UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles BIGHEAD, Defendant-Appellant , 128 F.3d 1329 ( 1997 )

PER CURIAM.

Charles Bighead appeals his conviction of one count of sexual abuse of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2243, 1153. We have jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.¹

I

At trial, Bighead’s daughter, Roxanne Bighead Eison, testified that Bighead began fondling her in or about 1982 after she began living with her parents on an Indian reservation. She was seven years old at the time. Roxanne also testified that in or about 1987, when she was approximately eleven years old, Bighead forced her to have sexual intercourse with him and paid her money after the act. She testified that over the course of the next several years, Bighead continued to have sexual intercourse with her and would often pay her money following these acts. In 1993, when she was seventeen, she rejected his overtures.

That same year, shortly before her eighteenth birthday, she confided in a tribal police officer about what had transpired with Bighead. This was her first disclosure to an adult about the instances of sexual abuse. She explained that she delayed reporting what happened because she was scared of Bighead, and because she felt ashamed, and like a prostitute. Although this was her first disclosure to an adult, Roxanne previously had confided in two of her childhood friends: once when she was in sixth grade, and once when she was sixteen years old.

Defense counsel’s cross-examination of Roxanne focused primarily on her delayed reporting, as well as on some inconsistencies in her testimony. In rebuttal, the government called Tasha Boychuk, director of forensic services at the Children’s Advocacy Center, as an expert witness. Boychuk testified about general characteristics of child sexual abuse victims, specifically the timing of their reporting and their recollection of details.

II

Bighead argues that the district court erred in admitting Boychuk’s expert testimony about certain characteristics of child sexual abuse victims, because it lacked foundation under Fed.R.Evid. 702 and under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). He faults Boychuk’s opinion as it went beyond her own observations, cf. United States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848 (9th Cir.1990), but lacked the bases required by Fed. R.Crim.P. 16; and he contends that the district court should have determined whether her theories could be tested, were subjected to peer review and publication, had the potential for error, and were generally accepted in the field.

Boychuk was called as a rebuttal witness after the victim’s ability to recall and to recount the incidents of sexual abuse vigorously had been challenged on cross-examination. Boychuk did not testify about the facts of this case, or about the particular victim, whom she had never examined. Rather, she testified about “delayed disclosure” and “script memory,” which are typical characteristics she has observed among the more than 1300 persons she has interviewed who say they are victims of child abuse. As such, her testimony falls within Hadley. It holds that where an expert testifies to “general behavioral characteristics” based upon the expert’s “professional experience” and does not rely on “novel scientific technique” or employ “any special techniques or models,” Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir. 1923) is not implicated. 918 F.2d at 853. Daubert has supplanted the Frye test that had previously been followed uniformly. However, we have already indicated that Daubert’& tests for the admissibility of expert scientific testimony do not require exclusion of expert testimony that involves specialized knowledge rather than scientific theory. United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225 (9th Cir.1997). Boychuk’s testimony consisted of her observations of typical characteristics drawn from many years experience interviewing many, many persons, interviewed because they were purported victims of child abuse. That it was not an abuse of discretion to permit it follows from Cordoba, where we held that expert testimony on narcotics traffickers’ modus operand! was not “scientific testimony” subject to Daubert, because it involved “specialized knowledge, not scientific knowledge” and required no inference or assertion derived from a scientific method. Id. at 230. See also McKendall v. Crown Control Corp., 122 F.3d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1997). We do not agree with Bighead that Hadley doesn’t apply simply because the expert referred in passing to “studies, literature and specific syndromes.” Her opinion was based on her own observations. In any event, she could have been, but was not, cross-examined about the nature and extent of her reliance on any other source.

Bighead also argues that Boychuk’s testimony did not assist the trier of fact, and was more prejudicial than probative, because it infringed on the jury’s province to determine credibility. We see no improper buttressing, as Boychuk testified only about “a class of victims generally,” and not the particular testimony of the child victim in this case. Hadley, 918 F.2d at 852; see also United States v. Antone, 981 F.2d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir.1992). By the same token, Boychuk’s testimony had significant probative value in that it rehabilitated (without vouching for) the victim’s credibility after she was cross-examined about the reasons she delayed reporting and about the inconsistencies in her testimony. The district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the expert to testify, even though two other witnesses testified about actual disclosures as early as 1984 and 1990, since Boychuk’s testimony went to disclosure for the purpose of assistance. Regardless, the jury was free to determine whether the victim delayed disclosure or simply fabricated the incidents.

AFFIRMED.

1 . We resolve two additional issues in a memorandum disposition filed contemporaneously with this opinion.