Ruffin v. Feller ( 2022 )

2022 IL App (1st) 220692No. 1-22-0692
Opinion filed August 2, 2022
SECOND DIVISION
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
LATONYA RUFFIN, )
)
Petitioner-Appellee, )
) Appeal from the
v. ) Circuit Court of
) Cook County
DAVID M. FELLER, Objector; LATAVIA WILSON, )
Objector; THE COOK COUNTY OFFICERS ) No. 22-COEL-19
ELECTORAL BOARD; KAREN YARBROUGH, )
Chairman and in Her Official Capacity as Cook County ) The Honorable
Clerk; KIMBERLY FOXX, Member; and IRIS ) Maureen Ward-Kirby,
MARTINEZ, Member, ) Judge Presiding.
)
Respondents )
)
(David M. Feller and Latavia Wilson, Respondents- )
Appellants). )
PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court,
with opinion.
Justices Howse and Lavin concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 This cause is before the court on appeal of an order of the circuit court of Cook County in
favor of the petitioner-appellee, Latonya Ruffin, on her petition for judicial review of a decision
of the Cook County Officers Electoral Board (or Electoral Board) under section 10-10.1 of the
Election Code. 10 ILCS 5/10-10.1 (West 2020). The petitioner is a candidate for the office of
No. 1-22-0692
Sheriff of Cook County, to be voted on at the general primary election on June 28, 2022. The
respondents-appellants are David M. Feller and Latavia Wilson, who have filed objections to the
petitioner’s candidacy. Given the timing of the election, this court entered an order accelerating
this appeal and initially entered this opinion as a summary order on May 31, 2022.
¶2 The facts are largely undisputed. The objectors’ petition alleged that the petitioner had used
a false name and not that of a registered voter of Cook County and, as a result, the petitioner had
falsely sworn in her statement of candidacy that she was a qualified voter when “Latonya Ruffin”
is not a qualified voter. The evidence adduced at the hearing showed that Ruffin was the
petitioner’s maiden name and the name under which she was registered to vote prior to 2012. At
that time, she changed her voter registration to her married name, “Latonya Stanford.” The
petitioner divorced in 2018, and the judgment for dissolution of marriage granted her leave to
resume use of her maiden name of Ruffin. However, the petitioner never updated her voter
registration to Latonya Ruffin as of March 13, 2022, when she filed her statement of candidacy
affirming that she was a qualified voter as of that date. On March 26, 2022, the petitioner updated
her voter registration to the name “Latonya Stanford-Ruffin.”
¶3 On April 29, 2022, the Cook County Officers Electoral Board issued its decision sustaining
the respondents’ objections to the petitioner’s candidacy. It found that, at the time of the signing
of the statement of candidacy, there was no registered voter at the address given by the name of
“Latonya Ruffin.” It relied on the case of McKennie v. Moseley-Braun, Chi. Bd. of Election
Comm’rs, No. 99-EB-ALD-163 (Jan. 19, 1999), https://app.chicagoelections.com/documents/
Electoral-Board/document_2372.PDF [https://perma.cc/V3TX-5FW3], as being “on point.” In
that case, a candidate had legally changed her name but remained registered to vote under her prior
name at the time she signed her statement of candidacy and filed her nomination papers using her
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new name; since the candidate was not registered to vote under the name that appeared on her
statement of candidacy at the time she signed it under oath, the board of elections found her
statement of candidacy and nomination papers to be invalid. Id.¶4 The board in McKennie relied upon the requirement of section 6-54 of the Election Code that
“[a]ny registered voter who changes his or her name by marriage or otherwise, shall be required
to register anew and authorize the cancellation of the previous registration.” See 10 ILCS 5/6-54
(West 1998). McKennie also cited People ex rel. Rago v. Lipsky, 327 Ill. App. 63, 70 (1945), in
which this court characterized section 6-54 of the Election Code as a “clear and unambiguous”
statute that “requires reregistration by any registered voter who changes his or her name for any
reason or by any means.” The board in McKennie found that the candidate had failed to register
anew following her name change, and therefore she was not a registered and qualified voter at the
time she signed her statement of candidacy and nominating petitions.
¶5 On May 16, 2022, the circuit court entered an order finding that the decision by the Cook
County Officers Electoral Board invalidating the petitioner’s candidacy was erroneous, and it
reversed the Electoral Board’s decision and ordered that the petitioner’s name appear on the ballot
for the June 28, 2022, general election as Latonya Ruffin. Although the circuit court’s order
indicates that it stated its reasoning in open court, no transcript is included in the record on appeal.
¶6 We reverse the decision of the circuit court and affirm the decision of the Cook County
Officers Electoral Board sustaining the respondents’ objections to the petitioner’s candidacy.
Section 5-23 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/5-23 (West 2020)), which applies to counties having
a population of over 500,000, contains language very similar to section 6-54 of the Election Code
(id. § 6-54), which applies to cities, villages, and towns. Section 5-23 states in pertinent part, “Any
registered voter who changes his or her name by marriage or otherwise, shall be required to register
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anew and authorize the cancellation of the previous registration.” Id. § 5-23. Thus, following
petitioner’s name change after her divorce, she was required by law to “register anew” under her
maiden name and to authorize the cancellation of her previous registration. Id. Petitioner did not
do this, and accordingly, there was no qualified voter by the name of “Latonya Ruffin” at the stated
address at the operative date when petitioner filed her statement of candidacy. Even after this time,
petitioner did not seek to register to vote using a name that matched the name on her statement of
candidacy, instead registering under the name “Latonya Stanford-Ruffin.”
¶7 We reject the various arguments raised by the petitioner. First, we do not believe that the
Electoral Board improperly relied upon sections 5-23 or 6-54 of the Election Code on the basis
that these provisions were not timely raised in the objectors’ petition. We find that the issues raised
by the objectors’ petitions were broad enough to encompass the Electoral Board’s consideration
of these statutes and legal argument concerning them.
¶8 Second, we reject the argument that section 7-10.2 of the Election Code (id. § 7-10.2) controls
over the reregistration requirement of section 5-23. Section 7-10.2 requires that, in the designation
of the name of a candidate on nomination petitions, the candidate’s given name, initials, a
nickname by which the candidate is commonly known, or a combination thereof “may be used in
addition to the candidate’s surname.” Id. It also contains a requirement of additional language that
must be used if a candidate has changed his or name within the prior three years, but it exempts
from this requirement name changes resulting from dissolution of marriage. Id. This provision is
inapplicable here because this case does not involve a name change within the last three years or
the need to use additional language informing voters of this name change. Thus, we reject the
argument that section 7-10.2 governs the outcome of this case.
¶9 Third, we recognize the petitioner’s argument that McKennie can be distinguished on its facts.
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However, we nevertheless find that the Electoral Board properly relied on its legal analysis and
find all of the cases cited by the petitioner to be distinguishable. In two of those cases, nomination
papers were found valid where candidates’ voter registrations included surnames matching their
nomination papers, even though their voter registrations also included middle names or additional
surnames not used on their nomination papers. See Jackson v. Lane, Chi. Bd. of Election Comm’rs,
No. 08-EB-WC-19 (Dec. 4, 2007), https://app.chicagoelections.com/documents/Electoral-Board/
document_3123.pdf [https://perma.cc/4989-EG9T]; Cole v. Andrews, Chi. Bd. of Election
Comm’rs, No. 99-EB-ALD-047 (Feb. 2, 1999), https://app.chicagoelections.com/documents/
Electoral-Board/document_2256.PDF [https://perma.cc/66ZX-3WSD]. Here, by contrast, the
surname Ruffin was not used in any part of the petitioner’s voter registration when the statement
of candidacy was filed. In Sanders v. Boyce, Chi. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, No. 11-EB-ALD-348
(Dec. 29, 2010), https://app.chicagoelections.com/documents/Electoral-Board/
document_3588.PDF [https://perma.cc/YDL9-AD59], nomination papers identifying a candidate
by her maiden name were found valid. However, unlike in this case, there was no proof that the
candidate’s name did not match the surname on her voter registration. The decision in O’Keefe v.
Zurowski, Chi. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, No. 91-EB-ALD-54 (Jan. 8, 1991),
https://app.chicagoelections.com/documents/Electoral-Board/document_1551.PDF
[https://perma.cc/3RRV-LSQ5], contains no explanation for the statement allowing the candidate
to use her maiden name in nominating papers, and thus it is unhelpful to the petitioner.
¶ 10 For all of these reasons, we conclude that the decision of the Cook County Officers Electoral
Board finding the petitioner’s statement of candidacy and nomination papers were invalid was not
erroneous.
¶ 11 We hereby order that the name of Latonya Ruffin, as a candidate for nomination of the
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Democratic Party to the office of Sheriff of Cook County to be voted upon at the general primary
election of June 28, 2022, shall not be printed on the ballot for that election. Further, no votes cast
on her behalf shall be counted. The clerk is to issue the mandate instanter.
¶ 12 Circuit court judgment reversed.
¶ 13 Board judgment affirmed.
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2022 IL App (1st) 220692Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 22-COEL-
19; the Hon. Maureen Ward-Kirby, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Burton S. Odelson, Ross D. Secler, and Jayman A. Avery III, of
for Odelson, Sterk, Murphey, Frazier & McGrath, Ltd., of Evergreen
Appellant: Park, for appellants.
Attorneys Anish Parikh, of Parikh Law Group, LLC, of Chicago, for
for appellee.
Appellee:
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