Law v. Cross , 17 L. Ed. 185 ( 1862 )

66 U.S. 533 (____) 1 Black 533

LAW
vs.
CROSS.

Supreme Court of United States.

Mr. S.D. Law, of New York, and Mr. Gillet, of Washington city, for the plaintiff in error.

Mr. Lane, of New York, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice GRIER.

The objection that this suit should have been brought in the name of Cross, Hobson & Company, instead of Alexander Cross, has no support, either in law or the facts in evidence. The contract on which the suit was brought was with Cross alone. Law had established a line of steamers on the Pacific, to run from Panama to San Francisco. It became necessary to supply them with coal at Valparaiso, and to have purchases of it made there, in expectation of their arrival round the cape, and for supplies at San Francisco.

Cross being in New York in January, 1850, and about to go to Valparaiso, was employed by Law to make purchases of coal for him at Valparaiso. His letters of instruction are all directed to Cross alone, and contain no intimation of any other party in the transaction. Cross was a member of the mercantile firm of Cross, Hobson & Co., doing business in Valparaiso. The same firm had a house also in San Francisco. Through these houses much of the correspondence necessary in the transaction of the business was carried on. That Cross was a member of each of these firms, was but an accident in the case, and would not necessarily make them parties to the contract more than if any other individual or firm had been his agents; and even if Cross had agreed to make them equal shares in the profits arising from the contract, they did not thereby become parties to it. The firm had no contract with Law on which they could sustain a suit, or be liable to him. Much stress was made in the argument of this case, that the firm, in their correspondence with Law, giving information of what had been done, used the words "we" and "us." There was certainly no grammatical impropriety in the use of these pronouns; but the inference that the firm were not acting for Mr. Cross, and that Law had made some contract with them which does not otherwise appear, is certainly not a necessary one either in law or in fact. Every letter of instruction as to purchase of coal was sent by Law to Cross individually. His letter of instruction also to the master of the Antelope directs a consignment of the vessel to Cross, and not to the firm. The letters of credit were to Cross alone, on the faith of which he alone could draw bills to make the necessary payments.

A congeries of instructions, so called, amounting to the number of twenty-eight, were requested. The court, without confusing the jury with a special answer to each one of these propositions, properly submitted the facts to the jury, and gave them instructions as to the law. A large number of these points, which involve questions of law, were ruled in the charge as requested by the counsel.

The case was argued here, in some measure, as if it had been an appeal in admiralty, or motion for a new trial.

To comment on all the objections attempted to be raised in the case would be tedious and unprofitable. It will be sufficient to notice the real questions in the case, and the instructions given by the court. If these were correct, the court below were not bound to answer specifically each question in the catechism, nor this court to comment thereon.

I. As to the cargo of the Duncan, it was objected that there was no authority to the agent to make such purchase.

The defendant had, by his letter of May 28, 1850, instructed the plaintiff as follows:

"I want you to purchase me two cargoes of coal afloat, and send it to San Francisco as soon as possible; consign it to your house there for me," &c. This cargo was purchased on its way to Valparaiso, with an option to refuse it if it should not arrive in sixty days. The coal afterwards arrived, but the master of the vessel refused to take it to San Francisco, and another vessel was chartered to take it. There was some dispute as to what was meant by the term "afloat," and testimony was given as to its meaning among merchants.

The court submitted the question to the jury.

We can discover no error in this instruction.

II. As to the coal purchased at Coquimbo, and afterwards sent to San Francisco by the Amelia, Law had instructed Cross to buy 350 tons of coal at Valparaiso for the Antelope, which was expected to arrive at Valparaiso by the first of June; but she did not arrive till 28th of August, in consequence of delay in starting and detention on the way. In July Cross wrote to Law that he had purchased the coal for the Antelope, not at Valparaiso, but at Coquimbo, stating as a reason that coal was scarce and difficult to procure, and he was fearful the vessel might arrive and not find a supply, and Coquimbo was but a day's sail further on the way, the coal cheaper, and a safer and easier place to ship it. But when the Antelope arrived afterwards, she was so much disabled as to require repairs, and being delayed at Valparaiso for that purpose, the master preferred to have other coal purchased at Valparaiso, which could be put on board while his vessel was being repaired, and directed the coal at Coquimbo to be sent to San Francisco.

The defendant objected that this purchase was not within his instructions.

It presented a case where the agent, acting, as he supposed, for the best interest of his distant principal, under the circumstances, had nevertheless gone beyond the letter of his instructions. But, as the coal was purchased for the principal, it belonged to him if he chose to accept it. If the price had risen, and Cross had sold it, Law might justly have claimed the profit; and when informed by his agent of what he had done, if the principal did not choose to affirm the act, it was his duty to give immediate information of his repudiation. He cannot, by holding his peace, and apparent acquiescence, have the benefit of the contract if it should afterwards turn out to be profitable, and retain a right to repudiate if otherwise.

The principal must, therefore, when informed, reject within a reasonable time, or be deemed to adopt by acquiescence. The rule is said to be a "stringent one upon the principal in such cases, where, with full knowledge of the acts of the agent, he receives a benefit from them, and fails to repudiate the acts." See Hoyt vs. Thompson, (19 N.Y., 218.)

Whether there was such acquiescence or not the judge left fairly to the jury.

III. The letter of Hackley was part of the res gesta, and properly admitted. The court instructed the jury that Mr. Law was bound by his advice or direction, because it was outside of his authority. The defendant cannot complain of this instruction.

IV. On the arrival of this coal at San Francisco the price of coal had fallen, and it became the interest of Law to have the loss thrown on Cross. Accordingly, Charlick, Law's agent to attend to his steamboats on the Pacific, assumed the power of repudiating the contract, and set up as a pretence that the coal was not good. As he refused to receive it, the coal was consequently sold for the benefit of whom it might concern, and bid in by Charlick for a sum which paid the freight only, leaving the price paid for the coal by Cross unpaid.

The court properly instructed the jury that the authority of Charlick, as shown, was not such as to authorize him to repudiate the purchase, leaving it to the jury to say, from the evidence, whether the defendant had communicated to Charlick any specific authority to reject the coal, and also whether the coal was of proper quality or not, and what was the contract, or whether there was any parole contract between Cross and Charlick.

There can be no error imputed to this instruction, except that the jury were left to presume a private instruction to Charlick, of which there was no evidence. But plaintiff in error cannot complain of errors in his favor.

These are all the material points in the case that were properly raised on the trial below, and it is not necessary to vindicate our decision by a more minute examination of the facts. The court below has given correct instructions as to the questions of law really involved in the case, and properly refused to confuse the case by a specific answer to each of the twenty-eight points. Those not answered in the instructions we have noticed were either answered affimatively or were wholly irrelevant.

Judgment of the Circuit Court affirmed.