United States v. Shelton , 2005 CAAF LEXIS 1094 ( 2005 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Darrell L. SHELTON, Sergeant
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 03-0694
Crim. App. No. 9900816
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued October 5, 2004
Decided September 27, 2005
PER CURIAM. BAKER, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which
CRAWFORD, J., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Rob W. MacDonald (argued); Lieutenant
Colonel Mark Tellitocci and Major Allyson G. Lambert (on brief);
Colonel Robert D. Teetsel and Captain Craig A. Harbaugh.
For Appellee: Captain Magdalena A. Przytulska (argued); Colonel
Steven T. Salata, Lieutenant Colonel Theresa A. Gallagher, and
Lieutenant Colonel Mark L. Johnson (on brief); Lieutenant
Colonel Margaret B. Baines.
Amicus Curiae for Appellant: Michael D. Hulser (law
student)(argued); Charles S. Temple, Director, Criminal Practice
Clinic (on brief) – for Franklin Pierce Law Center
Military Judges: Richard J. Hough and Patrick J. Parrish
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Shelton, No. 03-0694/AR
PER CURIAM:
At a general court-martial composed of officer members,
Appellant was convicted, contrary to his pleas, of conspiracy to
commit unpremeditated murder, unpremeditated murder, larceny,
and kidnapping, in violation of Articles 81, 118(2), 121, and
134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 881,
918(2), 921, and 934, respectively. The adjudged and approved
sentence included a dishonorable discharge, confinement for
life, total forfeiture of pay and allowances, and reduction to
the lowest enlisted grade. The United States Army Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion.
On Appellant’s petition, we granted review of one assigned
issue1 and one specified issue.2 For the reasons set forth
below, we affirm the findings of unpremeditated murder, larceny,
and kidnapping, modify the findings on the conspiracy charge,
and affirm the sentence.3
1
WHETHER APPELLANT’S FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
AND SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS WERE
VIOLATED WHEN THE MILITARY JUDGE REFUSED TO ORDER PRODUCTION
OF WITNESSES WHO WERE NECESSARY AND MATERIAL TO THE DEFENSE.
2
WHETHER THE SPECIFICATION UNDER CHARGE I OF WHICH
APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED, CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT UNPREMEDITATED
MURDER, STATES AN OFFENSE UNDER THE UCMJ.
3
We heard oral argument in this case at the Franklin Pierce Law
Center, Concord, New Hampshire, as part of the Court’s “Project
2
United States v. Shelton, No. 03-0694/AR
I. BACKGROUND
Appellant was convicted of murdering Private First Class
(PFC) Chafin in August 1997. In a separate trial, Appellant’s
co-actor, Sergeant Seay, was convicted of premeditated murder
and other offenses related to the death of Chafin. See United
States v. Seay, 60 M.J. 73 (C.A.A.F. 2004). In the present
trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of the following
events.
Chafin’s roommate, Specialist Henry, testified that
Appellant, Seay, and Chafin attended a party in the barracks
along with several other soldiers. During the evening, there
was a shoving match between Chafin and Appellant’s roommate,
Specialist Johnson. After the other soldiers separated Chafin
and Johnson, Henry escorted Chafin to their room. Henry, who
thought Chafin was too drunk to go out that evening, advised him
to stay in, and then left Chafin alone in the room.
According to Seay, Appellant subsequently brought Chafin to
Seay’s vehicle. Appellant and Chafin began to argue in the car.
Seay’s wife testified that after the three men arrived at Seay’s
apartment, Chafin passed out on the couch, and she told them to
remove Chafin from the apartment.
Outreach.” See United States v. Mahoney, 58 M.J. 346, 347 n.1
(C.A.A.F. 2003).
3
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Seay testified that he went to his vehicle, and at
Appellant’s direction, sat in the back. Appellant placed
Chafin, who was still drunk, in the front passenger seat and
drove away from the apartment. According to Seay, Appellant
“had some string on him and wanted me to choke [Chafin] ‘till he
passed out . . . .’” After initially declining to do so, Seay
began to choke Chafin, which awoke him. When Appellant drove to
the side of the road, Chafin left the vehicle and attempted to
escape. Appellant intercepted Chafin, pinned him to the ground,
gave Seay a knife, and told him to stab Chafin in the neck.
Seay complied, stabbing Chafin in the neck and ribs. He then
passed the knife to Appellant, who repeatedly stabbed Chafin in
the ribs. Appellant then dumped Chafin’s body down a ravine. A
week later, Appellant learned Chafin had been carrying a
substantial amount of money with him on the night of the murder.
He returned to the ravine with Seay and removed Chafin’s wallet,
keys, and a belt.
Chafin’s corpse was not discovered for four months, and the
investigation continued for two years. During the initial
stages, the investigators scrutinized the activities that
evening of a number of individuals, including Appellant, Seay,
and Johnson. Seay’s wife, at his request, initially misled the
investigators as to Chafin’s whereabouts on the night of his
disappearance, but she later advised them of her suspicion that
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her husband was involved in the murder. Two years after the
incident, Seay confessed, providing a detailed description of
his participation with Appellant in the murder of Chafin. Seay
was tried by general court-martial, convicted of murder, and
sentenced to confinement for life without parole, a dishonorable
discharge, total forfeiture of pay and allowances, and reduction
to the lowest enlisted grade. The convening authority then
provided a grant of testimonial immunity and ordered him to
testify at Appellant’s court-martial.
II. PRODUCTION OF WITNESSES
A. THE DEFENSE MOTION
One element of the defense strategy at trial involved an
attempt to persuade the panel that Johnson, not Appellant, was
Seay’s partner in crime. Although the defense had no plausible
explanation for the fact that Seay provided a detailed
description of Appellant as the perpetrator, and not Johnson,
the defense sought to raise a doubt as to Appellant’s role by
demonstrating that Johnson had motive and opportunity to murder
Chafin.
At the request of the defense, the military judge ordered
the production of Johnson as a witness. Anticipating that
Johnson would present self-exculpatory testimony, the defense
also sought production of three other witnesses -- Ms. Werth,
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Ms. Dominico, and Ms. King -- both to offer substantive evidence
of Johnson’s motive and opportunity to murder Chafin and for the
purpose of impeaching his expected testimony. The military
judge denied the request to produce these three witnesses. The
defense challenges that ruling in the present appeal.
The defense subsequently decided not to call Johnson as a
witness. Appellant asserts that the military judge forced the
defense to forgo calling Johnson because of the erroneous
refusal to order production of the three witnesses. According
to the defense, these witnesses would have demonstrated that
Johnson had a motive to commit the murder, that he had provided
investigators with a false alibi for the evening of the crime,
and that he had exhibited consciousness of guilt. Appellant
contends that the military judge’s ruling was contrary to his
Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses and his Fifth Amendment right to present the testimony
of such witnesses in his own defense.
B. ASSESSMENT OF PREJUDICE
For purposes of this appeal, we shall assume, without
deciding, that the three requested witnesses possessed
information that was “relevant and necessary” under Rule for
Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 703(b)(1), and that Appellant was
entitled to their production. See United States v. Breeding, 44
6
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M.J. 345, 350 (C.A.A.F. 1996). In that context, the issue is
whether any error in denying the production of these witnesses
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v.
Powell, 49 M.J. 220, 225 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
The defense proffer that accompanied the motion indicated
that Ms. King would dispute Johnson’s initial statement to
investigators that he was at Ms. King’s residence on the night
of Chafin’s disappearance, contrary to an alibi initially
provided by Johnson to investigators. Ms. King, however, could
not be located by either party. She did not testify at the
investigation pursuant to Article 32, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 832
(2000). Defense counsel had never spoken to her, and the
Government could not locate her at the address provided by the
defense. The defense has not demonstrated that the Government
was negligent or otherwise deficient in its attempt to locate
her.
Defense counsel proffered that Ms. Werth would testify that
Johnson called her from Kuwait, and during the conversation, he
inquired about the investigation into Chafin’s disappearance.
The proffer also indicated that she would testify that Johnson
was rude when Chafin’s father came to the installation to
inquire about his son. According to the defense, both of these
incidents would reflect Johnson’s guilty state of mind.
7
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The defense also proffered that Ms. Werth would testify
that Johnson told her that his wallet had been stolen. The
defense would have tied this to testimony from Mrs. Seay that
the wallet of a guest had been stolen, which the defense would
have used to show that Johnson, not Appellant, was in the Seay
apartment on the night of the murder. Finally, the defense
proffered that Ms. Werth would testify that Chafin had told her
that Johnson had once lied to her when Johnson said that he had
gone to Texas to settle a score, when he had not done so.
According to the defense, this would have shown that because
Chafin caught Johnson in a lie and told Werth about it, the
embarrassment would have provided Johnson with a motive to kill
him.
Defense counsel proffered that Ms. Dominico would testify
that several weeks after Chafin’s disappearance, Johnson said to
her “Personally, I think he’s dead.” According to defense
counsel, this comment reflected a guilty state of mind.
Assuming that these statements met the modest threshold
required for production of witnesses under R.C.M. 703, we
conclude that any error in non-production of these two witnesses
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Government’s case
against Appellant was very strong. Seay testified in graphic
detail how he and Appellant killed Chafin. His testimony was
corroborated by physical evidence and Mrs. Seay’s testimony,
8
United States v. Shelton, No. 03-0694/AR
particularly her description of Chafin’s arrival with Appellant
and Seay at the Seay residence on the night of the murder. The
defense was unable to provide the panel with any reasonable
explanation as to why Seay would substitute Appellant for
Johnson as his co-actor. With respect to Mrs. Seay, the defense
sought to portray her as confusing Appellant with Johnson, but
she confirmed that she knew both men, and that it was Appellant,
not Johnson, who was in her apartment on the evening in
question.
The entirety of the record establishes that the denial of
the three witnesses at issue was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. See United States v. Hall, 58 M.J. 90, 94-95 (C.A.A.F.
2003).
III. CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT UNPREMEDITATED MURDER
A. INSTRUCTIONS
The military judge instructed the panel regarding the
elements of both premeditated murder and conspiracy to commit
premeditated murder. In accordance with defense counsel’s
request, the military judge also included instructions regarding
the lesser included offenses of unpremeditated murder and
conspiracy to commit unpremeditated murder.
Regarding unpremeditated murder, the military judge
instructed, in part, that the members would have to find “that
9
United States v. Shelton, No. 03-0694/AR
at the time of the killing, the accused had the intent to kill
or inflict great bodily harm on PFC Chafin.” With respect to
conspiracy to commit unpremeditated murder, the military judge
included in the instructions the requirement that the members
would have to find that the accused “entered into an agreement
with Sergeant Bobby D. Seay II to commit unpremeditated murder,”
and that the elements of the object of the conspiracy were “the
same as set forth in the instruction on the lesser included
offense of unpremeditated murder.” After deliberations, the
panel returned findings of not guilty of the premeditated
offenses, but guilty of both lesser included offenses.
B. PREMEDITATED MURDER, UNPREMEDITATED MURDER, AND CONSPIRACY
Article 118, UCMJ, includes two offenses pertinent to the
present case: (1) premeditated murder (an unlawful killing by a
person who “has a premeditated design to kill”); and (2)
unpremeditated murder (an unlawful killing by a person who
“intends to kill or inflict great bodily harm”). Article 81,
UCMJ, in pertinent part, makes it an offense to “conspire[] with
another person to commit an offense” under the UCMJ.
Appellant contends that the act of conspiring to commit
murder transforms an unpremeditated murder into a premeditated
murder, and that a finding of not guilty to premeditated murder
10
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negates the existence of an agreement to commit murder.4
Appellant argues that if the parties to the conspiracy agreed
only to commit great bodily harm to Chafin, then the offense
would amount only to conspiracy to commit an aggravated assault.
Under the defense theory, the fact that a death eventually
resulted from a conspiracy to commit aggravated assault might be
relevant to whether a person could be charged with
unpremeditated murder, but that would not transform an agreement
to commit great bodily harm into an agreement to commit murder.
The Government counters that conspiracy to commit
unpremeditated murder is a valid offense under the UCMJ.
Specifically, the Government focuses on the “intent to inflict
great bodily harm” as an available state of mind under Article
118(2), the offense of unpremeditated murder. The Government
argues that the panel reasonably could have determined that
Appellant entered into an agreement with Seay to inflict great
bodily harm on Chafin. In the Government’s view, such an intent
would satisfy the intent element for the conspiracy offense
without a further need to determine whether Appellant intended
an unpremeditated killing.
4
In support of this position, Appellant cites Mitchell v. State,
767 A.2d 847, 854-55 (Md. 2001); People v. Cortez, 960 P.2d 537,
538 (Cal. 1998); and People v. Hammond, 466 N.W.2d 335, 337.
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
11
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In the present case, the military judge’s instructions
included alternative theories upon which the members could rely
to find Appellant guilty of unpremeditated murder, both as a
substantive crime and as the underlying offense of the
conspiracy. The members returned a general verdict of guilty of
both of these lesser included offenses. Because the members do
not provide an explanation when announcing their findings, the
record does not demonstrate whether the members found an “intent
to kill” or an “intent to inflict great bodily harm” as the
determinative state of mind. Under these circumstances, we
cannot affirm the finding of conspiracy to commit unpremeditated
murder unless Appellant would be liable under both theories.
See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 51-56 (1991); Yates
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312 (1957), overruled on other
grounds, Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978).
Appellant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit
unpremeditated murder cannot be affirmed on appeal because the
instructions authorized the members to base the conviction on a
finding of an intent to “inflict great bodily harm.” If the
intent of the parties to the agreement was limited to the
infliction of great bodily harm, their agreement was to commit
aggravated assault, not unpremeditated murder. See Article
128(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 928(b) (2000); 2 Wayne R. LaFave,
Substantive Criminal Law § 12.2(c)(2), at 278-79 (2d ed. 2003);
12
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State v. Donohue, 834 A.2d 253, 256 (N.H. 2003). In view of our
disposition of this issue, we need not address Appellant’s
contention that conspiracy to commit unpremeditated murder may
not be predicated upon an “intent to kill” state of mind after
the members have rejected the premeditation element of the
charged conspiracy to commit premeditated murder.
Under the circumstances of this case, we can affirm a
finding of guilty to the lesser included offense of conspiracy
to commit aggravated assault. In view of that finding and the
other findings we affirm in this decision, we conclude that any
error in the conspiracy finding was not prejudicial as to the
sentence.
IV. DECISION
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is affirmed, except for the finding of conspiracy to
commit unpremeditated murder. As to that offense, a finding of
the lesser included offense of conspiracy to commit aggravated
assault, in violation of Article 128, UCMJ, is affirmed.
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BAKER, Judge, with whom CRAWFORD, Judge, joins
(dissenting):
I agree with the majority’s result on Issue I, but
respectfully disagree with the analysis. I would not “assume
without deciding” that the witnesses at issue were relevant and
necessary. In my view, the defense did not carry its burden to
demonstrate relevance and necessity. Therefore, the military
judge did not err in refusing to order their production and we
should not shy away from saying so.
I respectfully dissent with respect to Issue II because I
believe the unusual text and legislative history to Article
118(2), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §
918(2) (2000), support the conclusion that conspiracy to commit
unpremeditated murder is an offense under the UCMJ. Therefore,
the military judge did not err, based on the facts of this case,
in giving the instruction the defense requested. The majority
reaches an opposite conclusion without reference to either the
text or legislative history to Article 118(2). In the end, the
question presented is academic in nature because the majority
provides Appellant no relief and the factual and legal
circumstances of this case, we might hope, are not likely to
repeat themselves.
United States v. Shelton, No. 03-0694/AR
APPELLANT’S TRIAL
At Appellant’s court-martial, defense counsel requested
production of Specialist Johnson in support of the theory that
Johnson, rather than Appellant, was involved in Chafin’s murder.
Defense counsel also sought production of three other witnesses,
Ms. Werth, Ms. Dominico, and Ms. King. Through these witnesses
the defense intended to impeach Johnson’s statements to
investigators and demonstrate that he had a greater motive and
opportunity to murder Chafin than Appellant. According to
defense counsel, Ms. Werth would have testified that Johnson was
rude to Chafin’s father after Chafin’s disappearance and that
Johnson later called her from Kuwait inquiring about the
investigation into Chafin’s death. Ms. Dominico would have
testified to a statement by Johnson following Chafin’s
disappearance that, “[p]ersonally, I think he’s dead.” Ms. King
would have contested Johnson’s statement to the Criminal
Investigation Division (CID) that he was at her apartment the
night of the murder. Finally, all three witnesses would have
testified that at some point before Chafin’s death, Chafin
revealed that Johnson had lied to the women about a trip,
unrelated to the murder, that Johnson claimed to have taken to
avenge a friend’s death.
2
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The military judge granted the defense motion to produce
Johnson, but denied production of the three proffered witnesses
in the following ruling:
In regards to Miss Dominico, her proffered testimony does
not show any guilty state of mind or guilty knowledge by
Specialist Johnson. Her proffered testimony is not
relevant. The motion to produce Miss Dominico as a witness
is denied.
With regards to Miss Werth, her proffered testimony does
not show any guilty state of mind or guilty knowledge by
Specialist Johnson. Her proffered testimony is not
relevant. The motion to produce Miss Werth is denied.
With regards to Miss King, defense has not talked to her,
and defense has not produced -- or excuse me -- has not
provided an address, location, or phone number as to how to
contact her, and the government’s not required to search
for defense witnesses. Now, for that proposition, I cite
you to Gans at 23 MJ 540. And, besides, her proffered
testimony is not relevant. The motion to produce her as a
witness is denied.
Although the request for Johnson was granted, the defense
declined to call him during its case on the merits. According
to Appellant’s post-trial submission pursuant to Rule for
Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1105, his reason for not calling Johnson
was that he had been “deprived of any ability to impeach”
Johnson’s expected testimony.
In his instructions to the members, the military judge
charged the panel regarding the elements of both premeditated
murder and conspiracy to commit premeditated murder. In
accordance with defense counsel’s request, the military judge
also included instructions regarding the lesser included
3
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offenses of unpremeditated murder and conspiracy to commit
unpremeditated murder. The panel returned a finding of not
guilty of the premeditated offenses, but guilty of both lesser
included offenses.
A. WITNESS PRODUCTION
Appellant argues that the military judge’s denial of his
motion to compel production of witnesses prevented him from
demonstrating that Johnson had a motive to commit the murder,
that he had provided investigators with a false alibi for the
evening of the crime, and that he had exhibited consciousness of
guilt. According to Appellant, he was effectively deprived of
his capacity to impeach Johnson on the witness stand and develop
the theory that Johnson, rather than Appellant, participated in
Chafin’s murder. Appellant contends that this amounted to a
deprivation of his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses and his Fifth Amendment right to present
the testimony of such witnesses in his own defense. The
appellate question is whether the military judge abused his
discretion in denying production of the requested witnesses.
“An accused has a constitutional right to present relevant
evidence to defend against [criminal] charges.” United States
v. Browning, 54 M.J. 1, 9 (C.A.A.F. 2000). The right, however,
is not absolute. Id. (citing United States v. Woolheater, 40
M.J. 170, 173 (C.M.A. 1994)). Under R.C.M. 703(b)(1), a party
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is entitled to production of witnesses whose testimony “would be
relevant and necessary” to a matter in issue. United States v.
Breeding, 44 M.J. 345, 350 (C.A.A.F. 1996). “Relevant evidence
is necessary when it is not cumulative and when it would
contribute to the party’s presentation of the case in some
positive way on a matter in issue.” R.C.M. 703(b)(1)
discussion. Relevant evidence is any evidence that tends to
prove or disprove any disputed fact that is significant to
resolving the action. Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 401.
A military judge’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Tanksley,
54 M.J. 169, 175 (C.A.A.F. 2000), overruled on other grounds,
United States v. Inong, 58 M.J. 460, 464 (C.A.A.F. 2003). We
will not overturn a military judge’s evidentiary decision unless
that decision was “arbitrary, fanciful, clearly unreasonable,”
or “clearly erroneous.” United States v. Miller, 46 M.J. 63, 65
(C.A.A.F. 1997)(citations omitted).
Admissibility issues are generally resolved through a
motion for appropriate relief. The burden of persuasion on a
motion to admit evidence is on the moving party. United States
v. Rodriguez, 60 M.J. 239, 246 (C.A.A.F. 2004); Browning, 54
M.J. at 9; R.C.M. 905(c)(2)(A); R.C.M. 906(b)(7). If the
military judge excludes evidence, the burden is also on the
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United States v. Shelton, No. 03-0694/AR
proponent of the evidence to demonstrate that the military judge
abused his discretion. Browning, 54 M.J. at 9.
1. Ms. Werth
Defense counsel proffered that Ms. Werth would offer
testimony in four areas. First, she would testify to a phone
call Johnson made from Kuwait inquiring about the investigation
into Chafin’s whereabouts. Second, she would testify that
Johnson was rude to Chafin’s father when the father came
inquiring about his son. Third, she would testify that Johnson
told her that someone had stolen his wallet. Lastly, she would
testify that Chafin told her that Johnson had lied to her about
going to Texas once. The portion of the colloquy between the
military judge and defense counsel regarding the relevance of
the telephone call follows:
MJ: So, Specialist Johnson called Miss Werth to ask
about a friend of his, that friend being PFC Chafin,
and you believe that that shows some sort of motive or
something on the part of Specialist Johnson.
DC: A culpable mind, yes, sir.
MJ: How?
DC: Because, again -- well, Miss Werth thought it was
unusual that he would call her back for that purpose
alone from Kuwait. . . .
MJ: Well, was it unusual for PFC Chafin to be missing
for several months?
DC: Yes, sir.
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Emphasis added. The defense argument was that only a guilty
party would make such inquiries from Kuwait. Thus, according to
defense counsel, the call supported the defense theory that
Johnson rather than Appellant was involved in the murder.
As for the relevance of the testimony about Johnson and
Chafin’s father, that colloquy went as follows:
DC: Yes, sir, they were friends. If they were
friends, you wouldn’t expect that friend to be rude
and obnoxious or belligerent . . . when the father
comes down trying to find his son.
MJ: So, what’s the relevance?
DC: Simply that’s unusual behavior. Unusual behavior
related to this case and trying to determine -- the
whereabouts --
MJ: What’s [sic] it show?
. . . .
DC: Well, if you take the cumulative evidence and not
each individual piece but the cumulative evidence of
his behavior in this case, it suggests that he had
something to do with this crime. . . .
Emphasis added.
Next, defense counsel asserted that Ms. Werth would testify
that Johnson had once boasted that he was going to Texas to
settle a score and then disappeared. She would then testify
that Chafin had told her that Johnson had lied and that he was
not in Texas at all but was instead in Colorado. According to
counsel, this testimony would show a conflict between Johnson
and Chafin and thus a motive to kill. However, defense counsel
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United States v. Shelton, No. 03-0694/AR
conceded that Ms. Werth never witnessed a dispute or argument
between Chafin and Johnson on this matter. Counsel’s colloquy
with the military judge with respect to this testimony reveals
that the witness heard one thing from Johnson and another from
Chafin. As a result, according to counsel, Ms. Werth would
testify that in her opinion Johnson had lied. The military
judge found insufficient foundation for such an opinion.
Finally, with respect to Ms. Werth’s expected testimony
regarding the stolen wallet, defense counsel prefaced his
argument with the assertion that the evidence would show that
after Chafin’s death a bus ticket with Johnson’s name on it was
found in Chafin’s room. Counsel’s argument on this issue
proceeded as follows:
DC: The one thing that Ms. Werth talks about or can
talk about is the loss of -- I’m sorry; the theft of
Specialist Johnson’s wallet, specifically that he had
told her that his wallet had been stolen. She said
that she observed that he did not have his wallet. If
you take that, then, link that up to the bus ticket
potentially that was found in PFC Chafin’s room after
his murder and then you link that to the statements by
Mrs. Seay, who claimed that she heard voices the night
that PFC Chafin was allegedly at her house, someone
made the remark, “Now we know who stole your ATM
card,” well, the only evidence that’s -- the only
evidence about the stolen ATM card potentially would
be the loss of Johnson’s credit cards. He would be
the natural person that that comment would be made to
in this case.
. . . .
MJ: How does the missing wallet connect up with a bus
ticket?
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DC: Well, the wallet could have been used -- and this
is what Johnson provides himself when he tries to
provide the explanation when asked by CID, “Why does a
bus ticket with your name wind up in PFC Chafin’s
room?” And his answer is, “Well, my ID card and my
dog tags were stolen,” and in fact the evidence
suggests that it was -- his wallet was stolen, one
conclusion possible, conclusion to that, is perhaps
PFC Chafin had stolen his wallet.
. . . .
MJ: . . . I’m confused as to how the ATM card links
up with Johnson’s wallet. Did Johnson say his ATM
card was missing? Did Johnson even say he had an ATM
card?
DC: No, sir. He said his wallet and his credit cards
were missing.
The apparent point of this confusing exchange was to show
that Chafin may have used Johnson’s stolen ID card to purchase
the bus ticket. Since an ID card and an ATM card are things
likely to be in a wallet, by logical extension Chafin may have
stolen Johnson’s wallet. Thus, according to counsel, the
statement purportedly overheard by Mrs. Seay could only have
been made to Johnson, placing him instead of Appellant at the
Seay residence that night.
In my view Appellant failed to demonstrate the relevance of
this witness. Ms. Werth’s proffered testimony may have been
useful to impeach Johnson (had Appellant chosen to put him on
the stand), but Appellant failed to demonstrate to the military
judge why the proffered testimony made it more or less likely
9
United States v. Shelton, No. 03-0694/AR
that Johnson and not Appellant participated in Chafin’s murder.
And Appellant did not present any alternate evidence implicating
Johnson in the crime. For example, Johnson was never connected
to the weapon involved. Therefore, based on counsel’s
insufficient statements on the record in support of the claims
of relevance, I would find that the military judge did not abuse
his discretion and that Appellant’s Fifth or Sixth Amendment
rights were not violated with respect to this witness.
2. Ms. Dominico
Counsel proffered that Ms. Dominico would testify to a
statement allegedly made by Johnson in reference to Chafin to
the effect, “Personally, I think he’s dead.” Defense counsel
argued relevance on the following basis:
MJ: Okay. Did he say anything besides, “I personally
think he’s dead[?”] Like, you know, “I know he’s
dead,” “I know where the body is,” or “I know who did
it,” or just “I think he’s dead[?”]
DC: Just that he thinks he’s dead. He didn’t make
any overtly incriminating statements, nor would you
expect him to make those. But, again, those are
unusual comments to make about someone.
MJ: It’s [an] unusual comment when someone’s been
missing for several weeks to say, “I think he’s
dead[?”]
DC: Yes, sir.
Emphasis added.
Like the military judge, I have difficulty discerning what
fact in issue this statement was intended to prove. This
10
United States v. Shelton, No. 03-0694/AR
evidence falls short in showing relevance for the reasons stated
with respect to Ms. Werth’s proffered testimony. Likewise, it
is not evident to me that the military judge erred in denying
production of this witness.
3. Ms. King
Defense counsel stated that Ms. King would testify that
Johnson was not at her apartment the night of Chafin’s
disappearance, contrary to an alibi initially provided by
Johnson to investigators. According to the record, the
Government was unable to locate this witness with the address on
file, she had not testified at the Article 32, UCMJ,
investigation, and defense counsel had never spoken to her. The
military judge expressed concern that defense counsel had failed
to provide an accurate address to enable the Government to find
her notwithstanding counsel’s response that his request for
investigative assistance had been denied by the convening
authority. The military judge then indicated that without any
known address for the witness, the Government was not obligated
to try and track her down.
With respect to this witness, the theory of relevance
apparently hinged on the fact that Johnson was considered, at
one time, a suspect in the case. But, even if Ms. King’s
testimony were relevant, it remains unclear to me why the
witness was “necessary” within the meaning of R.C.M. 703.
11
United States v. Shelton, No. 03-0694/AR
R.C.M. 703(f)(2) provides a remedy for unavailable evidence:
“[If] such evidence is of such central importance to an issue
that it is essential to a fair trial, and if there is no
adequate substitute, the military judge shall grant a
continuance or other relief . . . .” Emphasis added. Defense
counsel did not renew his request for investigative assistance
with the military judge, nor did he request a continuance. The
assistant defense counsel in this case was present at the
Article 32 investigation and cross-examined two investigators
who testified that early in their investigation that Johnson had
become a key suspect because his alibi had not checked out.
And, if the object was to later impeach Johnson’s alibi, it is
not clear why counsel could not have offered the investigators
as adequate substitutes for the unavailable Ms. King.
B. CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT UNPREMEDITATED MURDER
On Issue II, I part with the majority because I disagree
that the issue here is instructional error. Based on the text
of Article 118(2) and its legislative history, I believe the
Congress intended to include an “intent to inflict great bodily
harm” as both a possible intent element of Article 118(2) as
well as an intent element that also appears under Article
128(b), UCMJ. Although unusual in design, and complicated in
implementation -- as this case reflects -- I do not believe the
Congress was ultimately precluded from incorporating this
12
United States v. Shelton, No. 03-0694/AR
language in both Articles 118(2) and 128(b) in an effort to
capture different measures of intent in different legal
contexts. Therefore, on this point, I would answer the
specified question in the affirmative.
As a result, it is also necessary for me to address
Appellant’s primary argument that it is logically impossible for
the members to find that he had the necessary intent to
establish a conspiracy to commit murder as specified under
Article 118(2), sometimes described in case law as
“unpremeditated murder,” but at the same time, find Appellant
not guilty of premeditated murder. Appellant’s argument is
viscerally appealing, however, based on the particular text and
legislative history of Article 118(2), I believe the intent
elements required to commit a violation of Article 118(1),
118(2), and a conspiracy to violate Article 118(2) are
different. Therefore, it is unusual, but possible for members
to find an accused not guilty of premeditation, but guilty of a
conspiracy to violate Article 118(2).
Discussion
The first two clauses of Article 118 define murder in the
following terms:
Any [servicemember] who, without justification or excuse,
unlawfully kills a human being, when he -- (1) has a
premeditated design to kill; [or] (2) intends to kill or
inflict great bodily harm . . . is guilty of murder.
13
United States v. Shelton, No. 03-0694/AR
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2000 ed.)(MCM), pt.
IV, ¶ 43.a.
1. Parties’ Positions
Appellant claims that it is legally impossible to form the
agreement necessary for a conspiracy to commit any form of
murder without also necessarily forming the premeditation
required of Article 118(1). Conspiracy to commit unpremeditated
murder, he argues, is therefore a logical non sequitur that does
not state a valid offense under the UCMJ.1 Further, Appellant
argues that if the parties to the conspiracy agreed only to
commit great bodily harm to Chafin, then the offense amounts
only to conspiracy to commit an aggravated assault. The fact
that a death eventually resulted from the conspiracy to commit
aggravated assault may be relevant to whether a person might
also be charged with murder, but the result alone does not
change the conspiracy into a conspiracy to commit murder.
The Government argues that conspiracy to commit
unpremeditated murder is a valid offense under the UCMJ.
Specifically, the Government focuses on the phrase “intent to
inflict great bodily harm” as an available state of mind element
under Article 118(2) (the unpremeditated murder offense). Thus,
the Government argues that the panel could have reasonably
determined that Appellant entered into an agreement with Seay to
14
United States v. Shelton, No. 03-0694/AR
inflict great bodily harm on Chafin. Such an intent would
satisfy the intent element for the conspiracy offense without a
further need to determine that Appellant intended an
unpremeditated killing, and thus avoid the logical conundrums
identified by Appellant.2
2. The Jury Instructions and Findings
The military judge instructed the members regarding
premeditated murder and the lesser included offense of
unpremeditated murder, noting that in order to find the
Appellant guilty they would have to find “that at the time of
the killing, the accused had the intent to kill or inflict great
bodily harm upon PFC Chafin.” Shortly thereafter, and pursuant
to Appellant’s request, the military judge issued instructions
regarding conspiracy to commit murder and the following
instruction on the lesser included offense of conspiracy to
commit unpremeditated murder:
In order to find the accused guilty of this lesser offense,
you must be convinced by legal and competent evidence
beyond reasonable doubt that: One, on or about 29 August
1997 at or near Colorado Springs, Colorado, the accused
entered into an agreement with Sergeant Bobby D. Seay II to
commit unpremeditated murder, an offense under the [UCMJ];
and
Two, that while the agreement continued to exist, and
while the accused remained a party to the agreement,
1
Appellant cites several state court cases in support of his position. See,
e.g., People v. Cortez, 960 P.2d 537, 542 (Cal. 1998).
2
“If a party only has an intent to commit great bodily harm, no amount of
conspiring, planning, or contemplating can turn the crime into conspiracy to
commit first degree murder.” Brief on behalf of Appellee at 24.
15
United States v. Shelton, No. 03-0694/AR
Sergeant Shelton and Sergeant Seay, performed on [sic] or
more of the over [sic] acts alleged, that is, Sergeant Seay
and Sergeant Shelton drove PFC Jason Chafin to a remote
location and Sergeant Seay attempted to strangle PFC
Chafin, for the purpose of bringing about the object of the
agreement.
The elements of the offense of which the accused is
charged with conspiracy to commit are the same as set forth
in the instruction on the lesser included offense of
unpremeditated murder in the specification of Charge III.
Would anyone like me to re-read those elements and
definitions to you?
Apparently not.
The panel returned a finding of guilty to this lesser included
offense. Because neither comment nor explanation is required of
the members when announcing their findings, it is not clear
whether the members found an “intent to kill” and/or an “intent
to inflict great bodily harm” as the determinative state of mind
for the conspiracy to commit unpremeditated murder.
3. Conflicting Analyses
This Court has not yet construed the UCMJ in regard to
Appellant’s logic paradigm, but several state and federal courts
have addressed it in the context of their own murder and
conspiracy statutes. See Mitchell v. State, 767 A.2d 844, 847-
55 (Md. 2001)(contrasting the various case law approaches).3
Several state courts have agreed with Appellant’s position. Id.
In Cortez, 960 P.2d at 542-46, for example, the California
3
This Court has confronted a somewhat analogous issue regarding the inchoate
crime of attempted murder. United States v. Roa, 12 M.J. 210 (C.M.A. 1982).
Neither party cited to or relied upon the case. In light of the distinctions
between the law of attempt and conspiracy, I do not regard Roa as controlling
in the present case.
16
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Supreme Court applied common law scienter analysis to decide
that conspiracy to commit murder must necessarily be conspiracy
to commit premeditated murder. See also People v. Hammond, 466
N.W.2d 335, 336-37 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991). In contrast, the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits have construed the federal civilian
murder statute to permit conviction of conspiracy to commit
second degree, or unpremeditated murder. United States v.
Croft, 124 F.3d 1109, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Chagra, 807 F.2d 398, 400-02 (5th Cir. 1986).
These competing lines of case law, however, are of limited
precedential value given the disparity between the statutes
construed by those cases and the language of Articles 118 and
81, UCMJ. At this point it is helpful to turn to the text of
the UCMJ and its associated legislative history to determine
whether conspiracy to commit an unpremeditated murder is a valid
offense.
4. Statutory Analysis
Under Article 81, a conspiracy is formed when any
servicemember “conspires with any other person to commit an
offense under [the UCMJ] . . . ” and “one or more of the
conspirators does an act to effect the object of the
conspiracy.” The two elements for the crime of conspiracy under
Article 81 are: (1) that the accused entered into an agreement
with one or more persons to commit an offense under the [UCMJ];
17
United States v. Shelton, No. 03-0694/AR
and (2) that while the agreement continued to exist, and while
the accused remained a party to the agreement, the accused or at
least one of the co-conspirators performed an overt act for the
purpose of bringing about the object of the conspiracy. MCM,
pt. IV, ¶ 5.b.
In the present case, I see no issue with respect to the
second element. If there were a conspiracy between Seay and
Appellant to murder Chafin, I am satisfied that Appellant’s
driving into a remote area and Seay’s attempted choking of
Chafin, as specified in the charges against Appellant, were
overt acts performed for the purpose of bringing about the
object of that conspiracy. The parties have not argued
otherwise. Consequently, my analysis focuses on the first
element. Specifically, the issue is whether Appellant could
enter into an agreement with Seay to murder Chafin in violation
of Article 118(2), without necessarily engaging in a degree of
premeditation that also violated Article 118(1).
Article 118(1) requires that the accused have a
premeditated design to kill. Article 118(2) requires that the
accused have the intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm
upon a person. The explanation of the premeditation element of
Article 118(1) states that “[p]remeditated murder is murder
committed after the formation of a specific intent to kill
someone and consideration of the act intended.” MCM, pt. IV, ¶
18
United States v. Shelton, No. 03-0694/AR
43.c.(2)(a). By comparison, the explanation in Article 118(2)
notes that “[a]n unlawful killing without premeditation is also
murder when the accused had either an intent to kill or inflict
great bodily harm.” MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 43.c.(3)(a). Although not
explicitly stated in this explanatory text, Article 118(2) is a
specific intent crime, distinguished from the Article 118(1)
offense principally by the absence of a premeditated design to
kill. See United States v. Gray, 51 M.J. 1, 56 (C.A.A.F. 1999);
United States v. Loving, 41 M.J. 213, 279-80 (C.A.A.F. 1994);
United States v. Morgan, 37 M.J. 407, 411 (C.M.A. 1993); United
States v. Vaughn, 23 C.M.A. 343, 345, 49 C.M.R. 747, 748 (1975).
In other words, the true line of separation between murder under
Article 118(2) and premeditated murder under Article 118(1) is
in an increment of planning and consideration that an accused
directs towards his act of killing under Article 118(1).
While this makes the line between Article 118(1) and
Article 118(2) an imprecise one, as this case well reflects, it
is apparent from the legislative history that the drafters of
Article 118 intended to create two distinct crimes where the
accused possessed a design to effect death: one preceded by
premeditation and one not. When articulating the distinction
between what would become Article 118(1) and Article 118(2), one
of the UCMJ’s principal drafters, Mr. Felix Larkin, explained:
19
United States v. Shelton, No. 03-0694/AR
The first is where you have design to kill and it is
preceded by premeditation and deliberation, which
classically is common law murder in the first degree. Then
you have the kind where you have the design to effect death
and it is not preceded by premeditation and deliberation,
which is usually murder in the second degree.
Uniform Code of Military Justice: Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before
a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, 81st
Cong. 1246 (1949), reprinted in Index and Legislative History,
Uniform Code of Military Justice (1950) (not separately
paginated) [hereinafter Hearings]. A short time later, Mr.
Larkin responded to a question regarding the relationship
between a design to effect death and an intent to kill, stating
“[y]ou may have a design to effect death which is preceded by
premeditation and deliberation, or not. It might be on the spur
of the moment, a conscious, specific design to effect the death
without previous premeditation.” Id. at 1247. A member of the
subcommittee then summarized: “What do you think about this Mr.
Larkin: Murder in the first degree is the killing of a human
being with pre-meditation, deliberation, and malice; murder in
the second degree is the killing of a human being with malice
but without premeditation and deliberation . . . .” Id. As
this text again makes clear, the distinction between Article
118(1) and Article 118(2) hinges on premeditation (and
deliberation). Thus, it is possible to have a prior design to
effect death that is not accompanied by the consideration
20
United States v. Shelton, No. 03-0694/AR
required of premeditated murder. Indeed, this is the essence of
Article 118(2) -- “intent to kill” murder.
Returning to Appellant’s argument, he contends that
premeditation is a necessary feature of a conspiratorial
agreement: that it would be impossible for Appellant to agree
with Seay to kill Chafin without necessarily premeditating that
act. While this argument has some rhetorical appeal, the MCM’s
explanation of the conspiratorial “agreement” in Article 81
states that the agreement:
need not be in any particular form or manifested in any
formal words. It is sufficient if the minds of the parties
arrive at a common understanding to accomplish the object
of the conspiracy . . . . The agreement need not state the
means by which the conspiracy is to be accomplished or what
part each conspirator is to play.
MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 5.c.(2). I do not find in either this text or
the common law of conspiracy a requirement for an increment of
consideration and planning amounting to premeditated design,
although a factfinder could find such an agreement indicative of
premeditated design. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 20
M.J. 68, 69-70 (C.M.A. 1985) (finding conspiratorial agreement
to commit larceny where the accused spontaneously assisted
another in stealing a television).4
4
Similarly, I disagree with the assertion that a murder conspirator must have
taken “deliberate steps” to bring about the killing. All that conspiracy
requires is the agreement to commit a criminal offense and an overt act
committed for the purpose of bringing about the object of the conspiracy.
The overt act need not be “a deliberate step.” It may well be an impulsive
21
United States v. Shelton, No. 03-0694/AR
While members may find that evidence demonstrating an
agreement to murder also leads to a conclusion that there was
premeditation of the intended act, such an identical finding is
not legally or logically compelled. Thus, I conclude that,
contrary to Appellant’s contentions, it is legally possible for
a perpetrator to lack the premeditated design to kill and
nonetheless have the specific intent to enter into a conspiracy
to commit unpremeditated murder in violation of Article 118(2).5
Accord United States v. Chagra, 807 F.2d 398, 401 (5th Cir.
1986)(“[T]he quick answer to defendant’s argument is that
without proving premeditation the government can prove intent to
kill with malice aforethought. Under the government’s theory it
was entitled to prove that at the moment of conspiratorial
agreement, [the defendant’s] intent to kill . . . was impulsive
and with malice aforethought.”); United States v. Croft, 124
F.3d 1109, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 1997)(“[I]t is logically possible
to conspire to commit second degree murder.”).6
action, like Seay choking Chafin with a length of string that Appellant kept
in his truck.
5
In United States v. Kinder, 14 C.M.R. 742, 778 (A.F.B.R. 1954), an Air Force
Board of Review wrote, “[t]he essential element of conspiracy ‘of agreement’
between parties to commit an offense naturally reflects premeditation where
the object of the conspiracy is murder. In a charge of conspiracy to commit
murder the element of ‘premeditation’ is a feature of the ‘agreement’ and not
an object of the ‘agreement.’” The board provided no citation or further
analysis for this conclusory statement. My analysis in the present case
reaches a contrary conclusion for the reasons stated.
6
Even if one were to agree with Appellant’s argument, verdict inconsistency
is ordinarily not sufficient grounds for reversal. E.g., United States v.
Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 66-69 (1984); Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393
22
United States v. Shelton, No. 03-0694/AR
5. Alternative Intents
Turning to Appellant’s next argument, the alternative
intent formulation of Article 118(2)(“intent to kill or inflict
great bodily harm”) raises the possibility that the members may
have found an agreement between Seay and Appellant only to
inflict great bodily harm on Chafin. Appellant asserts that an
agreement to inflict great bodily harm, without an explicit
agreement to kill, will not support Appellant’s conviction for
conspiracy to commit unpremeditated murder, but only conspiracy
to commit an aggravated assault.
In Yates v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that a
verdict must be “set aside in cases where the verdict is
supportable on one [legal] ground, but not on another, and it is
impossible to tell which ground the jury selected.” 317 U.S.
(1932). In Dunn, for example, the Supreme Court affirmed the accused’s
conviction for maintaining a nuisance by selling liquor despite the fact that
the jury had acquitted the accused of the underlying charges of possessing
and selling liquor. Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes stated:
The most that can be said in such cases is that the verdict shows that
either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their
real conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced
of the defendant's guilt. We interpret the acquittal as no more than
their assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to
which they were disposed through lenity.
284 U.S. at 393. Similarly, in the present case, even if one were to
determine that the panel’s conclusion regarding Appellant’s state of mind was
logically inconsistent with a finding of guilty of conspiracy to commit
unpremeditated murder, there would be insufficient basis to reverse the
panel’s substantive findings of Appellant’s guilt. Cf. United States v.
Lyon, 15 C.M.A. 307, 313, 35 C.M.R. 279, 285 (1965)(noting that an
inconsistent verdict is not usually a cause for relief because the court-
martial may merely have given the accused “a break,” but reversing the
appellant’s conviction on other grounds).
23
United States v. Shelton, No. 03-0694/AR
298, 312 (1957), overruled on other grounds by Burks v. United
States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978); see also Roa, 12 M.J. at 212-13
(reversing an attempted murder conviction where the factfinder
possibly relied on a legally flawed theory of intent). This
principle was distinguished by the Court in Griffin v. United
States, 502 U.S. 46, 51-56 (1991). Griffin ultimately
recognized, however, that the Yates principle continues to be
good law: where one of the possible bases of a general verdict
is legally inadequate (as opposed to factually inadequate), that
verdict must be reversed. Id. at 55-60. Because the present
panel’s finding was general in nature, and did not specify which
of the two states of mind in Article 118(2) Appellant’s
conviction was predicated upon, it must be clear that Appellant
could be liable for a conspiracy to violate Article 118(2)
whether he had an unpremeditated “intent to kill” or an “intent
to inflict great bodily harm.”7
The drafters of Article 118(2) clearly intended that either
an “intent to kill” or an “intent to inflict great bodily harm”
would suffice to establish the state of mind required by Article
118(2).8 The current manifestation of Article 118 succeeded
Article of War 92, reprinted in MCM, U.S. Army (1928 ed.) at
7
If I were to reject the Yates principle, I would sustain Appellant’s
conviction on the basis of the foregoing “intent to kill” analysis alone.
8
See discussion of drafters’ intent supra.
24
United States v. Shelton, No. 03-0694/AR
223. United States v. Valdez, 40 M.J. 491, 495 (C.M.A. 1994).
The 1928 MCM defined murder in Article of War 92 as “the
unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.”9
While the drafters of the modern Article 118 dropped the textual
reference to malice aforethought, opting instead for the intent
terminology of the Model Penal Code, I am persuaded by reference
to the legislative history that they intended continuity with
common law understandings of the murder offense. The drafters’
commentary to Article 118(2) notes that “intent to inflict great
bodily harm has been held to satisfy the ‘malice aforethought’
requirement.” Hearings at 1231. Moreover, the Manual
discussion states that, “It may be inferred that a person
intends the natural and probable consequences of an act
purposely done.” MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 43.c.(3)(a).
I see no reason why a hypothetical accused could not enter
into an agreement to inflict great bodily harm against a victim
in a manner which naturally and probably will result in the
victim’s death. Such a hypothetical conspiracy could be formed
9
At common law, all murder was distinguished by malice aforethought:
The malice which distinguishes the crime of murder must be malice
aforethought . . . The legal meaning of malice aforethought, in cases
of homicide, is not confined to homicide committed in cold blood with
settled design and premeditation, but extends to all cases of homicide,
however sudden the occasion, where the act is done with such cruel
circumstances as are ordinary symptoms of a wicked, depraved, and
malignant spirit.
1 Oscar Leroy Warren & Basil Michael Bilas, Warren on Homicide § 66 at 273-74
(perm. ed. 1938).
25
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without the necessity of forming an express intent to kill.
Whether such a hypothetical “intent to inflict great bodily
harm” conspiracy would ultimately support a conviction for
conspiracy to commit unpremeditated murder, or only an
aggravated assault conspiracy may ultimately present a question
of fact for a finder of fact.
In the present case, the record indicates that Seay
inferred that the Appellant wanted to harm Chafin and that
“something was gonna [sic] happen” based upon Appellant’s
demeanor towards Chafin early on the evening of the victim’s
death. Upon leaving Seay’s apartment with Chafin, Appellant
instructed Seay to get in the back of the truck. As they pulled
out of the parking lot, Appellant gave Seay a length of string
and directed him to “choke [Chafin] ‘till [sic] he passed out.”
After Appellant’s third directive to choke Chafin, Seay
complied, thereby performing an overt act potentially in
furtherance of an agreement to kill or inflict great bodily harm
to Chafin. I conclude that on these facts, the panel could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant entered into a
conspiratorial agreement with Seay to kill or inflict great
bodily harm on Chafin without premeditation and deliberation,
and that the subsequent attempt to choke Chafin amounted to an
overt act performed for the purpose of bringing about that
murder.
26
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Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the United
States Army Court of Criminal Appeals.
27