PUBLISH
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
_______________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
02/14/2000
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 98-2123 CLERK
_______________________
D. C. Docket No. 97-42-CR-ORL-18
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ERIC ALLEN COOPER & ALBERT URBINA,
Defendants-Appellants.
_________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(February 14, 2000)
Before DUBINA, Circuit Judge, KRAVITCH, Senior Circuit Judge, and NESBITT*,
Senior District Judge.
*
Honorable Lenore C. Nesbitt, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Florida,
sitting by designation.
KRAVITCH, Senior Circuit Judge:
The principal issue in this appeal is whether criminal defendants had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room for which they neither paid nor
registered. We hold that under the circumstances as alleged by the defendants in
their motion to suppress, they did not and thus lacked standing to move to suppress
evidence allegedly obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.
I. BACKGROUND
On January 26, 1997, at approximately 3:45 a.m., Robert Garcia checked
into a Sheraton Hotel (the “Sheraton” or the “hotel”) in Orlando, Florida, and was
assigned to Room 616. He was accompanied by an unidentified male and a minor
female later identified as JoAnn Grande, neither of whom actually registered with
the hotel. At approximately 5:45 the same morning, Allen Gonzalez checked into
the hotel and was assigned to Room 624, the room directly opposite Garcia’s. He
was also accompanied by an unidentified male who did not register with the hotel.
Because both Garcia and Gonzalez proffered the occupancy fees in cash, hotel
policy mandated that each present some form of photographic identification; each
presented a Florida driver’s license, which the hotel desk clerk photocopied. Later
2
that same day, Garcia departed the hotel and allegedly turned the key to Room 616
over to Gonzalez.
Beginning on the evening of January 26, James O’Brien, a security officer
employed by a private firm under contract with the Sheraton, witnessed numerous
individuals, including Defendants Eric Allen Cooper and Albert Urbina
(collectively, “Defendants”), coming and going from the sixth floor of the hotel,
particularly during the early morning hours of January 27. On one occasion,
O’Brien assisted Defendant Urbina in entering Room 616, as the key Urbina had
was not working properly.
Shortly after midnight on January 28, O’Brien received a call from the
occupant of Room 618, the room adjoining Room 616. The guest complained that
a ringing alarm clock in Room 616 was disturbing his sleep. O’Brien proceeded to
Room 616 and knocked on the door several times, receiving no response. O’Brien,
using his pass key, entered Room 616 to switch off the alarm. While inside the
room, O’Brien noticed in plain view what he assumed to be marijuana. Following
what he described as hotel policy, O’Brien immediately exited the room and “pin
locked” it to prevent anyone other than himself from accessing the room. He then
notified the Orange County Sheriff’s Office.
3
After two sheriff’s deputies arrived, O’Brien escorted them to Room 616
and granted them entrance. The deputies inspected the room and, concluding
several varieties of narcotics were in fact on the premises, requested assistance
from a narcotics unit. The narcotics officers conducted on-site tests that confirmed
the presence of controlled substances.
O’Brien allowed the officers to lie in wait for the occupants of Room 616 in
the adjoining room, Room 618 (its occupant was relocated to another room).
Shortly thereafter, Defendants, accompanied by Grande, returned to the hotel. As
arranged, O’Brien notified the officers that some of the people he had observed
going in and out of Room 616 were en route to the sixth floor. Defendants and
Grande entered Room 616, at which time the awaiting officers also entered through
the adjoining room and arrested all three individuals. The officers searched each
suspect: from Defendant Urbina, they recovered the driver’s license of Allen
Gonzalez and approximately $6500 of United States currency in varying
denominations bundled together with rubber bands; from Defendant Cooper, they
recovered approximately $1500 of United States currency similarly bundled and a
plastic bag containing what were later identified as four broken tablets of
flunitrazepam, or Rohypnol, a controlled substance. A complete inventory of
Room 616 revealed: approximately 3100 grams of marijuana; approximately 225
4
grams of 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (“MDMA”), also known by its
street name “ecstasy”; approximately 58 grams of Rohypnol; approximately 8
grams of lysergic acid diethylamide (“LSD”); a Colt .38 revolver; $1043 of United
States currency; two packages of plastic bags; a pipe used for smoking marijuana;
assorted narcotics paraphernalia; and an address book. The street value of the
narcotics seized exceeded $33,000.
Defendants were indicted on five narcotics-related counts: one count of
conspiracy to possess and distribute narcotics, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 846
(Count I); and one count of possession with intent to distribute, in violation of
21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
21 U.S.C. § 2, for each of the four controlled substances
found on the premises (Counts II - V). At trial, Defendants moved to suppress all
evidence found in the hotel room, asserting the police searched the hotel room and
seized the evidence without a warrant and absent exigent circumstances or consent,
all in violation of their Fourth Amendment1 rights. The district court denied the
motion, holding Defendants had not alleged sufficient facts to establish they had a
“reasonable expectation of privacy” in the hotel room and therefore did not have
standing to challenge the search and seizure. Defendants requested an evidentiary
1
“The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
5
hearing on the standing issue, but the district court declined to hold one. Cooper
and Urbina each were convicted on all five counts of the indictment and sentenced
to prison terms of ninety-seven and fifty-one months, respectively.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Search of the Motel Room
1. The Motion to Suppress
The Supreme Court long has recognized that the Fourth Amendment’s
guarantee of freedom from warrantless searches and seizures is not premised on
arcane concepts of property and possessory interests; instead, the Fourth
Amendment protects an individual in those places where she can demonstrate a
reasonable expectation of privacy against government intrusion. See Katz v.
United States,
389 U.S. 347, 353,
88 S. Ct. 507, 512 (1967). Such a place can
include a hotel room. See Stoner v. California,
376 U.S. 483, 490,
84 S. Ct. 889,
893 (1964). Fourth Amendment rights, however, are personal, and only
individuals who actually enjoy the reasonable expectation of privacy have standing
to challenge the validity of a government search. See Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S.
128, 133-34, 143,
99 S. Ct. 421, 425, 430 (1978). Our initial inquiry, therefore,
focuses on whether Defendants established in their motion to suppress that they
6
possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in Room 616. See
id. at 131 n.1, 99
S. Ct. at 424 n.1; United States v. Sneed,
732 F.2d 886, 888 (11th Cir. 1984) (per
curiam). We review this mixed question of law and fact de novo. See United
States v. Cooper,
133 F.3d 1394, 1398 (11th Cir. 1998).
To determine whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy
in a hotel room, courts have looked to such indicia as whether the individual paid
and/or registered for the room or whether the individual’s personal belongings
were found inside the room. See United States v. Conway,
73 F.3d 975, 979 (10th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Carter,
854 F.2d 1102, 1105 (8th Cir. 1988). Here,
Defendants’ motion to suppress did not allege such details; instead, Defendants
contend their motion’s numerous references to the hotel room as “theirs”
established their privacy interests. We disagree. “A motion to suppress must in
every critical respect be sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural
to enable the court to conclude that a substantial claim is presented. . . . A court
need not act upon general or conclusory assertions . . . .” United States v.
Richardson,
764 F.2d 1514, 1527 (11th Cir. 1985) (internal citations omitted).
Defendants’ offhanded references fall far short of meeting this standard, especially
considering that Defendants’ claim to standing is founded only on their own
ultimate conclusion that the hotel room was “theirs,” rather than on facts
7
demonstrating that conclusion to be true. Even after the Government raised the
issue of standing in its opposition to Defendants’ motion to suppress, Defendants
failed to amend their motion to provide the specific facts essential to demonstrating
a reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room. See Sneed,
732 F.2d at 888
(acknowledging that Defendant Sneed failed to amend his motion once his
standing was questioned). Moreover, the undisputed trial testimony of O’Brien,
the hotel security officer, revealed that Robert Garcia was the individual who
actually paid and registered for Room 616, which he later transferred to Allen
Gonzalez; this evidence undermines any credible argument that Defendants were
the individuals who paid or registered for the room.2
In Minnesota v. Olson,
495 U.S. 91, 96-97,
110 S. Ct. 1684, 1688 (1990),
the Supreme Court held that overnight guests in the homes of third-persons can
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those premises. On appeal, Defendants
argue they were the overnight guests of Gonzalez, thus entitling them to a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel room. Whether the privacy interest
recognized in Olson extends to the overnight guests of hotel registrants, especially
2
In their appellate briefs and at oral argument, Defendants suggest “Gonzalez” was actually an
alias for either Cooper or Urbina, one of whom used a fraudulent driver’s license to check into the
hotel. Defendants, however, alleged this fact neither in their motion to suppress nor at trial, and they
did nothing to refute O’Brien’s testimony that Gonzalez was a distinct individual whom O’Brien
witnessed check in. Because Defendants did not develop this “suggestion” in their motion to
suppress, they are precluded from doing so for the first time on appeal.
8
those guests not disclosed to the hotel, is an open question in this circuit. Because
Defendants did not allege in their motion to suppress that they were Gonzalez’s
guests, however, we have no occasion to decide the issue.3 Again, Defendants
advanced no concrete foundation for standing in their motion to suppress. To now
allow Defendants to supplement their motion to suppress with new factual
allegations on appeal would undermine the requirement enunciated in Richardson
that motions to suppress be “definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural” when
considered by the district court.
We conclude Defendants’ motion to suppress was deficient of any facts that
might have demonstrated that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
Room 616. The district court correctly denied Defendants’ motion for lack of
standing.
2. The Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing
3
We note that the Supreme Court has qualified the holding of Olson to some extent. In
Minnesota v. Carter, __ U.S. __,
119 S. Ct. 469, 474 (1998), the Court held that in order to establish
a reasonable expectation of privacy in a third-party’s home, an individual must demonstrate she is
a guest on the premises for a personal occasion, rather than for strictly a commercial purpose.
Because the evidence in this case suggests Defendants were using the hotel room predominantly to
engage in narcotics trafficking, Defendants likely would lack standing even if they had been the
overnight guests of Gonzalez.
9
Defendants also appeal the district court’s refusal to hold an evidentiary
hearing on the issue of standing, arguing that had the district court granted them a
hearing, they would have demonstrated a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
hotel room. We review the district court’s action for abuse of discretion. See
Richardson,
764 F.2d at 1527.
As this court held in Sneed:
[W]here a defendant in a motion to suppress fails to allege
facts that if proved would require the grant of relief, the law
does not require that the district court hold a hearing
independent of the trial to receive evidence on any issue
necessary to the determination of the motion.
732 F.2d at 888. Based on our holding that Defendants’ motion to suppress was
wholly lacking in sufficient factual allegations to establish standing, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing.
Defendants are not entitled to an evidentiary hearing based on a “promise” to prove
at the hearing that which they did not specifically allege in their motion to
suppress.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence Against Urbina
Urbina separately appeals his convictions on the ground that the evidence
adduced at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements
10
of the crimes charged.4 We review the evidence supporting a guilty verdict to
determine whether “a reasonable jury, choosing among reasonable constructions of
the evidence, could have found that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” United States v. Richardson,
764 F.2d 1514, 1524 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing
United States v. Bell,
678 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc),5 aff’d on
other grounds,
462 U.S. 356,
103 S. Ct. 2398 (1983)). All factual and credibility
inferences are drawn in favor of the Government. See Bell,
678 F.2d at 549.
Urbina was convicted of four counts of possession of narcotics with intent to
distribute and one count of conspiracy to possess and distribute narcotics. Urbina
argues on appeal that the Government neither established his possession of the
narcotics found in Room 616, nor his involvement in the criminal conspiracy. We
find his arguments to be without merit, as the record reveals ample evidence on
which a reasonable jury could have predicated its guilty verdicts.
Convictions for the possession of narcotics can be premised on either actual
or constructive possession, see United States v. Ramos,
666 F.2d 469, 475 (11th
4
In his appellate brief, Cooper adopts those issues raised by Urbina on appeal insofar as they
affect Cooper. “[S]ufficiency arguments[, however,] are too individualized to be generally adopted.”
United States v. Davis,
61 F.3d 291, 296 n.2 (5th Cir. 1995). Cooper therefore has not properly
raised the issue on appeal, and we decline to consider it.
5
Decisions by Unit B of the former Fifth Circuit issued after September 30, 1981, are binding
on this court. See Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc.,
667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982).
11
Cir. 1982), and to prove constructive possession, the Government needed only to
demonstrate that Urbina “knew the identity of the substance[s] and exercised
dominion and control over [them],” Richardson,
764 F.2d at 1525, which the jury
was free to infer from circumstantial evidence. To sustain the conspiracy count,
“the [G]overnment [did not need to] prove that [Urbina] had knowledge of all
details or phases of a conspiracy[, but only] that [Urbina] knew the essential nature
of the conspiracy.” United States v. Payne,
750 F.2d 844, 859 (11th Cir. 1985).
The trial evidence adequately supports the jury’s ultimate conclusions that Urbina
at a minimum constructively possessed the narcotics in Room 6166 and was
engaged in the ongoing criminal conspiracy. In addition to observing Urbina
frequenting the sixth floor of the hotel at unusual hours of the morning, O’Brien
testified that on one occasion, he even assisted Urbina in entering Room 616
because Urbina’s key was not working properly, indicating Urbina had authorized
access to Room 616 prior to his arrest there.7 Urbina’s recurrent and somewhat
6
Further buttressing the sufficiency of the evidence of Urbina’s guilt on the four possession
counts is the fact that those counts also charged Urbina with “aiding and abetting” in the possession
of the narcotics. To prove Urbina was an “aider and abetter,” the Government needed only to
demonstrate Urbina “willfully associated himself with the enterprise to possess the [narcotics] and
contributed to its success.” Richardson,
764 F.2d at 1525; see also United States v. Hewitt,
663 F.2d
1381, 1385 (11th Cir. 1981). The evidence discussed above also reasonably supports such a finding
by the jury.
7
We recognize Urbina’s possession of the key to Room 616 might appear in tension with our
earlier holding that Urbina had no expectation of privacy in the hotel room. Aside from Urbina’s
failure to mention this fact in his motion to suppress, however, other courts have held that possession
12
erratic association with the room where the narcotics were discovered, coupled
with the large sum of currency found on his person at the time of his arrest, provide
a sufficient foundation for the jury’s guilty verdicts on all five counts of the
indictment.
C. Application of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Each defendant individually appeals his sentence, challenging the district
court’s application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”).
We consider each appeal in turn, reviewing the district court’s factual findings for
clear error and it application of the Guidelines to those facts de novo. See United
States v. Trujillo,
146 F.3d 838, 847 (11th Cir. 1998).
1. Cooper’s Sentencing Appeal
Pursuant to section 2D1.1(b)(1) of the Guidelines, Cooper was assessed a
two-level enhancement in his base offense level for the possession of a firearm
during a narcotics-related offense. Cooper objected to the enhancement on the
grounds that the Government did not demonstrate at trial that the revolver found in
of a key to a hotel room, without more, does not establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
room. See, e.g., United States v. Conway,
73 F.3d 975, 980 (10th Cir. 1995).
13
the hotel room belonged to him or, in the alternative, that the revolver was actually
connected to the underlying offense. Cooper’s first argument fails because, even if
the firearm actually belonged to Urbina rather than Cooper, the adjustment was
nonetheless proper because the two were co-conspirators with equal dominion over
the room where the gun was found. See United States v. Matthews,
168 F.3d 1234,
1248 (11th Cir. 1999).8 Cooper’s alternate argument likewise fails because the
Guidelines state “[the enhancement] should be applied if the weapon was present,
unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.”
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1 cmt. 3 (1997) (emphasis added). The
revolver was found in the hotel room directly under packaged bricks of marijuana,
suggesting an active connection with the narcotics enterprise that Cooper does not
credibly rebut. The district court therefore correctly assessed the two-level
enhancement against Cooper.
8
As Matthews explains:
A defendant’s sentence may also be enhanced for possession [of a
firearm] by a co-conspirator if (1) the actual possessor is charged as
a co-conspirator; (2) the co-conspirator possessed the firearm in
furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) the defendant who receives the
enhancement [(in this case, Cooper)] was involved in the conspiracy
at the time of the possession.
168 F.3d at 1248.
14
2. Urbina’s Sentencing Appeal
Pursuant to section 4A1.1(c) of the Guidelines, Urbina was assessed one
criminal history point for a two-count conviction in 1996 for driving with a
suspended license and possessing marijuana, both misdemeanors. Urbina,
unrepresented by counsel, pleaded guilty to both counts and served one day in jail.
Urbina was also assessed three other criminal history points, which, without the
additional point for the 1996 conviction, would have placed him in criminal history
category II, rather than in category III. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch.
5, pt. A (1997) (Sentencing Table). Urbina objected to the assessment of this
additional point for the 1996 conviction, arguing the Government had not alleged
in his pre-sentence investigative report that Urbina had waived his right to counsel
in pleading guilty to the 1996 changes, thus rendering this conviction
“presumptively invalid” and unable to be considered in a sentencing proceeding.
Cf. Burgett v. Texas,
389 U.S. 109, 115,
88 S. Ct. 258, 262 (1967) (“To permit a
conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright to be used against a
person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense is to erode
the principle of that case.”) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
Generally, this court does not allow a defendant to collaterally attack the
constitutionality of a conviction for the first time in a sentencing proceeding. See
15
United States v. Jackson,
57 F.3d 1012, 1018 (11th Cir. 1995); see also U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2 cmt. 6 (1997) (“[T]his guideline and
commentary do not confer upon the defendant any right to attack collaterally a
prior conviction or sentence beyond any such rights otherwise recognized in law . .
. .”). “[W]hen a defendant, facing sentencing, [however,] sufficiently asserts facts
that show that an earlier conviction is ‘presumptively void,’ the Constitution
requires the sentencing court to review this earlier conviction before taking it into
account.” United States v. Roman,
989 F.2d 1117, 1120 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc)
(per curiam). This court has suggested that “presumptively void” convictions “are
small in number and are perhaps limited to uncounseled convictions.”
Id.
Although Urbina’s 1996 conviction was indeed uncounseled, the burden was on
Urbina “to lay a factual foundation for collateral review on the grounds that the
state conviction was ‘presumptively void.’”
Id. As the district court remarked,
Urbina did not make this threshold showing, thereby precluding collateral review
of the 1996 conviction. Consequently, the district court did not err in assessing
Urbina the additional criminal history point and placing him in criminal history
category III.
III. CONCLUSION
16
We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motion to suppress,
AFFIRM Defendants’ convictions on all counts of the indictment, and AFFIRM
Defendants’ individual sentences.
17
