In re E.A. , 2022 Ohio 2625 ( 2022 )

[Cite as In re E.A., 2022-Ohio-2625.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
CRAWFORD COUNTY
IN RE:
E.A., CASE NO. 3-21-21
DEPENDENT CHILD.
OPINION
[SCOTT A. - APPELLANT]
Appeal from Crawford County Common Pleas Court
Juvenile Division
Trial Court No. C2215051
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: August 1, 2022
APPEARANCES:
Adam Charles Stone for Appellant, Scott A.
Michael J. Wiener for Appellee, Crawford Co. JFS
Kristin E. Brown for Appellee, Venessa A.
Case No. 3-21-21
MILLER, J.
{¶1} Contemnor-appellant, Scott A., appeals the November 23, 2021
judgment of the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division,
sentencing him for contempt of court. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. Facts & Procedural History
{¶2} On April 19, 2021, a complaint was filed in the trial court alleging that
Scott’s then seven-year-old son, E.A., was a dependent child. Both Scott and E.A.’s
mother, Venessa A., were named in the complaint. Scott and Venessa entered
admissions to the allegations of the complaint, and on May 18, 2021, E.A. was
adjudicated a dependent child. On May 25, 2021, the trial court awarded temporary
custody of E.A. to E.A.’s maternal grandmother. On June 9, 2021, the trial court
adopted a case plan under which Scott was required, among other things, to “not use
any illicit substances or non-prescribed medications,” “submit to random
drug/alcohol screens as requested,” and “sign any needed releases of information”
for certain service providers.
{¶3} On August 26, 2021, the Crawford County Department of Job and
Family Services (“CCJFS”), through the Crawford County Prosecuting Attorney’s
Office, filed a motion for Scott to show cause why he should not be held in contempt
of court for failing to comply with the terms of his case plan. Specifically, the
motion alleged that Scott had “tested positive for illicit substances on June 22, 2021,
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and June 29, 2021,” “refused to cooperate with [CCJFS] and its caseworkers,” and
“repeatedly refused to comply with requests for further drug/alcohol screens.” The
trial court set a hearing on CCJFS’s motion for September 22, 2021. On September
5, 2021, Scott was personally served with the summons to appear on the contempt
motion and notified of the September 22, 2021 hearing.
{¶4} On September 10, 2021, Scott filed a motion to continue the September
22, 2021 contempt hearing. In his motion, Scott indicated that he was “moving out
of state and w[ould] not be available.” (Underlining sic.) (Doc. No. 58). On
September 16, 2021, the trial court denied Scott’s motion, finding that Scott’s “plans
to move are optional to him and thus do not justify continuing the matter at a later
date and inconveniencing all the other parties.” (Doc. No. 61).
{¶5} Scott failed to appear at the September 22, 2021 hearing. However,
shortly before the hearing was set to start, the trial court received a facsimile
transmission from Scott informing the trial court that he would not be in attendance.
(Doc. No. 66). Scott assured the trial court that a “medical Dr. clear[ed] [his]
excusal.” Attached to Scott’s message was documentation purporting to show that
Scott had been admitted to the hospital for back pain and that he had been directed
to follow-up with an orthopedic surgeon in Michigan. Although the trial court
acknowledged its receipt of Scott’s message, it nevertheless proceeded to conduct
the hearing, noting that Scott’s message “did not contain a request for a continuance
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or a clear indication as to what the attached documentation purported to relay to the
Court nor the origin of same.” (Doc. No. 68). The trial court indicated that it could
not interpret Scott’s message “as a continuance request [or a] justification for not
appearing.” (Doc. No. 68).
{¶6} After receiving evidence, the trial court found Scott in contempt. In its
September 24, 2021 judgment entry, the trial court found that Scott “was willfully
in contempt for failing to comply with the terms and conditions of the Case Plan
previously filed herein, for testing positive for illicit substances, for refusing to sign
all requested releases of information, and for refusing to fully cooperate with
CCJFS.” (Emphasis sic.) (Doc. No. 68). Because Scott was not present at the
hearing, the trial court continued sentencing until he could be brought before the
court. The trial court found Scott’s failure to appear at the hearing to be an
additional contemptuous action, stating in its entry, “However the defendant is also
found in contempt for failing to appear on summons and thus a warrant for the arrest
of Scott [A.] shall be issued.” (Doc. No. 68). The trial court ordered that, upon
arrest, Scott be held without bond pending further hearing. (Doc. Nos. 68, 69).
{¶7} On November 3, 2021, Scott was located and taken into custody. A
hearing before the trial court was scheduled for the following Monday, November
8, 2021. As reflected in the trial court’s November 23, 2021 judgment entry, the
trial court entered the following orders at the November 8, 2021 hearing:
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It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that:
***
3) The defendant, Scott A[.], is fined the sum of $250.00 and is
sentenced to thirty (30) days county jail;
4) That Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) of the fine and fifteen
(15) days county jail are suspended on the following conditions:
i. The defendant is Ordered to sign any required Releases of
Information for [CCJFS];
ii. The defendant is Ordered to NOT rescind any executed Releases
of Information;
iii. The defendant is Ordered to fully cooperate with [CCJFS] and
to comply with the case plan;
iv. The defendant[] is Ordered to complete a Psychological
Evaluation * * * and to cooperate with any recommended treatment
therein;
5) The Defendant, Scott A[.], is remanded to the custody of the
Crawford County Sheriff’s Office to serve fifteen (15) days of the
sentence, with credit for time already served herein. The imposition
of these fifteen (15) days shall be subject to review by the Court upon
receipt of the complete records from the various providers[.]
(Boldface and capitalization sic.) (Doc. No. 90). Following the hearing, Scott was
transported to the Crawford County Jail to serve the unsuspended portion of his jail
sentence.
{¶8} On November 12, 2021, Scott filed a motion requesting that he be
released from the Crawford County Jail. In the motion, Scott’s attorney represented
that Scott “executed HIPAA waivers at the [November 8, 2021] hearing” and that
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the necessary documentation was requested “from the providers the day of [Scott’s]
sentencing.” (Doc. No. 85). Scott’s attorney certified that “[a]s of 2:30 p.m. * * *,
November 12, 2021, * * * both providers have responded to that request for medical
information.” (Doc. No. 85). Accordingly, he asked that Scott be immediately
released from the Crawford County Jail and that the balance of his jail sentence be
suspended. (Doc. No. 85). However, later that day, the trial court denied Scott’s
motion. (Doc. No. 86). Although it is unclear from the record when Scott was
released from the Crawford County Jail, Scott asserts he served the entirety of the
unsuspended portion of his jail sentence. (Appellant’s Brief at 11). CCJFS does
not dispute this claim.
II. Assignment of Error
{¶9} On November 29, 2021, Scott timely filed a notice of appeal.1 He raises
the following assignment of error for our review:
The trial court violated the appellant’s Fifth and Sixth
[Amendment] Rights to the United States Constitution, made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, by
proceeding on a criminal contempt allegation and making a
finding that appellant was in contempt without appellant being
present for such proceedings.
1
Although not cited or sanctioned for contempt, Venessa filed an appellate brief in this matter, wherein she
endorsed Scott’s appellate brief but made no additional arguments.
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III. Discussion
{¶10} In his assignment of error, Scott argues that the trial court violated his
right to due process and his right to confront the witnesses against him. Scott
maintains the trial court finding him in contempt for failing to comply with the terms
of the case plan was a criminal contempt and the trial court therefore violated his
constitutional rights at the September 22, 2021 hearing by finding him in contempt
of court in absentia.
A. Civil Contempt vs. Criminal Contempt
{¶11} “The Supreme Court of Ohio has defined ‘contempt of court’ as the
disobedience of a court’s order.” State v. Orta, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-20-05, 2020-
Ohio-4514, ¶ 22, citing Denovchek v. Bd. of Trumbull Cty. Commrs., 36 Ohio St.3d
14, 15 (1988). Contempt is “‘conduct which brings the administration of justice
into disrespect, or which tends to embarrass, impede or obstruct a court in the
performance of its functions.’” Denovchek at 15, quoting Windham Bank v.
Tomaszczyk, 27 Ohio St.2d 55 (1971), paragraph one of the syllabus. “The court’s
power to punish contumacious conduct is both inherent and statutory.” Orta at ¶
22, citing Denovchek at 15 and R.C. 2705.01 and 2705.02.
{¶12} “‘Proceedings in contempt are sui generis in the law. They bear some
resemblance to suits in equity, to criminal proceedings and to ordinary civil actions;
but they are none of these.’” Wilson v. Jones, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-13-06, 2013-
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Ohio-4368, ¶ 25, quoting Cincinnati v. Cincinnati Dist. Council 51, 35 Ohio St.2d
197, 201-202 (1973). Despite their singularity, contempts are generally categorized
either as civil contempt or as criminal contempt. “Although the distinction between
civil and criminal contempt is often murky, it is important.” Liming v. Damos, 133
Ohio St.3d 509, 2012-Ohio-4783, ¶ 11. If the contempt is a civil contempt, the
standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence, and the alleged contemnor is
entitled only to the rights afforded a litigant in a civil action. Cleveland v. Bright,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108989, 2020-Ohio-5180, ¶ 24. An alleged civil contemnor
must receive notice of the charged contempt and have an opportunity to be heard,
but “the alleged contemnor can be tried and sanctioned in absentia.” Id. In contrast,
where the contempt is a criminal contempt, the alleged contemnor is “afforded many
of the same constitutional safeguards that a defendant in a criminal trial enjoys.”
Liming at ¶ 11. These include the right to notice of the charges, the right to defend
oneself and be heard, the right to counsel, and the right that there be proof beyond
a reasonable doubt to support a conviction. Internatl. Union, United Mine Workers
of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826, 114 S.Ct. 2552 (1994). Furthermore, an
alleged criminal contemnor “who has not waived his right to be present may not be
tried and sentenced in absentia.” Adams v. Epperly, 27 Ohio App.3d 51 (9th
Dist.1985), syllabus.
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{¶13} “Because all contempt involves some type of sanction or punishment,
the distinction between civil and criminal contempt is usually based on the purpose
to be served by the sanction.” Liming at ¶ 12. “[I]n determining whether a contempt
is civil or criminal, the pertinent test is ‘what does the court primarily seek to
accomplish by imposing sentence?’” State ex rel. Corn v. Russo, 90 Ohio St.3d 551,
554-555 (2001), quoting Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370, 86 S.Ct.
1531 (1966).
{¶14} In civil contempts, the sanctions are designed to be “remedial or
coercive and for the benefit of the complainant.” Brown v. Executive 200, Inc., 64
Ohio St.2d 250, 253 (1980). Accordingly, civil contempt is marked by conditional
fines or terms of incarceration. See id. “A sanction for civil contempt * * * must
allow the contemnor to purge himself of the contempt. Once the contemnor
complies with the court’s order, the purpose of the contempt sanction has been
achieved and the sanction is discontinued.” (Citations omitted.) In re Purola, 73
Ohio App.3d 306, 312 (3d Dist.1991). The civil contemnor “is said to carry the
keys of his prison in his own pocket since he will be freed if he agrees to do as
ordered.” (Internal citation omitted.) Brown at 253.
{¶15} Criminal contempt, on the other hand, is typically characterized by
unconditional fines or terms of incarceration. Liming, 133 Ohio St.3d 509, 2012-
Ohio-4783, at ¶ 12; but see State v. Kilbane, 61 Ohio St.2d 201, 206-207 (1980)
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(rejecting an “approach that labels any conditional contempt as civil” and allowing
a “conditional criminal contempt sanction”). A sanction for criminal contempt
“operates not as a remedy coercive in its nature but as punishment for the completed
act of disobedience, and to vindicate the authority of the law and the court.” Brown
at 254. Because criminal contempt serves a punitive purpose, “there is no
requirement that the person charged be permitted to purge himself or herself of the
contempt.” Cleveland v. Robinson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109273, 2020-Ohio-
1030, ¶ 12.
B. The trial court did not violate Scott’s constitutional rights by proceeding in
his absence to find him in contempt of court.
{¶16} It is undisputed that Scott had notice of the original contempt charge
and of the September 22, 2021 hearing. It is also undisputed that Scott did not attend
the September 22, 2021 hearing or waive his right to be present. Thus, whether the
trial court erred at the September 22, 2021 hearing by finding Scott in contempt in
absentia depends on whether the contempt was civil or criminal.
{¶17} To determine whether the contempt was civil or criminal, we must
ascertain what the trial court aimed to accomplish by sanctioning Scott. “In order
to determine the purpose of the contempt sanction, an appellate court must consider
the entire record.” Rich v. Rich, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2012-T-0089, 2013-Ohio-
2840, ¶ 14, citing Kilbane at 206. We note that our review is complicated because
Scott failed to file transcripts from the hearings held on September 22, 2021 and
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November 8, 2021. Nevertheless, it is possible to determine the nature of the
contempt in this case by examining the trial court’s journal entries. See id. (in the
absence of a transcript of the contempt hearing, the reviewing court relied on the
motion for contempt and the trial court’s journalized findings to characterize the
contempt as civil).
{¶18} We first look to the trial court’s September 24, 2021 judgment entry.
In this entry, the trial court recorded its findings that Scott was “willfully in
contempt” and that he was in contempt for the “willful noncompliance with [the]
court’s previous orders.” The trial court’s description of Scott’s noncompliance as
“willful” could be read as an indication that the trial court was treating the contempt
as criminal because, “[i]n cases of criminal, indirect contempt, it must be shown that
the alleged contemnor intended to defy the court.”2 Midland Steel Prods. Co. v.
U.A.W. Local 486, 61 Ohio St.3d 121 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
However, contempt may still be categorized as civil even when the trial court finds
that the contemnor “willfully” disobeyed the court’s previous orders. See Johnson
v. Johnson, 71 Ohio App.3d 713, 717-718 (11th Dist.1991). Thus, the trial court’s
2
“Courts distinguish not only between civil and criminal contempt, but also between indirect and direct
contempt.” Orta, 2020-Ohio-4514, at ¶ 21. “Indirect contempt occurs outside the presence of the court.”
Id. “Direct contempt occurs in the presence of the court and has been defined to include ‘conduct which
brings the administration of justice into disrespect, or which tends to embarrass, impede or obstruct a court
in the performance of its functions.’” Id., quoting Denovchek, 36 Ohio St.3d at 15.
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characterization of Scott’s noncompliance as “willful” sheds little light on what the
court sought to accomplish by sanctioning Scott.
{¶19} Likewise, the fact that the September 24, 2021 judgment entry
contained an order that a warrant be issued for Scott’s arrest is not conclusive of the
trial court’s purpose in sanctioning Scott for contempt. Scott argues that the trial
court’s issuance of an arrest warrant without bond is evidence of its intention to
punish him, rendering the contempt criminal. But “the power to issue arrest
warrants in contempt cases is a ‘necessary corollary’ of the contempt power.” Burt
v. Dodge, 65 Ohio St.3d 34, 35 (1992). With respect to contempt charges filed
pursuant to R.C. 2705.02, as the charges in this case were, R.C. 2705.03
“specifically recognizes a court’s power to ‘issu[e] process to bring the accused into
court[.]’” Id. at 36. “R.C. 2705.02 does not distinguish between civil and criminal
contempt.” Zunt v. Zunt, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 2425, 1976 WL 188881, *2 (Aug. 11,
1976); see Cleveland v. Patterson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109274, 2020-Ohio-
1628, ¶ 8 (noting that the contemnor had been charged with criminal contempt under
R.C. 2705.02); Barton v. Barton, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2016-CA-12, 2017-Ohio-980,
¶ 145 (referencing “civil contempt proceedings under R.C. 2705.02”). Therefore, a
contempt cannot be classified as criminal simply because an arrest warrant was
issued in the case.
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{¶20} Moreover, the arrest warrant in this case was issued directly in relation
to Scott’s failure to appear at the September 22, 2021 hearing. Scott had been
ordered to appear at the September 22, 2021 hearing, and the summons specifically
advised Scott that his failure to appear could result in the issuance of an arrest
warrant. (Doc. No. 31). Once Scott failed to appear for the hearing, the trial court
had the authority to issue an arrest warrant to enforce its order and to bring Scott
before the court to answer for his contemptuous conduct. In re J.R.R., 12th Dist.
Butler No. CA2013-09-176, 2014-Ohio-3550, ¶ 30; R.C. 2705.02(A) and 2705.03.
While we take no position on the propriety of the no-bond provision of the arrest
warrant, under the circumstances—with Scott residing outside of the state of Ohio
and having exhibited an unwillingness or inability to comply with the trial court’s
orders to appear for scheduled hearings—we are not persuaded that this provision
proves the trial court’s overarching purpose was to punish Scott.
{¶21} Although the trial court’s September 24, 2021 judgment entry does not
do much to clarify whether the contempt in this case was civil or criminal, the same
cannot be said of the trial court’s November 23, 2021 judgment entry. It was
through the November 23, 2021 judgment entry that the trial court journalized the
sanctions it imposed on Scott.
{¶22} Here, the trial court sanctioned Scott by levying a $250 fine and
imposing a 30-day jail sentence. The trial court then bifurcated the overall sanction
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into a suspended portion and an unsuspended portion. The trial court’s division of
Scott’s sanction is significant. “It is well established * * * that the same act can
qualify as both civil and criminal contempt, and sanctions for both can be combined
in order for the court to achieve its desired result.” In re Wingrove, 4th Dist.
Washington No. 02CA4, 2003-Ohio-549, ¶ 20. As the Supreme Court of Ohio
explained:
This court has previously recognized that a contempt sanction can be
both civil and criminal. In Brown [v. Executive 200, Inc.], one of the
contemnors was sentenced to ten days in jail, seven of which could be
purged. The court of appeals had held that the contempt was criminal
in nature and reversed the judgment because the trial court had used
the clear-and-convincing standard. We reinstated a portion of the
sentence, determining that because seven days of the ten-day sentence
could be purged, that portion was civil in nature. The unconditional
three days, however, were criminal, and the case was remanded to the
trial court.
Liming, 133 Ohio St.3d 509, 2012-Ohio-4783, at ¶ 15, citing Brown, 64 Ohio St.2d
at 253, 255. Accordingly, we must examine the suspended and unsuspended
portions of Scott’s sanction individually.
{¶23} In the suspended portion of Scott’s sanction, the trial court suspended
the entirety of Scott’s $250 fine and 15 days of his 30-day jail sentence on condition
that Scott (1) sign and not revoke required releases of information, (2) cooperate
with CCJFS and comply with the case plan, and (3) complete a psychological
evaluation and any recommended follow-up treatment. These conditions were
addressed directly to the conduct that resulted in the trial court’s contempt finding—
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Scott’s failure to sign releases of information, comply with other terms of his case
plan, and cooperate with CCJFS. The conditions attached to the suspended portion
of Scott’s sanction were thus designed to induce Scott to comply with the terms of
the case plan and to cooperate with CCJFS. Because the clear purpose of this
portion of Scott’s sanction was to coerce Scott’s compliance, this portion is a civil
penalty.
{¶24} Scott suggests that this portion of his contempt sanction cannot be
considered civil because the trial court did not afford him an opportunity to purge
his contempt. Insofar as Scott maintains he does not actually have the ability to
purge his contempt, we find some merit in his argument. “It is well settled that a
purge order must provide ‘a true opportunity for purging’—it cannot simply purport
to regulate future conduct.” In re M.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97618, 2012-Ohio-
3371, ¶ 13, fn. 4, quoting Tucker v. Tucker, 10 Ohio App.3d 251, 252 (10th
Dist.1983); Frey v. Frey, 197 Ohio App.3d 273, 2011-Ohio-6012, ¶ 35 (3d Dist.).
Suspending a contempt sanction on condition that the contemnor comply with a
preexisting order of the court, such as a child support order or a case plan, “simply
amounts to the court’s reaffirmation of its previous * * * order and can have no
effect since any effort to punish a future violation of the * * * order would require
new notice, hearing, and determination.” Tucker at 252.
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{¶25} In this case, several of the conditions of Scott’s suspended sanction,
including the requirement that he sign the requested releases and that he obtain a
psychological evaluation, were appropriate. But this is not true of all the conditions
of the suspended portion of his sanction. One of the conditions of Scott’s suspended
sanction required Scott to comply with the case plan and cooperate with CCJFS.
However, Scott already had an obligation to comply with the case plan and
cooperate with CCJFS. Thus, this condition is simply a reaffirmation of the court’s
earlier orders that regulates Scott’s future conduct. Furthermore, the trial court did
not time limit this condition. The suspended portion of Scott’s sanction was not
conditioned upon compliance with the case plan for any definite period of weeks or
months, and there was no provision allowing for reassessment of Scott’s compliance
at some certain point in the future. Thus, Scott is effectively precluded from purging
his contempt. No matter how faithfully Scott complies with the case plan or for
how long, Scott cannot do anything to bring about the discontinuation of the
suspended portion of his sanction. Until there is no longer a case plan for Scott to
comply with, Scott will remain in contempt of court.
{¶26} Yet, in past cases, courts have treated contempts as civil
notwithstanding the presence of invalid purge conditions. See In re Contempt of
Lance, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102838, 2016-Ohio-2717, ¶ 14-19; Rich, 2013-
Ohio-2840, at ¶ 14-20; Tucker at 252. While Scott lacks a “true opportunity for
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purging,”3 the suspended portion of Scott’s sanction is still conditional and its
coercive purpose is manifest. Tucker at 252. Therefore, notwithstanding the
problematic conditions attached to the suspended portion of Scott’s sanction, this
portion of Scott’s sanction retains its civil character.
{¶27} We turn now to the unsuspended portion of Scott’s sanction. The trial
court ordered that Scott serve 15 days of his 30-day jail sentence. Scott was credited
for the days he served in the Crawford County Jail from his arrest on November 3,
2021, until he appeared before the trial court on November 8, 2021. Furthermore,
the trial court indicated that upon receipt of complete patient records from Scott’s
various service providers, it would reconsider the imposition of these 15 days.
{¶28} The unsuspended portion of Scott’s sanction is harder to define as
either civil or criminal. Although this portion of Scott’s sanction arguably has a
coercive purpose in deterring any additional noncompliance and ensuring
attendance at future court hearings, it is clearly punitive as demonstrated by the fact
Scott was kept in jail despite his request for release.
{¶29} But we need not, and in fact ought not, determine definitively whether
this portion of Scott’s sanction was civil or criminal. Even assuming that the
unsuspended portion of Scott’s sanction was a criminal penalty and that, due to
Scott’s absence from the September 22, 2021 hearing, the trial court might have
3
Scott does not challenge the validity of this condition in this appeal.
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been limited in its ability to impose this portion of the sanction upon Scott, Scott’s
arguments relating to this portion of his contempt sanction are moot. It is undisputed
that Scott served the entirety of the unsuspended portion of his 30-day jail sentence.
“When a contemnor appeals a finding of criminal contempt, courts typically apply
the general rule governing mootness of criminal appeals.” In re Chambers, 1st Dist.
Hamilton Nos. C-180333 and C-180334, 2019-Ohio-3596, ¶ 11. In non-felony
cases “where a criminal defendant * * * voluntarily satisfies the judgment imposed
upon him or her for [the] offense, an appeal from the conviction is moot unless the
defendant has offered evidence from which an inference can be drawn that he or she
will suffer some collateral legal disability or loss of civil rights stemming from that
conviction.” State v. Golston, 71 Ohio St.3d 224, 226-227 (1994). “The burden of
proof is on the defendant to establish at least an inference that he will suffer some
collateral disability or loss of civil rights.” Harris v. Omosule, 2d Dist. Greene No.
2009 CA 78, 2010-Ohio-1124, ¶ 6.
{¶30} Here, although Scott requested on November 12, 2021, that he be
released early from the Crawford County Jail, there is no indication in the record
that Scott ever sought to stay execution of the unsuspended portion of his contempt
sanction. See State v. Riggs, 9th Dist. Medina No. 17CA0011-M, 2018-Ohio-347,
¶ 8 (concluding that despite the defendant’s “Motion for Halftime Release,”
defendant had voluntarily served his jail sentence because he failed to seek a stay of
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execution of his sentence). Therefore, as it appears that Scott acquiesced to the
unsuspended portion of his sanction, Scott voluntarily served this portion of his
sanction. See Cleveland Hts. v. Lewis, 129 Ohio St.3d 389, 2011-Ohio-2673, ¶ 26.
Moreover, Scott has pointed to no evidence in the record supporting an inference
that he will suffer some collateral disability or loss of civil rights attributable to the
(assumedly) criminal component of his contempt sanction. Consequently, we
conclude that insofar as Scott appeals the unsuspended portion of his contempt
sanction, his appeal is moot.
{¶31} In sum, to the extent that Scott’s appeal still presents a live
controversy, it does so only with respect to the suspended portion of his contempt
sanctions. As we have explained, the suspended portion of Scott’s sanction is a civil
penalty imposed for civil contempt. As it was a matter of civil contempt, Scott was
entitled only to the rights afforded a litigant in a civil action, specifically notice of
the charged contempt and an opportunity to be heard. It is uncontested that Scott
had notice of the contempt charges, notice of the September 22, 2021 hearing, and
an opportunity to make his case at that hearing. As Scott was afforded all the rights
due him, the trial court was empowered to find Scott in contempt of court in
absentia, and it did not err in doing so.
{¶32} Scott’s assignment of error is overruled.
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IV. Conclusion
{¶33} For the foregoing reasons, Scott’s assignment of error is overruled.
Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned
and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Crawford County Court of Common
Pleas, Juvenile Division.
Judgment Affirmed
ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.
/jlr
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