State v. Wyne , 2022 Ohio 4068 ( 2022 )

[Cite as State v. Wyne, 2022-Ohio-4068.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
LOGAN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 8-22-06
v.
SEAN S. WYNE, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 8-22-07
v.
SEAN S. WYNE, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeals from Logan County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court Nos. CR 18 06 0180 and CR 21 08 0228
Appeal Dismissed in Case No. 8-22-06 and
Judgment Affirmed in Case No. 8-22-07
Date of Decision: November 14, 2022
APPEARANCES:
Eric J. Allen for Appellant
Stacia L. Rapp for Appellee
Case Nos. 8-22-06, 8-22-07
MILLER, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Sean S. Wyne, appeals the January 6, 2022
judgments of sentence of the Logan County Court of Common Pleas. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm the appeal in case number 8-22-07 and dismiss the
appeal in case number 8-22-06.
{¶2} This appeal involves three, separate, unrelated criminal cases. The first
of the cases, case number CR 18 06 0180, arises from a December 27, 2017 incident
where Wyne’s roommate found him unresponsive after ingesting fentanyl. On June
12, 2018, the Logan County Grand Jury indicted Wyne on two counts: Count One
of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(1)(a), a fifth-
degree felony and Count Two of inducing panic in violation of R.C. 2917.31(A)(3),
(C)(3), a fourth-degree felony. At his arraignment on June 29, 2018, Wyne pled not
guilty to the charges.
{¶3} On November 1, 2018, Wyne filed a motion requesting intervention in
lieu of conviction. Following a hearing held on February 7, 2019, the trial court
granted Wyne’s request. Pursuant to the agreement, Wyne withdrew his not guilty
pleas and entered pleas of guilty to the counts in the indictment.
{¶4} However, Wyne violated the terms and conditions of his intervention in
lieu of conviction.1 Consequently, on September 9, 2020, Wyne’s intervention in
1
The record indicates that while Wyne’s motion requesting intervention in lieu of conviction was pending in
case number CR 18 06 0180, he was indicted in Logan County case number CR 18 12 0371 on four counts
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Case Nos. 8-22-06, 8-22-07
lieu of conviction was terminated, and the trial court found Wyne guilty of the
counts in the indictment. The trial court sentenced Wyne to community control
sanctions and reserved a prison term of 12 months for Count One and 18 months for
Count Two, to be served concurrently, in the event that Wyne violated the terms of
his community control.
{¶5} On July 1, 2021, the State filed a motion requesting the trial court to
issue an order requiring Wyne to show cause why his community control should not
be revoked following violations of its terms and conditions. On December 9, 2021,
Wyne entered an admission acknowledging the violation of his community control.
{¶6} On June 26, 2021, Wyne engaged in a physical altercation with his
fiancée, B.L. During the incident, Wyne reportedly struck her multiple times in her
face, arms, and neck. On August 10, 2021, the Logan County Grand Jury indicted
Wyne on a single count of domestic violence in Logan County case number CR 21
08 0228 in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), (D)(4), a third-degree felony. At the
arraignment on August 13, 2021, Wyne entered a plea of not guilty.
{¶7} On December 9, 2021, pursuant to a plea agreement, Wyne withdrew
his not guilty plea and entered a guilty plea to the count in the indictment. In
of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25, fourth-degree felonies, and one count of disrupting public
services in violation of R.C. 2909.04, a fourth-degree felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Wyne was
convicted of three charges of domestic violence. Although he was initially sentenced to community control
sanctions, on December 9, 2021, Wyne entered an admission acknowledging the violation of his community
control. On January 6, 2022, he was sentenced to 54 months in prison for the violation of his community
control in this case.
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Case Nos. 8-22-06, 8-22-07
exchange, the State agreed to recommend community control sanctions. The trial
court accepted Wyne’s plea and found him guilty as charged.
{¶8} At a sentencing hearing held on January 6, 2022, the trial court
sentenced Wyne on the three pending cases. With respect to case number CR 18 06
0180, the trial court sentenced Wyne to 12 months in prison on the fourth-degree
felony aggravated-possession-of-drugs charge. In case number CR 18 12 0371, the
trial court sentenced Wyne to an aggregate term of 54 months in prison for the three
fourth-degree felony domestic violence charges. With respect to case number CR
21 08 0228, the trial court sentenced Wyne to 24 months in prison for the third-
degree domestic violence charge to be served consecutively to the sentence imposed
in case number CR 18 12 0371.
{¶9} On February 7, 2022, Wyne filed his notice of appeal in case numbers
CR 18 06 0180 and CR 21 08 0228. 2
Assignment of Error
The trial court erred by failing to following the joint
recommendation of the parties.
{¶10} In his sole assignment of error, Wyne argues that the trial court erred
by failing to follow the parties’ joint-sentence recommendation.
2
Wyne did not file a notice of appeal with respect to Logan County case number CR 18 12 0371.
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Case Nos. 8-22-06, 8-22-07
{¶11} However, before we can consider the merits of Wyne’s assignment of
error, we must address a jurisdictional matter. Appellate courts have jurisdiction to
review the final judgments of trial courts in their district. Section 3(B)(2), Article
IV, Ohio Constitution; R.C. 2505.02; see also App.R. 4(A). In the absence of a final
appealable order, this court lacks appellate subject-matter jurisdiction. State v.
Galloway, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-21-07, 2022-Ohio-1135, ¶ 8. Accordingly, if the
parties do not raise a jurisdictional issue, we must raise it sua sponte. State v.
Dearmond, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-21-43, 2022-Ohio-2324, ¶ 6, citing Davison v.
Rini, 115 Ohio App.3d 688 (4th Dist.1996).
{¶12} “When valid, a judgment of conviction is a final order under R.C.
2502.02(B).” State v. White, 156 Ohio St.3d 536, 2019-Ohio-1215, ¶ 13, citing
State v. Jackson, 151 Ohio St.3d 239, 2017-Ohio-7469, ¶ 11. “Crim.R. 32(C) sets
forth what must be contained in a judgment of conviction for it to be valid; it
provides that ‘[a] judgment of conviction shall set forth the fact of conviction and
the sentence” and that “[t]he judge shall sign the judgment and the clerk shall enter
it on the journal.’” White at ¶ 13. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “[a]
judgment of conviction is a final order subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02 when
the judgment entry sets forth (1) the fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the
judge’s signature, and (4) the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by
the clerk.” State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, ¶ 14. A sentencing
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entry that does not contain these elements is not final and appealable. State v. Baker,
119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, syllabus.
{¶13} Our review of the record in case number CR 18 06 0180 reveals that
on September 9, 2020, the trial court terminated Wyne’s intervention in lieu of
conviction in that case. At that time, the trial court found Wyne guilty of aggravated
possession of drugs in Count One and inducing panic in Count Two. (Case No. CR
18 06 0180, Doc. No. 85). The trial court imposed community control sanctions,
but reserved a prison term of 12 months for Count One and 18 months for Count
Two to be served concurrently to each other in the event that Wyne violated the
terms of his community control. (Id.).
{¶14} On January 6, 2022, when the trial court sentenced Wyne for violating
the terms of his community control in case number CR 18 06 0180, the trial court
imposed a sentence for Count One, aggravated possession of drugs, but did not
address Count Two, inducing panic.3 “[T]rial courts have ‘a mandatory duty “to deal
with each and every charge prosecuted against the defendant[,]”’ and lack the
3
Additionally, our review of the record reveals an inconsistency with respect to the trial court’s sentence for
Count One, aggravated possession of drugs. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated, “In CR 18-06-
0180, you are sentenced to 18 months to be served concurrently with [the sentence in Logan County case
number] CR 18-12-0371.” (Emphasis added.) (Jan. 6, 2022 Tr. at 12). However, the sentencing entry states
that in case number CR 18 06 0180, Wyne is sentenced to 12 months in prison with respect to Count One,
aggravated possession of drugs. (Case No. CR 18 06 0180, Doc. No. 115). We note that contrary to what
was stated at the sentencing hearing, the trial court’s journal entry is consistent with the hearing held on
September 9, 2020, where the trial court imposed community control sanctions but reserved a prison term of
12 months for Count One, aggravated possession of drugs, and 18 months for Count Two, inducing panic.
(Case No. CR 18 06 0180, Doc. No. 85). Further, as a fifth-degree felony, the statutory range for Wyne’s
aggravated-possession-of-drugs conviction is limited to a sentence of 6 to 12 months in prison. R.C.
2929.14(A)(5). It appears the trial court corrected itself, as to this issue, when preparing the sentencing entry.
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Case Nos. 8-22-06, 8-22-07
authority ‘to refuse to impose sentence altogether.’” State v. Jackson, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 28625, 2018-Ohio-19, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Ford, 9th Dist. Summit
No. 23269, 2006-Ohio-6961, ¶ 6, quoting State v. Hayes, 9th Dist. Lorain No.
99CA007416, 2000 WL 670672, *1 (May 24, 2000). “[T]he failure of an entry to
dispose of a court’s ruling on each prosecuted charge renders the order of the court
interlocutory.” State v. Whetstone, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2009-CA-00111, 2010-
Ohio-1835, ¶ 6, citing State v. Lewis, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 08CA09379, ¶ 4.
{¶15} Accordingly, because the trial court did not impose a sentence for
Count Two, inducing panic, in case number CR 18 06 0180, the judgment entry
does not set forth a complete sentence and thus, is not a final appealable order.
Dearmond, 2022-Ohio-2324, at ¶ 10. Thus, appellate case number 8-22-06, Wyne’s
appeal from the trial court’s judgment in case number CR 18 06 0180 is dismissed.
{¶16} However, the sentencing entry in case number CR 21 08 0228, which
corresponds to appellate case number 8-22-07, is a final appealable order.
Accordingly, we address the merits of Wyne’s assignment of error with respect to
that case.
{¶17} “Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court will reverse a sentence
‘only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not
support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is
otherwise contrary to law.’” State v. Nienberg, 3d Dist. Putnam Nos. 12-16-15 and
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Case Nos. 8-22-06, 8-22-07
12-16-16, 2017-Ohio-2920, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516,
2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1. “Clear and convincing evidence is that ‘“which will produce
in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to
be established.”’” Id., quoting Marcum at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio
St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶18} “‘Trial courts have full discretion to impose any sentence within the
statutory range.’” State v. Smith, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-15-17, 2015-Ohio-4225, ¶
9, quoting State v. Noble, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14-06, 2014-Ohio-5485, ¶ 9, citing
State v. Saldana, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-12-09, 2013-Ohio-1122, ¶ 20. A sentence
imposed within the statutory range is generally valid so long as the trial court
considered the applicable statutory policies that apply to every felony sentencing,
including those contained in R.C. 2929.11, and the sentencing factors of 2929.12.
See State v. Watts, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-20-10, 2020-Ohio-5572, ¶ 10, 14; State
v. Maggette, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-16-06, 2016-Ohio-5554, ¶ 31.
{¶19} R.C. 2929.11 provides, in pertinent part, that the “overriding purposes
of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and
others, to punish the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the
offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those
purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government
resources.” R.C. 2929.11(A). To achieve the overriding purposes of felony
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Case Nos. 8-22-06, 8-22-07
sentencing, R.C. 2929.11 directs courts to “consider the need for incapacitating the
offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the
offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.”
Id. In addition, R.C. 2929.11(B) instructs that a sentence imposed for a felony “shall
be reasonably calculated to achieve the three overriding purposes of felony
sentencing * * *, commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the
offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences
imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.”
{¶20} “In accordance with these principles, the trial court must consider the
factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12(B)-(E) relating to the seriousness of the offender’s
conduct and the likelihood of the offender’s recidivism.” Smith at ¶ 10, citing R.C.
2929.12(A). In addition, the trial court must consider “the factors set forth in [R.C.
2929.12(F)] pertaining to the offender’s service in the armed forces of the United
States.” R.C. 2929.12(A). “‘A sentencing court has broad discretion to determine
the relative weight to assign the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12.’” Smith at ¶
15, quoting State v. Brimacombe, 195 Ohio App.3d 524, 2011-Ohio-5032, ¶ 18 (6th
Dist.), citing State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215 (2000).
{¶21} In case number CR 21 08 0228, Wyne was sentenced for one count of
domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), (D)(4), a third-degree felony.
For third-degree felony domestic violence, “the prison term shall be a definite term
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Case Nos. 8-22-06, 8-22-07
of nine, twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, or thirty-six months.” R.C.
2929.14(A)(3)(b). The trial court sentenced Wyne to 24 months in prison, which is
within the statutory range.
{¶22} Furthermore, the record reflects that the trial court considered R.C.
2929.11 and 2929.12 when it sentenced Wyne. At the sentencing hearing, the trial
court specifically stated that it “considered the purposes and principles of sentencing
as set forth in Ohio Revised Code Section 2929.11 and Ohio Revised Code Section
2929.12.” (Jan. 6, 2022 Tr. at 10). The trial court then specifically referenced the
principles of felony sentencing contained in R.C. 2929.11, and discussed the
applicable R.C. 2929.12 factors. (Id. at 10-11). Additionally, in the judgment entry
of sentence, the trial court indicated it considered “the purposes and principals of
sentencing under R.C. 2929.11, and the need for deterrence, incapacitation,
rehabilitation, and restitution.” (Case No. CR 21 08 0228, Doc. No. 38). “A trial
court’s statement that it considered the required statutory factors * * * is sufficient
to fulfill its obligations under the sentencing statutes.” Maggette, 2016-Ohio-5554,
at ¶ 32, citing State v. Abrams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103786, 2016-Ohio-4570,
citing State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, ¶ 18. Therefore,
because Wyne’s sentence is within the statutory range and the record supports that
the trial court fulfilled its obligation of considering R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, his
sentence is valid. See Watts, 2020-Ohio-5572, at ¶ 14.
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Case Nos. 8-22-06, 8-22-07
{¶23} Nevertheless, Wyne summarily argues that the trial court erred by
declining to follow the parties’ joint-sentence recommendation seeking imposition
of community control sanctions. However, “[t]rial courts ‘are not bound by a jointly
recommended sentence.’” State v. Graham, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-19-11, 2020-
Ohio-1063, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, ¶
28. As outlined above, Wyne’s sentence is within in the statutory range and it is
clear that the trial court considered R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 when fashioning his
sentence. Hence, Wyne’s sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law,
and it must therefore be affirmed. See State v. Slife, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-20-17,
2021-Ohio-644, ¶ 17.
{¶24} Wyne’s assignment of error is overruled. Having found no error
prejudicial to the appellant here in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm
the judgment of the Logan County Court of Common Pleas in case number CR 21
08 0228, appellate case number 8-22-07. The appeal in case number CR 18 06 0180,
appellate case number 8-22-06, is dismissed.
Appeal Dismissed in Case No. 8-22-06 and
Judgment Affirmed in Case No. 8-22-07
ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.
/jlr
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