State v. King ( 2022 )

[Cite as State v. King, 2022-Ohio-3185.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
CRAWFORD COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 3-22-14
v.
EMILY KING, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Crawford County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 17 CR 0257
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Decision: September 12, 2022
APPEARANCES:
Howard A. Elliott for Appellant
Daniel J. Stanley for Appellee
Case No. 3-22-14
SHAW, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Emily King (“King”), appeals from the March
28, 2022 judgment entry of the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On September 26, 2017, King was charged in a two-count indictment
with the offenses of possession of drugs, a fifth degree felony (Count 1), and
tampering with evidence, a third degree felony (Count 2). King entered into a
negotiated plea agreement, pled guilty to both counts, and was sentenced to an
agreed sentence recommendation of twelve months in prison on Count 1 and thirty-
six months on Count 2, to be served consecutively, for a total of forty-eight months
in prison (with consideration of judicial release). The trial court granted her 63 days
of jail-time credit up to November 27, 2017, the date of sentencing.
{¶3} Subsequently, on King’s motion for judicial release, the trial court
granted the motion on March 15, 2018 and placed her on five years of community
control. The trial court filed a judgment entry which stated:
Defendant’s Motion is granted and the remainder of the prison
sentence imposed in the above-captioned case(s) be and hereby is
suspended. The Court hereby reserves jurisdiction to reimpose the
remaining prison time, and the Defendant is hereby placed on
Community Control for a period of five (5) years under the
standard conditions and terms of the Crawford County Probation
Department.
(Emphasis added.) (Doc. No. 24).
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{¶4} On July 6, 2021, King appeared before the trial court for a hearing on
community control violations wherein the trial court continued her community
control. At a subsequent community control violation hearing on October 20, 2021,
the trial court again continued her community control. King was back in court for
another community control violations hearing on March 28, 2022. The trial court
revoked her judicial release community control after the hearing on the matter, and
stated: “I’m going to reimpose the 48 months in prison.” (Emphasis added.) (Mar.
28, 2022 Tr. at 12). With regard to jail-time credit, the trial court stated: “[S]he
would get credit for any days that she’s done either in jail or in prison.” (Id. at 8-
9). In its subsequent judgment entry, the trial court sentenced King on Count 1 to
twelve months in prison, consecutive to thirty-six months in prison on Count 2, for
a total of forty-eight months. The trial court granted King “jail-time” credit in the
amount of 241 days, as of March 28, 2022. (Doc. No. 60). It is from this judgment
entry that King appeals, stating the following assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The trial court is obligated to determine at the sentencing hearing
how many days of credit the Defendant is entitled to for time
served with respect to the offense at hand. The failure to do so is
error requiring the matter be reversed for an appropriate
determination by the trial court at a sentencing hearing.
{¶5} For her sole assignment of error, King asserts the trial court erred by
failing to comply with its statutory obligation under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i) to
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determine what jail-time credit was to be afforded her at the sentencing hearing.
(Appellant’s Brief at 9). Additionally, while not expressly argued, King’s
assignment of error implicitly raises a question of whether the trial court erred in
the process of reimposing King’s prison sentence with credit for time served after
revoking her judicial release.
Legal Standard
{¶6} R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i) states that:
(B)(2) * * * [I]f the sentencing court determines at the sentencing
hearing that a prison term is necessary or required, the court shall
do all of the following:
***
(g)(i) Determine, notify the offender of, and include in the
sentencing entry the total number of days, including the
sentencing date but excluding conveyance time, that the offender
has been confined for any reason arising out of the offense for
which the offender is being sentenced and by which the
department of rehabilitation and correction must reduce the
definite prison term imposed on the offender as the offender’s
stated prison term * * * . The court’s calculation shall not include
the number of days, if any, that the offender served in the custody
of the department of rehabilitation and correction arising out of
any prior offense for which the prisoner was convicted and
sentenced.
{¶7} Next, R.C. 2929.20, which governs judicial release, provides in
pertinent part:
If the court grants a motion for judicial release under this section,
the court shall order the release of the eligible offender, shall place
the eligible offender under an appropriate community control
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sanction, under appropriate conditions, and under the
supervision of the department of probation serving the court and
shall reserve the right to reimpose the sentence that it reduced if
the offender violates the sanction.
R.C. 2929.20(K). Thus, an offender, like King, who has been granted judicial
release “ ‘has already served a period of incarceration, and the remainder of that
prison sentence is suspended pending either the successful completion of a period
of community control or the [offender’s] violation of a community control
sanction.’ ˮ (Emphasis added.) State v. Davis, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-21-03, 2021-
Ohio-3790, ¶ 5, quoting State v. Alexander, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-07-45, 2008-
Ohio-1485, ¶ 7.
Legal Analysis
{¶8} A review of the record clearly indicates that the trial court, after
revoking judicial release at the hearing, committed to King receiving credit for any
days that she had spent in jail and prison. (Mar. 28, 2022 Tr. at 8-9). However, in
its judgment entry of sentence, the trial court only noted the prior “jail time” with
no reference to prior “prison time.” Moreover, the record shows that following
King’s violation of judicial release, the trial court imposed the entire original prison
terms for her offenses, rather than reimposing the balance of her prison terms as
required by R.C. 2929.20(K).
{¶9} As noted earlier, the record shows that in its judgment granting judicial
release, the trial court specifically suspended the remaining portion of King’s prison
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sentence and specifically reserved jurisdiction to allow it to reimpose the remaining
prison time. In sum, it is our view that requiring the trial court to reimpose only the
balance of the previously imposed prison sentence, as opposed to reimposing the
entire original sentence and then purporting to deduct credit for both prior “prison
time” served as well as prior “jail time” served, not only avoids unnecessary issues
as to the calculation of prison time by the trial court instead of the Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction, but is also more consistent with the language of R.C.
2929.20(K), and our prior case law, as well as the language of the trial court’s own
judgment entry granting judicial release in this case.
{¶10} As for jail-time credit, the number of days of jail-time credit that the
trial court credited King when it sentenced her in this case, specifically 241 days, is
reflected in its judgment entry of March 28, 2022. We have recognized that the
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction has the duty to apply jail-time credit,
however, the trial court has the responsibility of determining the number of days to
be credited. State v. Mills, 3d Dist. Auglaize Nos. 2-22-09 and 2-22-10, 2022-Ohio-
2821, ¶ 8. It is then consistent for the trial court to determine the number of days of
jail-time credit that King is entitled to have credited toward the remaining balance
of her original sentence pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i). In this regard, we
note that while the record reflects that the calculation of “jail-time” credit was made
in this case, we are unclear from the record whether some part of the 241 days
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credited by the trial court would not count as “jail time” because, as previously
indicated, the trial court’s entry of sentence is devoid of any other consideration of
King’s prior “prison time.”
{¶11} Therefore, based on the foregoing analysis regarding the trial court’s
reimposition of King’s entire original sentence instead of the balance of the
previously imposed sentence and regarding jail-time credit, King’s sole assignment
of error is sustained to the extent as discussed above. Accordingly, we reverse the
sentence imposed by the trial court and remand this case for the trial court to
properly reimpose the balance remaining on King’s original prison terms consistent
with its own judgment entry granting judicial release subject only to the amount of
“jail-time” credit in accordance with R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i).
Conclusion
{¶12} Having found error prejudicial to the Appellant in the particulars
assigned and argued, the judgment of the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas
is reversed. This cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Judgment Reversed and
Cause Remanded
MILLER and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.
/jlr
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