United States v. Vazquez , 2013 CAAF LEXIS 220 ( 2013 )

UNITED STATES, Appellant
v.
Ray A. VAZQUEZ, Staff Sergeant
U.S. Air Force, Appellee
No. 12-5002
Crim. App. No. 37563
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued October 24, 2012
Decided March 4, 2013
RYAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ERDMANN,
J., and EFFRON, S.J., joined. BAKER, C.J., and STUCKY, J., each
filed separate opinions concurring in the result.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Tyson D. Kindness (argued); Colonel Don
M. Christensen, Lieutenant Colonel Linell A. Letendre, Major
Scott C. Jansen, Gerald R. Bruce, Esq. (on brief); Brian K.
Keller, Esq.
For Appellee: William E. Cassara, Esq. (argued); Captain Nathan
A. White (on brief).
Military Judge: Mark L. Allred
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Vazquez, 12-5002/AF
Judge RYAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Contrary to his pleas, a panel of officer members sitting
as a general court-martial convicted Appellee of one
specification of aggravated sexual contact with a child under
the age of 12, in violation of Article 120, Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2006). The adjudged
and approved sentence provided for a dishonorable discharge,
confinement for eight years, forfeitures of all pay and
allowances, reduction to Airman Basic, and a reprimand.
On March 19, 2012, the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals (AFCCA) held that the application of Rule for
Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 805(d)(1) to Appellee’s case violated
his “right to military due process . . . , resulting in a
fundamentally unfair trial.” United States v. Vazquez, No. ACM
37563, slip op. at 3 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 2012),
superseded by United States v. Vazquez, 71 M.J. 543, 544 (A.F.
Ct. Crim. App. 2012). Concluding that the error was structural,
the AFCCA set aside the findings and sentence and dismissed the
charge against Appellee. Id. at 14. On April 27, 2012, the
AFCCA denied the Government’s Motion for Reconsideration En
Banc, but granted its Motion for Reconsideration before the
original panel. United States v. Vazquez, No. ACM 37563 (A.F.
Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 27, 2012) (order granting review). After
reconsideration, the AFCCA released an amended decision in which
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it explained that it did not base its holding on a structural
error analysis, but nonetheless continued to find Appellee’s
denial of military due process per se prejudicial without
conducting plain error analysis. Vazquez, 71 M.J. at 552. On
certification under Article 67(a)(2), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 867(a)(2) (2006), the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force
asked this Court to consider the following questions:
I. WHETHER THE AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL
APPEALS ERRED BY HOLDING THAT APPELLEE WAS
NOT AFFORDED A FUNDAMENTALLY FAIR TRIAL, AS
GUARANTEED BY MILITARY DUE PROCESS AND THE
UCMJ, WHEN TWO REPLACEMENT COURT MEMBERS
DETAILED AFTER TRIAL ON THE MERITS HAD BEGUN
WERE PRESENTED RECORDED EVIDENCE PREVIOUSLY
INTRODUCED BEFORE THE MEMBERS OF THE COURT
IN COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 29, UCMJ, AND
R.C.M. 805(d)(1);
II. WHETHER THE AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL
APPEALS ERRED BY FAILING TO FIND WAIVER OR
BY FAILING TO CONDUCT A PLAIN ERROR
ANALYSIS; INSTEAD, THE COURT INCONGRUOUSLY
FOUND THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF APPELLEE’S
RIGHT TO MILITARY DUE PROCESS WAS PER SE
PREJUDICIAL DESPITE DECLARING THAT THE ERROR
WAS NOT STRUCTURAL.
Appellee has not shown that the application of Article
29(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 829(b) (2006), and R.C.M. 805(d)(1) was
unconstitutional as applied to him, and the military judge’s
decision to proceed in accordance with the procedure set out by
Congress in Article 29(b), UCMJ, was not an abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, the AFCCA’s decision is reversed.
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I. FACTS
On September 19, 2008, Petty Officer Second Class UG (PO2
UG), Appellee’s friend and former roommate, brought his
stepdaughter (AM) to Appellee’s house to visit. On September
28, 2008, AM told her mother, Staff Sergeant DG (SSgt DG), that
while she was at Appellee’s house, Appellee made her lick his
body. SSgt DG reported the allegation, which was investigated
by the Air Force Office of Special Investigations.
Appellee elected to be tried by a panel of officer members.
At the start of trial, the panel consisted of five members.
After the Government’s opening statement, the panel heard
testimony from five Government witnesses -- AM, PO2 UG, Dr.
Hollander, Special Agent Ferguson, and Dr. Benedek. 1 Prior to
the testimony of SSgt DG, the Government’s last witness,
Lieutenant (Lt.) Conn, a panel member, informed the military
judge that he recognized SSgt DG after seeing her in the witness
waiting area. Lt. Conn explained that he was a squadron section
commander and rates on SSgt DG’s boss for performance reporting
purposes. When Lt. Conn revealed his professional association
with SSgt DG, the military judge and defense counsel conducted
voir dire, after which the military judge asked if defense
1
AM testified remotely via live closed-circuit television
pursuant to R.C.M. 914A and Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.)
611(d)(3).
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counsel wished to challenge Lt. Conn for cause. At that point,
the court-martial panel consisted of five members, and the
military judge reminded defense counsel that the decision to
challenge the member for cause involved “a lot [of] tactical
things” because, although the military judge found no evidence
of actual bias, he was willing to grant a defense challenge to
Lt. Conn for implied bias under the liberal grant mandate.
Defense counsel asked for, and received, a recess to confer with
Appellee before the military judge ruled on the challenge.
After a one-hour break, defense counsel stated that the defense
wished to maintain the challenge. The military judge sustained
defense counsel’s challenge for cause and removed Lt. Conn from
the panel.
Because the remaining four members did not constitute a
quorum under Article 16, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 816 (2006), the
convening authority detailed five new officers, two of whom were
selected to join the panel. After the convening authority
detailed the new members, the military judge asked defense
counsel if there was “any issue an objection [sic] or any issue
with regards to the appointment of these members?” Defense
counsel answered “No, Sir.”
Defense counsel participated in a discussion off the record
as to how the trial record would be presented to the new
members. When asked if there was any objection, defense counsel
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declined to object and did not request that any of the witnesses
be recalled. Pursuant to the procedure set out in Article
29(b), UCMJ, and R.C.M. 805(d)(1), the military judge had a
verbatim transcript prepared, allowed counsel to give opening
statements, and then had counsel read the transcripts of
testimony of the Government’s first five witnesses to the newly
added members. Throughout this process, the four original panel
members were absent.
Subsequently, all six panel members heard testimony from
SSgt DG, the prosecution’s last witness. The panel then heard
defense counsel’s opening statement and the testimony from
Appellee and other defense witnesses.
II. AFCCA DECISION
Raising the issue sua sponte, in its original opinion the
AFCCA held that the military judge’s application of the
procedure set forth in R.C.M. 805(d)(1) to Appellee’s case,
rather than declaring a mistrial, was error. Vazquez, No. ACM
37563, slip op. at 14. Specifically, the AFCCA concluded that
allowing new members to join the panel after five of the six
Government witnesses had testified, and reading a verbatim
transcript of that testimony to the newly added members, in lieu
of hearing live testimony, violated Appellee’s rights to
confrontation, a properly instructed jury, and an impartial
panel. Id. at 6-11. The AFCCA further held that defense
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counsel’s failure to object to this process at trial did not
waive Appellee’s constitutional claim of error, id. at 11-12,
and that:
As applied in this case, RCM 805(d)(1) resulted in a
structural error in the trial mechanism such that the
“criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as
a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence.”
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991)
(quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986)).
For the reasons discussed, we find the appellant was
not afforded the due process protections guaranteed by
Congress.
Id. at 14.
The AFCCA deleted the above paragraph in its second amended
opinion, but nonetheless deemed the application of R.C.M.
805(d)(1) a “violation of . . . [A]ppellant’s military due
process rights” and per se prejudicial without conducting plain
error analysis. Vazquez, 71 M.J. at 552. The AFCCA further
concluded that the military judge “should have recognized that
application of R.C.M. 805(d)(1) would result in a patently
unfair trial and would not ‘preserve the ends of public
justice,’” and that he had a sua sponte duty to declare a
mistrial. Id. at 551-52.
III. DISCUSSION
The AFCCA was required, given the absence of any objection
at trial, to conduct plain error analysis and identify the
specific prejudice to a substantial right of Appellee. Its
determination that reversal was required because “military due
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process” was violated, without more, was, quite simply,
incorrect. Moreover, given that Appellee fails to establish
that the procedures Congress determined were appropriate when a
court-martial drops below quorum mid-trial in Article 29(b),
UCMJ, are unconstitutional as applied to him, the military judge
did not err, let alone abuse his discretion, in following those
procedures in this case.
A.
As was his right, Appellee chose to challenge a member for
cause, knowing it would drop the panel below quorum. Rather
than request a mistrial or any other alternative, trial defense
counsel affirmatively stated that they had no objection to the
new members being detailed, participated in voir dire and the
discussion about how to present the record to the new members,
and stated that they had no objection to the procedure used.
Appellate defense counsel identified no errors related to this
procedure in their brief to the AFCCA, and even today, Appellee
does not allege that trial defense counsel’s tactical decisions
to challenge the original member for cause and continue the
trial with two new members constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel. In light of the above, we would ordinarily conclude
that Appellee affirmatively consented to the application of the
procedure established in Article 29(b), UCMJ, and implemented by
R.C.M. 805(d)(1), and waived his right to object to them at this
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juncture, particularly when he failed to raise them before the
AFCCA. See United States v. Campos, 67 M.J. 330 (C.A.A.F. 2009)
(holding that the appellant waived his right to challenge the
admissibility of a stipulation of expected testimony when
defense counsel, at trial, had affirmatively responded that he
had no objection to the stipulation, had advance notice of the
stipulation, and had considered the impact of the stipulation on
the appellant’s case; and when the appellant, on appeal, had not
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel). However, given that
the application of these procedures in this context has not
previously been addressed by this Court, and that this Court
harbors a presumption against waiver of the fullest expression
of rights under the Confrontation Clause, see United States v.
Harcrow, 66 M.J. 154, 157 (C.A.A.F. 2008), we will treat the
failure to object as forfeiture and review for plain error. See
id. at 158.
Regardless, given the absence of an objection, it is a
certainty that the AFCCA erred in determining that there was
reversible error without identifying prejudice to a substantial
right of the accused. Both parties agree that the alleged error
was not structural, Brief for Appellee at 40, United States v.
Vazquez, No. 12-5002 (C.A.A.F. June 28, 2012); Brief for
Appellant at 36-37, United States v. Vazquez, No. 12-5002
(C.A.A.F. May 30, 2012), and the AFCCA disavowed the notion of
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structural error in its second opinion. Vazquez, 71 M.J. at 552
n.15. Accordingly, because it “does not constitute structural
error subject to automatic dismissal,” the alleged error would
be subject to plain error analysis. United States v. Humphries,
71 M.J. 209, 212 (C.A.A.F. 2012); see also Neder v. United
States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (recognizing that most
constitutional errors are subject to harmless error analysis).
In this context, the AFCCA’s conclusion that “[a] violation of
the appellant’s military due process rights [is] per se
prejudicial and mandate[s] reversal of the appellant’s
conviction,” Vazquez, 71 M.J. at 552, misstates the law. See
Article 59(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 859(a) (2006) (“A finding or
sentence of court-martial may not be held incorrect on the
ground of an error of law unless the error materially prejudices
the substantial rights of the accused.”).
B.
No one disagrees that the military judge scrupulously
followed the procedures established by Congress in Article
29(b), UCMJ, as implemented by the President under R.C.M.
805(d)(1). And no one, including the AFCCA, argues that the
statutory scheme is unconstitutional on its face. At issue,
therefore, is whether the application of Article 29(b), UCMJ,
and R.C.M. 805(d)(1) to Appellee’s case is constitutional as
applied to him. If so, the military judge did not commit error,
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let alone plain error, in applying them.
“The constitutionality of an act of Congress is a question
of law that we review de novo.” United States v. Ali, 71 M.J.
256, 265 (C.A.A.F. 2012). To determine if “a statute is
‘unconstitutional as applied,’ we conduct a fact-specific
inquiry.” Id. (footnote omitted).
In Article 29(b), UCMJ, Congress provided for a contingency
procedure in the event of a loss of quorum:
Whenever a general court-martial, other than a general
court-martial composed of a military judge only, is
reduced below five members, the trial may not proceed
unless the convening authority details new members
sufficient in number to provide not less than five
members. The trial may proceed with the new members
present after the recorded evidence previously
introduced before the members of the court has been
read to the court in the presence of the military
judge, the accused, and counsel for both sides.
The President implemented this statute as follows:
(1) Members. When after presentation of evidence on
the merits has begun, a new member is detailed under
R.C.M. 505(c)(2)(B), trial may not proceed unless the
testimony and evidence previously admitted on the
merits, if recorded verbatim, is read to the new
member, or, if not recorded verbatim, and in the
absence of a stipulation as to such testimony and
evidence, the trial proceeds as if no evidence has
been presented.
R.C.M. 805(d)(1). The analysis of this provision describes it
as “a means to proceed with a case in the rare circumstance in
which a court-martial is reduced below a quorum after trial on
the merits has begun and a mistrial is inappropriate.” Manual
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for Courts-Martial, United States, Analysis of the Rules for
Courts-Martial app. 21 at A21-47 (2008 ed.) (MCM). 2
Whether Article 29(b), UCMJ, is constitutional as applied
to Appellee’s case is controlled by the test adopted in Weiss v.
United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994). In Weiss, the petitioners
contended that they were entitled to relief because due process
required military judges to serve for some fixed length of time
to ensure independence and impartiality. Id. at 176, 178. The
Court, in analyzing this claim, noted that:
Congress, of course, is subject to the
requirements of the Due Process Clause when
legislating in the area of military affairs, and that
Clause provides some measure of protection to
defendants in military proceedings. But in
determining what process is due, courts “must give
particular deference to the determination of Congress,
made under its authority to regulate the land and
naval forces, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8.” . . .
Congress has “plenary control over rights, duties, and
responsibilities in the framework of the Military
Establishment, including regulations, procedures, and
remedies related to military discipline.” Judicial
deference thus “is at its apogee” when reviewing
congressional decisionmaking in this area. Our
deference extends to rules relating to the rights of
servicemembers: “Congress has primary responsibility
for the delicate task of balancing the rights of
servicemen against the needs of the military. . . .
[W]e have adhered to this principle of deference in a
variety of contexts where, as here, the constitutional
rights of servicemen were implicated.”
2
In the 2005 edition of the MCM, the discussion following R.C.M.
805(d) notes that “[w]hen the court-martial has been reduced
below a quorum, a mistrial may be appropriate.” R.C.M. 805(d)
Discussion.
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Id. at 176-77 (latter omission in original) (citations omitted). 3
In this context, the Supreme Court held that a petitioner’s
rights were violated only if “the factors militating in favor of
[the petitioner’s interest] are so extraordinarily weighty as to
overcome the balance struck by Congress.” Id. 177-78 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Applying this standard, the Court
3
Given the plenary authority of Congress, itself subject to the
requirements of the Due Process Clause, to legislate in the area
of rules relating to the rights of servicemembers at courts-
martial, see Weiss, 510 U.S. at 176-77, and the President’s
authority to make rules implementing Article 29(b), UCMJ, see
United States v. Easton, 71 M.J. 168, 176 (C.A.A.F. 2012)
(noting “the President’s authority as Commander in Chief and as
delegated by Congress pursuant to Article 36, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 836 (2006)” to prescribe rules governing courts-martial); cf.
United States v. Jones, 68 M.J. 465, 477 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (Baker,
J., dissenting) (“[T]he President’s authority is at its zenith
when he acts pursuant to Article 36, UCMJ, because he operates
with his own authority as well as that expressly delegated by
the Congress.”), we recognize that the choices made by Congress
and the President in establishing the procedures for courts-
martial under Article 29(b), UCMJ, and R.C.M. 805(d) are
entitled to a high degree of deference, see Weiss, 510 U.S. at
176-77. In view of that deference, we disagree with the
conclusions reached by the AFCCA and Chief Judge Baker. While
it is axiomatic that an accused is entitled to a fair trial, see
id. at 178, absent an argument that the statutory scheme is
facially unconstitutional, or an accused demonstrating that it
is unconstitutional as applied to him, we presume that the
statutory scheme established by Congress and implemented by the
President constitutes both the parameters of what process is due
and a fair trial in the military context. Id. at 181; see
United States v. Mitchell, 39 M.J. 131, 137 (C.M.A. 1994).
Appellee, however, concedes that Article 29(b), UCMJ, is not
facially unconstitutional, Brief for Appellee at 24, United
States v. Vazquez, No. 12-5002 (C.A.A.F. June 28, 2012), and no
one disagrees that Appellee has failed to meet his burden to
show that it is unconstitutional as applied to him. See infra
Part III.C; United States v. Vazquez, __ M.J. __ (3) (C.A.A.F.
2013) (Baker, C.J., concurring in the result).
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found that the petitioners fell “far short” of demonstrating
that their interest should overcome Congress’ determination
because (1) fixed terms of office had never been a part of the
military tradition, and (2) the UCMJ sufficiently preserved
judicial impartiality. Id. at 179, 181.
The Weiss standard controls Appellee’s claim that Article
29(b), UCMJ, and the procedures to implement it set forth in
R.C.M. 805(d)(1) are unconstitutional as applied to him. See
United States v. Gray, 51 M.J. 1, 49-50 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (holding
that the Weiss standard was “the appropriate test to determine
due process violations in court-martial procedure”); see also
Easton, 71 M.J. at 174-76 (holding that Article 44(c), UCMJ, is
constitutional as applied to trials by court members when
Congress appropriately exercised its Article I power).
Moreover, like the petitioners in Weiss, Appellee has the burden
to demonstrate that Congress’ determination should not be
followed. Weiss, 510 U.S. at 181; see Mitchell, 39 M.J. at 137
(holding that the appellant’s argument failed to satisfy the
Weiss standard “because he has not met his heavy burden to show
the Constitutional invalidity of this facet of the military
justice system”).
C.
We disagree that the military judge erred in this case.
The AFCCA did not cite Weiss as controlling authority, but
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rather determined sua sponte that a mistrial was warranted
because it believed that there is a “military due process” right
to have a panel of members “who have all heard and seen the same
material evidence,” and a Sixth Amendment right to have all
members view a witness’s demeanor. 4 Vazquez, 71 M.J. at 546-50.
Both positions are contrary to the plain language of Article
29(b), UCMJ.
First, the AFCCA mistakenly relied on the concept of
“military due process,” an amorphous concept as used by the
AFCCA that appears to suggest that servicemembers enjoy due
process protections above and beyond the panoply of rights
provided to them by the plain text of the Constitution, the
UCMJ, and the MCM. They do not.
Second, Article 29(b), UCMJ, specifically authorizes the
procedures used in this case, and represents Congress’ view of
what “process is due” in the event a panel falls below quorum.
Here, while it was within the military judge’s discretion to
4
The AFCCA also determined that the application of Article
29(b), UCMJ, and R.C.M. 805(d)(1) violated Appellee’s right to
have panel members comply with a military judge’s instructions.
Vazquez, 71 M.J. at 547-48. However, the AFCCA did not find
that any of the members disregarded the military judge’s
instructions, and its determination that the new members were
incapable of following the military judge’s instructions to
assess the witness’s credibility substantively duplicates its
Confrontation Clause holding and would result in a military due
process violation each time written witness testimony is
properly admitted in a court-martial.
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either (1) recall witnesses who had testified prior to Lt.
Conn’s removal from the panel under M.R.E. 614, or (2) declare a
mistrial under R.C.M. 915(a), the military judge did not abuse
his discretion in deciding to proceed in accordance with the
statute and R.C.M. 805(d)(1), particularly when defense counsel
affirmatively stated that they did not object to the procedures
that were actually used. It was Appellee’s burden to develop a
record at trial establishing that the procedures permitted by
statute were unconstitutional as applied to him. See supra Part
III.B. Appellee’s acquiescence and complicity in every aspect
of the procedures used did not create a record upon which to
support an as-applied challenge. Nor did they afford the
military judge either a reason to declare a mistrial or a reason
or opportunity to craft alternative procedures short of a
mistrial, such as recalling witnesses, to obviate the
Confrontation Clause complaints Appellee now raises for the
first time. 5
5
Moreover, we disagree with Chief Judge Baker’s view that the
military judge abused his discretion by not invoking R.C.M.
915(b) when the court-martial dropped below quorum in this case.
R.C.M. 915(b) requires the military judge to “inquire into the
views of the parties” when “grounds for a mistrial may exist”
and “then decide the matter as an interlocutory question.”
R.C.M. 915(b). “[A] mistrial is a drastic remedy [that] is
reserved for only those situations where the military judge must
intervene to prevent a miscarriage of justice.” United States
v. Garces, 32 M.J. 345, 349 (C.M.A. 1991). “Because of the
extraordinary nature of a mistrial, military judges should
explore the option of taking other remedial action . . . .”
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Third, while “[i]t is elementary that ‘a fair trial in a
fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process,’” Weiss,
510 U.S. at 178 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955)); see also Mitchell, 39 M.J. at 136 (quoting same), like
the petitioners in Weiss, Appellee has further failed to show,
either at trial or before this Court, how the members in his
case were either actually unfair or appeared to be unfair. See
Weiss, 510 U.S. at 178. While the AFCCA made a generalized
assertion that R.C.M. 805(d)(1)’s procedures violated Appellee’s
due process right to a fair and impartial jury because of the
possibility that the original four members exerted undue
influence on the two new members, Vazquez, 71 M.J. at 550, it
failed to consider, let alone apply, the high bar set in Weiss
for a determination that the balance struck by Congress in
Article 29(b), UCMJ, is unconstitutional as applied to a
particular individual.
United States v. Ashby, 68 M.J. 108, 122 (C.A.A.F. 2009). Chief
Judge Baker, in assessing whether grounds for a mistrial may
have existed in this case, does not give the requisite weight to
the procedures set forth in Article 29(b), UCMJ, and R.C.M.
805(d) to address a loss of quorum. Where, as here, (1) the
military judge diligently followed the procedures established
under Article 29(b), UCMJ, and R.C.M. 805(d), and (2) Appellee
fails to establish that the application of these procedures
deprived him of his due process right to a fair trial under the
facts of his case, the military judge could not have possibly
abused his discretion in determining that this remedial action
alleviated any potential grounds for a mistrial, and, thus, a
duty to turn to R.C.M. 915(b)’s procedures.
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Instead, the AFCCA asserted that “implicit in the concept
of a fair and impartial panel is the obligation to have members
present who have all heard and seen the same material evidence.
As such, the appellant’s military due process rights in this
regard were violated.” Id. In its view, there is a “military
due process” right to have all members be presented with all
evidence in the same way, and, “[i]f an accused is entitled to
have a ‘jury’ determine his fate, that right must include, at a
minimum, having the same jury present for the entire trial.”
Id. at 549. Not only are these propositions directly contrary
to Article 29(b), UCMJ -- not to mention other provisions of the
UCMJ and MCM, see Article 41, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 841 (2006);
R.C.M. 505; R.C.M. 912(f) -- but also the AFCCA provides no
relevant authority in support of its bald assertions and fails
to explain how Article 29(b), UCMJ, could even be facially
constitutional if either of their assertions was correct.
Fourth, “the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant
a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier
of fact.” Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988); see also
United States v. McCollum, 58 M.J. 323, 329 (C.A.A.F. 2003)
(“[T]he [Supreme] Court has stressed that an accused’s right to
physical, face-to-face confrontation with witnesses against him
forms the core of the Confrontation Clause.”). “The central
concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability
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of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to
rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding
before the trier of fact.” Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845
(1990); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987) (“[T]he
right to confrontation is a functional one for the purpose of
promoting reliability in a criminal trial.”).
As applied, and with no contrary facts developed by
Appellee at trial, Article 29(b), UCMJ, sufficiently satisfies
the central concern of the Confrontation Clause. Here, each
witness testified under oath and in the presence of the accused
and four of the final panel members. Appellee also had the
opportunity to cross-examine each witness. Accordingly, the
verbatim transcript read to the two new panel members was
subject “to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary
proceeding,” Craig, 497 U.S. at 845, and would be admissible
under the former testimony hearsay exception if the witnesses
were found to be unavailable in a subsequent proceeding, even
over defense objection. See M.R.E. 804(b)(1); see also United
States v. Hubbard, 28 M.J. 27, 31-33 (C.M.A. 1989) (military
judge did not err in admitting, over defense objection, an
unavailable witness’s Article 32, UCMJ, testimony under the
former testimony exception to the hearsay rule); United States
v. Arruza, 26 M.J. 234, 235-36 (C.M.A. 1988) (military judge did
not err in admitting, over defense objection, a substantially
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United States v. Vazquez, 12-5002/AF
verbatim transcript of an unavailable witness’s Article 32,
UCMJ, testimony under the former testimony exception to the
hearsay rule).
Moreover, while we do not discount the importance of the
trier of fact observing witness demeanor to the central concerns
of the Confrontation Clause, we note that absent a defense
objection, or in the event of witness unavailability, the
presentation of “written” witness “testimony,” without any of
the members seeing the witness’s demeanor, is both an accepted
practice and constitutionally unremarkable. See, e.g., M.R.E.
804(b)(1) (requiring that for certain former testimony to be
admissible under the rule, the testimony be offered in the form
of a “verbatim record”). Stipulations of expected testimony,
Article 32, UCMJ, testimony, and deposition transcripts are
routinely presented to members and, absent objection, pose no
dangers to the integrity of the courts-martial or the fairness
of the members. 6 See R.C.M. 811(a) (“The parties may make an
oral or written stipulation to . . . the expected testimony of a
witness.”); United States v. Clark, 53 M.J. 280, 281-82
(C.A.A.F. 2000) (“Evidence that otherwise would be inadmissible
under the Military Rules of Evidence may sometimes be admitted
6
And in some cases, like the current case, we can well see why a
defendant might prefer to have a “cold” reading of a witness’s
statement rather than the physical presence of a four-year-old
child alleging a sexual assault.
20
United States v. Vazquez, 12-5002/AF
at trial through a stipulation, if the parties expressly agree,
if there is no overreaching on the part of the Government in
obtaining the agreement, and if the military judge finds no
reason to reject the stipulation ‘in the interest of justice.’”
(quoting United States v. Glazier, 26 M.J. 268, 270 (C.M.A.
1988))); see also M.R.E. 804(b)(1); United States v. Connor, 27
M.J. 378, 389 (C.M.A. 1989) (concluding that a military judge
did not err in admitting testimony from the appellant’s pretrial
hearing under Article 32, UCMJ, because the conditions for
admitting former testimony under M.R.E. 804(b)(1) were met, and
the defense had both the “opportunity” for cross-examination and
a “similar motive” to cross-examine). In that light, Appellee
has shown neither that “the factors militating in favor of [his
interest] are so extraordinarily weighty as to overcome the
balance struck by Congress,” Weiss, 510 U.S. at 177-78, nor that
his rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated.
While a case could exist where Article 29(b), UCMJ, would
be unconstitutional as applied, Appellee has not met the burden
of showing that it is his case.
IV. DECISION
The decision of the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals is reversed. The record of trial is returned
to the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force for remand to the
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United States v. Vazquez, 12-5002/AF
Court of Criminal Appeals for further proceedings under Article
66, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (2006).
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BAKER, Chief Judge (concurring in the result):
I write separately because while I agree with the
majority’s result, I do not share the majority’s view that this
is, at heart, a case only about Article 29, Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 829 (2006), including
whether it is facially valid -- it is. Rather, like the Court
of Criminal Appeals, I believe this case is about whether or
not, in the particular circumstances of this court-martial,
Appellee received a fair trial. While I believe Appellee
ultimately received a fair trial for reasons described below, we
need not be in the position of speculating as to what may or may
not have been in Appellee’s interest or whether he did or did
not waive the issue. That is because Rule for Courts-Martial
(R.C.M.) 915 provides a mechanism for addressing such issues
where grounds for a mistrial may exist. The difference in legal
view between the majority and this concurrence is over whether
grounds for a mistrial may have existed where five of the six
Government witnesses, including the victim, had already
testified before two out of a total of six members were added to
return to quorum. In the circumstances of this case, I believe
the military judge abused his discretion in not applying
R.C.M. 915.
United States v. Vazquez, No. 12-5002/AF
Right to a Fair Trial
Article 29, UCMJ, identifies a normative way to address the
loss of quorum where new members are added to a court-martial
who have not had the benefit of the prior testimony. However,
it is not an exclusive approach. And, as the court below notes,
Article 29, UCMJ, does not purport to address or resolve
potential due process concerns that might arise in the context
of adding new members to a court-martial that is well underway
or where demeanor evidence is essential. General principles of
due process and impartiality also apply as does R.C.M. 805(d),
and in context, R.C.M. 915.
For example, in he-said-she-said sex cases where there is
no physical evidence, demeanor evidence could be determinative.
Therefore, the rote application of R.C.M. 805(d) and Article 29
UCMJ, could deprive a defendant of a fair trial where all or
most of the witnesses have testified before the original court-
martial panel prior to its reduction below quorum. In such a
case, simply reading the transcripts of the prior testimony
aloud to the replacement members could deprive them of
information critical to making credibility determinations. The
Supreme Court has recognized that “demeanor and tone of voice
. . . bear . . . heavily on the listener’s understanding of and
belief in what is said.” Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S.
564, 575 (1985). The point might also be illustrated with
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United States v. Vazquez, No. 12-5002/AF
reference to a he-said-she-said case where the single witness
against an accused (the victim) had already testified. Such an
example might illustrate that in certain rare cases, reading
aloud the transcripts of prior testimony to the replacement
members will not for the purposes of due process necessarily and
adequately substitute for the observations of in-court demeanor
as the majority now concludes. Congress did not decide
otherwise with Article 29, UCMJ.
However, even given the unusual circumstances of this case,
I conclude ultimately that there was no due process violation in
this case where five of the Government’s six witnesses,
including the victim, had already testified. First, the members
were presented with the testimony in question. Second, the
members were allowed to ask questions. Third, defense counsel
was given an opportunity to object and given adequate time to
consider whether to do so. Most importantly, in the context of
this trial there might be good reasons why a defendant would not
want the victim to testify before the new members, but would
prefer the more sterile reading of a transcript. The same is
true with expert testimony, although the difference between
seeing an expert’s in-court testimony and listening to the
transcript of that testimony may be less dramatic than in the
case of a child witness. Therefore, this record does not
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United States v. Vazquez, No. 12-5002/AF
establish a violation of Appellee’s constitutional right to a
fair trial.
Of course, we do not know whether Appellee made a conscious
choice not to request the recall of one or more witnesses,
whether he thought the demeanor evidence helpful or unhelpful,
or whether he fully understood his options when quorum was lost
because the record is devoid of such discussion. There is a
solution to that -- R.C.M. 915.
The difference in legal view between the majority and me is
over whether grounds for a mistrial may have existed. If the
answer to that question is yes, then R.C.M. 915 applies to this
case and the military judge abused his discretion by not
applying it. Indeed, if applied, the rule would have addressed
the questions presented here head-on, without need to now
speculate at the appellate level about waiver, the importance of
demeanor evidence, whether or not Appellee would have benefitted
from the recall of one or more witnesses, and whether the
accused’s right to a fair trial was protected.
In my view, the military judge in this trial had a duty to
inquire of the parties whether they wanted to proceed with a
mistrial, recall the Government witnesses who had already
testified, or proceed with the application of R.C.M. 805(d) and
Article 29, UCMJ.
As noted above, R.C.M. 915(b) requires that:
4
United States v. Vazquez, No. 12-5002/AF
On motion for a mistrial or when it otherwise appears that
grounds for a mistrial may exist, the military judge shall
inquire into the views of the parties on the matter and
then decide the matter as an interlocutory issue
Emphasis added. Here, Appellee’s trial was a textbook example
of an instance where grounds for a mistrial may have existed.
Five of the six Government witnesses, including the child-
accuser, had already testified before one of the five members of
the panel was excused and replaced by two new members who were
read the transcribed testimony of the five witnesses who had
already testified. There was no physical evidence to
corroborate the alleged sexual offense.
Typically, demeanor is but one component of testimony
factfinders use to determine guilt or innocence. However,
demeanor was essential in this case because it was a credibility
contest between the victim and the accused in a case devoid of
physical evidence. The military judge presiding over Appellee’s
trial was on notice that problems related to demeanor evidence
could create conditions necessitating declaration of a mistrial
to prevent injustice. See United States v. Ashby, 68 M.J. 108(C.A.A.F. 2009) (mistrial is appropriate when “manifestly
necessary” in the interest of justice) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here the military judge presented only one option:
application of R.C.M. 805(d). He did not elicit views on
5
United States v. Vazquez, No. 12-5002/AF
whether a mistrial or a recall of one or more witnesses was
required. After conferencing with the defense and trial counsel
in an R.C.M. 802 conference, the military judge went on the
record and stated:
I have discussed with counsel, in an 802, our plans for how
we will proceed in order to comply with RCM 805(d) and the
guidance therein as to how to proceed when the membership
of the court has been reduced below a quorum under RCM
505(c)(2)(b) after trial on the merits has begun.
The military judge then asked, “Do counsel for either side
object to our proceeding in that manner or have anything else
they wish to place on the record in this regard?” Neither the
defense counsel nor trial counsel objected or made any
additional statements regarding their options.
However, in a context where R.C.M. 915 was not followed,
and all three available options were not discussed with the
parties, I would not apply waiver to Appellee’s case. Instead,
I would treat this as a matter of forfeiture and review for
plain error. For the reasons stated above, I would then find a
clear and obvious error in not applying R.C.M. 915. However, I
would not find prejudice. For plain error analysis, Appellee
bears the burden of demonstrating material prejudice to a
substantial right. Article 59(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 859(a)
(2006). Here, Appellee has failed to carry this burden for the
same reasons the record fails to establish a violation of his
right to a fair trial.
6
United States v. Vazquez, No. 12-5002/AF
STUCKY, Judge (concurring in the result):
I have no disagreement whatsoever with the majority
concerning the merits of this case. The military judge did not
commit error in applying the procedures set forth in Article
29(b), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C.
§ 829(b) (2006), and Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 805(d)(1)
to this case. I also strongly agree with the Court’s discussion
of military due process, including the applicability of Weiss v.
United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994). I write separately solely
because I am unable to join the majority opinion in reviewing
the judgment of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals for plain error. Appellee clearly waived any objection
to the procedures the military judge followed, which were
consistent with Article 29(b) and R.C.M. 805.
Before granting the implied bias challenge on Lieutenant
(Lt.) Conn, the military judge warned Appellee that granting the
challenge would have consequences. The defense counsel asked
for a recess so he could discuss the issue with his client.
When court reconvened an hour later, the military judge asked
the defense counsel if Appellee still wished to challenge Lt.
Conn. The defense maintained the challenge. The military judge
granted the challenge and advised the parties “to prepare to
regroup and proceed as instructed in the Manuals (sic) for
United States v. Vazquez, No. 12-5002/AF
Courts-Martial.” When asked whether he concurred with that
approach, the defense counsel said he did.
The following day during a pretrial hearing, the military
judge advised Appellee that new members had been chosen. The
defense denied having any objection to the selection of the new
members. After voir dire and challenges, the new members were
seated and, in the presence of Appellee and his counsel, the
military judge advised them of the procedures that would be
followed -- that the transcribed testimony of the witnesses who
had already testified would be read to them. In an Article
39(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 839(a) (2006), session, the military
judge advised counsel that he intended to proceed under R.C.M.
805(d), which details the procedures for reading the testimony
to the new members. He then asked if counsel objected to
proceeding in that manner. Defense counsel answered in the
negative.
In this case, the military judge offered Appellee several
opportunities to object to the procedure for replacing court
members and reading a transcript of the previously given
testimony to the new members. Appellee did not merely forfeit
this issue by not objecting, such that we would apply plain
error; he affirmatively declined to object to any aspect of the
procedure. Under these circumstances, I conclude he waived
appellate review of this issue.
2