State of Arizona v. Douglas Lee Eddington ( 2011 )

SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc
STATE OF ARIZONA, ) Arizona Supreme Court
) No. CR-11-0040-PR
Appellee, )
) Court of Appeals
) Division Two
v. ) No. 2 CA-CR 08-0377
)
) Pima County
) Superior Court
DOUGLAS LEE EDDINGTON, ) No. CR20061586
)
Appellant. ) O P I N I O N
_________________________________ )
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
The Honorable Kenneth Lee, Associate Presiding Judge
AFFIRMED
________________________________________________________________
Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division Two
226 Ariz. 72, 244 P.3d 76 (2010)
AFFIRMED
________________________________________________________________
THOMAS C. HORNE, ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL Phoenix
By Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel,
Capital Litigation Section
David A. Sullivan, Assistant Attorney General Tucson
Attorneys for State of Arizona
ROBERT J. HIRSH, PIMA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER Tucson
By Rebecca A. McLean, Deputy Public Defender
Stephen Richard Elzinga, Rule 38 Law Student
Attorneys for Douglas Lee Eddington
________________________________________________________________
B E R C H, Chief Justice
1. Any person “interested directly or indirectly in [a] matter” is
disqualified from serving as a juror for that case. Ariz. Rev. Stat.
(“A.R.S.”) § 21-211(2) (2002). The question before the Court is
whether a peace officer employed by the law enforcement agency that
investigated a criminal case has such a disqualifying interest.[1] The
answer is yes.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
2. Douglas Lee Eddington was charged as an accomplice in the murder of the
son of a Tucson police officer. During voir dire, one potential juror
stated that he was employed as a deputy sheriff with the Pima County
Sheriff’s Department, the law enforcement agency that had investigated
the crime, and knew between one-third and one-half of the prospective
witnesses, including the lead detective. The deputy had been employed
by the Pima County Sheriff’s Department for twenty-four years and at
that time was assigned to the Pima County Superior Court security
detail. He acknowledged that he therefore understood why two officers
were present in the courtroom, suggesting that he knew Eddington was in
custody.
3. Based on these facts, Eddington moved to strike the deputy for cause.
The trial court denied the motion, relying on the deputy’s avowals that
he could be fair and impartial. Eddington then used a peremptory
strike to remove the deputy from the panel. The jury ultimately found
Eddington guilty of second degree murder.
4. On appeal, a majority of the court of appeals held that the trial court
erred in refusing to strike the deputy, reasoning that peace officers
employed by the law enforcement agency that investigated the case are
“interested persons” disqualified by A.R.S. § 21-211(2). State v.
Eddington, 226 Ariz. 72, 76 ¶ 8, 244 P.3d 76, 80 (App. 2010). But
finding no prejudice because the deputy had not participated in
deciding the case, the court affirmed the conviction. Id. at 79 ¶ 19,
244 P.3d at 83 (citing State v. Hickman, 205 Ariz. 192, 199 ¶ 31, 68
P.3d 418, 425 (2003)). The concurring judge agreed that the conviction
should be affirmed, but disagreed that peace officers should be
automatically disqualified from serving as jurors when their employing
agency conducted the criminal investigation. Id. at 83 ¶ 39, 244 P.3d
at 87 (Kelly, J., specially concurring).
5. We granted review of the State’s petition because the application of
A.R.S. § 21-211(2) in this context is an issue of statewide importance.
We have jurisdiction under Article 6, section 5, clause 3 of the
Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12–120.24 (2003).
II. DISCUSSION
6. The right to a jury trial requires unbiased, impartial jurors. Irvin
v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); accord State v. Miller, 178 Ariz.
555, 557, 875 P.2d 788, 790 (1994). States may determine the
qualifications for state jury service, so long as juries remain fair
and representative of the community. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 538 (1975).
7. Both a statute and Court rules set forth grounds on which potential
jurors may be disqualified from jury service. See A.R.S. § 21-211;
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4(b); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 47(c).[2] Rule 18.4(b)
directs dismissal for cause of potential jurors who cannot render a
fair and impartial verdict. Section 21-211(4) similarly bars
“[p]ersons biased or prejudiced in favor of or against either of the
parties.” While both statute and rule exclude those who cannot be
fair, the statute also prohibits three other categories of persons from
sitting as jurors: (1) witnesses in the action, (2) persons
“interested directly or indirectly” in the case, and (3) relatives of
the parties. A.R.S. § 21-211(1)-(3).
8. By broadly disqualifying four categories of persons from sitting on a
jury for a specific case, § 21-211 serves at least three goals: (1)
preserving the right to a fair trial by impartial jurors, (2) ensuring
that jurors derive their knowledge about the case solely from
information presented at trial to the jurors collectively, and (3)
protecting the appearance of fairness, which helps instill public
confidence in the judicial system. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior
Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (discussing “the appearance of fairness
so essential to public confidence in the [criminal justice] system”);
accord State v. Hursey, 176 Ariz. 330, 334, 861 P.2d 615, 619 (1993)
(noting that “[j]ustice and the law must rest upon the complete
confidence of the . . . public”) (internal quotation omitted); see also
Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965) (observing that
verdict must be based on evidence developed during trial); accord
Miller, 178 Ariz. at 557, 875 P.2d at 790.
9. As a statutory construction matter, an “interest” must differ from
“bias” and “prejudice” because the latter two terms are addressed
together in subsection (4) of § 21-211, while “interest” is separately
addressed in subsection (2). Had the legislature intended these words
to have the same or similar meanings, it likely would have included all
three terms in the same subsection. Moreover, if the terms mean the
same thing, then one subsection is redundant, and we generally construe
statutes so that no part is rendered redundant or meaningless. See
State v. Thompson, 204 Ariz. 471, 475 ¶ 10, 65 P.3d 420, 424 (2003).
10. The statute does not define the terms direct or indirect interest, but
Arizona cases provide some guidance. For example, “[j]urors who are
insured by an insurance company that is a party in the case” have been
deemed interested persons because in deciding the case, they may
improperly consider whether a ruling might affect their insurance
premiums. Lopez v. Farmers Ins. Co., 177 Ariz. 371, 374, 868 P.2d 954,
957 (App. 1993). Similarly, “every stockholder of a private
corporation, or a corporation exercising the functions defendant
exercises, is interested in the event of a suit brought against his
company and therefore, upon challenge for cause, should be excused.”
Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n v. Berry, 31 Ariz. 39, 43-44, 250
P. 356, 357 (1926) (citing statutory provision similar to § 21-211(2)).
In both cases, the court disqualified the prospective jurors without
requiring a showing that their interest might have affected their
ability to fairly and impartially deliberate. The potential for an
appearance of bias sufficed to require disqualification regardless of
any juror-specific finding of actual bias.
11. Yet an interest under A.R.S. § 21-211(2) is not limited to pecuniary
concerns. It may also include a desire to see one side prevail in
litigation or an alignment with or loyalty to one party or side. In
criminal cases, for example, officers of the agency that conducted the
investigation work closely with the prosecution and are often
considered part of the prosecution team. See, e.g., Carpenter v.
Superior Court, 176 Ariz. 486, 490, 862 P.2d 246, 250 (App. 1993)
(finding “law enforcement agency investigating a criminal action
operates as an arm of the prosecutor for purposes of obtaining
information” under Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure). The chief
investigator may sit at counsel table with the prosecution team, even
if the investigator will testify in the matter. Ariz. R. Crim. P.
9.3(d); accord State v. Williams, 183 Ariz. 368, 379-80, 904 P.2d 437,
448-49 (1995). Because investigators are part of the prosecution team,
the obligation of prosecutors to disclose exculpatory materials extends
to them. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995); see also
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Ariz. R. Crim. P.
15.1(f)(2), (3). And the investigating law enforcement agency, by
making an arrest and presenting the case to the prosecutor and
cooperating thereafter, indicates its determination that probable cause
exists and suggests that a conviction should ensue. Accordingly,
courts have recognized the interest shared by the investigating agency
and the prosecution in advocating for a conviction. See, e.g., Arizona
v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15 (1995) (identifying “the law enforcement team
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”)
(citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)); State v.
Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, 55 ¶ 21, 50 P.3d 407, 412 (App. 2002).[3]
12. In addition to the outward appearance of an interest, a co-employee
might feel pressure in judging the “credibility and conduct of
coworkers, a role with potential consequences for his future working
relationships.” Eddington, 226 Ariz. at 77 ¶ 11, 244 P.3d at 81. A
deputy sitting as a juror might hesitate to join a defense verdict in a
criminal case investigated by fellow officers from his own department
and presumptively approved by his superior. Id. at ¶ 10.
13. Beyond the general perception of fairness, § 22-211 also seeks to
ensure that jurors decide the facts and return a verdict based solely
on evidence presented to them during the trial, not on information they
glean from other sources. See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364
(1966) (noting a defendant’s right to a jury that considers only the
evidence presented at trial). A juror who works for the investigating
agency might have access to information not available to other jurors.
This concern is exemplified in this case, where the deputy had
information relating to Eddington’s in-custody status. By virtue of
his position, the deputy might also have had other inside information
about the investigators or the type of investigation conducted. Such
knowledge undermines a defendant’s right to be presumed innocent. See
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-04 (1976) (urging courts to “be
alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the fact finding
process”).
14. A primary purpose of § 21-211 is to promote public confidence in the
judicial system. Everyone participating in and observing a trial
should have confidence that the trial is fair in all respects. The
deputy here thought he could decide fairly, and perhaps he could have
done so, as the trial judge concluded. But if the defendant’s jury had
consisted of twelve peace officers employed by the investigating
agency, the public likely — and the defendant undoubtedly — would
reasonably perceive that a fair trial had not been had, even if all the
jurors had sworn during voir dire that they could be fair and
impartial.
15. The State argues that peace officers’ jury service is covered by A.R.S.
§ 21-202(B)(5) (Supp. 2011). That statute, however, simply permits
peace officers to opt out of jury service. An excuse from jury service
differs from a disqualification. See A.R.S. §§ 21-101 to -236 (2002 &
Supp. 2011). Once a peace officer elects to become a member of the
jury pool, that officer’s participation in the case, like that of any
other venire person, is subject to § 21-211.
16. The State also cites State v. Hill for the proposition that a police
officer acquainted with the prosecutor and two of the state’s witnesses
may serve on a jury if he says he can remain fair and impartial. 174
Ariz. 313, 848 P.2d 1375 (1993). But the facts here differ from those
in Hill. There, although the challenged juror was a “police officer,”
id. at 319, 848 P.2d at 1381, the crime was investigated by “deputies,”
id. at 317, 848 P.2d at 1379, suggesting that the officers worked for
different law enforcement agencies. The opinion mentions no ties
between the challenged juror and the investigating agency. Hill
recognizes that simply being a peace officer, without more, does not
disqualify one from jury service in a criminal case, a result with
which we agree.
17. Here, the deputy was neither exempt nor excused from jury service
solely because of his occupation. Rather, he was disqualified from
serving as a juror on this particular case because of his interest in
the matter arising from the fact of his employment by the same agency
that conducted the investigation.
18. The working relationship between the prosecution and the investigating
agency is the type of interest § 21-211(2) is meant to cover. Like the
court of appeals, we therefore conclude that a peace officer currently
employed by the law enforcement agency that investigated the case is an
“interested person” who is disqualified from sitting as a juror. Our
conclusion does not depend on the particular officer’s knowledge of
witnesses or facts of the case or the officer’s belief in his or her
ability to be fair and impartial.
III. CONCLUSION
19. For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the opinion of the court of
appeals.
_____________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Chief Justice
CONCURRING:
_____________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Vice Chief Justice
_____________________________________
W. Scott Bales, Justice
_____________________________________
A. John Pelander, Justice
_____________________________________
Robert M. Brutinel, Justice
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[1] We use the term “peace officer” as it is defined in A.R.S. §§ 1-
215(28) (Supp. 2011) and 13-105(29) (Supp. 2011).
[2] Because this is a criminal case, we do not address Civil Rule 47(c).
[3] The job description of a Deputy Pima County Sherriff further
illustrates the role a deputy may have in investigating and prosecuting a
case. Investigative tasks include preparing evidence for courtroom
presentation; testifying in court; investigating criminal activity;
preserving and analyzing facts and evidence; interviewing complainants, the
accused, witnesses, and the preliminary investigating officer; preparing
and submitting reports of criminal offenses, including modus operandi and
description of incriminating evidence, for determination of guilt and
prosecution of charges; among other duties. A deputy employed by the same
department that conducted the investigation may work with other deputies
engaged in investigative tasks related to the case at hand. See Pima
County Sheriff’s Department, Deputy Sheriff: Job Description, available at
http://www.pimasheriff.org/careers/deputy-sheriff/ job-description/.