United States v. Alexander ( 2005 )

United States, Appellee
v.
Jonathan L. ALEXANDER, Specialist
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 04-0677
Crim. App. No. 20000627
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued March 8, 2005
Decided August 4, 2005
BAKER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which CRAWFORD
and ERDMANN, JJ., joined. EFFRON, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which GIERKE, C.J., joined. GIERKE, C.J., also filed
a separate dissenting opinion.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Danyele M. Jordan (argued); Lieutenant
Colonel Mark Tellitocci and Major Allyson G. Lambert (on
brief).
For Appellee: Captain Edward E. Wiggers (argued); Colonel Steven
T. Salata, Lieutenant Colonel Mark L. Johnson, and Major
Natalie A. Kolb (on brief).
Military Judge: Kenneth H. Clevenger
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Alexander, No. 04-0677/AR
Judge BAKER delivered the decision of the Court.
A court-martial panel composed of officer and enlisted
members convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of one
specification of rape and one specification of carnal knowledge
as an aider and abettor in violation of Article 120, Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2000). He was
sentenced to a dishonorable discharge, five years of confinement,
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to grade E-1.
The convening authority approved the sentence as adjudged, except
for the forfeitures, and the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed.
We granted review of the following issue:
WHETHER THE RECORD OF TRIAL FAILS TO SHOW THAT
APPELLANT MADE A PERSONAL ELECTION OF FORUM, THUS
CREATING A JURISDICTIONAL ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL.
For the reasons articulated below, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
During Appellant’s arraignment, the military judge advised
Appellant of his forum rights, and Appellant indicated that he
understood these rights. Appellant was asked specifically if he
understood the difference between a trial before a military judge
and a trial before members, and he indicated that he did. The
military judge informed Appellant that he had the right to be
tried by “a court composed of commissioned and/or warrant
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officers,” but that upon request, he could alternatively be
“tried by a court composed of at least one-third enlisted
soldiers.”
The military judge also asked the Appellant to confirm his
desire to defer forum election until a later date and Appellant,
via his civilian defense counsel, reiterated his desire to defer
forum election. The military judge then granted this deferral,
and informed the Appellant that he would set a due date for final
choice of forum at some time in the future. The record of trial
1
is silent as to whether the military judge ever set a due date.
1
The following exchange occurred between Appellant and the military judge:
[Military Judge (MJ)]: Now, Specialist Alexander, you’ve got a right
to be tried by a court consisting of at least five court members -–
that is, a court composed of commissioned and/or warrant officers.
Also, should you request it, you would be tried by a court composed
of at least one-third enlisted soldiers, but none of these enlisted
soldiers would come from your same company-sized unit; in your case,
that would be Delta Troop, 6th Squadron of the 6th Cav[alry].
You’re further advised that no enlisted soldier on that court-
martial panel would be junior in rank than you. Do you understand
everything that I have just explained to you?
[Accused (ACC)]: Yes, sir.
MJ: Now, if you’re tried by a court with members, then the members
would vote by secret, written ballot, and two-thirds of the members
would have to agree before you could be found guilty of any of these
offenses. And should you be found guilty of any of these offenses,
then two-thirds of the members would also have to vote by secret,
written ballot on a sentence; and that sentence, if it included a
period of confinement in excess of 10 years, would have to be by a
three-quarters’ vote, or three-fourths of the members would have to
agree. Do you understand that?
ACC: Yes, sir.
MJ: Now, you also have a right to request a trial by military judge
alone and, if approved, there would be no court members, and the
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At a subsequent session pursuant to Article 39(a), UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 839(a) (2000), the military judge stated in the presence
of Appellant and his counsel, “On Monday, I intend to impanel --
I believe I was told -- an enlisted panel in this case, and we’re
going to go forward with trial.” The military judge and the
parties discussed various housekeeping matters relating to the
court-martial proceedings. They also discussed the instructions
that would be read to the panel as well as which members were
going to be empaneled.
At the next Article 39(a) session, the military judge and
counsel discussed the charges and specifications, and then
shifted to matters involving the panel members. The military
judge and both parties discussed instructions, the convening
order, the expected number of members, and the voir dire of the
members. The members were eventually called in and seated, and
judge alone would determine whether or not you are guilty. And,
should you be found guilty of any offense, then the judge alone
would determine an appropriate sentence in your case. So do you
understand the difference between trial before a court with members
and trial before a court by military judge alone?
ACC: Yes, sir.
MJ: Very well. Defense, I was told at [a Rule for Courts-Martial]
802 session earlier that you intended to defer your election in that
regard. Is that still your desire?
[Civilian Defense Council (CDC)]: Yes, Your Honor.
MJ: Very well. I will set a due date for final choice of forum to be
entered by the defense at some subsequent time, but at this point I
will grant the requested deferral.
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voir dire was conducted. Later that same day, the court-martial
proceeded with the empaneled members. The record of trial does
not reflect that a forum choice was ever expressly made on the
record or in writing by Appellant or his counsel. Nor does the
record reflect objection to the forum at which Appellant was
ultimately tried. Appellant did not raise this issue before the
court below.
DISCUSSION
Article 25(c)(1), UCMJ, provides:
Any enlisted member of an armed force on active duty
who is not a member of the same unit as the accused is
eligible to serve on general and special courts-martial
for the trial of any enlisted member of an armed force
who may lawfully be brought before such courts for
trial, but he shall serve as a member of a court only
if, before the conclusion of a session called by the
military judge under section 839(a) of this title
(article 39(a)) prior to trial or, in the absence of
such a session, before the court is assembled for the
trial of the accused, the accused personally has
requested orally on the record or in writing that
enlisted members serve on it.
10 U.S.C. § 825(c)(1) (2000).
Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 903(b)(2) sets forth the
requirements for the election of enlisted members:
A request for the membership of the court-
martial to include enlisted persons shall be
in writing and signed by the accused or shall
be made orally on the record.
Thus, in plain language both the UCMJ and the R.C.M. require that
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an accused personally elect to be tried by a panel including
enlisted members, either orally on the trial record or in
writing.
The parties agree that the record of trial does not contain
an explicit oral or written election by Appellant to be tried by
a panel of officer and enlisted members. The parties also agree
that the failure to record Appellant’s forum selection as
prescribed constitutes error. We agree. However, the parties
differ as to whether this error is jurisdictional or procedural
in effect.
Appellant argues that because a failure to adhere to the
forum selection requirements of Article 25(c)(1), amounts to
jurisdictional error, his court-martial was without authority to
hear his case and thus was a nullity. Consequently, Appellant
argues, he is entitled to immediate relief. Alternatively, if
this Court determines that the error was procedural in nature,
Appellant argues his substantial rights were materially
prejudiced because he was deprived of his statutory right to
select a forum on the record. The Government responds that the
omission was procedural in nature. Considered in context, the
Government argues, the record reflects that Appellant elected to
be tried by a panel with enlisted members. Thus, Appellant must
demonstrate prejudice under Article 59(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §
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859(a) (2000), to warrant relief, which he has not done, the
Government asserts.
We review jurisdictional questions de novo. United States
v. Melanson, 53 M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 2000). Questions of
jurisdiction are not subject to waiver. “[J]urisdiction over the
person, as well as jurisdiction over the subject matter, may not
be the subject of waiver.” United States v. Garcia, 5 C.M.A. 88,
94, 17 C.M.R. 88, 94 (1954). A jurisdictional defect goes to the
underlying authority of a court to hear a case. Thus, a
jurisdictional error impacts the validity of the entire trial and
mandates reversal. United States v. Perkinson, 16 M.J. 400, 402
(C.M.A. 1983). However, where an error is procedural rather than
jurisdictional in nature we test for material prejudice to a
substantial right to determine whether relief is warranted.
Article 59(a), UCMJ; United States v. Morgan, 57 M.J. 119, 122
(C.A.A.F. 2002) (citing United States v. Mayfield, 45 M.J. 176,
178 (C.A.A.F. 1996)).
In United States v. Townes, 52 M.J. 275 (C.A.A.F. 2000), the
Court determined that when the record indicates that an accused
personally requested enlisted members, the failure to record the
members selection as prescribed by Article 25 amounted to
procedural error, subject to prejudice review. Id. at 277.
Specifically, in Townes, we concluded that factors, such as the
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accused having been advised of his forum rights on the record,
the accused being present when his counsel noted his desire to be
tried by officer and enlisted members, and the accused testifying
before the empaneled members, gave rise to an inference that the
accused was tried by a panel of his choosing. Id. The Court
concluded that “‘the record of trial as a whole makes clear that
the selection was the accused’s choice, and that the error . . .
did not prejudice the substantial rights of the accused.’” Id.
(quoting United States v. Turner, 47 M.J. 348, 350 (C.A.A.F.
1997)). The Court applied a similar analysis in Morgan,
concluding that when “the record establishes that the selection
of an enlisted forum was appellant’s choice,” the failure to
obtain a written forum request on the record “was a procedural
error, not a jurisdictional defect.” 57 M.J. at 122. The Court
also noted that while the record did not contain a personal or
written statement of election, “[t]here were many opportunities
to voice an objection to having enlisted members on the panel,
and none was made.” Id.
In Townes and Morgan we determined, based on the facts of
those particular cases, that failure to comply with the
provisions of Article 25(c) was nonjurisdictional, and we tested
for prejudice under Article 59(a). However, our conclusions
rested in part on a determination that there had been
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“substantial compliance” with the requirements of Article 25(c).
In Townes, for example, the appellant was present when his
counsel selected the forum on his behalf. 52 M.J. at 277. And,
in Morgan, the record included a facsimile from trial defense
counsel informing the military judge that “[t]he defense will
request trial before a court-martial panel consisting of at least
one-third enlisted members.” 57 M.J. at 120. A subsequent
hearing pursuant to United States v. DuBay, 17 C.M.A. 147, 37
C.M.A. 411 (1967), also established that the facsimile reflected
that the accused was advised and “chose to go with the enlisted
panel.” Morgan at 121.
In this case, there is no argument that Appellant selected
trial by one-third enlisted members on the record, either in
writing or orally. He did not. Thus, this case goes beyond the
facts in Townes or Morgan. However, our analytic framework is
the same. We review the record for evidence as to whether the
accused chose the forum by which he was tried.
The military judge advised Appellant, in the presence of his
counsel, of his rights concerning forum election. The record
reflects a clear and thorough explanation. Appellant responded
on the record that he understood his election rights. Appellant
also indicated, through his counsel, that he wished to defer
election until a later time, and asked the military judge to
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permit him to do so. The record does not indicate that a date
was set for doing so. However, at a subsequent Article 39(a)
session the military judge stated: “On Monday, I intend to
impanel -- I believe I was told -- an enlisted panel in this
case, and we’re going to go forward with trial.” When the
military judge made this statement, both Appellant and his
counsel remained silent. Defense counsel did not object.
Appellant’s trial proceeded. Appellant and his counsel
participated in the voir dire of members, including enlisted
members. And, of course, Appellant and his counsel participated
in Appellant’s contested court-martial with one-third enlisted
members empaneled. Defense counsel did not seek to revisit the
deferred matter of forum selection.
In this case, the record reflects that Appellant chose trial
by members with one-third enlisted members. The root of
Appellant’s claim is in the failure of the military judge to
record that election as prescribed in Article 25. Appellant does
not argue that he was not personally subject to UCMJ authority at
the time of his offense or at the time of trial. He does not
challenge the authority of the convening authority to convene a
court-martial, or argue that his court-martial was improperly
convened. He does not argue that he was not informed of his
right of forum selection, nor does he assert that he did not
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exercise his right. His claim is simply that he did not do so on
the record.
The right being addressed and protected in Article 25 is the
right of an accused servicemember to select the forum by which he
or she will be tried. The underlying right is one of forum
selection, not the ministerial nature of its recording. Of
course, there is no better way to protect the right of selection
than through compliance with the specific and straightforward
recording requirements of Article 25. Nonetheless, where the
record reflects that the servicemember, in fact, elected the
forum by which he was tried, the error in recording that
selection is procedural and not jurisdictional. Thus, we will
not order relief absent a showing of prejudice. Mayfield, 45
M.J. at 178.
Appellant’s claim of prejudice is integral to his claim of
error. His essential argument is the same. He asserts prejudice
on the ground that he was not given the opportunity to personally
elect his forum, and therefore choose among trial by military
judge alone, a panel of officer members, and a panel composed of
one-third enlisted members. For the reasons stated above, the
record reflects otherwise. The military judge presented
Appellant with his options. Appellant acknowledged his options
and deferred election. The military judge subsequently stated on
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the record that an election had been made for a panel including
enlisted members, without comment or correction by counsel or
Appellant. Appellant proceeded through voir dire and trial with
a panel of one-third enlisted members, without objection.
Indeed, Appellant did not raise the question of selection and
prejudice either in his submissions under R.C.M. 1105 or before
the court below. As a result, for the same reasons that we find
the error in this case procedural and not jurisdictional, we
conclude that he did not suffer material prejudice to a
substantial right.
DECISION
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is affirmed.
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EFFRON, Judge, with whom GIERKE, Chief Judge, joins
(dissenting):
Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), a member
of the armed forces does not have the right to trial by jury,
but instead is subject to trial by a court-martial panel.
Article 25, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 825 (2000). Congress has strictly
regulated the composition of courts-martial. Although enlisted
members have the opportunity to serve on courts-martial panels,
the UCMJ expressly provides servicemembers with the right to be
tried by a panel that does not include enlisted membership.
Under Article 25(c)(1), a court-martial panel may include
enlisted members “only if . . . the accused personally has
requested orally on the record or in writing that enlisted
members serve on it.” The selection must be made “before the
court is assembled for the trial.” Id.
Where the record of trial is ambiguous as to whether a
timely choice was made personally by the accused on the record,
our Court has held that any error in the clarity of the request
is not prejudicial when the record otherwise demonstrates
“substantial compliance.” United States v. Morgan, 57 M.J. 119,
122 (C.A.A.F. 2002). Morgan concluded that although the record
of trial was ambiguous as to whether an accused had requested
enlisted membership on the panel, a post-trial proceeding
United States v. Alexander, No. 04-0677/AR
“establishe[d] that the selection of an enlisted forum was
appellant’s choice.” Id.
In the present case, there has been no such proceeding.
The record reflects that the military judge advised Appellant of
his rights regarding the composition of the court-martial, the
Appellant affirmed that he understood those rights, the military
judge deferred the election at Appellant’s request, and the
military judge stated that he would set a date for the election
in the future. The record also reflects that the military judge
indicated an intent to empanel a court-martial with enlisted
membership, and that Appellant’s court-martial included enlisted
members on the panel. The record does not indicate that the
military judge set a date for the Appellant to make a forum
selection, nor does the record contain such an election. The
record before us establishes, at most, acquiescence, not “an
informed, personal choice of forum” under Morgan. 57 M.J. at
121.
In the context of the substantial compliance standard,
Morgan demonstrates the critical role a post-trial proceeding
under United States v. DuBay, 17 C.M.A. 147, 37 C.M.R. 411(1967), plays in developing the facts necessary to determine
whether the Appellant made an informed personal selection as to
the composition of the panel. Before replacing the substantial
compliance standard with a mere acquiescence standard, we should
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follow the procedure relied upon in Morgan to determine whether
the composition of the panel reflected Appellant’s affirmative
choice, as mandated by Congress in Article 25(c)(1). I
respectfully dissent.
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GIERKE, Chief Judge (dissenting):
I join Judge Effron’s dissent. I write separately only to
note that this case is distinguishable from Townes1 and Morgan,2
where I joined the majority. In Townes, the trial defense
counsel stated on the record, in front of the accused, that the
defense requested enlisted membership.3 In Morgan, the detailed
defense counsel submitted a written request for enlisted
membership.4 Also in Morgan, the detailed defense counsel’s
testimony at a post-trial evidentiary hearing confirmed that the
accused personally selected enlisted membership.5 In this case,
there was not substantial compliance, but rather noncompliance
with the requirements of Article 25(c)(1), Uniform Code of
Military Justice.6 In the absence of an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether Appellant, in fact, chose enlisted membership,
this record reflects no more than Appellant’s acquiescence to
the panel composition. I would remand this case for an
evidentiary hearing, like that held in Morgan, to determine
whether Appellant actually chose enlisted membership. Excusing
the total abrogation of the requirements of Article 25(c)(1)
renders the congressionally prescribed procedure for selecting
enlisted membership a mere dead letter. I respectfully dissent.
1
United States v. Townes, 52 M.J. 275 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
2
United States v. Morgan, 57 M.J. 119 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
3
52 M.J. at 276.
4
57 M.J. at 120.
5
Id. at 121.
6
10 U.S.C. § 825(c)(1).