James R. Snyder v. Jack T. Nolen , 380 F.3d 279 ( 2004 )

PER CURIAM.

James Snyder filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Jack Nolen, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Saline County, Illinois. The complaint alleged that Mr. Nolen had violated Mr. Snyder’s constitutional right of access to the courts when Mr. Nolen prevented Mr. Snyder from prosecuting a domestic relations action for dissolution of marriage and a temporary restraining order in the state court. The district court dismissed Mr. Snyder’s complaint on the alternate grounds that it did not state a constitutional claim, that Mr. Nolen was entitled to absolute quasiju-dicial immunity and that Mr. Nolen was entitled to qualified immunity. Mr. Snyder appealed, and this court now affirms.

It is the unanimous opinion of the court that Mr. Nolen is not protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Nevertheless, it is the opinion of the majority of the panel that Mr. Snyder has not stated a claim for a constitutional violation of right to access to the courts; the individual judges, however, differ with respect to how they arrive at that determination. A third member of the panel is of the opinion that Mr. Snyder’s complaint states a constitutional violation and that Mr. Nolen is not entitled to qualified immunity on that claim.

This per curiam opinion sets forth the procedural background of the case and articulates the court’s holding with respect to the issue of absolute quasi-judicial immunity. The separate opinions of the panel majority follow, as does that of the panel’s dissenting member.

I

BACKGROUND

A.

In November of 1996, Mr. Snyder attempted to file a petition for a dissolution of marriage and a temporary restraining order against his wife, Denise Snyder, in the Circuit Court of Saline County, Illinois. In his petition, Mr. Snyder requested that the state court “enter an order restraining [his wife] from selling or concealing or encumbering in any manner” the property claimed to be his pursuant to a prenuptial agreement. R.22, Ex.1. Mr. Snyder alleged that he was estranged from his wife, that his wife was in sole possession of his non-marital property, that he was incarcerated in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections, and that his assets were at substantial risk because his wife had indicated to Mr. Snyder’s friends that she intended to liquidate certain property belonging to Mr. Snyder.

According to Mr. Snyder’s complaint in this action, the pleadings that he proposed to file in the state domestic relations proceedings complied with that court’s technical filing requirements and alleged a factual basis for a dissolution of marriage and for a temporary restraining order. Nevertheless, Mr. Nolen, as the Circuit Court Clerk, allegedly removed Mr. Snyder’s pleadings from the court’s docket and placed a large “X” over the court’s “Filed” stamp with the word “error.” R.22.¹ Mr. Nolen then returned the pleadings to Mr. Snyder with a note attached, stating that “[bjecause there is a child involved in this case, you must go thru [sic] an attorney for a divorce.” R.22, Ex.1. The parties do not dispute that Mr. Nolen’s instruction was incorrect. The complaint further alleges that Mr. Nolen took these actions “without consulting any judge ... as to the propriety of his actions.” R.22 at 5.² According to the complaint, sometime after Mr. Snyder’s state court pleadings were rejected and returned, his wife liquidated his non-marital assets and dissipated the proceeds.

B.

On September 17,1998, Mr. Snyder filed this action against Mr. Nolen pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint alleged that Mr. Nolen had violated Mr. Snyder’s constitutional right of access to the courts and that, as a result of that violation, Mr. Snyder was prevented from obtaining a court order to prevent his wife from dissipating his non-marital assets. Mr. Snyder’s original complaint was stricken by the district court for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of Local Rule 8.1 (“Pleadings Filed by Prisoners”) because the complaint was not prepared on the court’s required forms. See R.3.

On November 2, 1998, Mr. Snyder filed a first amended complaint. This complaint and a motion to dismiss filed by Mr. Nolen were referred to a magistrate judge. The magistrate judge recommended that Mr. Snyder’s complaint be dismissed on the ground that Mr. Nolen’s action was a quasi-judicial act entitled to absolute immunity. See R.19. Mr. Snyder timely objected to this recommendation. The district court, without considering the magistrate judge’s recommendation, dismissed Mr. Snyder’s complaint, with leave to re-file, on the ground that it was unclear from the complaint whether Mr. Snyder was suing Mr. Nolen in his official or individual capacity. See R.21.

On April 6, 2000, Mr. Snyder timely filed a second amended complaint, the pleading at issue here. In this complaint, Mr. Snyder claimed that Mr. Nolen was liable in his individual capacity for blocking Mr. Snyder’s access to the Saline County Court in violation of the federal right of access to the courts. He further alleged a supplemental claim based on the Constitution of the State of Illinois. Specifically alleging the loss of his personal property, Mr. Snyder sought compensatory damages in the amount of $60,000 (the value of his dissipated assets) and punitive damages in the amount of $100.

Mr. Nolen again filed a motion to dismiss. On February 2, 2001, the magistrate judge recommended that the complaint be dismissed on three separate grounds: (1) that the complaint did not state a constitutional claim; (2) that Mr. Nolen was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity; and (3) that Mr. Nolen was entitled to qualified immunity. See R.33. A notice accompanied the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation that notified the parties that the failure to object to the report within ten days of service “shall result in a waiver of the right to appeal all issues, both factual and legal, which are addressed in the Report and Recommendation.” Id.

Mr. Snyder filed no objections to the magistrate judge’s report. On February 23, 2001, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and granted Mr. Nolen’s motion to dismiss. See R.34. On March 7, 2001, the district court entered judgment in favor of Mr. Nolen. See R.35. On March 16, 2001, Mr. Snyder filed with the district court a motion to vacate the judgment and, in the alternative, a notice of appeal. In a sworn affidavit, Mr. Snyder explained that he had just returned from a different prison facility to which he had been transferred on temporary writ status for a fitness hearing in his underlying criminal case.³ He did not receive the magistrate judge’s order until his return. By that time, the district court had entered a judgment. Mr. Snyder further stated that, prior to his transfer, he had requested that the prison warden forward his mail to his temporary address but that the prison had failed to do so. The district court denied Mr. Snyder’s motion to vacate the judgment on April 2, 2001. See R.40. This appeal followed.

II

DISCUSSION

A.

We first must determine whether Mr. Snyder has waived his right to appeal. Mr. Nolen submits that, because Mr. Snyder failed to timely object to the magistrate judge’s report, he has waived his right to appeal all factual and legal issues to this court. Mr. Snyder concedes that he did not object to the magistrate judge’s report; however, he maintains that the interests of justice require a finding that his right to appeal has not been waived.

In Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985), the Supreme Court held that, consistent with the requirements of due process, “a court of appeals may adopt a rule conditioning appeal, when taken from a district court judgment that adopts a magistrate’s recommendation, upon the filing of objections with the district court identifying those issues on which further review is desired” so long as the rule provides “clear notice to the litigants and an opportunity to seek an extension of time for filing objections.” In so holding, the Court further provided that “because [this] rule is a nonjurisdictional waiver provision, the Court of Appeals may excuse the default in the interests of justice.” Id. In Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 797 F.2d 538, 539 (7th Cir.1986), this circuit adopted such a rule, concluding that “failure to file objections with the district judge waives the right to appeal all issues, both factual and legal.” However, we also recognized that “under certain circumstances the failure to file objections may be excused because the rule is not jurisdictional and should not be employed to defeat the ends of justice.” Id. at 540 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Mr. Snyder was a pro se litigant throughout the proceedings in the district court. As a general proposition, pro se litigants are subject to the same waiver rules as litigants represented by counsel. See Provident Sav. Bank v. Popovich, 71 F.3d 696, 700 (7th Cir.1995). However, we decline to apply waiver in this case because doing so would defeat the ends of justice. Shortly before the magistrate judge’s report was issued and mailed to Mr. Snyder’s “permanent” prison address, Mr. Snyder was transferred temporarily to a different correctional facility. Mr. Snyder requested that the prison forward his mail, but the prison failed to do so. As a result, Mr. Snyder did not receive the magistrate judge’s report until after the time for objection had expired and the district court had entered judgment against Mr. Snyder.

We cannot accept Mr. Nolen’s contention that waiver should be applied in this case because Mr. Snyder’s failure to receive the magistrate’s report was due to his own fault in failing to notify the court clerk of his change of address. The record simply will not support such a finding of fault on the part of Mr. Snyder. As a general principle, because “[t]he parties are far better situated to know of any errors in their address information,” litigants, including prisoners, “bear the burden of filing notice of a change of address in such a way that will bring the attention of the court to the address change.” Theede v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 172 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir.1999). Here, we deal with a temporary absence from a continuing address. Mr. Snyder has set forth the steps that he took to ensure that he received his mail during his absence on a temporary writ from the institution to which he was regularly assigned. Notably, the record contains no indication that Mr. Snyder in any way departed from the prison’s normal course of procedure.⁴ Accordingly, we decline to hold that Mr. Snyder waived his right to appeal.

B.

We next must determine whether, given the specific allegations of the complaint, Mr. Nolen may claim absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Following the holdings of the Supreme Court of the United States,⁵ we have recognized “the fundamental principle that judges are entitled to absolute immunity from damages for their judicial conduct.” Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir.2001). The principle “is supported by a long-settled understanding that the independent and impartial exercise of judgment vital to the judiciary might be impaired by exposure to potential damages liability. Accordingly, the ‘touchstone’ for the doctrine’s applicability has been ‘performance of the function of resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights.’ ” Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435-36, 113 S.Ct. 2167, 124 L.Ed.2d 391 (1993) (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 500, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)).

The Supreme Court has instructed that a functional approach should be taken in determining whether an individual is entitled to absolute immunity. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 201, 106 S.Ct. 496, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985). Whether absolute immunity ought to be afforded is dependent upon the nature of the functions performed by the officer in question and “the effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of those functions.” Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224, 108 S.Ct. 538. “[T]he cloak of immunity is designed to prevent a situation in which decision-makers act with an excess of caution or otherwise ... skew their decisions in ways that result in less than full fidelity to the objective and independent criteria that ought to guide their conduct out of a fear of litigation or personal monetary liability.” Tobin for Governor v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 268 F.3d 517, 522 (7th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

These policy concerns have required that, in some instances, “[t]he absolute immunity afforded to judges [be] extended to apply to quasi-judicial conduct of [n]on-judicial officials whose official duties have an integral relationship with the judicial process.” Rickman, 270 F.3d at 435 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir.2002) (“Absolute judicial immunity is not reserved solely for judges, but extends to nonjudicial officers for ‘all claims relating to the exercise of judicial functions.’ ” (quoting Burns, 500 U.S. at 499, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part))).

This immunity has been extended to non-judges in two circumstances. First, it has been applied to “quasi-judicial conduct,” Rickman, 270 F.3d at 435, that is, actions of non-judicial officers acting in a judicial capacity. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[w]hen judicial immunity is extended to officials other than judges, it is because their judgments are ‘functionally] comparable]’ to those of judges— that is, because they, too, ‘exercise a discretionary judgment’ as a part of their function.” Antoine, 508 U.S. at 436, 113 S.Ct. 2167 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n. 20, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976)).⁶ Absolute immunity does not extend to all positions simply “because they are part of the judicial function.” Id. at 435, 96 S.Ct. 984 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Absolute judicial immunity also has been extended to the conduct of a second group of individuals. “[W]hen functions that are more administrative in character have been undertaken pursuant to the explicit direction of a judicial officer, we have held that that officer’s immunity is also available to the subordinate.” Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 601 (7th Cir.1992). “The policy justifying an extension of absolute immunity in these circumstances is to prevent court personnel and other officials from becoming a lightning rod for harassing litigation aimed at the court.” Richman, 270 F.3d at 435 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In applying this type of quasi-judicial immunity, this court further has distinguished between the court’s order and the manner in which the order is enforced. See id. at 436. Thus, deputies who allegedly used excessive force in carrying out a judge’s order to clear the courtroom were not entitled to absolute immunity; the suit challenged the way the officers enforced the order, not the order itself. See id. at 437-39.

Before the recent guidance of the Supreme Court in Antoine, we had occasion to apply these principles to clerks of court on a few occasions. In Lowe v. Letsinger, 772 F.2d 308, 313 (7th Cir.1985), we noted that “a court clerk enjoys absolute immunity in rare instances where he is performing nonroutine, discretionary acts akin to those performed by judges.” We then determined that absolute immunity did not apply to a clerk’s involvement in the concealment of the entry of a post-conviction order “because the clerk’s duty to type and send notice after entry of judgment is a non-discretionary, ministerial task.” Id. In Kincaid, we considered the issue once again. Because the clerks in Kincaid acted pursuant to judicial instruction when they returned the plaintiffs’ complaint and filing fee and (erroneously) directed them to file in a different court, we readily concluded that the clerks’ actions were protected by absolute immunity. See Kincaid, 969 F.2d at 601.

We have not had the opportunity to address squarely the issue presently before us — whether a clerk’s refusal to file a pleading qualifies for absolute immunity in the absence of explicit judicial direction.⁷ We must therefore decide whether Mr. Nolen’s actions in the present case, as described in the operative complaint, fall within one of the two categories of actions for which absolute judicial immunity has been extended to non-judges in our previous cases.

With respect to the first category, Mr. Nolen was not acting in a “functionally comparable” way to a judge. At the outset, no one suggests that, under the law of Illinois, the action of Mr. Nolen of extracting from the files of the court a previously filed case and returning it to the litigant without any judicial action having been taken can be characterized as being colorably within his authority as the clerk of a court. Indeed, it appears established that such action is beyond the authority of the clerk.⁸ More importantly, on this record, we cannot say that a traditional judicial function that involves the exercise of discretion has been delegated to a subordinate court officer. As noted by the Supreme Court, the “touchstone” for applying absolute immunity has been “the function of resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights.” Antoine, 508 U.S. at 435, 113 S.Ct. 2167. Here, Mr. Nolen’s duty under the law of Illinois to maintain the official record was purely ministerial; he had no authority to resolve disputes between parties or to make substantive determinations on the worth or merits of a filing. In short, Mr. Nolen is charged with having breached his duty to perform the ministerial act of accepting technically sufficient papers.⁹ The function required of him by law involves none of the discretion that the Supreme Court has told us in Antoine is at the heart of absolute judicial immunity.

At least on the record before us, the second category for quasi-judicial immunity is equally inapplicable to the clerk in this case. This second category includes individuals who are acting at the direction of a judicial officer. At this point in the litigation, there is no claim that Mr. Nolen was acting at the direction of any judicial officer in returning Mr. Snyder’s papers.

Accordingly, we must conclude that, on this record, there is no basis for dismissal of the action on the ground of absolute quasi-judicial immunity.¹⁰

C.

We turn next to Mr. Nolen’s claim that he is entitled on this record to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability “for the performance of their discretionary functions when ‘their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). The central purpose of qualified immunity is to protect public officials “ ‘from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.’ ” Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 514, 114 S.Ct. 1019, 127 L.Ed.2d 344 (1994) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806, 102 S.Ct. 2727). In determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, we engage in a two-part inquiry. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). First, we determine whether, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts alleged show that the defendant violated a constitutional right. See id. If a constitutional violation is shown on the basis of those facts, we then determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the violation. See id. The clearly established inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Id. “ ‘The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’ ” Id. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the existence of a clearly established constitutional right. See McGrath v. Gillis, 44 F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir.1995).

We first must determine whether the complaint before us states a claim for a deprivation of the federal right of access to the courts. Mr. Snyder alleges that he was deprived of his federal constitutional right of access to the courts under the First Amendment and substantive due process when Mr. Nolen refused to file Mr. Snyder’s petition for a dissolution of marriage and for a temporary restraining order against his wife.

Mr. Nolen first maintains that Mr. Snyder was not deprived of a constitutional right because a prisoner’s right of access to the courts is limited to actions challenging his conviction, sentence or conditions of confinement. The members of the panel agree that Mr. Nolen’s argument misconstrues the relevant Supreme Court precedent. In one line of cases, the Supreme Court has held that the fundamental right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to provide prisoners with the tools necessary “to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996); see also Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579-80, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969). However, the Supreme Court also has held that the First Amendment right to petition the government includes the right to file other civil actions in court that have a reasonable basis in law or fact. See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 484, 105 S.Ct. 2787, 86 L.Ed.2d 384 (1985) (“[F]iling a complaint in court is a form of petitioning activity; but baseless litigation is not immunized by the First Amendment right to petition.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741, 103 S.Ct. 2161, 76 L.Ed.2d 277 (1983) (“[T]he right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances.”); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972) (“The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.”); see also Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243, 246 (2d Cir.1997) (“It is well established that all persons enjoy a constitutional right of access to the courts.”). This parallel development of these two distinct lines of cases was recognized explicitly by our colleagues in the Sixth Circuit in John L. v. Adams, 969 F.2d 228 (6th Cir.1992). That court held that “in order to assure that incarcerated persons have meaningful access to courts, states are required to provide affirmative assistance in the preparation of legal papers in cases involving constitutional rights and other civil rights actions related to their incarceration,” but “in all other types of civil actions, states may not erect barriers that impede the right of access of incarcerated persons.” Id. at 235.

The right of access to the courts is the right of an individual, whether free or incarcerated, to obtain access to the courts without undue interference. The right of individuals to pursue legal redress for claims that have a reasonable basis in law or fact is protected by the First Amendment right to petition and the Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process. See Vasquez v. Hernandez, 60 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir.1995); see also Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir.1993) (“Meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental constitutional right, grounded in the First Amendment right to petition and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process clauses.”). The Fifth Circuit’s discussion in Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.1986), is particularly instructive. In Jackson, a prisoner alleged that he was deprived of his constitutional right of access to the courts when personnel in the prison mail-room intentionally delayed his petition to proceed in forma pauperis and the delay resulted in the dismissal of his state appeal from an adverse civil judgment. The district court interpreted the prisoner’s claim as a negligent deprivation of property without due process and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim because there was an adequate post-deprivation state remedy. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the complaint stated a viable cause of action for the intentional deprivation of the prisoner’s constitutional right of access to the courts, in violation of the First Amendment and substantive due process. Id. at 308. The court squarely rejected the defendants’ contention that a prisoner’s right of access to the courts is limited to the presentation of constitutional, civil rights and habeas corpus claims, stating that “Recognition of the constitutional right of access to the courts ... long precedes Bounds, and has from its inception been applied to civil as well as constitutional claims.” Id. at 311.¹¹

Having rejected Mr. Nolen’s narrow view of prisoners’ right to access, we next must consider whether the constitutional right to access is sufficiently broad to encompass Mr. Snyder’s claim. For the reasons set forth in the separate opinions that follow, the majority of the panel concludes that Mr. Snyder’s complaint does not state a claim for violation of his constitutional right of access to the courts. The judgment of the district court therefore is affirmed.

1 . The district court characterized Mr. Nolen’s conduct as a refusal to file Mr. Snyder’s pleadings. We note, however, that Mr. Snyder’s second amended complaint actually characterizes Mr. Nolen's conduct in two ways. First, the complaint alleges that Mr. Nolen wrongfully refused to file the pleadings. Second, the complaint states that "Nolen gave the court jurisdiction by affixing a file-stamp and docketing number, and his actions in 'whiting out' [the] same was an 'impermissible encroachment of judicial authority.' ” R.22.

In Coles v. Terrell, 162 Ill. 167, 44 N.E. 391 (1896), and more recently in Ayala v. Goad, 176 Ill.App.3d 1091, 126 IIl.Dec. 413, 531 N.E.2d 1040 (1988), the Illinois courts have held that, once the clerk has file stamped the pleading and docketed the case, the papers become the files of the court and cannot be withdrawn without leave of court. See Coles, 44 N.E. at 392 ("The clerk put his file mark upon it, and also docketed it in the probate docket. It then ... most certainly became a part of the records of the court. It had passed completely out of the control of the party filing it, and it could not be subsequently withdrawn without an order of court. The clerk had no authority to permit its withdrawal.”); Ayala, 126 Ill.Dec. 413, 531 N.E.2d at 1043 ("It is clear that by file stamping the complaint and assigning a docket number, the clerk’s office filed the complaint on January 5, 1987, notwithstanding that the fee may not have been paid, and it was then in the exclusive custody and control of the clerk’s office and a part of the records of the circuit court. The filing date of the complaint could not thereafter be changed by the clerk of the circuit court as he has no authority to do so without leave of court.”).

2 . Whether Mr. Nolen’s action is characterized as a refusal to file Mr. Snyder’s pleadings or a removal of Mr. Snyder's pleadings from the docket, there appears to be no authority under Illinois law to justify his actions. See infra note 9; cf. Ayala, 126 Ill.Dec. 413, 531 N.E.2d at 1043 ("The circuit clerk’s practice of filing then changing the filing dates on documents where fees were not paid created the situation in the present case. Such a practice impermissibly encroaches upon the judicial authority and casts doubt upon the reliability of the dates on which documents have been filed with his office. We point out that the clerk may refuse to accept a document unless the fee is paid (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 25, par. 27.1); however, where the clerk has accepted a document for filing without the fee, file stamps it and assigns a docket number, as occurred in the present case, the circuit court nevertheless acquires jurisdiction of the case.”).

3 . Specifically, Mr. Snyder stated that he was transferred from the Shawnee Correctional Center to the Illinois River Correctional Center on January 3, 2001, and that he did not return to Shawnee until March 7, 2001.

4 . The realities of prison administration require that those responsible for the administration of these institutions have significant flexibility in setting up procedures to ensure that prisoners who are temporarily absent from their place of incarceration receive prompt notification of official correspondence. If a prison administration believes that the administrative burden of forwarding the mail of temporarily transferred prisoners is too great, it may establish a procedure requiring the prisoner to assume responsibility for making his new address known to his correspondents, including the courts in which the prisoner has cases pending. As long as the prisoner is given adequate and timely notice of his new address and an opportunity to notify the court, such a provision would impose a reasonable requirement upon the prisoner.

5 . See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12-13, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (holding that judge’s alleged action in directing officers to bring before the court an attorney who was in the courthouse was taken in judge's judicial capacity and, therefore, judge was entitled to absolute immunity even though he allegedly directed officers to carry out the order with excessive force); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225-29, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988) (holding that judge acted in administrative capacity when he demoted and dismissed probation officer and, therefore, was not entitled to absolute immunity); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362-63, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (holding that judge acted in judicial capacity when he approved mother's ex parte petition to have her mentally retarded minor daughter sterilized and, therefore, was entitled to absolute immunity); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not abolish the "settled principle” of judicial immunity and, therefore, judge could not be held liable for an unconstitutional conviction); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (holding that "judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly”).

6 . In holding that court reporters are not protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity, the Supreme Court in Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 113 S.Ct. 2167, 124 L.Ed.2d 391 (1993), wrote:

The function performed by court reporters is not in this category.... [C]ourt reporters are required by statute to “recor[d] verbatim” court proceedings in their entirety. 28 U.S.C. § 753(b). They are afforded no discretion in the carrying out of this duty; they are to record, as accurately as possible, what transpires in court.... In short, court reporters do not exercise the kind of judgment that is protected by the doctrine of judicial immunity.

Id. at 436-37, 113 S.Ct. 2167.

7 . Writing before the receipt of the more recent guidance from the Supreme Court, those circuits that have addressed the issue have reached contrary conclusions. In Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir.1987), the Ninth Circuit held that clerks who initially accepted and filed an incomplete bankruptcy petition without giving proper counseling and notice regarding the chapters of the Bankruptcy Code under which the plaintiff could file and later refused to accept an amended petition were protected by absolute immunity. In so doing, the court reasoned that "[t]he commencement of an action by filing a complaint or petition is a basic and integral part of the judicial process" and "[t]he clerk of court and deputy clerks are the officials through whom such filing is done.” Id.; see also Smith v. Erickson, 884 F.2d 1108, 1111 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting that "the filing of complaints and other documents is an integral part of the judicial process and that [a court clerk] would be protected by judicial immunity from damages for civil rights violations committed in connection with the performance of such tasks"). The Fourth Circuit in McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 4 (4th Cir.1972), held, however, that "there is no basis for sheltering [a] clerk from liability under section 1983 for failure to perform a required ministerial act such as properly filing papers." The court reasoned that there was no history of extending such immunity to clerks at common law and “the threat of possible tort liability does not 'unduly inhibit’ the clerk in the discharge of his duties.” Id.

8 . See, e.g., Ayala, 126 Ill.Dec. 413, 531 N.E.2d at 1043 (stating that a court clerk may refuse to accept a document unless the fee is paid, but where the clerk has accepted the document for filing without the fee, file stamps it and assigns a docket number, the court nevertheless acquires jurisdiction).

9 . Section 13 of the Clerks of Courts Act, 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/0.01 et seq., sets forth the general duties of court clerks. It does not give the clerk the authority to refuse to file papers that conform to the technical rules of court. Section 13 provides in relevant part that “[t]he clerks shall attend the sessions of their respective courts, preserve all the files and papers thereof, make, keep and preserve complete records of all the proceedings and determinations thereof, except in cases otherwise provided by law, and do and perform all other duties pertaining to their offices, as may be required by law or the rules and orders of their courts respectively.” 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/13. Rule 131 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Illinois specifies the proper form of papers and appears to provide some basis for a court clerk to reject a procedurally nonconforming pleading. The rule provides:

(a) Legibility. All papers and copies thereof for filing and service shall be legibly written, typewritten, printed, or otherwise duplicated. The clerk shall not file any which do not conform to this rule.

(b) Titles. All papers shall be entitled in the court and cause, and the plaintiff's name shall be placed first.

(c) Multiple Parties. In cases in which there are two or more plaintiffs or two or more defendants, it is sufficient in entitling papers, except a summons, to name the first-named plaintiff and the first-named defendant with the usual indication of other parties, provided there be added the official number of the cause.

(d) Name, Address and Telephone Number of Responsible Attorney or Attorneys. All papers filed in any cause or served upon the opposite party shall bear the name and business address and telephone number, if any, of the responsible attorney or attorneys and the law firm filing the same, or of the party who appears in his own proper person. If service by facsimile transmission is permitted and the responsible attorney or attorneys or the party who appears in his own proper person will accept service by facsimile transmission, then the paper shall also bear the statement “Service by facsimile transmission will be accepted at [facsimile telephone number].”

Ill. S.Ct. R. 131; see also 1A Nichols Ill. Civ. Prac. § 11:7 ("Supreme Court Rule 131, which pertains to the preparation and form of papers in original proceedings, provides that the clerk of the court is not to file any papers which do not conform with the requirements of Rule 131 as to form.”).

10 . At first glance, it may seem that our review of this case is precluded- by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rook-er v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). Neither the parties nor the district court addressed this issue, and we believe that they were correct in that regard. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits lower federal courts from engaging in appellate review of state court determinations. See Young v. Murphy, 90 F.3d 1225, 1230 (7th Cir. 1996); Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1364 (7th Cir. 1996); Levin v. Attorney Reg. & Disciplinary Comm’n of the Supreme Court of Illinois, 74 F.3d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 1996). "Litigants who believe that a state judicial proceeding has violated their constitutional rights must appeal that decision through their state courts and then to the [United States] Supreme Court.” Centres, Inc. v. Town of Brookfield, 148 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir.1998). The specific allegation in Mr. Snyder's complaint is that Mr. Nolen, acting as the Circuit Court Clerk, refused to file or actually removed already filed papers from the court's docket. Under Illinois law, the clerk simply has the ministerial duty to file papers that conform to the technical rules of court. See In re Estate of Davison, 102 Ill.App.3d 644, 58 Ill.Dec. 280, 430 N.E.2d 222, 223 (1981) ("Delivery alone has been held to constitute filing since the person filing has no control over the officer who receives documents. Subsequent ministerial tasks of the clerk evidence the filing of a document but are not essential to its perfection.” (internal citation omitted)); Roesch-Zeller, Inc. v. Hollembeak, 5 Ill.App.2d 94, 124 N.E.2d 662, 664 (1955) ("The duty of the clerk to file the document on the date it was presented to him was a ministerial act, the performance of which could be compelled by writ of mandamus.”). Illinois therefore certainly would not consider Mr. Nolen's actions a “proceeding.” We therefore have no occasion to address the tension between the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity and the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to suits for damages against state judicial officers. See Jackson v. Gardner, 42 F.3d 1391, 1994 WL 684041, at * 1 (7th Cir. Dec.7, 1994).

11 . Along with our colleagues in the Fourth Circuit, see Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 76 (4th Cir.1995), we have made clear that an allegation of simple negligence will not support a claim that an official has denied an individual of access to the courts. See Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 602 (7th Cir.1992) (holding that an isolated incident of negligence resulting in failure to file complaint did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation); see also Lee X v. Casey, 771 F.Supp. 725, 729 (E.D.Va.1991) (holding that negligent conduct by deputy clerk of court in failing to file letter as a notice of appeal did not give rise to a constitutional claim for violation of access to the courts). Although the pro se complaint in this case is not a model of clarity, we believe that it cannot be characterized fairly as alleging mere negligence on the part of Mr. Nolen. Cf. Gregory v. Nunn, 895 F.2d 413, 415 n. 2 (7th Cir.1990) (noting in access to courts context that pleading requisite intent "need not detain our review of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal” and holding that the plaintiff’s complaint stated a viable claim for deprivation of the right of access to the courts).