Gaston v. Bellingrath Gardens & Home, Inc. ( 1999 )

United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 98-6637
Non-Argument Calendar.
Jan C. GASTON, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BELLINGRATH GARDENS & HOME, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
Feb. 12, 1999.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama. (No. 93-1039-
BH-C), W.B. Hand, Judge.
Before COX, DUBINA and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff Jan Gaston appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant
Bellingrath Gardens & Homes ("Bellingrath Gardens"), her former employer, on her claim that it
discriminated against her on the basis of her disability in violation of the American with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court's judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Jan Gaston began working for Bellingrath Gardens in 1983, initially in the garden area and
later in the gift shop as a cashier. She had several surgeries between 1988 and 1992 due to an
osteoarthritic condition but was always able to return to her cashier job afterwards. Up until
December 1992, the guidelines describing her gift shop cashier position did not require her to carry
a weight in excess of ten pounds or to engage in any bending, lifting, or stooping.
In December 1992, Bellingrath Gardens came under new management. On December 4,
1992, Ms. Marty Wyas, the new general manager of Bellingrath Gardens, called Gaston into her
office and showed her the new job guidelines for a gift shop cashier. Those new guidelines required
a gift shop cashier to be able to lift and carry a weight of up to fifty pounds and specified that
bending, lifting, and stooping were part of the job. Wyas told her that she must meet those
requirements in the guidelines or "else." Gaston then told Wyas that she (Wyas) knew Gaston could
not meet those requirements. Wyas, however, did not take any action against Gaston at that time.
On December 30, 1992, Gaston resigned her position, allegedly because she could not meet
the requirements in the new guidelines. Gaston does not point to any evidence indicating that she
informed Bellingrath Gardens of the reason for her resignation.
On December 28, 1993, Gaston filed a complaint alleging that Bellingrath Gardens had
discriminated against her by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation for her disability. The
suit was subsequently continued, however, to allow Gaston to pursue a claim for disability benefits
from the Social Security Administration. On June 5, 1996, an Administrative Law Judge found that
Gaston was disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and awarded her disability
benefits. Shortly thereafter, the district court lifted the continuance on Gaston's ADA suit and
Bellingrath Gardens moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted Bellingrath Gardens summary judgment on the grounds that
Gaston could not establish that she was a "qualified individual with a disability" under the ADA,
that is, an individual who can perform the essential functions of the job either with or without
reasonable accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111. The district court reasoned that Gaston's
representation to the Social Security Administration that she was "permanently disabled" and the
ALJ's finding, in awarding Gaston disability benefits, that "she could not engage in even sedentary
2
work," estopped her from maintaining in the present suit that she could perform her former job as
gift shop cashier either with or without a reasonable accommodation.
Gaston appealed and we vacated the judgment and remanded the case to allow the district
court to consider our decision in Talavera v. School Bd. of Palm Beach County, 129 F.3d 1214 (11th
Cir.1997), which had been decided subsequent to the district court's entry of judgment. In Talavera,
we held that an ADA plaintiff who the Social Security Administration has certified as "totally
disab[led]" is not judicially estopped from claiming she is able to do her job with reasonable
accommodation for purposes of establishing that she is a "qualified individual with a disability"
under the ADA. Id. at 1220. We also held, however, that an ADA plaintiff was "estopped from
denying the truth of any statements made in her disability application [to the Social Security
Administration]." Id.On remand, the district court again awarded Bellingrath Gardens summary judgment after
finding that its previous order granting summary judgment was consistent with Talavera. Gaston
then filed this appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
"We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal
standard employed by the district court.... Summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows no
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
When deciding whether summary judgment is appropriate, all evidence and reasonable factual
inferences drawn therefrom are reviewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party." Witter
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 138 F.3d 1366, 1369 (11th Cir.1998) (citations and quotations omitted).
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We find it unnecessary to address the issue of whether Gaston is estopped from claiming
that she could have performed her job with a reasonable accommodation, because we conclude that
her claim that Bellingrath Gardens discriminated against her by failing to provide a reasonable
accommodation fails for a more basic reason-she never requested a reasonable accommodation.1
We have previously held that a plaintiff cannot establish a claim under the Rehabilitation
Act alleging that the defendant discriminated against him by failing to provide a reasonable
accommodation unless he demanded such an accommodation. See Wood v. President and Trustees
of Spring Hill College in the City of Mobile, 978 F.2d 1214, 1222 (11th Cir.1992). "Congress
intended for courts to rely on Rehabilitation Act cases when interpreting similar language in the
ADA." Pritchard v. Southern Co. Services, 92 F.3d 1130, 1132 n. 2 (11th Cir.1996). Like the ADA,
the Rehabilitation Act imposes a duty on entities covered by the act to provide employees with a
disability a reasonable accommodation. See Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1525 (11th
Cir.1991). Accordingly, our holding in Wood that the duty to provide a reasonable accommodation
is not triggered unless a specific demand for an accommodation has been made, is binding precedent
for purposes of defining the scope of the duty to provide a reasonable accommodation under the
ADA.2
1
Bellingrath Gardens raised this argument both before the district court and on appeal, but
Gaston, for whatever reason, chose not to respond to it. While we recognize that the district
court did not address this argument, we may affirm the district court's judgment "on any ground
that finds support in the record." See Jaffke v. Dunham, 352 U.S. 280, 77 S.Ct. 307, 308, 1
L.Ed.2d 314 (1957).
2
Although Wood did not involve employment discrimination but instead involved alleged
discrimination in a college admissions decisions, this distinction is irrelevant. The
Rehabilitation Act's prohibition against discriminating against an individual with a disability
"unquestionabl[y]" applies to employment decisions. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465
U.S. 624, 104 S.Ct. 1248, 1253, 79 L.Ed.2d 568 (1984).
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Moreover, the EEOC's interpretive guidelines, issued pursuant to its authority to issue
regulations under the ADA, provide that "[i]n general ... it is the responsibility of the individual with
a disability to inform the employer that an accommodation is needed." 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 App. §
1630.9. "Once a qualified individual with a disability has requested provision of reasonable
accommodation, the employer must make a reasonable effort to determine the appropriate
accommodation." Id.
Thus, both our precedent and the EEOC's interpretive guidelines clearly provide that the
initial burden of requesting an accommodation is on the employee. Only after the employee has
satisfied this burden and the employer fails to provide that accommodation can the employee prevail
on a claim that her employer has discriminated against her.
In this case, Gaston did not request a reasonable accommodation after Ms. Wyas, her
manager, informed her about the new job requirements of a gift shop cashier. Instead, she simply
told Ms. Wyas that she knew Gaston could not meet those requirements and then resigned without
explanation approximately three weeks later. Gaston's failure to demand a reasonable
accommodation after being shown the new job requirements is fatal to her ability to prevail on her
claim that Bellingrath Gardens discriminated against her by failing to provide a reasonable
accommodation.3
III. CONCLUSION
AFFIRMED.
3
We note that a different case might be presented if Gaston could show that the new job
requirements were implemented for the purpose of discriminating against her because of her
disability. However, Gaston presented no such evidence.
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