United States v. Hunter , 2008 CAAF LEXIS 51 ( 2008 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Jesse C. HUNTER, Machinery Technician Third Class
U.S. Coast Guard, Appellant
No. 07-0386
Crim. App. No. 1232
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued December 5, 2007
Decided January 11, 2008
RYAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which EFFRON,
C.J., and BAKER, ERDMANN, and STUCKY, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant Robert M. Pirone (argued); Lieutenant
Commander Nancy J. Truax (on brief).
For Appellee: Lieutenant Commander Patrick M. Flynn (argued).
Military Judge: Stephen McCleary
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Hunter, 07-0386/CG
Judge RYAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant was convicted at a special court-martial,
pursuant to his pleas, of three specifications of failure to go
to his appointed place of duty, one specification of willful
dereliction of duty, one specification of larceny, and one
specification of dishonorable failure to pay a just debt, in
violation of Articles 86, 92, 121, and 134, Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 886, 892, 921, 934 (2000).
The military judge sentenced Appellant to a bad-conduct
discharge, confinement for eight months, and reduction to E-1.
The convening authority approved the bad-conduct discharge,
a reduction to E-2, confinement for eight months, and deferred
and waived automatic forfeitures. Confinement in excess of 180
days was suspended for a period of twelve months from the date
of the convening authority’s action. The United States Coast
Guard Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the findings and
sentence. United States v. Hunter, 64 M.J. 571, 575-76 (C.G.
Ct. Crim. App. 2007).
We granted Appellant’s petitions on the following issues:
I. WHETHER R.C.M. 705(c)(2)(D) PERMITS PRETRIAL
MISCONDUCT TO FORM THE BASIS FOR A WITHDRAWAL FROM THE
SENTENCING LIMITATION OF THE PRETRIAL AGREEMENT WHEN
PRETRIAL MISCONDUCT, BY ITS VERY NATURE, CANNOT FALL
WITHIN ANY PERIOD OF SUSPENSION AS REQUIRED BY R.C.M.
1109 SINCE THERE IS NO SENTENCE PRIOR TO TRIAL.
II. WHETHER APPELLANT’S PLEAS WERE IMPROVIDENT BECAUSE
THE MILITARY JUDGE FAILED TO ENSURE THAT APPELLANT
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UNDERSTOOD THE MEANING AND EFFECT OF THE MISCONDUCT
PROVISIONS IN THE PRETRIAL AGREEMENT, AND THE
CONVENING AUTHORITY SUBSEQUENTLY WITHDREW FROM THE
SENTENCING LIMITATION PORTION OF THE PRETRIAL
AGREEMENT BASED ON PRETRIAL MISCONDUCT.1
We hold that, as long as the procedural protections set
forth in R.C.M. 1109 are either followed or waived, a convening
authority may withdraw before action from a pretrial agreement
(PTA) when the accused violates conditions established pursuant
to Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 705(c)(2)(D). We further
hold that Appellant has failed to demonstrate material prejudice
to a substantial right stemming from his plea colloquy;
therefore he is not entitled to relief. Article 59(a), UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 859(a) (2000). There is no evidence that Appellant
misunderstood the meaning and effect of the misconduct provision
within his PTA or that his understanding of it prejudiced his
ability to make a fully informed decision to plead guilty.
I. Factual Background
The relevant facts for resolution of the granted issues
are undisputed. Appellant signed a PTA with the convening
authority two days prior to trial. Appellant agreed to plead
guilty to the charged offenses before a military judge. The
convening authority agreed to disapprove any reduction below the
pay grade E-2 and to suspend any confinement in excess of 120
1
65 M.J. 300 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
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days for a period of twelve months from the date of the
convening authority’s action.
The PTA also covered the consequences of additional
misconduct by Appellant after signing the PTA and before
completing any sentence. It provided, inter alia, that if
Appellant committed misconduct after signing the agreement and
the convening authority acted on that misconduct after
Appellant’s guilty pleas were accepted but before the convening
authority took action under R.C.M. 1107, the convening authority
could set aside the sentence limitations, after affording
Appellant a hearing “‘substantially similar to the hearing
required by Article 72, UCMJ, [10 U.S.C. § 872 (2000)], and the
procedures based on the level of adjudged punishment set forth
in R.C.M. 1109(d), (e), (f), or (g).’” Hunter, 64 M.J. at 572.
Two events lead to the instant appeal. First, the
military judge did not discuss the misconduct provisions in the
PTA with Appellant during the course of the providency inquiry.
Second, before the convening authority acted on the adjudged
sentence, Appellant was alleged to have committed misconduct.
An inventory of Appellant’s possessions upon entry to the brig
led to accusations that he was in possession of government
property that was either stolen or misappropriated. And a
routine urinalysis administered to him upon entry to the brig
tested positive for marijuana.
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The convening authority gave notice that he intended to
exercise the provision in the PTA that allowed a withdrawal from
the sentencing limitation contained in the agreement due to
Appellant’s alleged misconduct. Under the specific terms of his
PTA, and by operation of R.C.M. 705 and R.C.M. 1109, Appellant
was entitled to a hearing to determine whether the alleged
misconduct occurred before the convening authority could
withdraw from any portion of the sentencing limitation set forth
in the PTA.
But Appellant waived his right to a R.C.M. 1109 hearing.2
In exchange, the convening authority agreed that only the
confinement portion of the sentence limitation contained in the
PTA would be affected and further agreed not to take action on
the additional alleged misconduct. The ultimate effect of the
above facts was that Appellant served sixty days of confinement
that, but for the alleged misconduct, would otherwise have been
suspended.
II. Discussion
Appellant argues that a misconduct provision in a PTA
governing misconduct that occurs before the convening authority
2
It was argued that this waiver of the R.C.M. 1109 hearing in
exchange for sixty additional days of confinement was a new,
post-trial, agreement under United States v. Dawson, 51 M.J.
411, 413 (C.A.A.F. 1999). This is an incorrect characterization
of the events that transpired subsequent to the convening
authority’s decision to enforce the misconduct provision in the
pretrial agreement.
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acts pursuant to R.C.M. 1107 is per se impermissible under
R.C.M. 1109 because R.C.M. 1109 requires that the withdrawal be
during the “period of suspension,” or after R.C.M. 1107 action.
Appellant asserts, therefore, that the convening authority
breached his PTA by failing to suspend confinement in excess of
120 days, as required by that agreement when considered without
reference to the misconduct provision contained therein. In
addition, Appellant contends that his guilty plea was
improvident because the PTA misconduct3 provision was not
explained to him by the military judge. For the reasons set
forth below, we reject Appellant’s arguments and affirm the
decision of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals.
A. Intersection of R.C.M. 705 and R.C.M. 1109
Appellant accepts that his PTA authorized a withdrawal by
the convening authority on the basis of misconduct that occurred
prior to convening authority action. But he argues that this
provision is unlawful because R.C.M. 705(c)(2)(D) and R.C.M.
1109, read together, do not permit misconduct that occurred
prior to convening authority action to be used as the basis for
3
We note that the granted issue and the party’s briefs refer to
“pretrial misconduct” and the “pretrial misconduct provision.”
Nothing in this type of case turns on whether the misconduct
happened before or after trial. Rather, pursuant to the PTA,
the pertinent inquiry is whether the convening authority acted
on the sentence before or after the misconduct provision was
enforced.
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a withdrawal from the confinement limitation of a PTA. We
disagree.
The interpretation of provisions of the R.C.M., and whether
a term in a PTA violates the R.C.M., are questions of law that
we review de novo. United States v. Tate, 64 M.J. 269, 271
(C.A.A.F. 2007). Ordinary rules of statutory construction apply
in interpreting the R.C.M. United States v. Clark, 62 M.J. 195,
198 (C.A.A.F. 2005). We hold that R.C.M. 705(c)(2)(D)’s
reference to R.C.M. 1109 requires that the procedural
protections for a suspension and vacation proceeding under
R.C.M. 1109 be extended to withdrawal from sentence limitations
of a PTA based on allegations of misconduct.
Permissible conditions for a PTA are set forth explicitly
in R.C.M. 705(c)(2). Subsection (D) of this rule specifically
permits:
(D) A promise to conform the accused’s conduct to
certain conditions of probation before action by the
convening authority as well as during any period of
suspension of the sentence, provided that the
requirements of R.C.M. 1109 must be complied with
before an alleged violation of such terms may relieve
the convening authority of the obligation to fulfill
the agreement . . . .
(emphasis added).
Of course, R.C.M. 1109 by its terms addresses the
procedural requirements for “[v]acation of suspension of [a]
sentence,” not withdrawal from a sentence limitation in a PTA.
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Appellant nonetheless argues that because R.C.M. 1109(b)(1)
provides, in relevant part, that where a condition is violated
“[v]acation shall be based on a violation of the conditions of
suspension which occurs within the period of suspension,” and
because the misconduct in this case occurred before the sentence
was acted on by the convening authority, it did not occur within
the period of suspension. Accordingly, he asserts that the
convening authority could not lawfully exercise the provision in
the PTA that allowed withdrawal before the convening authority
acted on the sentence.
This argument is unsupported by ordinary rules of statutory
construction. First, Appellant’s contention that R.C.M. 1109
prohibits PTAs concerning pretrial misconduct is directly
counter to R.C.M. 705(c)(2)(D), which expressly provides for a
PTA provision covering conduct “before action by the convening
authority.” We see no reason to read the R.C.M. in such a
fashion as to create internal inconsistencies for the purpose of
nullifying the rules as drafted by the President. See Loving v.
United States, 517 U.S. 748, 773 (1996) (stating that the
“President, acting in his constitutional office of Commander in
Chief, had undoubted competency to prescribe” R.C.M.
provisions); see also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 552
(1994) (eschewing a statutory interpretation that would have
required a statute to “contradict itself”). The requirements of
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United States v. Hunter, 07-0386/CG
R.C.M. 1109 referenced by R.C.M. 705(c)(2)(D) refer to how a
vacation hearing should be carried out, not what event triggers
the hearing.
Second, while R.C.M. 705(c)(2)(D) does incorporate the
requirements of R.C.M. 1109 by reference, we decline to read
this to mean that a misconduct provision can only justify
withdrawal from sentence limitation portions of a PTA when the
misconduct occurred after the convening authority takes action
under R.C.M. 1107 and during the suspension period. This
reading is contextually unreasonable, especially when the
provisions can be read to give effect to both. See Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (discussing “the cardinal principle
of statutory construction that courts must give effect, if
possible, to every clause and word of a statute”).
In our view, while R.C.M. 705(c)(2)(D) could have been
drafted more precisely, the plain import of its reference to
R.C.M. 1109 is to require a convening authority to comply with
the R.C.M. 1109 procedural protections before the benefit of a
PTA can be withdrawn. And while this Court has not expressly
addressed this issue before, this has been, in fact, how the
provisions have been interpreted together for some time. United
States v. Smith, 46 M.J. 263, 265 (C.A.A.F. 1997); United States
v. Tester, 59 M.J. 644, 646 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2003); United
States v. Bulla, 58 M.J. 715, 721 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2003);
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United States v. Perlman, 44 M.J. 615, 616 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App.
1996); United States v. Kendra, 31 M.J. 846, 848 (N.M.C.M.R.
1990); see also Manual for Courts-Martial, United States,
Analysis of the Rules for Courts-Martial app. 21 at A21-40 (2005
ed.). Moreover, this is precisely what Appellant’s PTA provided
for in this case.
The misconduct provision of Appellant’s PTA complied with
R.C.M. 705, and the convening authority did not violate the PTA
by withdrawing from a portion of the sentencing limitation in
light of Appellant’s post-trial misconduct where Appellant
waived the procedural protections to which he was otherwise
entitled under R.C.M. 1109.
B. The Providency of Appellant’s Plea
The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the military judge
legally erred in failing to explain the pretrial misconduct
provision to Appellant prior to accepting his guilty plea, but,
despite the error, Appellant was not entitled to relief because
he failed to establish the material prejudice to a substantial
right required under Article 59(a), UCMJ. Hunter, 64 M.J. at
573-74. We agree.
“Military law imposes an independent obligation on the
military judge to ensure that the accused understands what he
gives up because of his plea and the accused’s consent to do so
must be ascertained.” United States v. Resch, 65 M.J. 233, 237
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United States v. Hunter, 07-0386/CG
(C.A.A.F. 2007). “The accused must know and understand not only
the agreement’s impact on the charges and specifications which
bear on the plea . . . but also other terms of the agreement,
including consequences of future misconduct or waiver of various
rights.” United States v. Felder, 59 M.J. 444, 445 (C.A.A.F.
2004); see also United States v. Jones, 23 M.J. 305, 308 (C.M.A.
1987) (discussing this Court’s willingness to strike down PTA
clauses that “violate the institutional safeguards an accused
has under the Uniform Code of Military Justice”).
Reflecting these concerns, R.C.M. 910(f)(4) requires that
where a plea agreement exists the military judge “shall inquire
to ensure: (A) That the accused understands the agreement; and
(B) That the parties agree to the terms of the agreement.” This
inquiry is part and parcel of the providence of an accuser’s
plea, and necessary to ensure that an accused is making a fully
informed decision as to whether or not to plead guilty. United
States v. King, 3 M.J. 458, 458 (C.M.A. 1977). And we have
noted on more than one occasion that an inquiry that falls short
of these requirements and fails to ensure the accused
understands the terms of the agreement is error. Felder, 59
M.J. at 445.
When, as in this case, an error is found, we will reject
the providency of a plea only where the appellant demonstrates a
“material prejudice to a substantial right.” Id. at 446 (citing
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Article 59(a), UCMJ). Not every error constitutes a material
prejudice to a substantial right warranting relief under Article
59(a), UCMJ. Id.In this case, the substantial right that must be prejudiced
is the right to make an informed decision to plead guilty. Cf.
United States v. Ginn, 47 M.J. 236, 247 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (stating
that “the determination whether the error ‘prejudiced’ the
defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather than go to trial
will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence
would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the
plea” in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel
case) (emphasis removed); see also Felder, 59 M.J. at 446(holding that guilty plea need not be set aside where accused is
not materially prejudiced by the failure to be questioned on a
plea agreement provision); United States v. Simpson, 17 C.M.A.
44, 47, 37 C.M.R. 308, 311 (1967) (stating that there was no
prejudice when there was nothing in the record that suggested
either accused would have changed their plea, but for the
error); United States v. Gonzalez, 61 M.J. 633, 636 (C.G. Ct.
Crim. App. 2005) (finding an error exists when there is “a
substantial likelihood that the [a]ppellant would have chosen to
change his pleas to not guilty and demanded a contested trial”).
Where there is “no evidence or representation before this Court
that Appellant misunderstood the terms of his agreement, that
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the operation of any term was frustrated, [or] that Appellant’s
participation in the agreement was anything other than wholly
voluntary” we will not find prejudice. Felder, 59 M.J. at 446.
We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that Appellant
has not alleged, and the record does not reflect, that Appellant
was not able to make an informed decision whether to plead
guilty because the provision in question was not explained to
him by the military judge. Hunter, 64 M.J. at 574. Moreover,
as noted by the Court of Criminal Appeals, Appellant’s attorney
negotiated with the convening authority to waive the R.C.M. 1109
hearing and increase his confinement based on the provision in
question in exchange for an agreement not to proceed on the
allegations of additional misconduct, rather than argue that he
had never heard of, or did not understand, the provision.
Instead, Appellant argues he was prejudiced because, due to
his subsequent misconduct, he spent sixty additional days in
confinement that would otherwise have been suspended. This is
not the prejudice we look for in the context of Article 59(a),
UCMJ, where a PTA provision was not explained to an accused by
the military judge. See Felder, 59 M.J. at 446.
Under the facts of this case, we find that Appellant’s
substantial rights were not prejudiced by the military judge’s
error in failing to explain the misconduct provision to him
during the course of the providence inquiry.
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III. Decision
The decision of the United States Coast Guard Court of
Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
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