United States v. Davis ( 2006 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Charles W. DAVIS, Lieutenant Commander
U.S. Navy, Appellant
No. 06-6001
Crim. App. No. 9600585
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued February 8, 2006
Decided May 19, 2006
ERDMANN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which
GIERKE, C.J., and CRAWFORD, EFFRON, and BAKER, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Richard A. Viczorek, USMC (argued).
For Appellee: Lieutenant Steven M. Crass, JAGC, USNR (argued);
Commander Charles N. Purnell, JAGC, USN (on brief).
Military Judge: Charles R. Hunt
This opinion is subject to revision before final publication.
United States v. Davis, No. 06-6001/NA
Judge ERDMANN delivered the opinion of the court.
Lieutenant Commander Charles W. Davis was charged with a
number of offenses resulting from the prolonged sexual abuse of
his stepdaughter. Davis entered mixed pleas and, following a
general court-martial, was found guilty of rape of a child,
forcible sodomy upon a child, forcible sodomy, indecent
liberties with a child, and indecent liberties, in violation of
Articles 120, 125, and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 920, 925, 934 (2000). He was sentenced to
confinement for life and forfeiture of $2,500.00 pay per month
for twenty-four months. The convening authority approved the
sentence, but suspended execution of the forfeitures on the
condition that Davis maintain an allotment of all disposable pay
and allowances to his wife. On initial review the United States
Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the
findings and sentence. United States v. Davis, 47 M.J. 707, 714
(N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1997).
Following the initial review at this court, we remanded the
case for a factfinding hearing pursuant to United States v.
DuBay, 17 C.M.A. 147, 37 C.M.R. 411 (1967), to resolve questions
of fact relating to an issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel. United States v. Davis, 52 M.J. 201, 206-07 (C.A.A.F.
1999). After the DuBay hearing, the Navy-Marine Corps court
again affirmed the findings and sentence. United States v.
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United States v. Davis, No. 06-6001/NA
Davis, No. NMCM 9600585, 2003 CCA LEXIS 161, at *28, 2003 WL
21789030, at *11 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. July 24, 2003)
(unpublished). Upon further review this court concluded that
counsel’s performance was ineffective and that Davis was
prejudiced as to sentence. United States v. Davis, 60 M.J. 469,
475 (C.A.A.F. 2005). We set aside the sentence and authorized a
sentence rehearing. Id.At the sentence rehearing the military judge dismissed the
case finding that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over
Davis because he was no longer a sentenced prisoner and had
received an administrative discharge in 1997. The Government
appealed the ruling of the military judge pursuant to Article
62, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 862 (2000). The Navy-Marine Corps court
granted the Government’s appeal and remanded the case, directing
the military judge to hold the sentence rehearing. United
States v. Davis, 62 M.J. 533, 538 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2005).
Davis petitioned this court and we granted review of two issues.1
1
On January 24, 2006, we granted review of the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRETED
ARTICLE 62, UCMJ, TO ALLOW A GOVERNMENT
APPEAL OF AN ORDER FROM A COURT-MARTIAL IN
WHICH NO PUNITIVE DISCHARGE COULD HAVE BEEN
ADJUDGED.
II. WHETHER THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT
THE DOCTRINE OF CONTINUING JURISDICTION
APPLIES TO TRIAL LEVEL COURTS-MARTIAL.
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United States v. Davis, No. 06-6001/NA
Article 62(a)(1), UCMJ, gives the Government a right to
appeal certain decisions from a “court-martial in which a
military judge presides and in which a punitive discharge may be
adjudged.” We granted review of the first issue to determine
whether the Government had the right to appeal the military
judge’s decision under Article 62, UCMJ, where Davis had not
been sentenced to a punitive discharge (dismissal) at the
original trial.2 Davis argues that since his sentence on
rehearing cannot be greater than the sentence adjudged at the
original trial, an appeal under Article 62, UCMJ, is not
authorized. We conclude that the Government properly appealed
the military judge’s decision under Article 62, UCMJ, as the
sentence rehearing was empowered to adjudge any sentence
authorized for the underlying offenses regardless of the
sentence approved after the original trial.
An essential component of court-martial jurisdiction is in
personam jurisdiction or jurisdiction over the person of an
accused. Article 2(a)(1) and (7), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(1),
(7) (2000), authorize court-martial jurisdiction over members of
the armed forces and persons serving sentences imposed by
62 M.J. 452 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
2
Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1003(b)(8) provides that there
are only three types of punitive separations that may be
adjudged by courts-martial. Dismissal from the service is the
only punitive separation that applies to a commissioned officer.
Compare R.C.M. 1003(b)(8)(A), with R.C.M. 1003(b)(8)(B), (C).
4
United States v. Davis, No. 06-6001/NA
courts-martial. We granted the second issue to determine
whether Davis, because he was administratively discharged in
1997 and because his sentence was set aside, remains subject to
the jurisdiction of a court-martial. We conclude that the power
of the court-martial over Davis was established at his initial
trial and that the intervening administrative discharge does not
divest the appellate courts of the power to correct error, order
further proceedings, and maintain appellate jurisdiction over
the person during the pendency of those proceedings.
DISCUSSION
A. The Availability of an Article 62, UCMJ, Appeal
Davis claims that the court-martial convened to conduct the
sentence rehearing was not authorized to adjudge a punitive
discharge because no discharge was adjudged at his original
trial. Because Article 62, UCMJ, limits the Government to
appealing only rulings from courts-martial at which a punitive
discharge may be adjudged, Davis argues that no Government
appeal was authorized in this case.
The Government responds that the characteristics of the
sentence rehearing relate back to the original court-martial and
that a punitive discharge was authorized at that trial. The
Government further argues that the military judge was bound to
follow the mandate of this court and where he departs from that
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United States v. Davis, No. 06-6001/NA
mandate, the Government should be afforded access to the
appellate courts to enforce the appellate court’s decision.
Resolution of this question involves issues of statutory
interpretation and the sentencing jurisdiction of a rehearing,
both of which are legal questions we review de novo. United
States v. Henderson, 59 M.J. 350, 351 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (the
jurisdiction of a court-martial is a legal question); United
States v. Tardif, 57 M.J. 219, 223 (C.A.A.F. 2002)
(interpretation of the Articles of the UCMJ presents an issue of
law).
Davis’s assertion that a punitive discharge cannot be
adjudged at his sentence rehearing is based on two 1959 cases
from this court and the current Discussion to Rule for Courts-
Martial (R.C.M.) 1005(e)(1). As written, Article 63(b), UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 863(b) (1950), prohibited a sentence at a rehearing
in excess of that “imposed” at the initial trial unless there
were additional findings of guilty not considered at that first
trial. The language of the discussion to R.C.M. 1005(e)(1) also
appears to limit the sentence at a rehearing to that which was
“adjudged by a prior court-martial or approved on review.”
R.C.M. 1005(e)(1) Discussion. In United States v. Eschmann, 11
C.M.A. 64, 67, 28 C.M.R. 288, 291 (1959), and United States v.
Jones, 10 C.M.A. 532, 533-34, 28 C.M.R. 98, 99-100 (1959), the
court found that it was error for a military judge’s
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United States v. Davis, No. 06-6001/NA
instructions to inform members of the basis for this sentence
limitation at a sentence rehearing. Davis’s reliance on these
references, however, is misplaced.
At the time the Eschmann and Jones cases were decided,
Article 63(b), UCMJ, read, in pertinent part, as follows:
Upon such rehearing . . . no sentence in excess of or
more severe than the original sentence shall be
imposed unless the sentence is based upon a finding of
guilty of an offense not considered upon the merits in
the original proceedings or unless the sentence
prescribed for the offense is mandatory.
Emphasis added. This language was enacted as part of the
original UCMJ and was designed to limit the sentence that a
rehearing could impose. See Commentary to Article 63(b),
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 1950, Text, References and
Commentary Based on the Report of the Committee on a Uniform
Code of Military Justice to The Secretary of Defense (Morgan
Draft), at 88, reprinted in 2 United States Army Court of
Military Review, Index and Legislative History, Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 1950, at 1424 (1985). The terms of the
statute specifically limited the sentencing authority of a
rehearing: “Under the Uniform Code a court-martial is expressly
bound by the findings and the sentence of the first trial.
Article 63(b) [UCMJ], 10 U.S.C. § 863.” United States v. Dean,
7 C.M.A. 721, 724, 23 C.M.R. 185, 188 (1957).
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United States v. Davis, No. 06-6001/NA
Since the enactment of the UCMJ3 there have been two changes
to Article 63, UCMJ. The first, in 1983, merged the subsections
of Article 63, UCMJ, and made other changes concerning the
impact of pretrial agreements not applicable to Davis’s case.4
The other change, made in 19925, changed the word “imposed” to
“approved.” Article 63, UCMJ, now reads, in pertinent part:
Upon a rehearing . . . no sentence in excess of or
more severe than the original sentence may be
approved, unless the sentence is based upon a finding
of guilty of an offense not considered upon the merits
in the original proceedings, or unless the sentence
prescribed for the offense is mandatory.
Emphasis added. “Approved” as used in Article 63, UCMJ, is a
word of art. A convening authority “approves” a sentence as
opposed to a court-martial which “adjudges” a sentence. Compare
Article 60(c)(2), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 860(c)(2) (2000), with
Articles 18, 19, 20, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 818, 819, 820 (2000).
The impact of this change to Article 63, UCMJ, was to move
responsibility for protecting the accused against greater
sentences at a rehearing from the trial court to the convening
authority.
The Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) was amended by the
President in 1995 to reflect this 1992 change to Article 63,
3
Act of 5 May 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-506, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 107(1950).
4
Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, § 5, 97 Stat.
1393, 1398-99 (1983).
5
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub.
L. No. 102-484, § 1065, 106 Stat. 2315, 2506 (1992).
8
United States v. Davis, No. 06-6001/NA
UCMJ.6 Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 810(d)(1), as amended,
states that sentences “shall be adjudged within the limits of
R.C.M. 1003.” Thus, R.C.M. 810(d)(1) echoes Article 63, UCMJ:
Except as otherwise provided in subsection
(d)(2) [pretrial agreements] of this rule,
offenses on which a rehearing, new trial, or
other trial has been ordered shall not be
the basis for an approved sentence in excess
of or more severe than the sentence
ultimately approved by the convening or
higher authority following the previous
trial or hearing, unless the sentence
prescribed for the offense is mandatory.
Emphasis added. The Discussion to R.C.M. 810(d)(1) indicates
that the sentence to be adjudged at a rehearing is not limited
by the previously approved sentence: “An appropriate sentence
on a retried or reheard offense should be adjudged without
regard to any credit to which an accused may be entitled” and
“[t]he members should not be advised of the basis for the
sentence limitation under this rule.” R.C.M. 810(d)(3)
Discussion.
The limitations in R.C.M. 1003, referred to in R.C.M.
810(d)(1), provide no sentence limitation on adjudged sentences
at rehearings other than to state in subsection (c)(4) that
“this rule may be further limited by other Rules for Courts-
Martial.” R.C.M. 1003(c)(4). The Discussion to R.C.M.
6
Exec. Order 12960, 60 Fed. Reg. 26,647 (May 17, 1995). See
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Historical Executive
Orders app. 25 at A25-21 (2005 ed.).
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1003(c)(4) refers to R.C.M. 810(d) without limiting the scope of
R.C.M. 810(d)(1). R.C.M. 1003(c)(4) Discussion.
Subsequent to the 1992 amendment to Article 63, UCMJ, and
the conforming change to R.C.M. 810(d)(1), this court said:
As a general matter, a court-martial,
including a rehearing, may adjudge any
punishment authorized by the Manual. See
RCM 1002, Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States (1998 ed.). Rehearings are
constrained, however, by specific
limitations on the sentence that may be
approved by the convening authority.
“Offenses on which a rehearing, new trial,
or other trial has been ordered shall not be
the basis for an approved sentence in excess
of or more severe than the sentence
ultimately approved by the convening or
higher authority following the previous
trial or hearing, unless the sentence
prescribed for the offense is mandatory.”
RCM 810(d)(1).
United States v. Rosendahl, 53 M.J. 344, 347 (C.A.A.F. 2000)
(emphasis added); see also United States v. Mitchell, 58 M.J.
446, 447 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
Only the discussion to R.C.M. 1005(e)7, one of the sources
relied upon by Davis, indicates that the maximum sentence to be
adjudged at a rehearing is limited by punishment adjudged and/or
approved from the prior trial: “[I]n a rehearing or new or
other trial [the maximum punishment is the lowest of] the
7
R.C.M. 1005(e) (instructions on sentence -- required
instructions).
10
United States v. Davis, No. 06-6001/NA
punishment adjudged by a prior court-martial or approved on
review, supplemented by the total permitted by any charges not
tried previously (see R.C.M. 810(d)).” R.C.M. 1005(e)(1)
Discussion (citing R.C.M. 810(d)). However, this Discussion has
not been changed since it appeared in the Manual for Courts-
Martial, United States (1984 ed.), and does not reflect the 1992
amendment to Article 63, UCMJ. Despite the “see” reference to
R.C.M. 810(d), the language of the Discussion to R.C.M.
1005(e)(1) is inconsistent with the substance of the 1995
amendment to R.C.M. 810(d). This Discussion to R.C.M.
1005(e)(1) is “non-binding” and thus is not controlling over
specific provisions of the UCMJ. Willenbring v. Neurauter, 48
M.J. 152, 168 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (“‘Discussion’ sections . . . are
not part of the [MCM] and . . . do not contain official rules or
policy.”); MCM, Analysis of the Rules For Courts-Martial app. 21
at A21-3 (2005 ed.).
We conclude that the authority of a rehearing to adjudge a
sentence is limited only by the maximum authorized sentence for
the offenses of which the accused has been found guilty or the
jurisdictional maximum of the court-martial. At a rehearing,
the sentencing body, whether members or military judge, should
consider the evidence in aggravation, extenuation, and
mitigation in light of the allowable maximum sentence for the
findings of guilty and adjudge an appropriate sentence. The
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United States v. Davis, No. 06-6001/NA
burden of protecting an accused against higher sentences rests
with the convening authority at the time action is taken on an
adjudged sentence from a rehearing.8
The offense for which Davis was to be resentenced included
a punitive dismissal from the service as an authorized
punishment. See, e.g., MCM pt. IV, para. 45.e.(1) (2005 ed.)
(maximum punishment for rape). Therefore, the sentence
rehearing was authorized to adjudge a punitive discharge. This
rehearing was in the class of serious cases that Article 62,
UCMJ, contemplates permitting the Government to prosecute an
interlocutory appeal.
B. Personal Jurisdiction
Davis contends that any court-martial jurisdiction over him
that arose from the initial court-marital terminated when the
record of trial was authenticated and that the rehearing on
sentence was a newly convened court-martial. Davis notes that
trial level courts in the military justice system, unlike
military appellate courts, are not standing courts and do not
retain jurisdiction. He argues that the personal jurisdiction
8
Prior to a rehearing, an appellant may have served the entire
sentence to confinement adjudged at the original trial; or the
adjudged sentence at a rehearing may be such that there is no
further confinement to be served after the rehearing. In
addition to the obligation to protect an appellant against
higher sentences at rehearings, a convening authority must also
ensure that the appellant does not serve any unwarranted post-
rehearing confinement by deferring execution of any confinement
that will not be approved at action.
12
United States v. Davis, No. 06-6001/NA
of the trial level courts, including the sentence rehearing, was
lost when he was discharged from the Navy in 1997 and when this
court set aside his sentence when we authorized a rehearing.
The Government counters that a rehearing authorized by an
appellate court is an extension of the appellate process and
jurisdiction continues until a case is final. The Government
contends that an intervening administrative discharge does not
terminate this jurisdiction which derives from the appellate
proceedings. The Government concludes that there has been no
final disposition of Davis’s case and that jurisdiction, which
fixed at the time of the original trial, continues unabated
through the course of appeal.
As a general matter, an individual discharged and returned
to civilian life is not subject to the jurisdiction of a court-
martial convened under the UCMJ. United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14 (1955); see Smith v. Vanderbush, 47
M.J. 56, 59 (C.A.A.F. 1997). The question before us is, when an
appellate court approves the findings of a court-martial,
disapproves the sentence, and orders a sentence rehearing, does
a post-trial administrative discharge preclude completion of the
sentencing proceedings ordered by an appellate court? Whether
jurisdiction exists is a question of law that is reviewed de
novo. United States v. Melanson, 53 M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
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Contrary to Davis’s contentions, our precedent recognizes
that there is “continuing jurisdiction” over a case that has
been tried and in which the accused was convicted while in a
status that subjected him or her to the UCMJ. We also disagree
with Davis’s suggestion that a rehearing stands wholly
independent of the preceding court-martial and appeal.
In United States v. Entner, 15 C.M.A. 564, 564, 36 C.M.R.
62, 62 (1965), the appellant was administratively discharged
while his case was pending review at the United States Army
Board of Review. This court said, “Once jurisdiction attaches,
it continues until the appellate processes are complete.” Id.
at 564, 36 C.M.R. at 62. The Entner case identified the point
at which jurisdiction was fixed as “because of the sentence to a
punitive discharge when it was referred to the board of review.”
Id. at 564-65, 36 C.M.R. at 62-63. A convening authority’s
subsequent action in setting aside the punitive discharge and
approving an administrative discharge did not divest the board
of jurisdiction. Id. at 564-65, 36 C.M.R. at 62-63.
In Peebles v. Froehlike, 22 C.M.A. 266, 266-67, 46 C.M.R.
266, 266-67 (1973), petitioner Peebles claimed that an executed
dishonorable discharge from a second court-martial conviction
terminated jurisdiction over him with respect to a rehearing
ordered after his initial court-martial conviction was reversed.
Because petitioner was “apprehended, tried, and sentenced while
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United States v. Davis, No. 06-6001/NA
on active duty with the Army” during his first trial, this court
held that “[h]is dishonorable discharge as a result of a
separate court-martial proceeding cannot serve to defeat the
execution of the earlier sentence.” Id. at 268, 46 C.M.R. at
268. We clearly stated, “Nor does our action in reversing the
conviction and sentence prevent petitioner’s retrial even though
his discharge occurred before the reversal.” Id.
In Smith v. Vanderbush, this court did not rely on
continuing jurisdiction, but distinguished the concept by
noting, “[T]he concept of continuing jurisdiction may be applied
for the limited purpose of permitting appellate review and
execution of the sentence in the case of someone who already was
tried and convicted while in a status subject to the UCMJ.” 47
M.J. at 59. More recently in Steele v. Van Riper, 50 M.J. 89(C.A.A.F. 1999), this court examined the effect of an end of
term of service (ETS) discharge which was given after conviction
but before action was taken on a sentence that included a
punitive discharge. We noted that the effect of the ETS
discharge was to “remit” the punitive discharge, but the ETS
discharge did not “impair” the findings and sentence of the
court:
This Court has held that, if a person is
discharged administratively while appellate
review is pending, there is “no good reason
to hold the findings and sentence of the
court-martial are impaired by the
discharge.” United States v. Speller, 8
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United States v. Davis, No. 06-6001/NA
U.S.C.M.A. 363, 368, 24 C.M.R. 173, 178
(1957). Similarly, the power of review
authorities over the court-martial is
unaffected by the administrative discharge.
See United States v. Woods, 26 M.J. 372 (CMA
1988); United States v. Jackson, 3 M.J. 153(CMA 1977); United States v. Entner, 15
U.S.C.M.A. 564, 36 C.M.R. 62 (1965); United
States v. Speller, [8 U.S.C.M.A. 363, 24
C.M.R. 173 (1957)]; United States v. Sippel,
4 U.S.C.M.A. 50, 15 C.M.R. 50 (1954).
Moreover, the administrative discharge does
not negate the responsibility of the
convening authority to act on the findings
and sentence; nor does it restrict his power
to do so. See generally Speller, supra 8
U.S.C.M.A. at 365-66, 24 C.M.R. at 175-76
(recognizing validity of convening
authority’s action where accused was
released from active duty and transferred to
Reserves after court-martial but before the
convening authority’s action).
As indicated earlier, the convening
authority here approved the findings and
sentence. The earlier honorable
discharge through administrative channels
had the effect of remitting the bad-conduct
discharge that had been adjudged. See
Speller, supra at 369, 24 C.M.R. at 179. As
a result, the bad-conduct discharge cannot
be executed, see id., but the remission of
the punitive discharge does not affect the
power of the convening authority or
appellate tribunals to act on the findings
and sentence.
Id. at 91-92; see also United States v. Johnson, 45 M.J. 88, 90
(C.A.A.F. 1996), and Boudreaux v. Navy-Marine Corps Court of
Military Review, 28 M.J. 181, 182 (C.M.A. 1989) (a rehearing
sentence under the threshold for appellate review did not divest
appellate courts of continuing jurisdiction).
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When Davis’s administrative discharge was issued, his case
had progressed beyond trial and conviction and was pending
appellate review. There is no evidence that indicates that this
discharge was intended to undermine the conviction or appellate
review. That discharge has no effect on the completed court-
martial proceedings and appeal, nor does it divest jurisdiction
over Davis at any rehearing.
The power of the rehearing to adjudicate a new sentence
derives from the initial court-martial and the appellate action
of this court. Upon trial and conviction, and a sentence
subject to appellate review approved by the convening authority,
jurisdiction over Davis was fixed for purposes of appeal, new
trial, sentence rehearing, and new review and action by the
convening authority. A rehearing relates back to the initial
trial and to the appellate court’s responsibility to ensure that
the results of a trial are just. Where the appellate courts are
invoked by an appellant and a rehearing is authorized, an
intervening administrative discharge does not serve to terminate
jurisdiction over the person of the accused for purposes of that
rehearing.
DECISION
The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court
of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
17