United States v. Scalo ( 2005 )


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  •                                     IN THE CASE OF
    UNITED STATES, Appellee
    v.
    Jonathan G. SCALO, Private (E-1)
    U.S. Army, Appellant
    No. 04-0250
    Crim. App. No. 20020624
    United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
    Argued November 8, 2004
    Decided February 8, 2005
    EFFRON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
    GIERKE, C.J., BAKER, and ERDMANN, JJ., joined. CRAWFORD, J.,
    filed a separate opinion concurring in the result.
    Counsel
    For Appellant: Major Sean S. Park (argued); Colonel Mark
    Cremin, Colonel Robert D. Teetsel, Lieutenant Colonel Mark
    Tellitocci and Captain Kathleen D. Schmidt (on brief).
    For Appellee: Captain Magdalena A. Przytulska (argued); Colonel
    Steven T. Salata, Lieutenant Colonel Margaret B. Baines,
    Lieutenant Colonel Theresa A. Gallagher and Lieutenant
    Colonel Mark L. Johnson (on brief).
    Military Judge:       Jeffrey D. Smith
    THIS   OPINION IS SUBJECT TO EDITORIAL CORRECTION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
    United States v. Scalo, No. 04-0250/AR
    Judge EFFRON delivered the opinion of the Court.
    At a general court-martial composed of a military judge
    sitting alone, Appellant was convicted, pursuant to his pleas,
    of wrongful use of marijuana (four specifications), wrongful
    possession of marijuana (three specifications), and forgery (two
    specifications), in violation of Articles 112a and 123, Uniform
    Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 912a and 923.    He
    was sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for
    fourteen months, and forfeiture of all pay and allowances.    The
    convening authority approved these results and suspended
    confinement in excess of twelve months for twelve months
    pursuant to a pretrial agreement.    The United States Army Court
    of Criminal Appeals affirmed.   United States v. Scalo, 
    59 M.J. 646
     (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2003) (en banc).
    On Appellant’s petition, we granted review of the following
    issue:
    WHETHER THE UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF
    CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED BY HOLDING THAT THE
    STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE’S FAILURE TO ADVISE THE
    CONVENING AUTHORITY OF THE NATURE AND
    DURATION OF APPELLANT’S PRETRIAL RESTRAINT
    DID NOT CONSTITUTE PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
    Because Appellant failed to make a colorable showing of possible
    prejudice from the error in the post-trial recommendation, we
    affirm the decision of the Army Court of Criminal Appeals.
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    United States v. Scalo, No. 04-0250/AR
    I. BACKGROUND
    As we observed in United States v. Finster, 
    51 M.J. 185
    ,
    186 (C.A.A.F. 1999):
    One of the distinguishing features of the
    military justice system is the broad
    authority of the commander who convened a
    court-martial to modify the findings and
    sentence adjudged at trial. Although
    frequently exercised as a clemency power,
    the commander has unfettered discretion to
    modify the findings and sentence for any
    reason -- without having to state a reason -
    - so long as there is no increase in
    severity.
    See also United States v. Davis, 
    58 M.J. 100
    , 102 (C.A.A.F.
    2003)(describing the convening authority as the accused’s best
    hope for clemency).    When a sentence includes a punitive
    discharge or confinement for one year or more, the convening
    authority must receive a written recommendation from his or her
    staff judge advocate (SJA) before taking action on the case.
    Article 60(d), UCMJ, 
    10 U.S.C. § 860
    (d); Rule for Courts-Martial
    (R.C.M.) 1106(a).   The President has issued detailed guidance as
    to the material that must be set forth in the SJA’s
    recommendation, including “[a] statement of the nature and
    duration of any pretrial restraint.”   R.C.M. 1106(d)(3)(D).
    The SJA’s recommendation plays a vital role in providing
    the convening authority with complete and accurate advice in the
    exercise of command discretion.   See Finster, 51 M.J. at 187.
    Accurate advice is particularly important in light of the fact
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    United States v. Scalo, No. 04-0250/AR
    that the convening authority is not required to review the
    record of trial personally before taking action.    See United
    States v. Diaz, 
    40 M.J. 335
     (C.M.A. 1994).
    In the present case, the SJA reported to the convening
    authority that Appellant had not been subject to any pretrial
    restraint.   The parties agree that the SJA erred, overlooking
    the fact that Appellant had been restricted to the confines of
    Fort Stewart, Georgia, for forty-four days prior to his court-
    martial.   The defense counsel did not comment on this omission.
    II. DISCUSSION
    If defense counsel does not make a timely comment on an
    omission in the SJA’s recommendation, the error is waived unless
    it is prejudicial under a plain error analysis.    R.C.M. 1106(f);
    United States v. Kho, 
    54 M.J. 63
    , 65 (C.A.A.F. 2000).    We
    conduct a de novo review of this issue.     Kho, 54 M.J. at 65.   To
    prevail under a plain error analysis, Appellant must persuade
    this Court that: “(1) there was an error; (2) it was plain or
    obvious; and (3) the error materially prejudiced a substantial
    right.”    Id.; see United States v. Powell, 
    49 M.J. 460
    , 463, 465
    (C.A.A.F. 1998).
    The granted issue in the present appeal involves the third
    prong of the plain error test -- an appellant’s burden to
    establish that the error materially prejudiced a substantial
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    United States v. Scalo, No. 04-0250/AR
    right.   To meet this burden in the context of a post-trial
    recommendation error, whether that error is preserved or is
    otherwise considered under the plain error doctrine, an
    appellant must make “some colorable showing of possible
    prejudice.”   Kho, 54 M.J. at 65 (citing United States v.
    Wheelus, 
    49 M.J. 283
    , 289 (C.A.A.F. 1998)).   The low threshold
    for material prejudice with respect to an erroneous post-trial
    recommendation reflects the convening authority’s vast power in
    granting clemency and is designed to avoid undue speculation as
    to how certain information might impact the convening
    authority’s exercise of such broad discretion.   See, e.g.,
    Wheelus, 49 M.J. at 289.
    The threshold is low, but there must be some colorable
    showing of possible prejudice.   See Kho, 54 M.J. at 65.    In the
    context of a convening authority’s exercise of post-trial
    discretion, the omission of pretrial restraint information is
    not inherently prejudicial.   There must be a colorable showing
    of possible prejudice in terms of how the omission potentially
    affected an appellant’s opportunity for clemency.
    Appellant argues that we should find a colorable showing of
    possible prejudice by looking at his loss of liberty in
    conjunction with the clemency matters submitted to the convening
    authority and his compliance with a pretrial agreement.
    According to Appellant, he was a strong candidate for clemency,
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    United States v. Scalo, No. 04-0250/AR
    and knowledge of his pretrial restraint could have been the
    additional factor that would have persuaded the convening
    authority to grant clemency.   Appellant further maintains that
    if the pretrial restraint information had been included in the
    SJA’s recommendation, the convening authority could have noticed
    that Appellant served his pretrial restraint without
    disciplinary problems, which could have made the convening
    authority more likely to grant clemency.
    Appellant’s argument does not reveal any connection between
    the time he spent in pretrial restraint and his clemency
    request.    The petition for clemency that Appellant submitted to
    the convening authority highlighted Appellant’s cooperation with
    authorities, acceptance of responsibility, and desire to witness
    the birth of his child.   Appellant did not directly or
    indirectly refer to the pretrial restraint or suggest that the
    convening authority should take it into account in considering
    clemency.    Moreover, the 44-day period of pretrial restraint was
    not of such unusual duration that there is a reasonable
    likelihood that the length alone -- without any mention by
    Appellant -- would have attracted the convening authority’s
    attention for purposes of clemency.   Under these circumstances,
    Appellant has not made a colorable showing of possible
    prejudice.
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    United States v. Scalo, No. 04-0250/AR
    III. CONCLUSION
    Accordingly, the decision of the United States Army Court
    of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
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    CRAWFORD, Judge (concurring in the result):
    I concur in the result for the reasons set forth in United
    States v. Kho, 
    54 M.J. 63
    , 65-66 (C.A.A.F. 2000)(Crawford, C. J.
    (concurring in the result)).