State v. Boyle , 2022 Ohio 2887 ( 2022 )

[Cite as State v. Boyle, 2022-Ohio-2887.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
GREENE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : Appellate Case No. 2022-CA-19
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2013-CR-42
:
DAVID BOYLE : (Criminal Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the 19th day of August, 2022.
...........
MEGAN A. HAMMOND, Atty. Reg. No. 0097714, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Greene
County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, 61 Greene Street, Suite 200, Xenia, Ohio
45385
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
DAVID BOYLE, #A687-887, C.C.I., P.O. Box 5500, Chillicothe, Ohio 45601
Defendant-Appellant, Pro Se
.............
LEWIS, J.
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{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant David Boyle appeals from an order of the Greene
County Common Pleas Court denying his “Request to Subpoena Specific Records.” For
the reasons outlined below, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} The history of this case was recently addressed in State v. Boyle, 2d Dist.
Greene No. 2022-CA-7, 2022-Ohio-2165, ¶ 2-6:
In 2013, Boyle was indicted on 16 counts of rape involving his
daughter. Following negotiations, Boyle entered a plea of guilty to six
counts of rape in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining counts. No
agreement was reached as to sentencing. The trial court sentenced Boyle
to an aggregate prison term of 40 years and designated him a Tier III sex
offender. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. State v. Boyle, 2d Dist.
Greene No. 2013-CA-43, 2014-Ohio-1271.
On June 16, 2014, Boyle filed a pro se application to reopen his
appeal pursuant to App.R. 26(B). We denied his application to reopen on
September 29, 2014. Boyle filed three additional applications to reopen in
2016, 2020, and 2021, which were all denied by this Court.
On June 24, 2018, Boyle filed a “Motion to Dismiss Defective
Indictment,” in which he argued that the indictment violated his
constitutional right to due process because it contained numerous
undifferentiated counts of rape. Boyle claimed these “carbon-copy” counts
failed to describe sufficiently the charges, thereby preventing him from
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properly preparing his defense. The State filed a memorandum in
opposition. The trial court overruled the motion, finding that Boyle's guilty
plea waived any error associated with the indictment and that his claims
were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Boyle appealed, and we
affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See State v. Boyle, 2d Dist. Greene
No. 2018-CA-12, 2018-Ohio-3284.
On September 19, 2018, Boyle filed a “Petition for an Evidentiary
Hearing,” in which he alleged Miranda violations, speedy trial violations,
insufficient evidence, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court
construed the motion as a petition for post-conviction relief and denied it as
untimely on October 23, 2018.
On November 2, 2021, Boyle filed a “Motion for Fraud Upon the
Court Pursuant to R.C. 2921.32(A).” The State filed a memorandum in
opposition on December 1, 2021. The trial court again construed the
motion as a petition for post-conviction relief and denied it as untimely on
January 6, 2022.
This Court affirmed the trial court’s decision denying Boyle’s November 2021 motion as
an untimely and successive petition for post-conviction relief. Id. at ¶ 16-17.
{¶ 3} After the trial court overruled Boyle’s November motion, Boyle filed a
“Request to Subpoena Specific Records.” Boyle sought the following documents: grand
jury transcripts, Miranda waivers, sworn affidavits from his defense attorneys, his own
statements, statements made by the victim and two other witnesses, text messages, Ohio
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Bureau of Criminal Investigation (“BCI”) documents, and speedy trial time waivers.
Boyle explained that he requested the records in order to demonstrate that his conviction
had not been supported by the evidence and that his attorney had been ineffective. He
later argued in his response to the State’s reply that he was seeking the records to obtain
possible newly-discovered evidence and to potentially show a Brady violation if, in fact,
new evidence came to light.
{¶ 4} The trial court construed Boyle’s motion as: (1) a petition for post-conviction
relief, (2) a request for public records filed pursuant to R.C. 149.43, (3) a request for grand
jury transcripts, and (4) a request for court records as defined by Sup.R. 44. To the
extent the trial court construed Boyle’s motion as a petition for post-conviction relief, a
request for grand jury transcripts, and a request for public records, his motion was denied.
To the extent that the motion sought court records, the trial court did not deny Boyle’s
motion but, instead, instructed Boyle to request those records from the Greene County
Clerk of Courts and remit payment to the clerk for any costs of the copies. Boyle timely
appealed.
{¶ 5} While not clear from his brief, it appears that Boyle argues on appeal that the
trial court should have granted his request for various records, and that the trial court
erred in denying his motion as an untimely petition for post-conviction relief. We find no
merit to his arguments.
{¶ 6} We first note that prior to the filing of briefs, this Court questioned whether a
portion of the trial court’s decision constituted a final appealable order. Having found
that the portion of the trial court’s order denying Boyle’s post-conviction request for grand
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jury transcripts is not a final appealable order, we specifically limited the scope of this
appeal to exclude review of the denial of his request for grand jury transcripts. Therefore,
we will not consider that portion of the trial court’s order in this opinion.
II. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
{¶ 7} The trial court first considered Boyle’s “Request to Subpoena Specific
Records” as an untimely and successive petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court
found it lacked jurisdiction to consider Boyle’s petition and denied it. Upon review, we
find the trial court did not err in construing Boyle’s motion as a petition for post-conviction
relief and, thereafter, denying it.
{¶ 8} It is well-established that “[c]ourts may recast irregular motions into whatever
category necessary to identify and establish the criteria by which the motion should be
judged.” State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153, 2008-Ohio-545, 882 N.E.2d 431, ¶ 12.
“[W]here a criminal defendant, subsequent to his or her direct appeal, files a motion
seeking vacation or correction of his or her sentence on the basis that his or her
constitutional rights have been violated, such a motion is a petition for post[-]conviction
relief as defined in R.C. 2953.21.” State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 160, 679
N.E.2d 1131 (1997). In his motion, Boyle requested the trial court to review certain
documents from his case in order to prove to the trial court that his attorney was ineffective
for various reasons. At the end, he asked that the trial court review the specifically
identified records so that the court could see that he did not receive “a fair trial if one was
to be had, a fair plea agreement, a fair direct appeal, a fair delayed appeal, post-
conviction, state habea[s], or any other remedy that would be required[.]” While we
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agree with the trial court that Boyle’s motion was difficult to adequately categorize, we do
not think it was unreasonable for the trial court to have construed his motion as an
untimely petition for post-conviction relief.
{¶ 9} “A post[-]conviction proceeding is not an appeal of a criminal conviction, but,
rather, a collateral civil attack on the judgment.” State v. Steffen, 70 Ohio St.3d 399,
410, 639 N.E.2d 67 (1994). If a defendant has filed a direct appeal of his or her
conviction, a petition for post-conviction relief must be filed no later than 365 days after
the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal. R.C.
2953.21(A)(2)(a). Boyle filed a direct appeal of his conviction, and the transcript of
proceedings was filed in this Court in August 2013. The current petition for post-
conviction relief was filed in January 2022, well beyond the 365-day deadline set forth in
R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a).
{¶ 10} Where a defendant files an untimely petition for post-conviction relief, the
trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider it, unless the untimeliness is excused under R.C.
2953.23(A)(1)(a). State v. Wells, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2010-CA-5, 2010-Ohio-3238,
¶ 10. The untimely filing of a petition for post-conviction relief may be excused with a
showing that either (1) the defendant was unavoidably prevented from discovering the
facts upon which he or she relies to present the claim, or (2) the United States Supreme
Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to his or her
situation and the petition asserts a claim based on that right. R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a).
Additionally, the petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that, if not for the
constitutional error from which he or she suffered, no reasonable factfinder would have
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found the petitioner guilty of the offense for which the defendant was convicted. R.C.
2953.23(A)(1)(b).
{¶ 11} “We review a trial court's denial of a petition for postconviction relief without
a hearing for an abuse of discretion.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Taylor, 2021-Ohio-
1670, 170 N.E.3d 1310, ¶ 40 (2d Dist.). A trial court abuses its discretion when its
decision evidences an attitude that is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Blakemore
v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶ 12} Boyle has failed to allege or assert any facts that would satisfy the two-
prong test set forth in R.C. 2953.23(A)(1). Specifically, Boyle has failed to allege any
facts that would establish he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts upon
which he relies to present his claims, and he does not assert that the United States
Supreme Court has recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to
his situation. Because Boyle did not satisfy the two-prong test to excuse the
untimeliness of his petition, the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider his petition
or provide the relief he requested. State v. Apanovitch, 155 Ohio St.3d 358, 2018-Ohio-
4744, 121 N.E.3d 351, ¶ 41. As such, the trial court correctly denied Boyle’s motion.
III. Request for Records
{¶ 13} Due to the ambiguity of Boyle’s motion, the trial court considered the motion,
in the alternative, as a request for public records. Ohio’s Public Records Act requires a
public office to make copies of public records available to any person on request and
within a reasonable period of time. R.C. 149.43(B)(1). “But when a requester seeks
public records from a court, the Rules of Superintendence generally apply.” State ex rel.
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Ware v. Kurt, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-1627, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 11. Because the
two categories of public records requests operate differently, it was necessary for the trial
court to determine under which category Boyle’s requests fell. The court found that the
majority of the records requested fell under Ohio’s Public Records Act codified in R.C.
149.43, while the court records fell under the Rules of Superintendence for the Courts of
Ohio. To the extent that the trial court considered Boyle’s motion a public records
request, the trial court found that Boyle had not provided any information for the court to
conclude that he was pursuing a justiciable claim and that the records sought were
necessary to support that claim. To the extent the trial court considered Boyle’s request
for court records under the Rules of Superintendence, it explained that Boyle was entitled
to request and obtain those records, but that he must direct his request to the Greene
County Clerk of Courts and remit payment to the clerk for any costs for those copies. We
agree with the trial court in both respects.
a. Public Records Act
{¶ 14} While the Public Records Act should be applied “liberally in favor of broad
access” to public records, there are some limitations. One such limitation is in R.C.
149.43(B)(8), which states, in relevant part, that:
A public office or person responsible for public records is not required to
permit a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a criminal conviction * * *
to inspect or to obtain a copy of any public record concerning a criminal
investigation or prosecution * * * unless the request to inspect or to obtain
a copy of the record is for the purpose of acquiring information that is subject
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to release as a public record under this section and the judge who imposed
the sentence * * * with respect to the person, or the judge's successor in
office, finds that the information sought in the public record is necessary to
support what appears to be a justiciable claim of the person.
{¶ 15} The statute “sets forth heightened requirements for inmates seeking public
records, and requires an incarcerated criminal defendant to demonstrate that the
information he is seeking pursuant to R.C. 149.43 is necessary to support a justiciable
claim or defense.” State v. Gibson, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2006-CA-37, 2007-Ohio-
7161, ¶ 13 (applying former R.C. 149.43(B)(4), now R.C. 149.43(B)(8)). “A ‘justiciable
claim’ is a claim that is properly brought before a court of justice for relief.” State v.
Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23737, 2011-Ohio-4195, ¶ 9. A justiciable claim does
not exist where an inmate fails to identify “any pending proceeding with respect to which
the requested documents would be material * * *.” State v. Atakpu, 2d Dist. Montgomery
No. 25232, 2013-Ohio-4392, ¶ 9, citing Gibson at ¶ 14.
{¶ 16} Orders denying an inmate’s request for public records are reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Morris, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 26949 and
26960, 2017-Ohio-1196, ¶ 29, citing Atakpu at ¶ 7. A trial court abuses its discretion
when the determination is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. Blakemore v.
Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶ 17} There is no question that Boyle was an incarcerated individual pursuant to
a criminal conviction as he was sentenced to a term of 40 years in prison as a result of
his guilty pleas. The relevant records he sought included Miranda waivers, his own
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statements, statements made by the victim and two other witnesses, text messages, and
BCI documents—all of which concerned a criminal investigation or prosecution. The
sworn affidavits Boyle requested of his defense attorneys did not exist and, therefore,
could not be obtained from a public records request. The filed time waivers are
addressed below as they fall under the category of court records. Because R.C.
149.43(B)(8) plainly applied, Boyle was required to show that the information he was
seeking under the public records request was necessary to support a justiciable claim or
defense.
{¶ 18} Given that Boyle’s November 2021 petition for post-conviction relief was
denied, there was no pending proceeding with respect to which the requested documents
would be material. Boyle has not shown that any potentially cognizable claims remain
justiciable in his case, which already has seen a direct appeal, multiple petitions for post-
conviction relief, and a federal habeas corpus action. Further, because Boyle entered a
negotiated guilty plea, which this Court affirmed on direct appeal, it is difficult to conceive
how Boyle could show that the documents he sought were necessary to support a
justiciable claim or defense, inasmuch as Boyle’s guilty pleas constitute a complete
admission of guilt. Crim.R. 11(B)(1). Thus, any claims pertaining to factual guilt, such
as witness statements or text messages, are irrelevant. Accordingly, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it determined Boyle had failed to demonstrate that the
information sought in the public record was necessary to support what appears to be a
justiciable claim.
b. Rules of Superintendence for the Courts of Ohio
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{¶ 19} “Sup.R. 44 through 47 deal specifically with the procedures regulating public
access to court records and are the sole vehicle for obtaining such records in actions
commenced after July 1, 2009.” State ex rel. Richfield v. Laria, 138 Ohio St. 3d 168,
2014-Ohio-243, 4 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 8. The superintendence rules define “court record” as
both a “case document” and an “administrative document.” Sup.R. 44(B). Relevant
here, the term “case document” means a document or information submitted to a court or
filed with a clerk of courts in a judicial action or proceeding (e.g., exhibits, pleadings,
orders), as well as any document prepared by the court or the clerk of courts in the judicial
action or proceeding (e.g., journals, dockets), subject to certain exceptions. Sup.R.
44(C)(1).
{¶ 20} Of the documents requested by Boyle, only the speedy trial time waivers
filed with the clerk of courts were subject to the Rules of Superintendence for the Courts
of Ohio. Those records were accessible through the Greene County Clerk of Courts’
office. Pursuant to Greene County Common Pleas Court Local Rules of Practice and
Procedure 1.08(I)(A), the clerk of courts is responsible for filing and maintaining all
documents delivered to the clerk’s office. Upon request and the payment of a photocopy
fee, the clerk will provide copies of any original document maintained by its office within
a reasonable period of time. Gr. Co. C.P.R. 1.08(II)(C). See also Sup.R. 45(B)(4)
(allowing charges for actual costs or deposit of estimated actual costs incurred in
responding to a request for a court record). Thus, the trial court was correct in informing
Boyle that he was entitled to the documents, but that the request must be made to the
Greene County Clerk of Courts and payment must be made to cover the costs of those
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copies.
{¶ 21} Having found no errors in the trial court’s order, the judgment of the Greene
County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
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DONOVAN, J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Megan A. Hammond
David Boyle
Hon. Adolfo A. Tornichio