (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). But when
    attorney error amounts to constitutionally ineffective
    assistance of counsel, that error is imputed to the State
    (for the State has failed to comply with the constitutional
    requirement to provide effective counsel), rendering the
    error external to the petitioner. Coleman, supra, at 754;
    8                    MARTINEZ v. RYAN
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    Carrier, 
    supra, at 488
    . Accordingly, as Martinez himself
    appears to recognize, see Brief for Petitioner 22, our cases
    require that absent a determination that Arizona violated
    the Constitution by failing to provide effective counsel,
    attorney error cannot provide cause to excuse his proce-
    dural default. Rather than apply that rule here, the Court
    adopts the very approach Coleman explicitly addressed
    and rejected.
    The Court essentially disclaims any need to give full
    consideration to the principle of stare decisis because
    Coleman did not involve an initial-review collateral pro-
    ceeding for a claim of ineffective assistance of trial coun-
    sel. See ante, at 12. That is rather like saying that Mar-
    bury v. Madison, 
    1 Cranch 137
     (1803), does not establish
    our authority to review the constitutionality of a new
    federal statute because it involved a different enactment.
    Just as the reasoning of Marbury was categorical, so was
    the reasoning of Coleman and Carrier: Attorney error is
    not an external factor constituting cause for excusing
    default unless the State has a constitutional obligation to
    provide effective counsel. Had the majority seriously
    considered the relevant stare decisis factors, see, e.g.,
    Montejo v. Louisiana, 
    556 U. S. 778
    , 792–793 (2009), it
    would have had difficulty justifying today’s decision. Nor
    can it escape the demands of stare decisis by saying that
    our rules regarding the excuse of procedural default reflect
    an “equitable judgment” that is “elaborated in the exercise
    of the Court’s discretion.” Ante, at 10. Equity is not law-
    lessness, and discretion is not license to cast aside estab-
    lished jurisprudence reaffirmed this very Term. See Ma-
    ples v. Thomas, 565 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 12)
    (“Negligence on the part of a prisoner’s postconviction
    attorney does not qualify as ‘cause’ ” (quoting Coleman,
    
    supra, at 753
    )). “ ‘[C]ourts of equity must be governed by
    rules and precedents no less than courts of law.’ ” Lonchar
    v. Thomas, 
    517 U. S. 314
    , 323 (1996) (quoting Missouri
    Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)                    9
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    v. Jenkins, 
    515 U. S. 70
    , 127 (1995) (THOMAS, J.,
    concurring)).
    Noticeably absent from the Court’s equitable analysis,
    moreover, is any consideration of the very reason for a
    procedural-default rule: the comity and respect that fed-
    eral courts must accord state-court judgments.             See
    Edwards v. Carpenter, 
    529 U. S. 446
    , 451 (2000). The
    procedural-default doctrine reflects the understanding that
    federal review of defaulted claims may “circumvent the
    jurisdictional limits of direct review and ‘undermine the
    State’s interest in enforcing its laws.’ ” Lee v. Kemna, 
    534 U. S. 362
    , 388 (2002) (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (quoting
    Coleman, 
    supra, at 731
    ). Unlike today’s decision, Carrier
    and Coleman took account of the significant costs federal
    habeas review imposes on States, including the “reduction
    in the finality of litigation and the frustration of ‘both the
    States’ sovereign power to punish offenders and their
    good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.’ ” Car-
    rier, 
    supra, at 487
     (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 
    456 U. S. 107
    ,
    128 (1982)). Criminal conviction ought to be final before
    society has forgotten the crime that justifies it. When a
    case arrives at federal habeas, the state conviction and
    sentence at issue (never mind the underlying crime) are
    already a dim memory, on average more than 6 years old
    (7 years for capital cases).5 I would adhere to the prece-
    dents that prevent a bad situation from becoming worse.
    II
    We granted certiorari on, and the parties addressed
    their arguments to, the following question:
    “Whether a defendant in a state criminal case who is
    ——————
    5 See King, Cheesman, & Ostrom, Final Technical Report, at 21–22
    (reporting the average interval between state judgment and federal
    habeas filing for a sample of federal habeas cases filed in the early-to-
    mid 2000’s).
    10                    MARTINEZ v. RYAN
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    prohibited by state law from raising on direct appeal
    any claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but
    who has a state-law right to raise such a claim in a
    first post-conviction proceeding, has a federal consti-
    tutional right to effective assistance of first post-
    conviction counsel specifically with respect to his
    ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim.” Pet. for
    Cert. i.
    While the Court’s decision not to answer the question did
    not avoid the costs a constitutional holding would have
    imposed on States, it did avoid the Court’s need to con-
    front the established rule that there is no right to counsel
    in collateral proceedings. To avoid his procedural default,
    Martinez advocates in favor of an exception to this rule
    where the prisoner seeks the right to counsel in an initial-
    review collateral proceeding—an argument we have previ-
    ously declined to address. See Coleman, 
    501 U. S., at 755
    .
    The argument is quite clearly foreclosed by our prece-
    dent. In Pennsylvania v. Finley, 
    481 U. S. 551
     (1987), and
    Murray v. Giarratano, 
    492 U. S. 1
     (1989), we stated un-
    equivocally that prisoners do not “have a constitutional
    right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon
    their convictions.” Finley, 
    supra, at 555
    . See also Giar-
    ratano, 
    492 U. S., at 10
     (plurality opinion) (“[T]he rule
    of Pennsylvania v. Finley should apply no differently
    in capital cases than in noncapital cases”); 
    id., at 14
    (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment) (indicating that
    the Constitution does not categorically require States to
    provide counsel to death-row inmates seeking state habeas
    review). Though Finley may have involved only claims
    that could have been raised on direct review, see 
    481 U. S., at 553
    ; Giarratano, 
    supra, at 24
     (Stevens, J., dissenting),
    the Court was no doubt aware that States often limit “the
    collateral review process [to] issues that have not previ-
    ously been litigated or argued on the direct appeal.” Brief
    Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)           11
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    for Respondent in Finley, O. T. 1986, No. 85–2099, p. 11,
    n. 5. And Giarratano, which involved a class action filed
    under 
    42 U. S. C. §1983
    , addressed the general assertion
    that the Constitution requires the appointment of counsel
    for collateral attacks on capital convictions. See 
    492 U. S., at
    3–4 (plurality opinion). The Court rejected that asser-
    tion without qualification. The dissenting opinion, more-
    over, made the precise argument Martinez now asserts:
    under state law “some claims [including ineffective assis-
    tance of trial counsel] ordinarily heard on direct review
    will be relegated to postconviction proceedings.” 
    Id., at 24
    (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Brief for Respondents in
    Giarratano, O. T. 1988, No. 88–411, p. 29, n. 8 (“In [Vir-
    ginia capital habeas] proceedings, Death Row inmates
    seek to assert claims that have not been, and could not
    have been addressed on direct appeal . . . ”). Thus, in
    announcing a categorical rule in Finley, see Giarratano,
    
    supra, at 12
     (plurality opinion), and then reaffirming it in
    Giarratano, the Court knew full well that a collateral
    proceeding may present the first opportunity for a prison-
    er to raise a constitutional claim. I would follow that rule
    in this case and reject Martinez’s argument that there is a
    constitutional right to counsel in initial-review collateral
    proceedings.
    *     *     *
    Far from avoiding the consequences a constitutional
    holding would have imposed on the States, today’s holding
    as a practical matter requires States to appoint counsel in
    initial-review collateral proceedings—and, to boot, elimi-
    nates the pre-existing assurance of escaping federal-
    habeas review for claims that appointed counsel fails to
    present. Despite the Court’s protestations to the contrary,
    the decision is a radical alteration of our habeas jurispru-
    dence that will impose considerable economic costs on the
    States and further impair their ability to provide justice in
    12                   MARTINEZ v. RYAN
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    a timely fashion. The balance it strikes between the final-
    ity of criminal judgments and the need to provide for
    review of defaulted claims of ineffective assistance of trial
    counsel grossly underestimates both the frequency of such
    claims in federal habeas, and the incentives to argue
    (since it is a free pass to federal habeas) that appointed
    counsel was ineffective in failing to raise such claims. The
    balance might have been close (though it would disregard
    our established jurisprudence) if the Court merely held
    that uncounseled failure to raise ineffective assistance of
    trial counsel would not constitute default. But in adding
    to that the rule that counseled failure to raise it may also
    provide an excuse, the Court creates a monstrosity. For
    these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-1001

Citation Numbers: 182 L. Ed. 2d 272, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 566 U.S. 1, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 2317

Judges: Kennedy, Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Scalia, Thomas

Filed Date: 3/20/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/15/2024

Authorities (26)

McCleskey v. Zant , 111 S. Ct. 1454 ( 1991 )

Coleman v. Thompson , 111 S. Ct. 2546 ( 1991 )

Marbury v. Madison , 2 L. Ed. 60 ( 1803 )

Pennsylvania v. Finley , 107 S. Ct. 1990 ( 1987 )

Massaro v. United States , 123 S. Ct. 1690 ( 2003 )

Montejo v. Louisiana , 129 S. Ct. 2079 ( 2009 )

Fox Film Corp. v. Muller , 56 S. Ct. 183 ( 1935 )

United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co. , 26 S. Ct. 282 ( 1906 )

Murdock v. City of Memphis , 22 L. Ed. 429 ( 1875 )

Brady v. Maryland , 83 S. Ct. 1194 ( 1963 )

Murray v. Giarratano , 109 S. Ct. 2765 ( 1989 )

Murray v. Carrier , 106 S. Ct. 2639 ( 1986 )

Missouri v. Jenkins , 115 S. Ct. 2038 ( 1995 )

Lonchar v. Thomas , 116 S. Ct. 1293 ( 1996 )

State v. Spreitz , 202 Ariz. 1 ( 2002 )

Martinez v. Schriro , 623 F.3d 731 ( 2010 )

Hust v. State , 147 Idaho 682 ( 2009 )

Fay v. Noia , 83 S. Ct. 822 ( 1963 )

Edwards v. Carpenter , 120 S. Ct. 1587 ( 2000 )

Lee v. Kemna , 122 S. Ct. 877 ( 2002 )

View All Authorities »

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