United States v. Stefan , 2010 CAAF LEXIS 1075 ( 2010 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Dustin A. STEFAN, Private
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 10-0349
Crim. App. No. 20081097
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued November 9, 2010
Decided December 29, 2010
STUCKY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which EFFRON,
C.J., and BAKER, ERDMANN, and RYAN, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Jess B. Roberts (argued); Colonel Mark
Tellitocci, Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan F. Potter, and Major
Laura R. Kesler (on brief); Lieutenant Colonel Matthew M.
Miller, Major Grace M. Gallagher, and Major Timothy W. Thomas.
For Appellee: Captain Benjamin M. Owens-Filice (argued); Major
Christopher B. Burgess and Major LaJohnne A. White (on brief);
Lieutenant Colonel Martha L. Foss.
Military Judge: Gary J. Brockington
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Stefan, No. 10-0349/AR
Judge STUCKY delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted review to determine whether the chief of
military justice was disqualified from preparing the addendum to
the staff judge advocate’s recommendation (SJAR) because, before
trial, she had caused the charges to be served on the accused.
We hold that she was disqualified under Article 6(c), Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 806(c) (2006), and
Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1106(b), but Appellant was not
prejudiced.1
I.
A.
On August 20, 2008, Appellant damaged a door and some
ceiling tiles, among other things, to obtain keys to the
barracks rooms from the First Sergeant’s office. With the keys,
Appellant entered seven rooms and stole numerous personal items
from fellow soldiers, including iPods, game systems, DVD
players, laptop computers, and other property. While being
questioned by military police about the thefts, Appellant was
ordered to stand fast, but he disobeyed that order and left.
This was not the first time Appellant had been in trouble with
1
The Government has submitted a motion for this Court to
consider an affidavit from the disqualified staff judge
advocate. “The Court will normally not consider any facts
outside of the record established at the trial and the Court of
Criminal Appeals,” unless good cause is shown. C.A.A.F. R.
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military authorities. Before the barracks larceny, Appellant
had possessed marijuana once and missed morning formations twice
-- once to be with a woman in his room, contrary to orders.
Based on the above conduct, Appellant pled guilty at a
general court-martial to failure to go to his appointed place of
duty (two specifications), disobeying a noncommissioned officer
(NCO), failure to obey an order, damaging military property,
possessing marijuana, larceny (seven specifications), and
burglary, in violation of Articles 86, 91, 92, 108, 112a, 121,
129, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 886,
891, 892, 908, 912a, 921, 929 (2006). The military judge
accepted Appellant’s pleas and sentenced him to a dishonorable
discharge, confinement for twenty-two months, and forfeiture of
all pay and allowances.
B.
After trial, Major Van Eck drafted and signed the SJAR as
the acting SJA. He recommended that the convening authority
approve Appellant’s sentence without clemency. Without comment
on the SJAR, Appellant provided post-trial matters pursuant to
R.C.M. 1105 and R.C.M. 1106. In his clemency submission,
Appellant’s only request was to reduce his dishonorable
discharge to a bad-conduct discharge.
30A(a). Good cause has not been shown; therefore, the motion is
denied.
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Following this submission, Major Wright, the chief of
military justice, acting as the SJA, signed the addendum to the
SJAR, in which she stated that “clemency [was] not warranted.”
On June 2, 2009, the convening authority reduced the time of
confinement to eighteen months in accordance with the pretrial
agreement, but otherwise approved the adjudged sentence.
Appellant submitted the case on its merits to the United States
Army Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA), which affirmed in a
summary disposition. United States v. Stefan, No. 20081097,
2010 CCA LEXIS 12, at *1 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2010)
(unpublished).
Judge Ham dissented, arguing that Article 6(c) disqualified
Major Wright from preparing the addendum to the SJAR because of
her position as chief of military justice and because she had
acted as trial counsel in Appellant’s case. Id. at *10-*11.
Judge Ham reached this conclusion because, inter alia, Major
Wright had signed the original and additional charge sheets,
indicating that she had caused the charges to be served on
Appellant as trial counsel. Id. at *18.
II.
A.
Article 6(c) provides that “[n]o person who has acted as
member, military judge, trial counsel, assistant trial counsel,
defense counsel, assistant defense counsel, or investigating
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officer in any case may later act as a staff judge advocate or
legal officer to any reviewing authority upon the same case.”
R.C.M. 1106(b) echoes this sentiment in similar language.
Whether Article 6(c) and R.C.M. 1106(b) disqualify an individual
from acting as the SJA is a question of law, which we review de
novo. See United States v. Taylor, 60 M.J. 190, 194 (C.A.A.F.
2004).
The plain text of Article 6(c) states that an individual
who acted as trial counsel is disqualified from acting as the
SJA. We reject the Government’s argument “that only those
persons that were detailed as trial counsel in accordance with
Article 27, UCMJ[, 10 U.S.C. § 827 (2006),] are disqualified”
under Article 6(c). The text does not support such a narrow
reading of the statute, as disqualification does not require
that a person be detailed as trial counsel, only that the person
act as such.
Therefore, a person will be disqualified from acting as the
SJA if that person performed the duties of a disqualifying
position. See United States v. Mallicote, 13 C.M.A. 374, 376,
32 C.M.R. 374, 376 (1962) (“although the staff judge advocate or
his assistant are not, by reason of their office and ordinary
pretrial activities, barred by Article 6(c) from subsequently
advising the reviewing authority, the implication and reason why
he must be when he acts -- directly or indirectly -- as trial
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counsel, are clear”). As for when a person has performed the
duties of a disqualifying position, some relevant considerations
include the action taken, the position of the person that would
normally take that action, and the capacity in which the action
is claimed to have been taken.
B.
In this case, Major Wright performed some duties of -- and
thus acted as -- trial counsel. She not only caused the charges
to be served on Appellant, a task traditionally reserved for
detailed trial counsel, see R.C.M. 602 (“The trial counsel
detailed to the court-martial . . . shall cause to be served
upon each accused a copy of the charge sheet.”), but she also
acknowledged performing that act as trial counsel in block 15 of
the two charge sheets. As such, she was disqualified by Article
6(c) from acting as the SJA in Appellant’s case.
III.
A.
Although we find error, we do not find that Appellant was
prejudiced. We have not held that “recommendations prepared by
a disqualified officer [are] void.” United States v. Edwards,
45 M.J. 114, 115 (C.A.A.F. 1996). Rather, we test for prejudice
under Article 59(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 859(a) (2006), which
requires material prejudice to the substantial rights of the
accused. Appellant asks that we presume prejudice when Article
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6(c) is violated, but we find that these kinds of errors are
amenable to being tested for prejudice. To find reversible
error, an appellant must, inter alia, “make[] ‘some colorable
showing of possible prejudice.’” Taylor, 60 M.J. at 195(quoting United States v. Wheelus, 49 M.J. 283, 289 (C.A.A.F.
1998)).
B.
At the outset, we note that Appellant did not even raise
this issue on appeal to the CCA; the case was submitted to that
court on its merits. Instead, Judge Ham raised it sua sponte.
Stefan, 2010 CCA LEXIS 12, at *1. Regardless of whether
Appellant raised the issue below, other facts substantiate that
Appellant has not made a colorable showing of prejudice.
Candidly, Major Wright’s involvement in Appellant’s case
was minimal. While minimal conduct can contravene Article 6(c),
it is obvious that when the conduct is relatively minimal, the
likelihood of actual prejudice is substantially diminished. In
this case, Major Wright’s actions simply did not rise to the
level that traditionally has been found to cause prejudice.
See, e.g., United States v. Johnson-Saunders, 48 M.J. 74, 74-75
(C.A.A.F. 1998) (finding prejudice when the acting SJA had been
detailed as the assistant trial counsel, had actively prosecuted
the case, and had requested a harsher sentence than adjudged);
United States v. Coulter, 3 C.M.A. 657, 658-59, 14 C.M.R. 75,
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United States v. Stefan, No. 10-0349/AR
76-77 (1954) (finding prejudice when the acting SJA had been
detailed as trial counsel, actively prosecuted the case, and
called the accused a “worthless individual” in a report to the
convening authority).
In this case, nothing indicates that Major Wright actively
prosecuted the case or took a firm stance on sentencing. Her
addendum to the SJAR merely echoed Major Van Eck’s succinct
recommendation of no clemency without further elaboration of
Appellant’s case. See United States v. Hamilton, 47 M.J. 32, 35
(C.A.A.F. 1997) (noting, inter alia, that a recommendation,
which was “plain-vanilla in substance,” did not prejudice the
appellant). Considering the circumstances of this case,
including the host of offenses committed by Appellant and the
seriousness of some of his crimes,2 there is nothing that would
suggest that another SJA would have made a different
recommendation on Appellant’s clemency request. We conclude
that Appellant was not prejudiced.
2
One should not underestimate the seriousness of barracks
larceny. From basic training onwards, servicemembers are taught
to trust their fellow servicemembers with their life, and
barracks theft substantially damages that trust. See United
States v. Usry, 9 M.J. 701, 703 (N.C.M.R. 1980); accord United
States v. Hampton, 40 M.J. 457, 460 (C.M.A. 1994).
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IV.
The judgment of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is affirmed.
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