United States v. Buber , 2006 CAAF LEXIS 308 ( 2006 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Scott A. BUBER, Sergeant
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 05-0262
Crim. App. No. 20000777
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued December 6, 2005
Decided March 16, 2006
ERDMANN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which
GIERKE, C.J., and CRAWFORD, EFFRON, and BAKER, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Eric D. Noble (argued); Lieutenant
Colonel Kirsten V. C. Brunson and Major Billy B. Ruhling II (on
brief); Colonel Mark Cremin, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Tellitocci,
and Major Allyson G. Lambert.
For Appellee: Captain Michael D. Wallace (argued); Colonel
Steven T. Salata, Lieutenant Colonel Theresa A. Gallagher, and
Major Natalie A. Kolb (on brief); Lieutenant Colonel Mark L.
Johnson.
Military Judges: Robert F. Holland and Steven V. Saynisch
This opinion is subject to revision before final publication.
United States v. Buber, No. 05-0262/AR
Judge ERDMANN delivered the opinion of the court.
Sergeant Scott A. Buber pled not guilty to charges of false
official statement, unpremeditated murder, and assault upon a
child under the age of sixteen in violation of Articles 107,
118, and 128, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C.
§§ 907, 918, 928 (2000), respectively. He was convicted by a
panel of enlisted and officer members and sentenced to a
dishonorable discharge and thirty-three years of confinement.
The convening authority approved the sentence. The United
States Army Court of Criminal Appeals found the evidence
factually insufficient to support the findings of murder and
assault upon a child, set aside those findings and dismissed the
charges, and modified the finding of guilty to false official
statement. The lower court reassessed the sentence and affirmed
only so much of the sentence as provided for a bad-conduct
discharge and confinement for two years. United States v.
Buber, No. ARMY 20000777 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2005).
We granted Buber’s Petition for Grant of Review on a single
issue concerning whether the Army court properly reassessed the
sentence rather than directing a rehearing on the sentence.1
1
We granted review on the following issue:
WHETHER THE ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
ERRED IN REASSESSING APPELLANT’S SENTENCE TO
TWO YEARS CONFINEMENT AND A BAD-CONDUCT
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United States v. Buber, No. 05-0262/AR
A Court of Criminal Appeals can reassess a sentence to cure
the effect of prejudicial error where that court can be
confident “that, absent any error, the sentence adjudged would
have been of at least a certain severity.” United States v.
Sales, 22 M.J. 305, 308 (C.M.A. 1986). Where the Court of
Criminal Appeals can be so convinced, then that court may
reassess and affirm only a sentence of that magnitude or less.
Id. Buber claims that the Army court abused its discretion in
deciding to reassess his sentence rather than order a rehearing
because a charge alleging a single, exculpatory false official
statement may not have even been referred to a courts-martial
much less result in a sentence to a bad-conduct discharge and
two years in jail. We find that the Army court’s decision to
reassess this sentence was an abuse of discretion.
BACKGROUND
After trial on the merits, Buber stood convicted of:
killing his four-year-old stepson by shaking and striking the
child; separately assaulting the child by striking the child “in
the head and face with his hands and/or an object”; and making a
false official statement about the circumstances of the child’s
death. The members were properly instructed that the maximum
sentence for these offenses included a dishonorable discharge,
DISCHARGE FOR A SINGLE SPECIFICATION OF A
FALSE OFFICIAL STATEMENT TO AN INVESTIGATOR.
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United States v. Buber, No. 05-0262/AR
confinement for life with or without eligibility for parole,
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to the
lowest enlisted grade. The members returned a sentence to a
dishonorable discharge and thirty-three years of confinement.
Finding that the defense theory of accidental injury could
not be discounted beyond a reasonable doubt, the Army Court of
Criminal Appeals set aside the findings of murder and assault
and dismissed those charges. Buber, No. ARMY 20000777, slip op.
at 2, 11. Additionally, the court found that a portion of the
specification alleging false official statement was unsupported
by factually sufficient evidence and that the specification was
“duplicitous, in that the statements to SA [Special Agent]
Siebert and Dr. Lyngholm were given at different times and
places.” Id. at 10. As a result, the Army court set aside the
factually insufficient and duplicitous portions of the false
official statement specification, dismissed them, and affirmed
the remaining portions of the finding of guilt. Thus,
reassessment of the sentence was based only on the following
specification under Article 107, UCMJ:
In that Sergeant Scott A. Buber . . . did .
. . with intent to deceive, utter a
statement to Special Agent Nicolas Siebert
to wit: Ja’lon Johnson became unresponsive
after falling asleep on 29 November 1999 and
sustained no injuries on 29 November, or
words to that effect, which statement was
totally false in that Ja’lon Johnson became
United States v. Buber, 61 M.J. 473 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
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United States v. Buber, No. 05-0262/AR
unresponsive after sustaining injuries on 29
November 1999 when he was awake, and was
then known by the said SGT Scott A Buber to
be so false.
See id. at 10-11.
In discussing its decision to reassess the sentence rather
than order a sentence rehearing, the Army court cited the
applicable law and concluded:
Appellant’s duty performance was described
as being in the top five percent of
noncommissioned officers. He was dependable
and demonstrated initiative, tenacity, and
creativity. Given the serious circumstances
of appellant’s lie, our collective
experience, and the principles of Sales, we
conclude that we can reliably determine what
sentence would have been imposed if these
errors had not occurred.
Id. at 10. Having determined that it could reassess the
sentence, the Army court affirmed only so much of the sentence
as provided for a bad-conduct discharge and confinement for two
years.2
2
Buber petitioned this court for extraordinary relief in the
nature of a writ of habeas corpus on March 9, 2005, requesting
his immediate release from confinement. Buber claimed that he
was entitled to release in that he had already served
confinement in excess of that ultimately affirmed by the Army
court. On March 14, 2005, we ordered the Government to show
cause why the requested relief should not be granted. The
Government answered the order to show cause on March 18, 2005.
On March 30, 2005, we granted Buber’s petition for extraordinary
relief in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus and ordered his
immediate release from confinement. Buber v. Harrison, 61 M.J.
70 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
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DISCUSSION
Buber claims that the sentencing landscape in this case
changed so dramatically that even the experienced judges of the
Army court could not make “a reliable determination as to the
minimum punishment a panel would have imposed had the remaining
charge and specification stood alone.” Buber suggests further
that a single specification alleging a false official statement
might not even be tried by court-martial. He claims that given
the mitigating evidence of good duty performance and soldierly
character, this reassessment was an abuse of discretion and
miscarriage of justice.
The Government responds that there was no abuse of
discretion. Noting that the false official statement related to
a child’s death and could have involved serious consequences,
the Government urges that the Army court could “reliably
determine the sentence that would have been imposed absent the
alleged error in this case.” We will overturn a Court of
Criminal Appeals’ reassessment only for obvious miscarriages of
justice or abuses of discretion. United States v. Doss, 57 M.J.
182, 185 (C.A.A.F. 2002); United States v. Eversole, 53 M.J.
132, 133 (C.A.A.F. 2000); United States v. Harris, 53 M.J. 86,
88 (C.A.A.F. 2000); United States v. Curtis, 52 M.J. 166, 169
(C.A.A.F. 1999). Buber bears the burden of showing that the
Army court’s reassessment of his sentence was an abuse of
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United States v. Buber, No. 05-0262/AR
discretion. United States v. Hawes, 51 M.J. 258, 260 (C.A.A.F.
1999).
In United States v. Sales, this court articulated the
standard to be applied in determining whether a sentence may be
reassessed to cure prejudicial error:
In connection with reassessment, we have
emphasized
that, when a Court of Military Review
reassesses a sentence because of
prejudicial error, its task differs
from that which it performs in the
ordinary review of a case. Under
Article 66, Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 866, the Court of
Military Review must assure that the
sentence adjudged is appropriate for
the offenses of which the accused has
been convicted; and, if the sentence is
excessive, it must reduce the sentence
to make it appropriate. However, when
prejudicial error has occurred in a
trial, not only must the Court of
Military Review assure that the
sentence is appropriate in relation to
the affirmed findings of guilty, but
also it must assure that the sentence
is no greater than that which would
have been imposed if the prejudicial
error had not been committed. . . .
United States v. Suzuki, 20 M.J. 248, 249
(C.M.A. 1985). Thus, if the court can
determine to its satisfaction that, absent
any error, the sentence adjudged would have
been of at least a certain severity, then a
sentence of that severity or less will be
free of the prejudicial effects of error;
and the demands of Article 59(a) will be
met. Of course, even within this limit, the
Court of Military Review will determine that
a sentence it proposes to affirm will be
“appropriate,” as required by Article 66(c).
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In short, a reassessed sentence must be
purged of prejudicial error and also must be
“appropriate” for the offense involved.
22 M.J. at 307-08 (footnote omitted).
To validly reassess a sentence to purge the effect of
error, the court must be able to make a number of
determinations. The court must be able to discern the extent of
the error’s effect on the sentence. Hawes, 51 M.J. at 260
(quoting United States v. Reed, 33 M.J. 98, 99 (C.M.A. 1991)).
The reassessment must be based on a conclusion that the sentence
that would have been imposed at trial absent the error “would
have been at least of a certain magnitude.” Doss, 57 M.J. at
185. This conclusion about the sentence that would have been
imposed must be made “with confidence.” United States v.
Taylor, 51 M.J. 390, 391 (C.A.A.F. 1999); see also Eversole, 53
M.J. at 134 (indicating that there must be a “degree of
certainty” in determining what the trial court would have done
absent the error).
No higher sentence than that which would have been imposed
by the trial forum may be affirmed. Hawes, 51 M.J. at 260
(quoting United States v. Davis, 48 M.J. 494, 495 (C.A.A.F.
1998)). A “dramatic change in the penalty landscape” gravitates
away from the ability to reassess. United States v. Riley, 58
M.J. 305, 312 (C.A.A.F. 2003). This court will overturn the
lower court’s reassessment of a sentence where we cannot be
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confident that the Court of Criminal Appeals could “reliably
determine what sentence the members would have imposed.” Id.;
see United States v. Vasquez, 54 M.J. 303, 306 (C.A.A.F. 2001).
Although the content of this false statement relates to the
injury and eventual death of a young child, we must bear in mind
that an accused is to be sentenced only for the offenses he has
been found guilty of committing beyond a reasonable doubt.
Buber’s reassessed sentence must be punishment for only the
offense of false official statement as aggravated by facts and
circumstances admissible in aggravation of that offense –-
“circumstances directly relating to or resulting from the
offense[].” Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1001(b)(4).
In its opinion, the Army court did not articulate and we
are uncertain what “serious circumstances of appellant’s lie” it
considered in fashioning the reassessed sentence. Buber, No.
ARMY 20000777, slip op. at 10. The Army court dismissed that
portion of the specification indicating that the statement was
made to a doctor. The single statement made to law enforcement
ten days before the child’s death does not necessarily support
any determination that there was a causal connection between the
statement to law enforcement and any medical treatment or the
failure to give any necessary medical treatment. The child had
been evacuated to Anchorage before SA Seibert became involved
and interviewed Buber in Buber’s home. Nothing in SA Seibert’s
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testimony indicates that he passed Buber’s statements on to
medical personnel or that the statement made to Seibert was
relied upon by medical personnel in treating the child. At a
minimum, it is uncertain what, if any, consequential
relationship exists between the false statement to SA Seibert
and the child’s subsequent death.3
In addition, the sentencing landscape in this case changed
dramatically as a result of the Army court’s decision. There
are no longer findings of murdering and assaulting a child.
There is no longer a maximum sentence that includes confinement
for life without eligibility for parole. Instead, the
sentencing body would now have before it a single false official
statement and a maximum sentence that includes only five years
of confinement. See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States
pt. IV, para. 31.e. (2005 ed.) (MCM). In Riley this court
addressed a similar dramatic change in the sentencing landscape
as follows:
In light of the dramatic change in the
“penalty landscape” in this case, we do not
3
This case presents a situation in which the admissible evidence
at sentencing may have significantly changed. Specifically, the
permissible aggravation evidence “directly related” to the false
official statement may not have included all the evidence
presented on the question of homicide. At a rehearing, Buber
would have had the opportunity to litigate the scope of proper
aggravation evidence under R.C.M. 1001(b)(4). Where, as here,
the Court of Criminal Appeals sets aside significant findings of
guilt and reassesses the sentence, the court should provide a
more illuminating explanation of the aggravation evidence it
considered upon reassessment.
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believe that an appellate court can reliably
determine what sentence the members would
have imposed. The court members considered
a maximum sentence including life
imprisonment but imposed a term of 25 years.
The maximum term of confinement is now three
years. MCM Part IV, para. 85.e. The
offense has been reduced from an intentional
killing to an act of simple negligence
resulting in death. We conclude that the
only “fair course of action” is a sentencing
rehearing.
Riley, 58 M.J. at 312. Riley also involved the death of a
child. The offense that remained in Riley, negligent homicide,
directly related to the death of that child. In Buber’s case,
there is no death-related offense -– a point that makes Buber’s
penalty landscape even more dramatically changed than Riley’s.
As we did in Riley, we conclude that the only fair course
of action in this case is to order a sentence rehearing. With
all due respect to the experience of the judges of the Army
Court of Criminal Appeals, we are not convinced that the
reviewing court could reliably determine what sentence the
members would have imposed. Nor are we able to affirm that this
reassessed sentence is no greater than that which would have
been imposed absent the findings that have been set aside.
DECISION
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is affirmed as to findings and set aside as to sentence.
The sentence is set aside. The record is returned to the Judge
Advocate General of the Army for a rehearing on sentence.
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