United States v. King , 2005 CAAF LEXIS 772 ( 2005 )

IN THE CASE OF
UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Deandrea J. KING Jr., Airman Basic
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 05-0044
Crim. App. No. 35653
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued May 3, 2005
Decided July 19, 2005
ERDMANN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which
GIERKE, C.J., CRAWFORD, EFFRON, and BAKER, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain John N. Page III (argued); Colonel
Carlos L. McDade, Major Terry L. McElyea, Major Sandra K.
Whittington, and Captain Jennifer K. Martwick (on brief).
For Appellee: Captain Stacey J. Vetter (argued); Lieutenant
Colonel Robert V. Combs and Lieutenant Colonel Gary F. Spencer
(on brief).
Military Judge: Gregory E. Pavlik
This opinion is subject to revision before final publication.
United States v. King Jr., No. 05-0044/AF
Judge ERDMANN delivered the opinion of the court.
Airman Basic Deandrea J. King Jr. pleaded guilty to
attempting to possess cocaine and ecstasy and to breaking
restriction in violation of Articles 80 and 134, Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 934 (2000). A
military judge sitting as a general court-martial sentenced King
to a bad-conduct discharge and nine months of confinement. The
convening authority approved the sentence and the United States
Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the findings and
sentence. United States v. King, No. ACM 35653 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. Aug. 19, 2004).
Article 13, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 813 (2000), provides:
No person, while being held for trial, may
be subjected to punishment or penalty other
than arrest or confinement upon the charges
pending against him, nor shall the arrest or
confinement imposed upon him be any more
rigorous than the circumstances required to
insure his presence, but he may be subjected
to minor punishment during that period for
infractions of discipline.
King, who was held in pretrial confinement at the hands of
military authorities from March 9, 2003 until he was tried on
June 26 and 27, 2003, argues that his custody status as a
“maximum security” prisoner and the conditions of his
confinement constituted illegal pretrial punishment and he
should have been awarded credit for a violation of Article 13,
UCMJ. We granted review to determine whether the military judge
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erred in denying King credit for pretrial punishment.1 We agree
in part with King that he is entitled to confinement credit for
a violation of Article 13, UCMJ.
FACTS
King, who was pending administrative discharge from the Air
Force, and a companion went for a night on the town despite the
fact that King was on restriction as the result of nonjudicial
punishment. During the evening King purchased what he thought
were cocaine and ecstasy from an undercover agent. King was
initially detained by civilian authorities from February 7 to
March 3, 2003. After being released by civilian authorities, he
was involved in a disturbance at the enlisted club. King
subsequently was placed in pretrial confinement at Barksdale Air
Force Base (AFB), Louisiana. At the time he was confined,
King’s commander listed a number of offenses in support of
pretrial confinement including: the failure to obey regulations
(underage drinking and weapons violations); use of a controlled
substance (two offenses); the “wrongful use” of a controlled
substance with the intent to distribute; breaking restriction;
disturbing the peace; and the failure to obey an order.
1
We granted review of the following issue:
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT CREDIT UNDER ARTICLE 13, UCMJ.
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After an initial evaluation, confinement officials
classified King as a “maximum security” prisoner. He was
confined in a double occupancy cell with another maximum custody
pretrial inmate. The general conditions and restrictions
imposed upon King as a maximum custody inmate included:
1. Remaining in the cell with the exception of
appointments or emergencies;
2. Eating all meals in the cell (meals were
delivered to the cell);
3. No library or gym privileges (books and gym
equipment were delivered to the cell);
4. No sleeping during duty hours;
5. A requirement to wear a yellow jumpsuit and
shackles when released for appointments; and
6. Two escorts, one of whom was armed, whenever
King was moved to appointments.
King was permitted to watch a television that was placed outside
the cell but close enough for him to reach out and change the
channels. When he was moved outside the confinement facility,
it was usually early in the morning and through alternate
entrances to minimize public contact.
When the inmate with whom King shared the cell was
convicted at court-martial, confinement officials requested a
waiver of the rules against commingling pretrial and post-trial
prisoners. This request was based on the limited confinement
facilities at Barksdale AFB. When that request was denied, King
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was moved on May 1, 2003 to a “6 by 6 by 8” windowless
segregation cell until May 14.
During King’s pretrial confinement, his defense counsel
requested that King be released from pretrial confinement or
that his custody status be “downgraded.” In response, defense
counsel received a memo from King’s commander on May 2, 2003
declining to order King’s release and a memo from the
confinement officer on May 12, 2003 responding to counsel’s
custody concerns. King remained a maximum security inmate
throughout his entire period of pretrial confinement.
At trial, defense counsel made a motion for appropriate
relief asserting that the conditions of King’s pretrial
confinement amounted to punishment under Article 13. After
receiving evidence and hearing argument on the motion, the
military judge denied relief, finding that “[t]he conditions
were based on legitimate non-punitive reasons. The conditions
of [King’s] confinement were not more rigorous than necessary.”
DISCUSSION
King argues that his classification as a maximum custody
inmate was more rigorous than required to ensure his presence
for trial and to satisfy the Government’s concerns for safety in
the confinement facility. He claims that not only was he
incorrectly classified when he entered pretrial confinement but
also that his continued classification as a maximum security
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inmate constituted punishment. Further, King asserts he was
unlawfully punished by being commingled with a sentenced
prisoner and later when he had to endure two weeks of solitary
confinement after the request for a waiver of the prohibition
against commingling pre- and post-trial prisoners was denied.
The Government counters that there was no intent to punish
King and no conditions of his pretrial confinement were more
rigorous than required by the circumstances. The Government
argues that King’s history and the potential charges against
him, as well as the responsibilities of confinement facility
officials, support the finding of no punitive intent and do not
support any inference of punishment. The Government asserts
that commingling is not a per se violation of Article 13 and
that King’s segregation was a nonpunitive act by a relatively
small confinement facility confronted with limited space and
options.
Our determination of whether King endured unlawful pretrial
punishment involves both constitutional and statutory
considerations. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36
(1979); United States v. McCarthy, 47 M.J. 162, 164-65 (C.A.A.F.
1997); Article 13, UCMJ. We defer to the findings of fact by
the military judge where those findings are not clearly
erroneous. However, our application of those facts to the
constitutional and statutory considerations, as well as any
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determination of whether King is entitled to credit for unlawful
pretrial punishment involve independent, de novo review. United
States v. Smith, 53 M.J. 168, 170 ((C.A.A.F. 2000); United
States v. Mosby, 56 M.J. 309, 310 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (“[W]hether
appellant is entitled to credit for a violation of Article 13 is
a mixed question of fact and law.”); McCarthy, 47 M.J. at 165;
see Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 113 (1995). King must
establish his entitlement to additional sentence credit because
of a violation of Article 13. See Rule for Courts-Martial
(R.C.M.) 905 (c)(2).
Article 13, UCMJ, prohibits two things: (1) the imposition
of punishment prior to trial, and (2) conditions of arrest or
pretrial confinement that are more rigorous than necessary to
ensure the accused’s presence for trial. The first prohibition
of Article 13 involves a purpose or intent to punish, determined
by examining the intent of detention officials or by examining
the purposes served by the restriction or condition, and whether
such purposes are “reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental objective.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 539; McCarthy, 47
M.J. at 165, 167.
The second prohibition of Article 13 prevents imposing
unduly rigorous circumstances during pretrial detention.
Conditions that are sufficiently egregious may give rise to a
permissive inference that an accused is being punished, or the
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conditions may be so excessive as to constitute punishment.
McCarthy, 47 M.J. at 165; United States v. James, 28 M.J. 214,
216 (C.M.A. 1989) (conditions that are “arbitrary or
purposeless” can be considered to raise an inference of
punishment).
The military judge made no specific finding of fact that
the confinement facility officials had any intent to punish
King. Rather, the military judge found that “the conditions
were based on legitimate non-punitive reasons.” Similarly, the
Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals found neither punishment nor
unduly rigorous conditions.
We have reviewed the findings of the military judge and the
circumstances and conditions of King’s pretrial confinement,
including King’s status as a “maximum” custody inmate. We are
reluctant to second-guess the security determinations of
confinement officials. McCarthy, 47 M.J. at 167-68. The
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in determining what
offenses to bring to trial does not necessarily alter the
security concerns of confinement facility officials. Thus, we
do not find that King’s continued classification as “maximum”
custody was so egregious as to give rise to any inference of
intent to punish. Nor do we find the conditions of King’s
confinement that resulted from his classification to be so
excessive as to amount to punishment.
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Similarly, we do not find that any departure from the
guidelines for evaluation or reevaluation of custody level was
indicative of punishment in this instance. Table A3.1 of Air
Force Instruction 31-205 (Apr. 2004), provides discretionary
authority to increase or decrease a custody level based upon an
inmate’s behavior. Despite King’s apparent good behavior in
confinement, any alleged departure from the directive’s
authority to reclassify “does not justify the conclusion that
confinement was a form of punishment or penalty . . . . [and]
does not, per se, require awarding additional credit. McCarthy,
47 M.J. at 166, (citing United States v. Moore, 32 M.J. 56, 60
(C.M.A. 1991)).
The fact that defense counsel requested that King be
released from pretrial confinement or that his custody status be
downgraded is not pivotal. Although the lack of complaint is
some evidence that an accused is not being punished in violation
of Article 13, the fact that a complaint is made does not
necessarily demonstrate punishment or penalty. McCarthy, 47
M.J. at 166. Prisoners can be very vocal about their conditions
without those complaints actually reflecting any unlawful
pretrial punishment.
Additionally, the fact that King was commingled with a
post-trial inmate while a request for waiver was processed does
not entitle King to credit. Commingling with post-trial inmates
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is a factor to consider when assessing conditions of
confinement, but alone it is not a per se violation of Article
13. United States v. Palmiter, 20 M.J. 90, 96 (C.M.A. 1985).
Considering these conditions of King’s pretrial confinement, we
find neither punishment nor unnecessarily rigorous conditions
warranting additional administrative credit.
However, we find that King was subjected to punishment
during the two weeks he was in segregation following the denial
of the confinement official’s request for a waiver from the
prohibition against commingling. The Government has proffered
no explanation as to whether they explored alternatives and no
sound reason why King, a pretrial inmate, was singled out and
suffered segregation in a six-by-six, windowless cell. Other
than a single reprimand for falling asleep in his chair, the
military judge found that King was not disciplined, caused no
disturbances, made no threats, and was not disrespectful during
his pretrial confinement. The decision to confine King in a
segregated environment otherwise reserved for inmates with
disciplinary problems was an arbitrary response to the physical
limitations at Barksdale AFB. We have previously referred to
this type of result:
Given the limited facilities and programs
available at most installations, the total
separation of pretrial confinees from the
general population of the confinement
facilities might well result in imposition
of much harsher conditions than those
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imposed upon some prisoners who have been
sentenced to hard labor. We cannot believe
that such an illogical and anomalous result
is necessary or was intended by Congress.
Palmiter, 20 M.J. at 94. Placing King in a segregated
environment with all the attributes of severe restraint and
discipline, without an individualized demonstration of cause in
the record, was so excessive as to be punishment and is not
justified by the Barksdale AFB confinement facility space
limitations. See McCarthy, 47 M.J. at 165; James, 28 M.J. at
216.
King is entitled to appropriate credit. See R.C.M. 305(k).
We agree with King that an appropriate credit in this instance
is three days of administrative credit for each day he endured
solitary segregation. We shall order the appropriate credit.
DECISION
The decision of the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals is affirmed except to the extent that it holds
that King is not entitled to additional sentence credit for a
violation of Article 13, UCMJ. In addition to any other
confinement credits to which he is entitled, King will be
credited with service of forty-two days of confinement.
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